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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2012

Solids Accumulation Scouting Studies

The objective of Solids Accumulation activities was to perform scaled testing to understand the behavior of remaining solids in a Double Shell Tank (DST), specifically AW-105, at Hanford during multiple fill, mix, and transfer operations. It is important to know if fissionable materials can concentrate when waste is transferred from staging tanks prior to feeding waste treatment plants. Specifically, there is a concern that large, dense particles containing plutonium could accumulate in poorly mixed regions of a blend tank heel for tanks that employ mixing jet pumps. At the request of the DOE Hanford Tank Operations Contractor, Washington River Protection Solutions, the Engineering Development Laboratory of the Savannah River National Laboratory performed a scouting study in a 1/22-scale model of a waste staging tank to investigate this concern and to develop measurement techniques that could be applied in a more extensive study at a larger scale. Simulated waste tank solids: Gibbsite, Zirconia, Sand, and Stainless Steel, with stainless steel particles representing the heavier particles, e.g., plutonium, and supernatant were charged to the test tank and rotating liquid jets were used to mix most of the solids while the simulant was pumped out. Subsequently, the volume and shape of the mounds of residual solids and the spatial concentration profiles for the surrogate for heavier particles were measured. Several techniques were developed and equipment designed to accomplish the measurements needed and they included: 1. Magnetic particle separator to remove simulant stainless steel solids. A device was designed and built to capture these solids, which represent the heavier solids during a waste transfer from a staging tank. 2. Photographic equipment to determine the volume of the solids mounds. The mounds were photographed as they were exposed at different tank waste levels to develop a composite of topographical areas. 3. Laser rangefinders to determine the volume of the solids mounds. The mounds were scanned after tank supernatant was removed. 4. Core sampler to determine the stainless steel solids distribution within the solids mounds. This sampler was designed and built to remove small sections of the mounds to evaluate concentrations of the stainless steel solids at different special locations. 5. Computer driven positioner that placed the laser rangefinders and the core sampler in appropriate locations over solids mounds that accumulated on the bottom of a scaled staging tank where mixing is poor. These devices and techniques were effective to estimate the movement, location, and concentrations of the solids representing heavier particles and could perform well at a larger scale The experiment contained two campaigns with each comprised of ten cycles to fill and empty the scaled staging tank. The tank was filled without mixing, but emptied, while mixing, in seven batches; the first six were of equal volumes of 13.1 gallons each to represent the planned fullscale batches of 145,000 gallons, and the last, partial, batch of 6.9 gallons represented a full-scale partial batch of 76,000 gallons that will leave a 72-inch heel in the staging tank for the next cycle. The sole difference between the two campaigns was the energy to mix the scaled staging tank, i.e., the nozzle velocity and jet rotational speed of the two jet pumps. Campaign 1 used 22.9 ft/s, at 1.54 rpm based on past testing and Campaign 2 used 23.9 ft/s at 1.75 rpm, based on visual observation of minimum velocity that allowed fast settling solids, i.e., sand and stainless steel, to accumulate on the scaled tank bottom.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2012

Chemical Differences Between Sludge Solids at the F and H Area Tank Farms

The primary source of waste solids received into the F Area Tank Farm (FTF) was from PUREX processing performed to recover uranium and plutonium from irradiated depleted uranium targets. In contrast, two primary sources of waste solids were received into the H Area Tank Farm (HTF): a) waste from PUREX processing; and b) waste from H-modified (HM) processing performed to recover uranium and neptunium from burned enriched uranium fuel. Due to the differences between the irradiated depleted uranium targets and the burned enriched uranium fuel, the average compositions of the F and H Area wastes are markedly different from one another. Both F and H Area wastes contain significant amounts of iron and aluminum compounds. However, because the iron content of PUREX waste is higher than that of HM waste, and the aluminum content of PUREX waste is lower than that of HM waste, the iron to aluminum ratios of typical FTF waste solids are appreciably higher than those of typical HTF waste solids. Other constituents present at significantly higher concentrations in the typical FTF waste solids include uranium, nickel, ruthenium, zinc, silver, cobalt and copper. In contrast, constituents present at significantly higher concentrations in the typical HTF waste solids include mercury, thorium, oxalate, and radionuclides U-233, U-234, U-235, U-236, Pu-238, Pu-242, Cm-244, and Cm-245. Because of the higher concentrations of Pu-238 in HTF, the long-term concentrations of Th-230 and Ra-226 (from Pu-238 decay) will also be higher in HTF. The uranium and plutonium distributions of the average FTF waste were found to be consistent with depleted uranium and weapons grade plutonium, respectively (U-235 comprised 0.3 wt% of the FTF uranium, and Pu-240 comprised 6 wt% of the FTF plutonium). In contrast, at HTF, U-235 comprised 5 wt% of the uranium, and Pu-240 comprised 17 wt% of the plutonium, consistent with enriched uranium and high burn-up plutonium. X-ray diffraction analyses of various FTF and HTF samples indicated that the primary crystalline compounds of iron in sludge solids are Fe 2 O 3 , Fe 3 O 4 , and FeO(OH), and the primary crystalline compounds of aluminum are Al(OH) 3 and AlO(OH). Also identified were carbonate compounds of calcium, magnesium, and sodium; a nitrated sodium aluminosilicate; and various uranium compounds. Consistent with expectations, oxalate compounds were identified in solids associated with oxalic acid cleaning operations. The most likely oxidation states and chemical forms of technetium are assessed in the context of solubility, since technetium-99 is a key risk driver from an environmental fate and transport perspective. The primary oxidation state of technetium in SRS sludge solids is expected to be Tc(IV). In salt waste, the primary oxidation state is expected to be Tc(VII). The primary form of technetium in sludge is expected to be a hydrated technetium dioxide, TcO 2 ⋅ xH 2 O, which is relatively insoluble and likely co-precipitated with iron. In salt waste solutions, the primary form of technetium is expected to be the very soluble pertechnetate anion, TcO 4 - . The relative differences between the F and H Tank Farm waste provide a basis for anticipating differences that will occur as constituents of FTF and HTF waste residue enter the environment over the long-term future. If a constituent is significantly more dominant in one of the Tank Farms, its long-term environmental contribution will likely be commensurately higher, assuming the environmental transport conditions of the two Tank Farms share some commonality. It is in this vein that the information cited in this document is provided - for use during the generation, assessment, and validation of Performance Assessment modeling results.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2019

Proposed Plutonium-Nickel Critical Experiment

The Los Alamos Critical Experiments Facility (LACEF) and subsequently its descendant, the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) located at the Nevada National Security Site, have been performing critical experiments for over 75 years. The work done continues to build upon lessons learned from the past. It also builds upon knowledge gained from past experiments. The LACEF and NCERC experiments “provide nuclear criticality benchmark data for a wide variety of fissile and non-fissile materials in all neutron energy spectra systems”. In 2014, a subcritical benchmark with plutonium surrounded by nickel was issued in the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP). Two years later, a new benchmark experiment was performed, commonly known as Subcritical Copper Reflected $\mathcal{a}$-Phase Plutonium SCR$\mathcal{a}$P. The uncertainties in the SCR$\mathcal{a}$P experiment were significantly reduced from the Pu-Ni experiment and the methods were refined. Additionally, a Pu-lead critical experiment was performed in 2017 which followed different methods and with different objectives. Now, an experiment is proposed that builds on both the subcritical nickel experiment and the critical lead experiment. The proposed experiment has interleaved nickel and plutonium, in a thermal arrangement. This particular experiment would support criticality safety at the Hanford Tank Farms, whose tanks contain a significant amount of nickel credited as a neutron absorber in the criticality safety evaluation.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2012

Hanford Technology Development (Tank Farms) - 12509

The mission of the Department of Energy's Office of River Protection (ORP) is to safely retrieve and treat the 56 million gallons of Hanford's tank waste and close the Tank Farms to protect the Columbia River. The millions of gallons of tank waste are a byproduct of decades of plutonium production. After irradiated fuel rods were taken from the nuclear reactors to the processing facilities at Hanford they were exposed to a series of chemicals designed to dissolve away the rod, which enabled workers to retrieve the plutonium. Once those chemicals were exposed to the fuel rods they became radioactive and extremely hot. They also couldn't be used in this process more than once. Because the chemicals are caustic and extremely hazardous to humans and the environment, underground storage tanks were built to hold these chemicals until a more permanent solution could be found. One key part of the ongoing work at Hanford is retrieving waste from the single-shell tanks, some of which have leaked in the past, and transferring that waste to the double-shell tanks - none of which have ever leaked. The 56 million gallons of radioactive tank waste is stored in 177 underground tanks, 149 of which are single-shell tanks built between 1943 and 1964. The tanks sit approximately 250 feet above the water table. Hanford's single-shell tanks are decades past their 20-year design life. In the past, up to 67 of the single-shell tanks are known or suspected to have leaked as much as one million gallons of waste to the surrounding soil. Starting in the late 1950's, waste leaks from dozens of the single-shell tanks were detected or suspected. Most of the waste is in the soil around the tanks, but some of this waste is thought to have reached groundwater. The Vadose Zone Project was established to understand the radioactive and chemical contamination in the soil beneath the tanks as the result of leaks and discharges from past plutonium-production operations. The vadose zone is the area of soil between the ground surface and the water table 200-to-300 feet below. The project tracks and monitors contamination in the soil. Technologies are being developed and deployed to detect and monitor contaminants. Interim surface barriers, which are barriers put over the single-shell tanks, prevent rain and snow from soaking into the ground and spreading contamination. The impermeable barrier placed over T Farm, which was the site of the largest tank waste leak in Hanford's history, is 60,000 square feet and sloped to drain moisture outside the tank farm. The barrier over TY Farm is constructed of asphalt and drains moisture to a nearby evaporation basin. Our discussion of technology will address the incredible challenge of removing waste from Hanford's single-shell tanks. Under the terms of the Tri-Party Agreement, ORP is required to remove 99 percent of the tank waste, or until the limits of technology have been reached. All pumpable liquids have been removed from the single-shell tanks, and work now focuses on removing the non-pumpable liquids. Waste retrieval was completed from the first single-shell tank in late 2003. Since then, another six single-shell tanks have been retrieved to regulatory standards. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2012

2020 Vision for Tank Waste Cleanup (One System Integration) - 12506

The mission of the Department of Energy's Office of River Protection (ORP) is to safely retrieve and treat the 56 million gallons of Hanford's tank waste and close the Tank Farms to protect the Columbia River. The millions of gallons of waste are a by-product of decades of plutonium production. After irradiated fuel rods were taken from the nuclear reactors to the processing facilities at Hanford they were exposed to a series of chemicals designed to dissolve away the rod, which enabled workers to retrieve the plutonium. Once those chemicals were exposed to the fuel rods they became radioactive and extremely hot. They also couldn't be used in this process more than once. Because the chemicals are caustic and extremely hazardous to humans and the environment, underground storage tanks were built to hold these chemicals until a more permanent solution could be found. The Cleanup of Hanford's 56 million gallons of radioactive and chemical waste stored in 177 large underground tanks represents the Department's largest and most complex environmental remediation project. Sixty percent by volume of the nation's high-level radioactive waste is stored in the underground tanks grouped into 18 'tank farms' on Hanford's central plateau. Hanford's mission to safely remove, treat and dispose of this waste includes the construction of a first-of-its-kind Waste Treatment Plant (WTP), ongoing retrieval of waste from single-shell tanks, and building or upgrading the waste feed delivery infrastructure that will deliver the waste to and support operations of the WTP beginning in 2019. Our discussion of the 2020 Vision for Hanford tank waste cleanup will address the significant progress made to date and ongoing activities to manage the operations of the tank farms and WTP as a single system capable of retrieving, delivering, treating and disposing Hanford's tank waste. The initiation of hot operations and subsequent full operations of the WTP are not only dependent upon the successful design and construction of the WTP, but also on appropriately preparing the tank farms and waste feed delivery infrastructure to reliably and consistently deliver waste feed to the WTP for many decades. The key components of the 2020 vision are: all WTP facilities are commissioned, turned-over and operational, achieving the earliest possible hot operations of completed WTP facilities, and supplying low-activity waste (LAW) feed directly to the LAW Facility using in-tank/near tank supplemental treatment technologies. A One System Integrated Project Team (IPT) was recently formed to focus on developing and executing the programs that will be critical to successful waste feed delivery and WTP startup. The team is comprised of members from Bechtel National, Inc. (BNI), Washington River Protection Solutions LLC (WRPS), and DOE-ORP and DOE-WTP. The IPT will combine WTP and WRPS capabilities in a mission-focused model that is clearly defined, empowered and cost efficient. The genesis for this new team and much of the 2020 vision is based on the work of an earlier team that was tasked with identifying the optimum approach to startup, commissioning, and turnover of WTP facilities for operations. This team worked backwards from 2020 - a date when the project will be completed and steady-state operations will be underway - and identified success criteria to achieving safe and efficient operations of the WTP. The team was not constrained by any existing contract work scope, labor, or funding parameters. Several essential strategies were identified to effectively realize the one-system model of integrated feed stream delivery, WTP operations, and product delivery, and to accomplish the team's vision of hot operations beginning in 2016: - Use a phased startup and turnover approach that will allow WTP facilities to be transitioned to an operational state on as short a timeline as credible. - Align Tank Farm (TF) and WTP objectives such that feed can be supplied to the WTP when it is required for hot operations. - Ensure immobilized waste and waste recycle streams can be received by the TF when required to support 2016 production of immobilized low-activity waste (ILAW). - Ensure the required baseline and additional funding is provided beginning in fiscal year 2011. - Modify TF and WTP contracts to adequately address this vision. The 2020 Vision provides a summary of strategies and key actions that optimize the approach to startup, commissioning, and turnover of WTP facilities. This vision focuses on the legally enforceable requirement to achieve the Consent Decree milestones of starting radioactive operations in 2019, and achieving initial WTP operations in 2022. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Evaluation of Electrical Resistivity Tomography to Monitor the Transport of Past Releases Beneath Tank Farms

Underground storage tanks at the Hanford Site, in southeastern Washington State, hold radioactive waste generated from four decades of plutonium production. The 149 single-shell tanks and the 28 double-shell tanks have all exceeded their initial design life of approximately 25 years. At least 67 tanks are assumed to have leaked in the past, resulting in radioactive releases into the vadose zone. Gamma ray logging within dry monitoring wells is currently the primary method for tracking the migration of leaked tank waste through the vadose zone. While this approach provides an accurate assessment of radioactive contamination, that information is only provided near (within ~1m) the borehole, leaving most of the vadose zone unmonitored, particularly the important region directly beneath the tank. This report describes a numerical study that investigates the feasibility and performance of time-lapse 3D electrical resistivity tomography (ERT) for long-term monitoring of a hypothetical tank waste location and migration through the vadose zone. ERT is a method of remotely imaging the bulk electrical conductivity (EC) of the subsurface, which is significantly impacted by the presence of conductive solid and liquid tank waste. The release of liquid tank wastes increases subsurface fluid conductivity and saturation over time, creating a target to use time-lapse ERT for long-term monitoring. Although the presence of metallic infrastructure can cause ERT interference, recent advancements in ERT data processing enable the deleterious effects of buried metallic infrastructure (e.g. pipes, wellbore casings, tanks) to be removed to better determine the liquid tank waste migration over time. Three hypothetical realistic scenarios were simulated in the ERT evaluation. The first two scenarios assume the same leak amount and rate (i.e., between 1/1/1951 and 12/31/1951 at the rate of 347 m 3 per year) but different leaky tanks. Scenario 1 assumes leaks under tank B-102, which is located on the edge of the B-tank farm and surrounded by a few metallic infrastructure including cased pipes/wells/tanks. Scenario 2 assumes leaks under tank B-108, which is located near the center of the B-tank farm and surrounded by larger amount of metallic infrastructure than B-102. Scenario 3 assumes the same metallic infrastructure as B-102, with a more recent contaminant leak that was simulated to have occurred between 1/1/2018 and 12/31/2023 at a rate of 1.89 m 3 per year. The leak time in Scenarios 1 and 2 corresponds to a historical overfill event in 1951 and Scenario 3 corresponds to a recent found tank leak in 2019. In each scenario, a “true” bulk EC model vs. time reflecting contaminant migration was generated. ERT data was simulated from these “true” bulk EC models and a time-lapse ERT inversion produced “imaged” bulk EC vs. time. Three electrode configurations in two, four and eight boreholes surrounding the leak tank were used in the ERT simulations in each scenario. These borehole configurations were considered logistically feasible and cost-effective for monitoring. The hypothetical ERT boreholes are assumed to have non-metallic casing. By comparing the “imaged” bulk EC with the “true” bulk EC, it was demonstrated that the three configurations of wells used (two, four, and eight wells) were able to successfully monitor the migration of tank leaks through the vadose zone, with bulk EC resolution increasing with the number of down borehole ERT arrays for all scenarios. Therefore, the use of eight boreholes to perform ERT monitoring beneath the tanks provided the best spatiotemporal information.

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DOE OSTI2020

IER-519 CED-2: Final Design for Thermal/Epithermal eXperiments (TEX) with Absorbers to Provide Validation Benchmarks for Hanford Tank Farms

The Hanford tank farms contain 56 million gallons of waste across 177 tanks. The primary criticality safety concern for the waste is the plutonium inventory in waste solids – approximately 670 kg in total. Criticality safety analysis credits the absorption and dilution properties of the large quantities of other elements (aluminum, chromium, iron, manganese, nickel, silicon, sodium, and zirconium) present in the waste. Of these, iron and manganese are by far the most significant neutron absorbers, particularly for the waste compositions of highest criticality safety concern. The criticality safety analyses at the Hanford Waste Treatment and Vitrification Plant (WTP) and the Savannah River tank farms also credit iron and manganese as the primary neutron absorbers to demonstrate subcriticality.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2014

ACTUAL WASTE TESTING OF GYCOLATE IMPACTS ON THE SRS TANK FARM

Glycolic acid is being studied as a replacement for formic acid in the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) feed preparation process. After implementation, the recycle stream from DWPF back to the high-level waste Tank Farm will contain soluble sodium glycolate. Most of the potential impacts of glycolate in the Tank Farm were addressed via a literature review and simulant testing, but several outstanding issues remained. This report documents the actual-waste tests to determine the impacts of glycolate on storage and evaporation of Savannah River Site high-level waste. The objectives of this study are to address the following: Determine the extent to which sludge constituents (Pu, U, Fe, etc.) dissolve (the solubility of sludge constituents) in the glycolate-containing 2H-evaporator feed. Determine the impact of glycolate on the sorption of fissile (Pu, U, etc.) components onto sodium aluminosilicate solids. The first objective was accomplished through actual-waste testing using Tank 43H and 38H supernatant and Tank 51H sludge at Tank Farm storage conditions. The second objective was accomplished by contacting actual 2H-evaporator scale with the products from the testing for the first objective. There is no anticipated impact of up to 10 g/L of glycolate in DWPF recycle to the Tank Farm on tank waste component solubilities as investigated in this test. Most components were not influenced by glycolate during solubility tests, including major components such as aluminum, sodium, and most salt anions. There was potentially a slight increase in soluble iron with added glycolate, but the soluble iron concentration remained so low (on the order of 10 mg/L) as to not impact the iron to fissile ratio in sludge. Uranium and plutonium appear to have been supersaturated in 2H-evaporator feed solution mixture used for this testing. As a result, there was a reduction of soluble uranium and plutonium as a function of time. The change in soluble uranium concentration was independent of added glycolate concentration. The change in soluble plutonium content was dependent on the added glycolate concentration, with higher levels of glycolate (5 g/L and 10 g/L) appearing to suppress the plutonium solubility. The inclusion of glycolate did not change the dissolution of or sorption onto actual-waste 2H-evaporator pot scale to an extent that will impact Tank Farm storage and concentration. The effects that were noted involved dissolution of components from evaporator scale and precipitation of components onto evaporator scale that were independent of the level of added glycolate.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2017

Investigation of Tank 241-AN-101 Floating Solids

Tank 241-AN-101 is the receiver tank for retrieval of several C-Farms waste tanks, including Tanks 241-C-102 and 241-C-111. Tank 241 C 111 received first-cycle decontamination waste from the bismuth phosphate process and Plutonium and Uranium Extraction cladding waste, as well as hydraulic fluid. Three grab samples, 1AN-16-01, 1AN-16-01A, and 1AN-16-01B, were collected at the surface of Tank 241-AN-101 on April 25, 2016, after Tank 241-C-111 retrieval was completed. Floating solids were observed in the three grab samples in the 11A hot cell after the samples were received at the 222-S Laboratory. Routine chemical analyses, solid phase characterization on the floating and settled solids, semivolatile organic analysis mainly on the aqueous phase for identification of degradation products of hydraulic fluids were performed. Investigation of the floating solids is reported.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2012

Tank Farms and Waste Feed Delivery - 12507

The mission of the Department of Energy's Office of River Protection (ORP) is to safely retrieve and treat the 56 million gallons of Hanford's tank waste and close the Tank Farms to protect the Columbia River. Our discussion of the Tank Farms and Waste Feed Delivery will cover progress made to date with Base and Recovery Act funding in reducing the risk posed by tank waste and in preparing for the initiation of waste treatment at Hanford. The millions of gallons of waste are a by-product of decades of plutonium production. After irradiated fuel rods were taken from the nuclear reactors to the processing facilities at Hanford they were exposed to a series of chemicals designed to dissolve away the rod, which enabled workers to retrieve the plutonium. Once those chemicals were exposed to the fuel rods they became radioactive and extremely hot. They also couldn't be used in this process more than once. Because the chemicals are caustic and extremely hazardous to humans and the environment, underground storage tanks were built to hold these chemicals until a more permanent solution could be found. The underground storage tanks range in capacity from 55,000 gallons to more than 1 million gallons. The tanks were constructed with carbon steel and reinforced concrete. There are eighteen groups of tanks, called 'tank farms', some having as few as two tanks and others up to sixteen tanks. Between 1943 and 1964, 149 single-shell tanks were built at Hanford in the 200 West and East Areas. Heat generated by the waste and the composition of the waste caused an estimated 67 of these single-shell tanks to leak into the ground. Washington River Protection Solutions is the prime contractor responsible for the safe management of this waste. WRPS' mission is to reduce the risk to the environment that is posed by the waste. All of the pumpable liquids have been removed from the single-shell tanks and transferred to the double-shell tanks. What remains in the single-shell tanks are solid and semi-solid wastes. Known as salt-cakes, they have the consistency of wet beach sand. Some of the waste resembles small broken ice, or whitish crystals. Because the original pumps inside the tanks were designed to remove only liquid waste, other methods have been developed to reach the remaining waste. Access to the tank waste is through long, typically skinny pipes, called risers, extending out of the tanks. It is through these pipes that crews are forced to send machines and devices into the tanks that are used to break up the waste or push it toward a pump. These pipes range in size from just a few inches to just over a foot in diameter because they were never intended to be used in this manner. As part of the agreement regulating Hanford cleanup, crews must remove at least 99% of the material in every tank on the site, or at least as much waste that can be removed based on available technology. To date, seven single-shell tanks have been emptied, and work is underway in another 10 tanks in preparation for additional retrieval activities. Two barriers have been installed over single-shell tanks to prevent the intrusion of surface water down to the tanks, with additional barriers planned for the future. Single and double-shell tank integrity analyses are ongoing. Because the volume of the waste generated through plutonium production exceeded the capacity of the single-shell tanks, between 1968 and 1986 Hanford engineers built 28 double-shell tanks. These tanks were studied and made with a second shell to surround the carbon steel and reinforced concrete. The double-shell tanks have not leaked any of their waste. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2012

Overview and History of DOE's Hanford Site - 12502

Hanford's DOE offices are responsible for one of the largest nuclear cleanup efforts in the world, cleaning up the legacy of nearly five decades of nuclear weapons production. Nowhere in the DOE Complex is cleanup more challenging than at the Hanford Site in southeastern Washington. Hanford cleanup entails remediation of hundreds of large complex hazardous waste sites; disposition of nine production reactors and the preservation of one as a National Historic Landmark; demolition of hundreds of contaminated facilities including five enormous process canyons; remediation of billions of gallons of contaminated groundwater; disposition of millions of tons of low-level, mixed low-level, and transuranic waste; disposition of significant quantities of special nuclear material; storage and ultimate disposition of irradiated nuclear fuel; remediation of contamination deep in the soil that could impact groundwater; decontamination and decommissioning of hundreds of buildings and structures; and treatment of 56 million gallons of radioactive waste in 177 large underground tanks through the construction of a first-of-its-kind Waste Treatment Plant. Cleanup of the Hanford Site is a complex and challenging undertaking. The DOE Richland Operations Office has a vision and a strategy for completing Hanford's cleanup including the transition to post-cleanup activities. Information on the strategy is outlined in the Hanford Site Completion Framework. The framework describes three major components of cleanup - River Corridor, Central Plateau, and Tank Waste. It provides the context for individual cleanup actions by describing the key challenges and approaches for the decisions needed to complete cleanup. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), as regulated by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology), is implementing a strategy to achieve final cleanup decisions for the River Corridor portion of the Hanford Site. The DOE Richland Operations Office (RL) and DOE Office of River Protection (ORP) have prepared this document to describe the strategy and to begin developing the approach for making cleanup decisions for the remainder of the Hanford Site. DOE's intent is that the Completion Framework document will facilitate dialogue among the Tri-Parties and with Hanford's diverse interest groups, including Tribal Nations, State of Oregon, Hanford Advisory Board, Natural Resource Trustees, and the public. Future cleanup decisions will be enhanced by an improved understanding of the challenges facing cleanup and a common understanding of the goals and approaches for cleanup completion. The overarching goals for cleanup are sevenfold. - Goal 1: Protect the Columbia River. - Goal 2: Restore groundwater to its beneficial use to protect human health, the environment, and the Columbia River. - Goal 3: Clean up River Corridor waste sites and facilities to: Protect groundwater and the Columbia River. Shrink the active cleanup footprint to the Central Plateau, and support anticipated future uses of the land. - Goal 4: Clean up Central Plateau waste sites, tank farms, and facilities to: Protect groundwater. Minimize the footprint of areas requiring long-term waste management activities. Support anticipated future uses of the land. - Goal 5: Safely manage and transfer legacy materials scheduled for off-site disposition including special nuclear material (including plutonium), spent nuclear fuel, transuranic waste, and immobilized high-level waste. - Goal 6: Consolidate waste treatment, storage, and disposal operations on the Central Plateau. - Goal 7: Develop and implement institutional controls and long-term stewardship activities that protect human health, the environment, and Hanford's unique cultural, historical and ecological resources after cleanup activities are completed. These goals embody more than 20 years of dialogue among the Tri-Party Agencies, Tribal Nations, State of Oregon, stakeholders, and the public. They carry forward key values captured in forums such as the Hanford Future Site Uses Working Group, Tank Waste Task Force, Hanford Summits, and Hanford Advisory Board Exposure Scenario Workshops, as well as more than 200 advice letters issued by the Hanford Advisory Board (http://www.hanford.gov/page.cfm/hab). These goals help guide all aspects of Hanford Site cleanup. Cleanup activities at various areas of the site support the achievement of one or more of these goals. These goals help set priorities to apply resources and sequence cleanup efforts for the greatest benefit. These goals reflect DOE's recognition that the Columbia River is a critical resource for the people and ecology of the Pacific Northwest. The 50-mile stretch of the river known as the Hanford Reach is home to the last free-flowing section of the river in the U.S. As one of the largest rivers in North America, its waters support a multitude of uses that are vital to the economic and environmental well being of the region and it is particularly important in sustaining the culture of Native Americans. Cleanup actions must protect this river. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Evaluation of Material Balance Approaches for Hanford Direct-Feed Low Activity Waste Processing - 20022

The Hanford Site has accumulated millions of gallons of tank waste from reprocessing spent fuel to recover plutonium, uranium, cesium, and strontium. The supernatant from the accumulated tank waste will be treated using a Direct Feed Low-Activity Waste approach. The supernatant will be treated to remove solids and cesium in the Tank-Side Cesium Removal process in the Hanford tank farm, then vitrified in a semi-batch process in the Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP). Currently, each batch of feed is sampled at three locations prior to being fed to the melter: the feed qualification tank in the Hanford tank farm as well as the concentrate receipt vessel (CRV) and melter feed preparation vessel (MFPV) in the WTP. The feed qualification sample is taken from a large batch of accumulated feed, only two to three samples are expected each year. Approximately 275 samples from the CRVs and 1100 samples from the MFPV are expected each year. An evaluation was performed to determine if a material balance based on the feed qualification sample could replace most of the sampling in the CRVs and MFPVs. The evaluation consisted of three elements: (1) determination of the practicality of using a material balance to estimate the stream composition of the CRV and MFPV contents, (2) evaluation of whether the material balance could be automated using the existing process control system, and (3) determination of the uncertainty in glass composition using the material balance approach. It is assumed that periodic sampling at the CRV and MFPV would be performed periodically to re-baseline the material balance, evaluations are in progress to determine the frequency of this periodic sampling. Process sample locations downstream of the melter were reviewed as well, but the partitioning of semi-volatile species in the melter was determined to preclude extending the material balance approach past the melter. It was determined that replacement of the CRV sample location was feasible and did not increase process uncertainty or significantly impact waste loading. Replacement of the MFPV sample was also determined to be feasible, but that measurement of the glass former chemical addition may be needed prior to addition of these chemicals to the MFPV. This measurement could be performed by an in situ laser-induced breakdown spectroscopy (LIBS) system. Limited tests were performed to evaluate LIBS for direct measurements of the low-activity waste melter feed. The use of a material balance would eliminate over 1200 samples each year if only 10% of the CRV and MFPV batches are sampled and could likely allow the WTP laboratory to operate on days only versus 24/7 operation. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2014

Joint US/Russian Studies of Population Exposures Resulting from Nuclear Production Activities in the Southern Urals

Beginning in 1948, the Soviet Union initiated a program for production of nuclear materials for a weapons program. The first facility for production of plutonium was constructed in the central portion of the country east of the southern Ural Mountains, about halfway between the major industrial cities of Ekaterinburg and Chelyabinsk. The facility now known as the Mayak Production Association and its associated town, now known as Ozersk, were built to irradiate uranium in reactors, separate the resulting plutonium in reprocessing plants, and prepare plutonium metal. The rush to production, coupled with inexperience in handling radioactive materials, lead to large radiation exposures, not only to the workers in the facilities, but also to the surrounding public. Fuel processing started with no controls on releases, and fuel dissolution and accidents in reactors resulted in release of about 37 PBq (1015 Bq) of 131I between 1948 and 1967. Designed disposals of low- and intermediate-level liquid radioactive wastes, and accidental releases via cooling water from tank farms of high-level liquid radioactive wastes, into the small Techa River caused significant contamination and exposures to residents of numerous small riverside villages downstream of the site. Discovery of the magnitude of the aquatic contamination in late 1951 caused revisions to the waste handling regimes, but not before over 200 PBq of radionuclides (with large contributions of 90Sr and 137Cs) were released. Liquid wastes were diverted to tiny Lake Karachay (which today holds over 4 EBq); cooling water was stopped in the tank farms. In 1957, one of the tanks in the tank farm overheated and exploded; over 70 PBq, disproportionately 90Sr, was blown over a large area to the northeast of the site; a large area was contaminated and many villages evacuated. This area today is known as the East Urals Radioactive Trace (EURT). Each of these releases was significant; together they have created a group of cohorts unrivaled in the world for their chronic, low-dose-rate radiation exposure. The 26,000 workers at Mayak were highly exposed to external gamma and inhaled plutonium. A cohort of individuals raised as children in Ozersk is under evaluation for their exposures to radioiodine. The Techa River Cohort consists of over 30,000 people who were born before the start of exposure in 1949 and lived along the Techa River. The Techa River Offspring Cohort consists of about 21,000 persons born to one or more exposed parents of this group - many of whom also lived along the contaminated river. The EURT Cohort consists of about 18,000 people who were evacuated from the EURT soon after the 1957 explosion and another 8000 who remained. These groups together are the focus of dose reconstruction and epidemiological studies funded by the US, Russia, and the European Union to address the question “Are doses delivered at low dose rates as effective in producing health effects as the same doses delivered at high dose rates?”

63 RADIATION, THERMAL, AND OTHER ENVIRON. POLLUTAN↗
DOE OSTI2013

Analysis Of 2h-Evaporator Scale Wall [HTF-13-82] And Pot Bottom [HTF-13-77] Samples

Savannah River Remediation (SRR) is planning to remove a buildup of sodium aluminosilicate scale from the 2H-evaporator pot by loading and soaking the pot with heated 1.5 M nitric acid solution. Sampling and analysis of the scale material has been performed so that uranium and plutonium isotopic analysis can be input into a Nuclear Criticality Safety Assessment (NCSA) for scale removal by chemical cleaning. Historically, since the operation of the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF), silicon in the DWPF recycle stream combines with aluminum in the typical tank farm supernate to form sodium aluminosilicate scale mineral deposits in the 2Hevaporator pot and gravity drain line. The 2H-evaporator scale samples analyzed by Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) came from the bottom cone sections of the 2H-evaporator pot [Sample HTF-13-77] and the wall 2H-evaporator [sample HTF-13-82]. X-ray diffraction analysis (XRD) confirmed that both the 2H-evaporator pot scale and the wall samples consist of nitrated cancrinite (a crystalline sodium aluminosilicate solid) and clarkeite (a uranium oxy-hydroxide mineral). On “as received” basis, the bottom pot section scale sample contained an average of 2.59E+00 ± 1.40E-01 wt % total uranium with a U-235 enrichment of 6.12E-01 ± 1.48E-02 %, while the wall sample contained an average of 4.03E+00 ± 9.79E-01 wt % total uranium with a U-235 enrichment of 6.03E-01% ± 1.66E-02 wt %. The bottom pot section scale sample analyses results for Pu-238, Pu-239, and Pu-241 are 3.16E- 05 ± 5.40E-06 wt %, 3.28E-04 ± 1.45E-05 wt %, and <8.80E-07 wt %, respectively. The evaporator wall scale samples analysis values for Pu-238, Pu-239, and Pu-241 averages 3.74E-05 ± 6.01E-06 wt %, 4.38E-04 ± 5.08E-05 wt %, and <1.38E-06 wt %, respectively. The Pu-241 analyses results, as presented, are upper limit values. These results are provided so that SRR can calculate the equivalent uranium-235 concentrations for the NCSA. Results confirm that the uranium contained in the scale remains depleted with respect to natural uranium. SRNL did not calculate an equivalent U-235 enrichment, which takes into account other fissionable isotopes U-233, Pu-239 and Pu-241. The applicable method for calculation of equivalent U-235 will be determined in the NCSA.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2013

Analysis Of 2H-Evaporator Scale Wall [HTF-13-82] And Pot Bottom [HTF-13-77] Samples

Savannah River Remediation (SRR) is planning to remove a buildup of sodium aluminosilicate scale from the 2H-evaporator pot by loading and soaking the pot with heated 1.5 M nitric acid solution. Sampling and analysis of the scale material has been performed so that uranium and plutonium isotopic analysis can be input into a Nuclear Criticality Safety Assessment (NCSA) for scale removal by chemical cleaning. Historically, since the operation of the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF), silicon in the DWPF recycle stream combines with aluminum in the typical tank farm supernate to form sodium aluminosilicate scale mineral deposits in the 2H-evaporator pot and gravity drain line.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2013

One System Integrated Project Team: Retrieval and Delivery of Hanford Tank Wastes for Vitrification in the Waste Treatment Plant - 13234

The One System Integrated Project Team (IPT) was formed in late 2011 as a way for improving the efficiency of delivery and treatment of highly radioactive waste stored in underground tanks at the U.S. Department of Energy's (DOE's) 586-square-mile Hanford Site in southeastern Washington State. The purpose of the One System IPT is to improve coordination and integration between the Hanford's Waste Treatment Plant (WTP) contractor and the Tank Operations Contractor (TOC). The vision statement is: One System is a WTP and TOC safety-conscious team that, through integrated management and implementation of risk-informed decision and mission-based solutions, will enable the earliest start of safe and efficient treatment of Hanford's tank waste, to protect the Columbia River, environment and public. The IPT is a formal collaboration between Bechtel National, Inc. (BNI), which manages design and construction of the WTP for the U.S. Department of Energy's Office of River Protection (DOEORP), and Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS), which manages the TOC for ORP. More than fifty-six (56) million gallons of highly radioactive liquid waste are stored in one hundred seventy-seven (177) aging, underground tanks. Most of Hanford's waste tanks - one hundred forty-nine (149) of them - are of an old single-shell tank (SST) design built between 1944 and 1964. More than sixty (60) of these tanks have leaked in the past, releasing an estimated one million gallons of waste into the soil and threatening the nearby Columbia River. There are another twenty-eight (28) new double-shelled tanks (DSTs), built from 1968 to 1986, that provide greater protection to the environment. In 1989, DOE, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the Washington State Department of Ecology (Ecology) signed a landmark agreement that required Hanford to comply with federal and state environmental standards. It also paved the way for agreements that set deadlines for retrieving the tank wastes and for building and operating the WTP. The tank wastes are the result of Hanford's nearly fifty (50) years of plutonium production. In the intervening years, waste characteristics have been increasingly better understood. However, waste characteristics that are uncertain and will remain as such represent a significant technical challenge in terms of retrieval, transport, and treatment, as well as for design and construction of WTP. What also is clear is that the longer the waste remains in the tanks, the greater the risk to the environment and the people of the Pacific Northwest. The goal of both projects - tank operations and waste treatment - is to diminish the risks posed by the waste in the tanks at the earliest possible date. About two hundred (200) WTP and TOC employees comprise the IPT. Individual work groups within One System include Technical, Project Integration and Controls, Front-End Design and Project Definition, Commissioning, Nuclear Safety and Engineering Systems Integration, and Environmental Safety and Health and Quality Assurance (ESH and QA). Additional functions and team members will be added as the WTP approaches the operational phase. The team has undertaken several initiatives since its formation to collaborate on issues: (1) alternate scenarios for delivery of wastes from the tank farms to WTP; (2) improvements in managing Interface Control Documents; (3) coordination on various technical issues, including the Defense Nuclear Facilities Nuclear Safety Board's Recommendation 2010-2; (4) deployment of the SmartPlant{sup R} Foundation-Configuration Management System; and (5) preparation of the joint contract deliverable of the Operational Readiness Support Plan. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2020

Effect of Nuclear Data Covariances on Integral Experiment Design with Sensitivity and Uncertainty Analysis

Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS) uses MCNP6.2 and the Whisper code for criticality safety analyses of the Hanford Tank Farm. Together the codes derive baseline upper subcritical limits (USLs) for the waste models using experimental benchmarks. Whisper returns higher USLs, i.e. , has less of a conservative penalty, when the neutronic similarity of the experimental benchmarks to the application is high. Unfortunately, few critical benchmarks have high similarity to the Hanford tanks. The waste in the tanks is highly dilute in plutonium and contains large masses of weakly neutron-absorbing elements like iron and manganese. Experimental benchmarks typically have low sensitivity to these absorbers because they are present as structural materials. Lacking similar benchmarks, new Thermal Epithermal eXperiment (TEX) configurations with high Pu content and interstitial iron absorbers have been designed for the criticality safety validation. The features of the design have been iterated upon to maximize the similarity between the experiment and different Hanford waste models. The similarity is quantified with sensitivity analysis and uncertainty quantification using the representativity coefficient, or c k . The representativity calculation requires nuclear data covariances, which may differ between nuclear data libraries and between library versions. Because of these variations, the optimal design may depend on the nuclear data covariances library. A scenario can be envisioned where an experiment is designed, and c k is maximized, with one set of covariance data. However, when the covariance data is changed, say from ENDF/B-VII.1 to ENDF/B-VIII.0, and the benchmark is used in a criticality safety evaluation, the experiment becomes suboptimal with respect to c k . In this paper, we present how the optimal design of the new TEX experiments varied depending on the nuclear data covariances used to calculate c k . We compare ENDF/B-VII.1 and ENDF/B-VIII.0, as if the library had been updated since the design of the experiment. Additionally, we use JEFF3.3 to simulate if the covariance data of a different library had been used. The results show that the covariances do have an important effect on the designs, less so for thermal systems (where the data are more consistent between evaluations) and more so for epithermal systems where more differences exist.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2014

Organic Separation Test Results

Separable organics have been defined as “those organic compounds of very limited solubility in the bulk waste and that can form a separate liquid phase or layer” (Smalley and Nguyen 2013), and result from three main solvent extraction processes: U Plant Uranium Recovery Process, B Plant Waste Fractionation Process, and Plutonium Uranium Extraction (PUREX) Process. The primary organic solvents associated with tank solids are TBP, D2EHPA, and NPH. There is concern that, while this organic material is bound to the sludge particles as it is stored in the tanks, waste feed delivery activities, specifically transfer pump and mixer pump operations, could cause the organics to form a separated layer in the tank farms feed tank. Therefore, Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS) is experimentally evaluating the potential of organic solvents separating from the tank solids (sludge) during waste feed delivery activities, specifically the waste mixing and transfer processes. Given the Hanford Tank Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) waste acceptance criteria per the Waste Feed Acceptance Criteria document (24590-WTP-RPT-MGT-11-014) that there is to be “no visible layer” of separable organics in the waste feed, this would result in the batch being unacceptable to transfer to WTP. This study is of particular importance to WRPS because of these WTP requirements.

complexants↗