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Department of Energy: Nuclear S&T workforce development programs

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) national laboratories use their expertise in nuclear science and technology (S&T) to support a robust national nuclear S&T enterprise from the ground up. Traditional academic programs do not provide all the elements necessary to develop this expertise, so the DOE has initiated a number of supplemental programs to develop and support the nuclear S&T workforce pipeline. This document catalogs existing workforce development programs that are supported by a number of DOE offices (such as the Offices of Nuclear Energy, Science, Energy Efficiency, and Environmental Management), and by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the Naval Reactor Program. Workforce development programs in nuclear S&T administered through the Department of Homeland Security, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the Department of Defense are also included. The information about these programs, which is cataloged below, is drawn from the program websites. Some programs, such as the Minority Serving Institutes Partnership Programs (MSIPPs) are available through more than one DOE office, so they appear in more than one section of this document.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

The future of RADCALC- the radioactive material and waste transportation software program - 15154

This paper provides a thorough review of RADCALC, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)-developed software tool to assist DOE sites in making radioactive material and waste packaging and transportation determinations in compliance with applicable Federal regulations and DOE Orders and Standards. There are more than 400 registered users of the RADCALC tool across the DOE complex. DOE has also authorized a limited number of users from certain universities and foreign countries. DOE periodically upgrades the software consistent with changing domestic and international requirements, as well as needs unique to DOE. Due to recent changes in regulatory requirements by the Department of Transportation (DOT), it is necessary that the current version of RADCALC should be updated in a timely manner. Prior to investing funds in software upgrades, DOE decided to evaluate the nature of changes required and level of operational support and looked for alternatives for meeting sites' operational needs. DOE formed a joint review team consisting of experts from Energy Facility Contractors Group (EFCOG) sites, commercial waste treatment facilities and the National Laboratories. This team evaluated the RADCALC software, commercially available software packages, and internal DOE site-developed programs against an established set of criteria. The team also reviewed and prioritized regulatory changes and user-recommended enhancements. Based on extensive review, the team recommended that DOE continue to support RADCALC noting that RADCALC is a cost-effective, technically robust tool that can perform complicated radioactive material shipping determinations. The tool promotes accuracy, consistency, and completeness between shipments by a single shipper, between shippers at a given site, and between sites. The isotopic coverage, decay algorithm and the range of calculations are without compare either within DOE or in industry in a tool of this kind. The team also recommended that DOE should actively promote RADCALC use throughout the DOE complex and consider cooperative arrangements with the Department of Defense or other government entities that may have similar needs. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Integrated program for department of energy environmental management office of soil and groundwater remediation - 15426

The subsurface problems that remain at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Environmental Management (EM) sites are technically complex and the costs to complete the cleanup mission are expected to range from $17 billion to $21 billion. There is growing recognition that conventional remedies will not meet regulatory goals at a number of sites and alternative approaches will be required. To address the challenge, the EM Office of Soil and Groundwater Remediation created an integrated program to develop innovative scientific and technical in conjunction with engagement of stakeholders, regulators, and the public. The integrated program provides a holistic approach to assess the risk associated with the remaining challenges facing EM and develop solutions that achieve remediation goals and protect human health and the environment. The integrated program uses a systems-based framework for achieving environmental remediation goals. The framework is based on developing and updating a site conceptual model and includes steps to 1) provide the technical basis for remedial actions, 2) assessments of potential remedies, and 3) implementation and management of remedies to achieve site restoration goals. The Office of Soil and Groundwater remediation defines research and development needed to successfully define and apply the framework. Research opportunities and targets are identified in characterization and conceptual model development, predictions of site conditions, remediation, monitoring, and remediation decision support. Characterization and quantification of key subsurface uncertainties is needed to support conceptual model development, identify contaminant source zones, quantify the flux of contaminants from source terms to points of compliance, and characterize controlling processes for remediation approaches including natural attenuation. Predictive analyses are needed to support development of remediation endpoints, select and design active and in situ or passive remedies, assess remedy performance, and predict long-term contaminant behavior for design of monitoring systems. Advancements are needed to support adaptive remediation approaches and to develop long-term contaminant management strategies for complex sites, such as effective in situ treatment methods for long-lived contaminants ({sup 99}Tc, {sup 129}I, U, Hg, etc.). Monitoring tools and approaches are needed to evaluate remedy performance and plume behavior and decision support methods are needed to quantitatively evaluate remediation alternatives. The Office of Soil and Groundwater Remediation leverages scientific understanding provided through partnerships with the DOE Office of Science, the Department of Defense, and Environmental Protection Agency. These partnerships are helping EM develop scientific understanding and technologies for implementing the assessment framework. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Estimating Fallout Building Attributes from Architectural Features and Global Earthquake Model (GEM) Building Descriptions

A nuclear explosion has the potential to injure or kill tens to hundreds of thousands (or more) of people through exposure to fallout (external gamma) radiation. Existing buildings can protect their occupants (reducing fallout radiation exposures) by placing material and distance between fallout particles and individuals indoors. Prior efforts have determined an initial set of building attributes suitable to reasonably assess a given building’s protection against fallout radiation. The current work provides methods to determine the quantitative values for these attributes from (a) common architectural features and data and (b) buildings described using the Global Earthquake Model (GEM) taxonomy. These methods will be used to improve estimates of fallout protection for operational US Department of Defense (DoD) and US Department of Energy (DOE) consequence assessment models.

42 ENGINEERING↗

SURF: Advances in the Incorporation of Sustainability Into Remedial Approaches - 16451

The inclusion of sustainability considerations in remediation cleanup process (investigation through site closure) benefits site owners, including Federal agencies such as the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Energy (DOE), through development of more efficient and cost-effective remedies as well as communities by considering socio-economic impacts and redevelopment into remedial decisions. The incorporation of social, environmental, and economic considerations early in the remedial process often enables achievement of regulatory site closure sooner and with broader community acceptance. In order to achieve these objectives, stakeholders, including federal facilities, regulators, contractors, and consultants, have expressed the need for case studies demonstrating successful implementation of sustainable practices. The Sustainable Remediation Forum emerged in 2006 and was established as a non-profit organization in 2010. Through exploration of technical issues such as groundwater conservation and reuse at remediation sites to life cycle assessment approaches, subject matter experts have led discussions across the industry of how the incorporation of sustainability into the remediation process can provide benefits through: - Consideration of socioeconomic impacts and drivers for remediation and redevelopment; - Reduced environmental impacts of remedial actions; and - Enhanced economic value through partnerships and informed decision making. Incorporation of sustainable remediation concepts provides distinct and recognizable value, as demonstrated through the technical initiatives of the Sustainable Remediation Forum, remediation industry conferences and events, and the prevalence of government agency and corporate sustainable remediation programs, such as the DOE's Cross-Programmatic Work Group. Sustainable remediation has evolved from discussions of environmental impacts of cleanups (with considerable green-washing), to quantifying and minimizing the environmental footprint and subsequent long term global impacts of a remedy, and currently, incorporating strategies to address all three components of sustainability - environmental, social, and economic. However, the practice of sustainability must continue to advance and new approaches should be adopted to holistically evaluate beneficial and detrimental impacts from the remedial process and incorporate sustainability concepts throughout the project life cycle. A more holistic and comprehensive approach, beyond the traditional paradigm of sustainable remediation, will lead a project team to achieve social and economic sustainability objectives of the community while protecting human health and the environment. This 'advanced' approach is where the most significant benefits will be achieved. Practitioners need documented, peer-reviewed, technically sound concepts and examples of sustainable remediation as supporting material to gain acceptance and approval of incorporation of best management practices and evaluation techniques. Reviewing the advancements of sustainable remediation over the last 5-10 years and the identification of lessons learned has great merit. This discussion of case studies will highlight successful incorporation of social impacts, economic analysis, and site redevelopment into the remedial process to provide a roadmap for site owners in developing sustainable approaches for their sites. Specifically, benefits were achieved in these case studies through promotion of economic development, innovative financing, incorporation of risk-based approaches, and consideration of social value of a site. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Licensing Challenges Associated with Autonomous Control

Very small special purpose reactors (SPRs), or microreactors at less than 50 MW electric, are under consideration by various entities for applications in remote installations and communities. These entities include remote municipalities, the US Department of Defense (DoD), and the US Department of Energy (DOE). SPRs or microreactors may be transportable from a factory with fresh fuel included to serve as a complete power battery. This type of plug-and-go resource requires inherently positive safety attributes and robust design. SPRs and microreactors are being designed to fulfill black-start or microgrid capabilities and to provide protection against severe natural phenomena or cyber security threats. These reactors would be available to operate for several years without a need to shut down for refueling.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Surrogate Post-Detonation Urban Debris (SPUD): Standard Reference Materials 4600 and 4601

If a terrorist nuclear explosion were to occur in the United States, high-quality (accurate and precise) legally defensible nuclear forensics measurements will be required to assure the certainty and confidence needed, for conclusions drawn from these data will be coupled with law enforcement and intelligence information for the purposes of attribution and retribution. Standard Reference Materials (SRMs)/Certified Reference Materials (CRMs) establish the traceability, accuracy, and precision of nuclear forensic measurements and provide the ability to benchmark measurement methods essential to meeting the requirements of legal scrutiny. Currently there is a critical shortage of key SRMs/CRMs required for accurate and precise measurements that are fundamental to nuclear measurements supporting pre- and post-detonation nuclear forensics. Supplies either do not exist, are not good enough, are in short supply, and/or are very expensive. The radionuclide measurement techniques and data quality objectives for pre- and post-detonation nuclear forensics are quite different than the applications for which the current suite of available SRMs/CRMs was developed. Specifically, 1) modern mass spectrometry methods have largely replaced traditional activity-based measurement methods for quantifying small quantities of long-lived radionuclides and most trace radionuclide SRMs/CRMs are certified for activity and are thus not adequate for current applications, 2) modern instrumental methods are capable of higher precision than historic measurement techniques, and in some cases exceed the precision of the available SRMs/CRMs, and 3) the quality assurance requirements for pre- and post-detonation nuclear forensics are such that the existing cadre of SRMs/CRMs does not adequately support the needs for method validation. There are numerous governmental stakeholders both within the US (DOE, DoD) and internationally (IAEA, JRC-ITU) whose missions are either directly involved with nuclear forensics measurements or rely on the forensic data obtained to make the exacting policy decisions (DOJ (FBI), DHS, CIA, DIA, DoD) associated with disrupting the production of illicit nuclear materials, interdicted nuclear materials or a nuclear/radiological detonation event. Starting in 2008 the DHS NTNFC, in collaboration with NBL and NIST, took on the production of suitable SRMs/CRMs for the pre-detonation nuclear forensics community. Two CRMs have been released since the start of this effort and two more are slated for completion in 2016. More recently, NIST, as a part of its mission as the US National Metrology Institute (NMI) to deliver standards (providing traceability) and foster homeland security, has launched the first certification campaign of a measurement traceable post nuclear detonation SRM. NIST, in cooperation with partner labs (AFIT (DoD), FBI (DOJ), and NPL) and with support from the FBI, has developed two Surrogate Post-Detonation Urban Debris (SPUD) Standard Reference Materials (SRMs) - SRM 4600 and 4601. These SRMs have been developed to simulate the expected debris mixture from the detonation of an Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) in an urban environment, which is capable of producing fresh fission as well as activation products. The elemental composition of the vitrified debris materials is a composite of minerals and metals characteristic of the concrete and steel, the building materials that would be exposed to a nuclear detonation and whose resulting activation products would be found in rubble samples collected for forensics evidence and attribution. Additionally, because post-detonation samples would also contain short-lived fission products, the debris materials have been doped with Uranium (U). To create the nuclear fission products, samples of the SPUD materials can be placed in a well-characterized nuclear reactor and exposed to a set neutron flux and energy, causing the encased U atoms to split and yield short-lived fission products. Because a known amount of U is added to the SPUD materials it is feasible to determine the concentration of the resulting fission products. The subsequent irradiated SPUD glass would be chemically similar to samples that would be generated in an actual detonation, and thus can serve as a standardized reference material for nuclear forensic post detonation measurements. (authors)

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗

SU-E-T-446: Evaluation of the Dosimetric Properties of a Diode Detector to Proton Radiosurgery

Purpose: To test the PTW PR60020 proton dosimetry diode in radiation fields relevant to proton radiosurgery applications and evaluate its suitability as a high resolution, real time dosimetry device. Methods: Data was collected using our standard nominal radiosurgery energies of 126 MeV and 155 MeV through a single stage scattering system, corresponding to a range of 9.7 and 15 cm in water respectively. Various beam modulations were tested as part of this study. Depth dose and beam profile measurements were completed with the PTW PR60020 dosimetry diode with comparative measurements using a PTW Markus ionization chamber and EBT2 Gafchromic film. Monte Carlo simulations were also completed for comparison. Results: The single 1 mm{sup 2} by 20 μm thick sensitive volume allowed for high spatial resolution measurements while maintaining sufficient sensitive volume to ensure that measurements could be completed without excessive beam delivery. Depth dose profiles exhibited negligible LET dependence which typically impacts film and other solid state dosimetry devices, while beam ranges measured with the PTW diode were within 1 mm of ion chamber data. In an edge on arrangement beam profiles were also measured within 0.5 mm full-width at half-maximum at various depths as compared to film and simulation data. Conclusion: The PTW PR60020 proved to be a very useful radiation metrology apparatus for proton radiosurgery applications. Its waterproof and rugged construction allowed for easy deployment in phantoms or water tanks that are commonly used in proton radiosurgery QA. Dosimetrically, the diode exhibited negligible LET dependence as a function of depth, while in edge on arrangement to the incident proton beam it facilitated the measurement of beam profiles with a spatial resolution comparable to both Monte Carlo and film measurements. This project was sponsored in part by funding from the Department of Defense (DOD# W81XWH-BAA-10-1)

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

AVANTech's Advanced Polymer Solidification for Radioactive and Mixed Waste Stabilization: Case Studies - 18571

This presentation describes recent developments in polymer technology, as well as summarizes several applications and the history of process improvements that simplify the process and improve the efficiency for stabilizing low and intermediate level radioactive and mixed radioactive/hazardous wastes. Polymer technology has been used successfully since the early 1990's to solidify and stabilize radioactive and mixed hazardous/radioactive waste at United States (US) Department of Energy (DOE), US Department of Defense (DOD), United Kingdom government sites, and at commercial nuclear power plants. It is an effective, efficient, and economical means of preparing waste for storage and disposal. Recently, polymer solidification has been combined with other waste pretreatment technologies, such as evaporator concentrate drying, to further enhance volume reduction and packaging efficiency. This presentation reviews applications of the technology and identifies waste streams where polymers have advantages over cement, vitrification, and other stabilization processes. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Summary of Booster Development and Qualification Report

This report outlines booster development work done at Los Alamos National Laboratory from 2007 to present. The booster is a critical link in the initiation train of explosive assemblies, from complex devices like nuclear weapons to conventional munitions. The booster bridges the gap from a small, relatively sensitive detonator to an insensitive, but massive, main charge. The movement throughout the explosives development community is to use more and more insensitive explosive components. With that, more energy is needed out of the booster. It has to initiate reliably, promptly, powerfully and safely. This report is divided into four sections. The first provides a summary of a collaborative effort between LANL, LLNL, and AWE to identify candidate materials and uniformly develop a testing plan for new boosters. Important parameters and the tests required to measure them were defined. The nature of the collaboration and the specific goals of the participating partners has changed over time, but the booster development plan stands on its own merit as a complete description of the test protocol necessary to compare and qualify booster materials, and is discussed in its entirety in this report. The second section describes a project, which began in 2009 with the Department of Defense to develop replacement booster formulations for PBXN-7. Replacement of PBXN-7 was necessary because it contained Triaminotrinitrobenzene (TATB), which was becoming unavailable to the DoD and because it contained Cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine (RDX), which was sensitive and toxic. A LANL-developed explosive, Diaminoazoxyfurazan (DAAF), was an important candidate. This project required any replacement formulation be a drop-in replacement in existing munitions. This project was timely, in that it made use of the collaborative booster development project, and had the additional constraint of matching shock sensitivity. Additionally it needed to be a safety improvement, and a performance improvement, especially at cold temperatures. The requirements of this project necessitated novel test development and a different approach to ranking booster qualities. Results of this project have been documented to the DoD and the relevant portions are included within. The third section of this booster report outlines testing related to main charge initiation merit. Initiability can be evaluated by looking at critical diameter, run distance, and shock sensitivity. Once a booster is initiated, it needs to be powerful enough to initiate the main charge symmetrically and evenly. Main charge initiability is evaluated directly by observing detonation wave symmetry, curvature, and first break out over the surface of a charge. Furthermore it must be insensitive to accidents and insults, and safe and reliable across a range of temperatures. These effects, tests, and results will be discussed individually in the context of DAAF and other explosives similarly tested. The last section provides a conclusion and summary of our experimental work and recommendations for the path forward. References and additional supporting documentation and results are provided in the appendices at the end of this report.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Implementing an Alternative Modeling Strategy for Closure of the Rainier Mesa Corrective Action Unit at the Nevada National Security Site - 17481

The strategy to close the Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain (RMSM) Corrective Action Unit (CAU) of the Underground Test Area (UGTA) Project at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) is defined under a joint agreement between the State of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) and the Department of Defense (DoD). That strategy required a corrective action investigation (CAI) to define the evolution of contaminated volumes of groundwater under uncertainty as a means to define a surface-projected contaminant boundary and serve as a basis for longer term monitoring. As the initial phase of the CAI was nearing completion in 2012, concerns were raised as to whether the original Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) strategy was achievable. This was evident when the complexity of the system and the additional costs required to sufficiently characterize it were judged to be out of balance with the overall perceived risks (low) associated with this particular CAU. As a result, an Alternative Modeling Strategy (AMS) and New FFACO Strategy Decision Process for UGTA RM/SM CAU were approved in November 2013. The AMS removes the requirement for developing ensembles of 3D contaminant transport simulations and replaces it with a simpler one requiring the generation of multiple 1D streamline models. These are meant to encompass a range of alternative, yet plausible release and transport scenarios as a means to bound the overall lateral extent of contaminant transport. The new Decision Process is streamlined and progresses from the revised CAI stage, to an external peer review, and then, upon favorable evaluation, directly to a closure stage. Although the project has suffered some delays from implementation of the new strategy, the new process of achieving closure is expected to save several years in time and several million dollars over the original process while still protecting human health and the environment over the 1,000-year compliance period stipulated in the FFACO. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Achieving the End State for the Pahute Mesa Corrective Action Units at the Nevada National Security Site - 20355

Underground nuclear testing at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) ended in 1992. To address the impact of radionuclide contamination from underground nuclear testing on the groundwater resources of Nevada, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Environmental Management (EM) Nevada Program created the Underground Test Area (UGTA) activity to characterize the radionuclides in groundwater, understand the nature and extent of radionuclide migration, and forecast the distribution of radionuclides in groundwater for 1,000 years. The UGTA activity is regulated by the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO), an agreement negotiated between the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection (NDEP), DOE, and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). DOE is close to achieving the end state (closure in place with monitoring and institutional control) for three of the five UGTA corrective action units (CAUs) on the NNSS. A number of challenges remain to achieve the end state of the other two CAUs, both located on Pahute Mesa. Pahute Mesa was the location of 82 underground nuclear tests, less than 10% of the total number of tests on the NNSS. Yet, Pahute Mesa contains slightly more than 60% of the total radionuclides (in curies). Based on groundwater sampling in monitoring wells, two radionuclide plumes have migrated several kilometers (km) in groundwater from selected test cavities and have crossed the boundary of the NNSS (yet remain within the boundaries of Federally controlled land). The path to achieve the end state continues to evolve as more data are collected and a better understanding of radionuclide migration in groundwater is developed. DOE has invested in drilling and sampling more than 50 characterization and monitoring groundwater wells over the past 25 years. The data indicate that the primary radionuclide of concern is tritium as it is about 89% of the total radionuclide inventory (in curies). As well, only tritium has been measured in groundwater outside of cavities at concentrations exceeding the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) standard. For one of the tritium plumes that has migrated across the NNSS boundary, the average rate of migration has been measured as about 45 meters (m) per year with the rate of migration at the leading edge of the plume of about 85 meters per year. At that rate of migration, the tritium plume will decay to safe levels and not reach the publicly accessible environment at concentrations above the SDWA standard. Other radionuclides, at concentrations below the SDWA standards, will be monitored to ensure they remain at safe levels. Consequently, the end state path forward for Pahute Mesa has evolved to take full advantage of the data from the monitoring network to constrain uncertainty in model forecasts and to reduce reliance on probabilistic simulations. The focus of the end state approach relies on developing a monitoring well network that is protective of human health by increasing confidence that no radionuclide plume in the groundwater will migrate undetected to the accessible environment, located about 22 km from the nearest up-gradient underground nuclear test. Using the measured data to remove uncertainty, the evaluation of radionuclide migration from Pahute Mesa is directed toward meeting the goals of the end state. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

From Bombs to Breast Cancer Imaging: Los Alamos National Laboratory

In the United States, one in eight women will be affected by breast cancer. According to the American Cancer Society, breast cancer is the most commonly diagnosed - as well as the second most fatal - cancer in American women. It is estimated that there will be nearly 200,000 diagnoses of breast cancer this year; more than 40,000 of these will be fatal. Although advances in medical technologies have greatly increased the odds of surviving the disease, the increase in screenings has not resulted in a significant reduction in the breast cancer mortality rate. Moreover, recent studies have even suggested that an increase in these methods might, in itself, cause cancer. A new tool for early detection and diagnosis of breast cancer, supported by an award from the Breast Cancer Research Program (BCRP) of the Congressionally Directed Medical Research Programs of Department of Defense, could give women a new advantage in the fight against breast cancer. This LANL-led project will integrate ultrasound tomography (UST) with recent discoveries in the field of cell and tissue biomechanics to improve breast cancer detection and characterization. UST uses ultrasound waves instead of X-rays to identify and characterize breast tumors. This technology reveals small mechanical-property changes within the breast. These changes are often the earliest signs of breast cancer. Additionally, UST is effective for women with dense breast tissue, who have a higher risk of developing breast cancer. Because the technology does not use radiation, UST can also be used as frequently as needed for women with a high risk of developing breast cancer. In contrast, mammography, the only routine breast-cancer screening tool currently available, is not effective for women with dense breast tissue and may come with unwanted side-effects caused by ionizing radiation. UST has great potential to become an alternative breast-cancer screening tool because of UST's advantages and benefits over mammography. Currently, there is fierce debate surrounding the age at which breast cancer screening should begin, and once begun, how often it should occur. The American Cancer Society recommends yearly mammograms starting at age 40. On the other hand, the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force recommends against routine so early. Rather, the Task Force recommends biennial mammography screening for women aged 50 to 74 years. The ten-year discrepancy in the onset of screening results from recent data suggesting that the frequent use of X-ray radiation during screenings could potentially increase the likelihood of developing cancer. This danger is increased by the low sensitivity and accuracy of mammograms, which sometimes require multiple screenings to yield results. Furthermore, mammograms are often not only inaccurate, but average appalling misdiagnoses rates: about 80% false positives and 15% false negatives. These misdiagnoses lead to unwarranted biopsies at an estimated health care cost of $2 billion per year, while at the same time, resulting in excessive cases of undetected cancer. As such, the National Cancer Institute recommends more studies on the advantages of types and frequency of screenings, as well as alternative screening options. The UST technology developed at LANL could be an alternative option to greatly improve the specificity and sensitivity of breast cancer screening without using ionizing radiation. LANL is developing high-resolution ultrasound tomography algorithms and a clinical ultrasound tomography scanner to conduct patient studies at the UNM Hospital. During UST scanning, the patient lies face-down while her breast, immersed in a tank of warm water, is scanned by phased-transducer arrays. UST uses recorded ultrasound signals to reconstruct a high-resolution three-dimensional image of the breast, showing the spatial distribution of mechanical properties within the breast. Breast cancers are detected by higher values of mechanical properties compared to surrounding tissues. Thus, high-resolution breast images obtained using LANL's novel UST algorithms have the potential to detect breast cancer at its earliest stage. The goal of this Multi-Team Award project is two-fold: (1) develop a novel, safe and cost-effective breast-imaging technique, and (2) improve the specificity and sensitivity of breast cancer imaging. The project is expected to integrate basic research with clinical studies, perform substantive cross-disciplinary training among scientists on the teams and involve participation of consumer advocates. Those involved in the project are optimistic about future developments.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

The Challenge for Arms Control Verification in the Post-New START World

Nuclear weapon arms control treaty verification is a key aspect of any agreement between signatories to establish that the terms and conditions spelled out in the treaty are being met. Historically, arms control negotiations have focused more on the rules and protocols for reducing the numbers of warheads and delivery systems - sometimes resorting to complex and arcane procedures for counting forces - in an attempt to address perceived or real imbalances in a nation's strategic posture that could lead to instability. Verification procedures are generally defined in arms control treaties and supporting documents and tend to focus on technical means and measures designed to ensure that a country is following the terms of the treaty and that it is not liable to engage in deception or outright cheating in an attempt to circumvent the spirit and the letter of the agreement. As the Obama Administration implements the articles, terms, and conditions of the recently ratified and entered-into-force New START treaty, there are already efforts within and outside of government to move well below the specified New START levels of 1550 warheads, 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles, and 800 deployed and nondeployed strategic launchers (Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) silos, Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) tubes on submarines, and bombers). A number of articles and opinion pieces have appeared that advocate for significantly deeper cuts in the U.S. nuclear stockpile, with some suggesting that unilateral reductions on the part of the U.S. would help coax Russia and others to follow our lead. Papers and studies prepared for the U.S. Department of Defense and at the U.S. Air War College have also been published, suggesting that nuclear forces totaling no more than about 300 warheads would be sufficient to meet U.S. national security and deterrence needs. (Davis 2011, Schaub and Forsyth 2010) Recent articles by James M. Acton and others suggest that the prospects for maintaining U.S. security and minimizing the chances of nuclear war, while deliberately reducing stockpiles to a few hundred weapons, is possible but not without risk. While the question of the appropriate level of cuts to U.S. nuclear forces is being actively debated, a key issue continues to be whether verification procedures are strong enough to ensure that both the U.S. and Russia are fulfilling their obligations under the current New Start treaty and any future arms reduction treaties. A recent opinion piece by Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft (2012) raised a number of issues with respect to governing a policy to enhance strategic stability, including: in deciding on force levels and lower numbers, verification is crucial. Particularly important is a determination of what level of uncertainty threatens the calculation of stability. At present, that level is well within the capabilities of the existing verification systems. We must be certain that projected levels maintain - and when possible, reinforce - that confidence. The strengths and weaknesses of the New START verification regime should inform and give rise to stronger regimes for future arms control agreements. These future arms control agreements will likely need to include other nuclear weapons states and so any verification regime will need to be acceptable to all parties. Currently, China is considered the most challenging party to include in any future arms control agreement and China's willingness to enter into verification regimes such as those implemented in New START may only be possible when it feels it has reached nuclear parity with the U.S. and Russia. Similarly, in keeping with its goals of reaching peer status with the U.S. and Russia, Frieman (2004) suggests that China would be more willing to accept internationally accepted and applied verification regimes rather than bilateral ones. The current verification protocols specified in the New START treaty are considered as the baseline case and are contrasted with possible alternative verification protocols that could be effective in a post-New START era of significant reductions in U.S. and other countries nuclear stockpiles. Of particular concern is the possibility of deception and breakout when declared and observed numbers of weapons are below the level considered to pose an existential threat to the U.S. In a regime of very low stockpile numbers, 'traditional' verification protocols as currently embodied in the New START treaty might prove less than adequate. I introduce and discuss a number of issues that need to be considered in future verification protocols, many of which do not have immediate solutions and so require further study. I also discuss alternatives and enhancements to traditional verification protocols, for example, confidence building measures such as burden sharing against the common threat of weapon of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism, joint research and development.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Closure Report for Corrective Action Unit 547: Miscellaneous Contaminated Waste Sites, Nevada National Security Site, Nevada

This Closure Report (CR) presents information supporting closure of Corrective Action Unit (CAU) 547, Miscellaneous Contaminated Waste Sites, and provides documentation supporting the completed corrective actions and confirmation that closure objectives for CAU 547 were met. This CR complies with the requirements of the Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order (FFACO) that was agreed to by the State of Nevada; the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Environmental Management; the U.S. Department of Defense; and DOE, Legacy Management (FFACO, 1996 as amended). CAU 547 consists of the following three Corrective Action Sites (CASs), located in Areas 2, 3, and 9 of the Nevada National Security Site: (1) CAS 02-37-02, Gas Sampling Assembly; (2) CAS 03-99-19, Gas Sampling Assembly; AND (3) CAS 09-99-06, Gas Sampling Assembly Closure activities began in August 2011 and were completed in June 2012. Activities were conducted according to the Corrective Action Decision Document/Corrective Action Plan (CADD/CAP) for CAU 547 (U.S. Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office [NNSA/NSO], 2011). The recommended corrective action for the three CASs in CAU 547 was closure in place with administrative controls. The following closure activities were performed: (1) Open holes were filled with concrete; (2) Steel casings were placed over vertical expansion joints and filled with cement; (3) Engineered soil covers were constructed over piping and exposed sections of the gas sampling system components; (4) Fencing, monuments, Jersey barriers, radiological postings, and use restriction (UR) warning signs were installed around the perimeters of the sites; (5) Housekeeping debris was picked up from around the sites and disposed; and (6) Radiological surveys were performed to confirm final radiological postings. UR documentation is included in Appendix D. The post-closure plan was presented in detail in the CADD/CAP for CAU 547 and is included as Appendix F of this report. The requirements are summarized in Section 5.2 of this report. The proposed post-closure requirements consist of visual inspections to determine the condition of postings and radiological surveys to verify contamination has not migrated. NNSA/NSO requests the following: (1) A Notice of Completion from the Nevada Division of Environmental Protection to NNSA/NSO for closure of CAU 547; and (2) The transfer of CAU 547 from Appendix III to Appendix IV, Closed Corrective Action Units, of the FFACO.

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Shock and Detonation Physics at Los Alamos National Laboratory

WX-9 serves the Laboratory and the Nation by delivering quality technical results, serving customers that include the Nuclear Weapons Program (DOE/NNSA), the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security and other government agencies. The scientific expertise of the group encompasses equations-of-state, shock compression science, phase transformations, detonation physics including explosives initiation, detonation propagation, and reaction rates, spectroscopic methods and velocimetry, and detonation and equation-of-state theory. We are also internationally-recognized in ultra-fast laser shock methods and associated diagnostics, and are active in the area of ultra-sensitive explosives detection. The facility capital enabling the group to fulfill its missions include a number of laser systems, both for laser-driven shocks, and spectroscopic analysis, high pressure gas-driven guns and powder guns for high velocity plate impact experiments, explosively-driven techniques, static high pressure devices including diamond anvil cells and dilatometers coupled with spectroscopic probes, and machine shops and target fabrication facilities.

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International Governmental Collaboration on Best Practice in Aging Infrastructure Management - 18027

Legacy nuclear sites in the US, UK and Canada are all facing a similar challenge of completing their operational and cleanup missions in parallel in a safe, efficient and cost-effective manner. Compounding the challenge is the fact that many important facilities are old with a significant level of deferred maintenance/capital needs, resulting in the need for a strategic approach to infrastructure management to ensure that maintenance and capital funding is directed at the highest priority items and that neither operations nor ongoing Decontamination and Decommissioning (D and D) activities are compromised. To help address this challenge, a Technical Information Exchange meeting was held in Ottawa, Canada in early June 2017 which brought together responsible parties from; - Government agencies including the UK Nuclear Decommissioning Authority (NDA), US Department of Energy Environmental Management (DOE EM), US National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd (AECL) and Canadian Department of Defense - Implementers and other Government entities including Savannah River National Laboratory, Idaho National Laboratory and Canadian Nuclear Laboratories (CNL) - Associations including representation on behalf of the Institute of Asset Management and; - Contractors including Mission Support Alliance, Mott McDonald, and Longenecker and Associates The objective of this meeting was to share information about respective 'best practices' and to begin to develop common approaches to the prioritization and management of aging infrastructure investment across the organizations. The exchange focused on identifying common critical issues which were discussed through a series of presentations and small group discussions. The outcome from the meeting was an improved understanding by all participants of the latest approaches being applied to Infrastructure Asset Management and the formation of four International Working Groups which now meet on a regular (4-6 week) basis to share lessons learned and to develop international best practice in their area of interest. This paper details; - the issues and challenges that were identified during the meeting - how these were assimilated and distilled into discrete areas to enable formation of specific Working Groups - progress made by the Working Groups to date. (authors)

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Execution of an Alternative Modeling Strategy for Closure of the Rainier Mesa Corrective Action Unit at the Nevada National Security Site - 19099

The Underground Test Area (UGTA) Project of the U.S Department of Energy (DOE) is investigating radionuclide contaminant movements in groundwater derived from a decades-long period of underground nuclear testing at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) to support regulatory corrective action and closure requirements. The project is built around an integrated campaign of drilling and sampling, data interpretation, computer modeling, and broader monitoring activities conducted under a joint Federal Facilities Agreement and Consent Order (1996 as amended) (FFACO) between the State of Nevada, the DOE, and the U.S. Department of Defense. The FFACO strategy is applied to individual Corrective Action Units (CAUs) that roughly envelop disparate geographic testing areas at the NNSS. The Rainier Mesa/Shoshone Mountain (RMSM) CAU is a geologically and hydrologically complex system lying in a remote up-gradient section of the NNSS. It was the site of 67 underground tests conducted between 1957 and 1992, 61 at Rainier Mesa proper, and 6 at Shoshone Mountain, isolated to its south. The original strategy to close the RMSM CAU required a simulation-based investigation to define the evolution of contaminated volumes of groundwater (in 3D) under uncertainty as a means to define a surface-projected contaminant boundary and to serve as a basis for longer term monitoring activities. Early models developed under this strategy proved to be quite complex and difficult to calibrate. Additional costs required to better characterize the system were judged to be out of balance with the low risks associated with this particular CAU. As a result, an Alternative Modeling Strategy (AMS) was adopted. The AMS removes the requirement for developing ensembles of 3D simulations and replaces it with a simpler one requiring the generation of multiple 1D streamline models. These are meant to encompass a range of alternative, yet plausible release and transport scenarios as a means to bound the overall lateral extent of contaminant transport. This paper will review the modeling approach developed under the AMS and its application to the Rainier Mesa portion of the CAU. Preliminary model results made under different parametric assumptions and boundary condition scenarios will be presented. Additional refinements of the model and its further application will be discussed. (authors)

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