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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Approach for Identifying IASMS Services, Functions, and Capabilities From Data Sources

Assuring safety in the NAS with the inclusion of new entrants that are part of Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) will require overcoming unique safety challenges that result from combining innovative technologies with novel airspace concepts for moving people and cargo using semi-autonomous/autonomous vehicles. Overcoming these AAM safety assurance challenges is the focus of the In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS). The IASMS Concept of Operations (ConOps) describes an interconnected set of services, functions, and capabilities (SFCs)designed to manage operational risks, identify unknown risks, and inform system design to mitigate risk. This paper describes a broad approach for identifying SFCs involving technology trends in research, assessment of known and unknown risks in safety reports, and causal and contributing factors in aviation accidents and incidents. This approach leverages these sources to identify potential SFCs that enable the Monitor, Assess, and Mitigate (M-A-M)functionality that represents the enabling framework of the IASMS.

Kyle Ellis↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

An Approach for Defining IASMS Services, Functions, and Capabilities

Assuring safety in the NAS with the inclusion of new entrants, such as Advanced Air Mobility (AAM), will require overcoming unique safety challenges that result from combining innovative technologies with novel airspace concepts for moving people and cargo using autonomous vehicles. The focus of the In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) is to overcome AAM’s safety assurance challenges. The IASMS Concept of Operations (ConOps) describes an interconnected set of services, functions, and capabilities (SFCs) designed to manage operational risks, identify unknown risks, and inform system designs. This paper describes an approach for defining SFCs based on technology trends in research, assessment of known and unknown risks in voluntary safety reports, and causal and contributing factors in aviation accidents and incidents. This approach would identify potential SFCs that further expand the Monitor, Assess, and Mitigate (M-A-M) functionality that represents the enabling framework of the IASMS. Safety implications that will result from integration of AAM in the transformation of the National Airspace System (NAS) were addressed in National Academies committees reports on AAM and IASMS. Development of a ConOps for IASMS was a top recommendation and can be represented as a reframing of safety assurance that builds on real-time alerting such as the Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System, and adds the more encompassing in-time temporal parameter in recognition of the different timelines for collecting and assessing safety data for risk mitigations. For example, mining for safety trends from data sources such as the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing system occurs over a longer time period. Research on AAM operations poses that SFCs can be designed to monitor the safety margin appropriate for AAM including with regards to the distance between current flight parameters and nominal ideal conditions. These in-time comparisons will become more complex as the density of operations increases at least in certain areas and can include planned and actual 4D trajectory, and in-time comparisons having implications on conflict modeling and prediction including expected and actual departure time, fix/waypoint crossing times, and arrival time. These comparisons would be integrated as part of SFCs that redefine and inform new safety margin. An increased safety margin improves management of operational risks while reducing the potential for anomalies. An increased safety margin also has implications for operator confidence in the certainty of its operations and trust in automation. Technology trends in research could be used to refine existing SFCs and define needs for additional SFCs that provide safety improvements to the design and operation of vehicles, airspace design, and operator performance requirements. NASA is developing innovative approaches to safeguard against major accidents and incidents that have occurred in the NAS and those anticipated with the inclusion of envisioned AAM operations. The innovations use operational performance data to monitor, detect, and predict flight variations exceeding safe nominal patterns, such as would be caused by navigational error, severe weather complications, or hijacking of UAS controls. These innovative approaches have high potential to prevent accidents and incidents in the new AAM era. It is anticipated that elements of the innovations will evolve into SFCs for the IASMS. Voluntary safety reports can be monitored to identify anomalies related to design or operational performance risks. Reports could be periodically monitored and assessed for specific topics. Reports might serve as weak signals or precursors indicative of emergent risk such as when combined with other safety information. The architecture could include SFCs that are based on voluntary safety reports recognizing the periodic temporal nature of data analysis. As previously mentioned, aviation accidents with their causal and contributing precursors can inform the need for SFCs in the IASMS. Accidents and incidents at San Francisco International Airport such as Asiana 214 and Air Canada 759 illustrate how combinations of different factors lead to increased risk. These types of precursors and different factors have implications on the types of SFCs that could be needed to monitor and manage different sources and types of design and operational risk. Continuing to assure the safety of AAM as designs and operations gain in complexity can be accompanied by defining SFCs that also increase in complexity. These SFCs can leverage information from findings and recommendations synthesized across on-going research, voluntary safety reports, and accident and incident reports. These SFCs can serve to refine accuracy of algorithms and resolve limitations with current practices. The IASMS architecture represents the framework for the SFCs and their critical role in safety assurance.

In-Time Aviation Safety Management System↗
NASA NTRS2018

Using ADOPT Algorithm and Operational Data to Discover Precursors to Aviation Adverse Events

The US National Airspace System (NAS) is making its transition to the NextGen system and assuring safety is one of the top priorities in NextGen. At present, safety is managed reactively (correct after occurrence of an unsafe event). While this strategy works for current operations, it may soon become ineffective for future airspace designs and high density operations. There is a need for proactive management of safety risks by identifying hidden and "unknown" risks and evaluating the impacts on future operations. To this end, NASA Ames has developed data mining algorithms that finds anomalies and precursors (high-risk states) to safety issues in the NAS. In this paper, we describe a recently developed algorithm called ADOPT that analyzes large volumes of data and automatically identifies precursors from real world data. Precursors help in detecting safety risks early so that the operator can mitigate the risk in time. In addition, precursors also help identify causal factors and help predict the safety incident. The ADOPT algorithm scales well to large data sets and to multidimensional time series, reduce analyst time significantly, quantify multiple safety risks giving a holistic view of safety among other benefits. This paper details the algorithm and includes several case studies to demonstrate its application to discover the "known" and "unknown" safety precursors in aviation operation.

aviation safet↗
NASA NTRS2015

Developing Probabilistic Safety Performance Margins for Unknown and Underappreciated Risks

Probabilistic safety requirements currently formulated or proposed for space systems, nuclear reactor systems, nuclear weapon systems, and other types of systems that have a low-probability potential for high-consequence accidents depend on showing that the probability of such accidents is below a specified safety threshold or goal. Verification of compliance depends heavily upon synthetic modeling techniques such as PRA. To determine whether or not a system meets its probabilistic requirements, it is necessary to consider whether there are significant risks that are not fully considered in the PRA either because they are not known at the time or because their importance is not fully understood. The ultimate objective is to establish a reasonable margin to account for the difference between known risks and actual risks in attempting to validate compliance with a probabilistic safety threshold or goal. In this paper, we examine data accumulated over the past 60 years from the space program, from nuclear reactor experience, from aircraft systems, and from human reliability experience to formulate guidelines for estimating probabilistic margins to account for risks that are initially unknown or underappreciated. The formulation includes a review of the safety literature to identify the principal causes of such risks.

Safety Performance Margin↗
NASA NTRS2005

On Space Exploration and Human Error: A Paper on Reliability and Safety

NASA space exploration should largely address a problem class in reliability and risk management stemming primarily from human error, system risk and multi-objective trade-off analysis, by conducting research into system complexity, risk characterization and modeling, and system reasoning. In general, in every mission we can distinguish risk in three possible ways: a) known-known, b) known-unknown, and c) unknown-unknown. It is probably almost certain that space exploration will partially experience similar known or unknown risks embedded in the Apollo missions, Shuttle or Station unless something alters how NASA will perceive and manage safety and reliability

Bell, David G.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Innovative Technologies for Efficient Pharmacotherapeutic Management in Space

Current and future Space exploration missions and extended human presence in space aboard the ISS will expose crew to risks that differ both quantitatively and qualitatively from those encountered before by space travelers and will impose an unknown risk of safety and crew health. The technology development challenges for optimizing therapeutics in space must include the development of pharmaceuticals with extended stability, optimal efficacy and bioavailability with minimal toxicity and side effects. Innovative technology development goals may include sustained/chronic delivery preventive health care products and vaccines, low-cost high‐efficiency noninvasive, non‐oral dosage forms with radio‐protective formulation matrices and dispensing technologies coupled with self‐reliant tracking technologies for quality assurance and quality control assessment. These revolutionary advances in pharmaceutical technology will assure human presence in space and healthy living on Earth. Additionally, the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations advocates the use of health information technologies to effectively execute all aspects of medication management (prescribing, dispensing, and administration). The advent of personalized medicine and highly streamlined treatment regimens stimulated interest in new technologies for medication management. Intelligent monitoring devices enhance medication accountability compliance, enable effective drug use, and offer appropriate storage and security conditions for dangerous drug and controlled substance medications in remote sites where traditional pharmacies are unavailable. These features are ideal for Exploration Medical Capabilities. This presentation will highlight current novel commercial off‐the‐shelf (COTS) intelligent medication management devices for the unique dispensing, therapeutic drug monitoring, medication tracking, and drug delivery demands of exploration space medical operations.

Putcha, Lakshmi↗
NASA NTRS1977

The squirrel monkey as a candidate for space flight

Because of its size and other unique diurnal-primate characteristics, the squirrel monkey is used in: (1) actual bioflight missions, (2) in laboratory tests designed to clarify the risks to man during launch and recovery as well as in hazardous spaceflight environments; and (3) in the acquisition of data on unknown risks encountered in long duration space exploration. Pertinent data concerning samiri sciureus as described in published and unpublished reports are summarized. Topics include: taxonomy, ethology, life history, sensory-learning-motor capabilities in primate perspective, anatomy and physiology (including homeostatic adaptation to stress), susceptibility to environmental hazards, reproduction, care and clinical management, and previous use in aerospace biomedical research.

Brizzee, K. R.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

HUMAN FACTORS AND BEHAVIORAL PERFORMANCE EXPLORATION MEASURES: ASSESSING ASTRONAUT RISK

INTRODUCTION: The Human Factors and Behavioral Performance Exploration Measures (HFBP-EM) suite is a set of standardized measures to assess behavioral health and performance risk related to future exploration class missions, and to support reduction of the Human Research Program’s (HRP) Behavioral Medicine (BMed), Team, Sleep, and Human Systems Integration Architecture (HSIA) risks. This presentation will provide an overview of the HFBP-EM program, describe its implementation across spaceflight analogs and the international space station (ISS), and discuss its applicability to audience members. TOPIC: HFBP-EM is a research program designed to develop a standard set of measures that can be used in space and space-analog research to characterize BMed, Team, Sleep, and HSIA risks. It is an ongoing research project that is used examine the validity and reliability of HFBP measures, as well as their shorter forms. It also serves as a test bed for HFBP measures being considered for the spaceflight standard measures. The suite of measures is used to test the efficacy of countermeasures. To date, HFBP-EM has been collected in Human Exploration Research Analogs campaigns 4 and 5, and the SIRIUS 19 mission in the Russian Ground Based Experiment Complex. A subset of the HFBP-EM suite was collected during spaceflight as part of HRP’s Standard Measures in Spaceflight Project. Data was collected from a total of 55 multinational astronaut and astronaut-like crewmembers (mean age: 39.5, SD = 7.6; 31% female; 91% with advanced degrees). Three broad categories of HFBP-EM measures and their relevance to HRP risks will be discussed: 1) surveys that assess team functioning (Teams risk) as well as mood and affect (Bmed risk), 2) performance-based tasks of cognitive functioning and operationally relevant performance (Bmed risk), and 3) physiological biomarkers of sleep (sleep risk) and heart rate (Bmed risk). We will provide an overview of the background of the HFBP-EM program, what the suite currently includes, and next steps in its future development. We will also discuss the application to aerospace practitioners and researchers. APPLICATION: Astronaut teams selected for future space exploration missions will face several challenges that pose significant yet still unknown risks to the behavioral health and performance of astronauts. The HFBP-EM suite provides a comprehensive assessment of behavioral health and performance in space analog and spaceflight settings. This suite can be applied to both operational and research settings to advance risk reduction research for long duration space exploration missions.

S T Bell↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Informing New Concepts for UAS and Autonomous System Safety Management using Disaster Management and First Responder Scenarios

As emerging flight operations become more prevalent and increasingly automated and distributed, the capabilities for managing safety of vehicles and operations will also need to evolve. To address this challenge, the National Academies has envisioned an In-Time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) capability for a wide range of aviation operations including current commercial operations as well as new entrants envisioned with advanced air mobility (AAM). The suite of IASMS services, functions, and capabilities (SFCs) would be implemented in a federated approach and would address trends as well as individual operations. Through predictive modeling and data analysis, IASMS is envisioned to identify arising risks so that they can be mitigated, in-time, before a safety incident occurs. IASMS and its requisite set of SFCs must leverage a wide range of information to perform. To better understand these new needs, FSF worked with the aviation and humanitarian communities to develop and validate scenarios that include traditional aviation operations and UAS operations intermingled as they are deployed for disaster management and first responder (DMFR) situations. The three scenarios developed include: • Post Natural disaster response, such as a hurricane, involving multiple parties utilizing traditional aviation and UAS to support rescue operations, surveil damage, and locate survivors needing assistance. • Wildfire fighting in remote locations with traditional aircraft for transport and fire-retardant delivery combined with UAS for surveillance of fire locations as well as to track individual firefighter locations. • Medical Operations and AAM in Urban Environments including passenger-carrying helicopters and AAM vehicles, medical missions (such as transport of radio-pharmaceuticals), and other UAS delivery operations (such as the delivery of defibrillators). Each scenario was developed and validated by representatives with expertise in humanitarian operations, urban and rural emergency response, air traffic management, UAS operations, and traditional flight operations. The scenario definitions address roles and responsibilities of individual actors, the appropriate utilization of UAS, and the actions taken by those actors to appropriately manage risks associated with the mission and environment. The risks to aviation traffic and to people on the ground explored included potential risks arising from incompatibilities in calculating reference altitudes (eg, differing uses of AGL, MSL, barometric, or GPS-derived values), loss of command and control (C2) communications, rapid changes in weather and winds, and physical interference. For each risk, IASMS SFCs were postulated in the context of monitoring services, risk assessment capabilities, and identifying appropriate mitigation strategies. The identified SFC capabilities were envisioned from known services postulated for IASMS and for UTM. For these unique environments, IASMS SFCs are needed to address conditions such as hazardous payloads, micro-climates and urban canyons, and the need to keep uninvolved air traffic out of the area where DMFR operations are being conducted. The second phase of analysis focused on inferring the specific information needs and the SFCs for IASMS, utilizing a structure of 16 information classes to organize requirements. For each of the risks identified in the workshops, it was postulated what data sources would be necessary to monitor critical aspects of the risk (eg, surrounding air traffic, ground population, terrain, etc). to be directly measured as well as data that would be derived, which implies additional SFCs for different actors to understand what information would likely be exchanged between parties. For an IASMS to be effective, additional research is needed to develop the advanced algorithms that can address the increasingly autonomous and complex operations in differing environments and to develop means of identifying unknown risks. Looking at these scenarios highlighted a number of research issues. These include the ability to quickly "cordon off" airspace thru temporary flight restrictions (TFRs) or other means, developing clear definitions to enable automation-based algorithms for prioritizing operations, defining airspace density metrics, standardization of altitude reporting, and establishing a basis for safety data metrics definition and collection. This paper seeks to outline the development of an IASMS in the context of the DMFR scenarios and resulting demonstrations. Utilizing this contextual approach, NASA will generate recommendations for an assured safety framework for AAM operations that enables AAM operations to safely access the NAS.

In Time Aviation Safety Management System↗
NASA NTRS2003

Past, Present and Future Trends for NASA's EEE Parts Program

The foundation of NASA's Electrical, Electronic and Electromechanical (EEE) parts program is standardization. Standardization helps to reduce the number of unknown variables present as a project or program progresses; unknown variables equate to unknown risk. NASA spacecraft are usually 'one-offs' or at least part of a very short run, and every new part that is used represents a risk that has to be understood and mitigated as necessary. This equates directly to time and cost. Standardization of component parts is used to provide a foundation of known, dependable, qualified parts upon which a safe, reliable system can be built. In addition, the evaluation and selection of parts for the standard parts list unifies the activity under one group of experts rather than having engineers on each project overlapping and duplicating efforts. Thus, the project support engineers are able to concentrate on understanding and mitigating the risks for the non standard parts required to meet specific requirements of their project. Rapid technology change is producing conditions that make any form of parts-based standardization increasingly difficult, particularly the use of Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) parts and assemblies. There are many complications to COTS-based standardization. COTS parts change rapidly and unpredictably, often have different characteristics fiom manufacturer to manufacturer, frequently are only available through distribution, have no universal specification and have variable and unpredictable radiation characteristics. This presentation will discuss some potential approaches to COTS parts standardization. Further into the future, in three to five years perhaps, the use of COTS boards and boxes will be extensive and standardization at these levels of assembly will be necessary. In five to ten years, most major spacecraft functions will probably be performed by COTS boards. How will this be achieved? What role will the parts engineer play, if any? This presentation will borrow from the lessons of the past to suggest some scenarios for the future.

Sampson, Michael J.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Interrelationships Between Receiver/Relative Operating Characteristics Display, Binomial, Logit, and Bayes' Rule Probability of Detection Methodologies

Unknown risks are introduced into failure critical systems when probability of detection (POD) capabilities are accepted without a complete understanding of the statistical method applied and the interpretation of the statistical results. The presence of this risk in the nondestructive evaluation (NDE) community is revealed in common statements about POD. These statements are often interpreted in a variety of ways and therefore, the very existence of the statements identifies the need for a more comprehensive understanding of POD methodologies. Statistical methodologies have data requirements to be met, procedures to be followed, and requirements for validation or demonstration of adequacy of the POD estimates. Risks are further enhanced due to the wide range of statistical methodologies used for determining the POD capability. Receiver/Relative Operating Characteristics (ROC) Display, simple binomial, logistic regression, and Bayes' rule POD methodologies are widely used in determining POD capability. This work focuses on Hit-Miss data to reveal the framework of the interrelationships between Receiver/Relative Operating Characteristics Display, simple binomial, logistic regression, and Bayes' Rule methodologies as they are applied to POD. Knowledge of these interrelationships leads to an intuitive and global understanding of the statistical data, procedural and validation requirements for establishing credible POD estimates.

Generazio, Edward R.↗
NASA NTRS2020

Artemis Sustained Translational Acceleration Limits: Human Tolerance Evidence from Apollo to ISS

The designers of the next generation of lunar landers may adopt novel, crew-body orientations outside of our flight history or applied to flight durations and environments outside of our experience. Current sustained translational acceleration requirements in NASA-STD-3001 are applicable only to crewmembers in a seated posture and are thus inadequate to address human tolerance in non-seated configurations. Initial designs for the Apollo Lunar Module (LM) included seats for both commander and pilot; however, these were subsequently removed from the vehicle due to mass constraints and a willingness to accept the unknown risks for short-duration missions given the limited human physiologic data at the time. In the years since Apollo, our evidence base has grown immensely. Initial Artemis mission timelines under consideration will be longer than the longest Apollo mission, by a significant margin, with timeframes more analogous to longer Space Shuttle missions. Given the incidence of postflight orthostatic intolerance following shuttle missions, a significant risk may exist for lander design(s) pursuing a standing crew configuration similar to Apollo LM. New sustained translational acceleration limits developed to address this risk are presented herein. These limits were derived from evaluations of Apollo biomedical and flight profile data during lunar descent and ascent operations, Soyuz and Space Shuttle flight profile and post-landing biomedical data, and analogue bed rest post-exposure data on orthostatic intolerance.

James M. Pattarini↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Multi-Class Anomaly Detection in Flight Data using Semi-Supervised Explainable Deep Learning Model

Identifying precursor for safety incidents in aviation data is a crucial task, yet extremely challenging. The main approach, in practice, leverages domain expertise to define expected tolerances in system’s behavior and alarm exceedance from such safety margins. However, this approach is incapable of identifying unknown risk and vulnerabilities. Machine learning has been long studied and deployed to identify precursors for such anomalies, with the great challenge of the need for sufficient labelled set of data to achieve a reliable and accurate performance. In this article, we develop an explainable deep semi-supervised model for anomaly detection in aviation, building upon recent advancements in the machine learning literature. The proposed model combines feature engineering and classification in the feature space, while leveraging all available data (labelled and unlabeled). Validating on two case studies of anomaly detection in take-off and landing phases of commercial aircraft, we show that our model is able to outperform state-of-the-art supervised anomaly detection model and reach significantly high accuracy and low false alarm with minimum amount of available labelled data.

Anomaly Detection↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Acquisition of and Access to Research Omics Data

Omics data are essential for understanding the myriad and complex effects of space environments on humans. To assure maximum benefit from these kinds of data, the NASA Human Research Program Data Management Plan stipulates that human omics data should be archived within and accessed through the NASA Life Sciences Portal (NLSP). The NLSP has the capability to acquire and provision access to omics (and other kinds of) research results for individual and ad-hoc groups of subjects at the direction of institutional review boards, or other authorizing bodies or individuals, per institutional, program and investigation-specific policies and procedures. However, because some single-subject omics data, like CT scans and other kinds of large, complex biomedical data, could be used to identify heretofore unknown risks to the subject’s health, or, in certain cases, be used to identify a subject, NASA Policy Directive 7170.1 describes various policies regarding the management of and access to “research genetic testing” data, which includes many kinds of omics data. For example, NPD 7170.1 prohibits access to human research genetic data by NASA personnel who make employment decisions for the subjects from whom the data were obtained. To meet the objective of acquiring research omics data for NLSP in compliance with the policies in NPD 7170.1 and other applicable NASA policies, we designed NOMADS (the NLSP Omics Multimodal Acquisition of Data System), a new component that supports the transfer of large research data files, including research genetic testing data, using one of several different transfer mechanisms. The choice of mechanism is made by the submitter of the data, with guiding information from the system, and is likely to often be determined in large part by the nature and source location of the data. For example, for small files where the source data files are not already stored in a cloud storage system, users are likely to prefer to transfer their data to the NLSP via a web browser. Conversely, for large sets of files already organized and stored in a cloud storage system, users may opt for NOMAD’s cloud-to-cloud transfer method. All omics datasets targeted for the NASA Life Sciences Data Archive must pass a variety of quality checks to ensure data integrity and adherence to the standards defined by the LSDA Data Submission Guidelines (DSG) (see https://nlsp.nasa.gov/explore/lsdahome/datasubmit). These include requirements that data are consistent with open standards established by the omics community. Non-compliant data will not be accepted however archivists are available to advise submitters on how to revise data submissions and re-submit until compliance is achieved. Following compliance with the LSDA DSG, omics data next undergo a variety of additional quality checks to ensure the data meet omics community standards. Domain specific Omics data quality control tools and techniques are continually evolving and linked to the advancements in omics assays utilized and thus, the tools and techniques utilized by the LSDA for data quality control and validation will need to be sustained accordingly. All human omics data will be access controlled according to the policies described above, and requiring IRB approval for any additional access grants once the data are acquired (including access for analysis using the NLSP workspace tools).

Omics↗
NASA NTRS2024

Acquisition of and Access to Research Omics Data

Omics data are essential for understanding the myriad and complex effects of space environments on humans. To assure maximum benefit from these kinds of data, the NASA Human Research Program Data Management Plan stipulates that human omics data should be archived within and accessed through the NASA Life Sciences Portal (NLSP). The NLSP has the capability to acquire and provision access to omics (and other kinds of) research results for individual and ad-hoc groups of subjects at the direction of institutional review boards, or other authorizing bodies or individuals, per institutional, program and investigation-specific policies and procedures. However, because some single-subject omics data, like CT scans and other kinds of large, complex biomedical data, could be used to identify heretofore unknown risks to the subject’s health, or, in certain cases, be used to identify a subject, NASA Policy Directive 7170.1 describes various policies regarding the management of and access to “research genetic testing” data, which includes many kinds of omics data. For example, NPD 7170.1 prohibits access to human research genetic data by NASA personnel who make employment decisions for the subjects from whom the data were obtained. To meet the objective of acquiring research omics data for NLSP in compliance with the policies in NPD 7170.1 and other applicable NASA policies, we designed NOMADS (the NLSP Omics Multimodal Acquisition of Data System), a new component that supports the transfer of large research data files, including research genetic testing data, using one of several different transfer mechanisms. The choice of mechanism is made by the submitter of the data, with guiding information from the system, and is likely to often be determined in large part by the nature and source location of the data. For example, for small files where the source data files are not already stored in a cloud storage system, users are likely to prefer to transfer their data to the NLSP via a web browser. Conversely, for large sets of files already organized and stored in a cloud storage system, users may opt for NOMAD’s cloud-to-cloud transfer method. All omics datasets targeted for the NASA Life Sciences Data Archive must pass a variety of quality checks to ensure data integrity and adherence to the standards defined by the LSDA Data Submission Guidelines (DSG) (see https://nlsp.nasa.gov/explore/lsdahome/datasubmit). These include requirements that data are consistent with open standards established by the omics community. Non-compliant data will not be accepted however archivists are available to advise submitters on how to revise data submissions and re-submit until compliance is achieved. Following compliance with the LSDA DSG, omics data next undergo a variety of additional quality checks to ensure the data meet omics community standards. Domain specific Omics data quality control tools and techniques are continually evolving and linked to the advancements in omics assays utilized and thus, the tools and techniques utilized by the LSDA for data quality control and validation will need to be sustained accordingly. All human omics data will be access controlled according to the policies described above, and requiring IRB approval for any additional access grants once the data are acquired (including access for analysis using the NLSP workspace tools).

Omics↗