URANIUM ACCUMULATIONS IN CASTING OPERATIONS
Uranium Accumulations in Casting Operations
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Uranium Accumulations in Casting Operations
In December 2017, unexpected accumulations of uranium were discovered in several locations throughout the casting process area at the Y-12 National Security Complex that subsequently placed casting operations on hold. The Y-12 uranium casting process takes place in enclosures and hoods, many of which are open to a large floor surface area that has limited visibility and access. At the time of discovery, there were no Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) analyses or limits for material accumulations in the casting processing areas. Due to changes in the operation of the casting process and invalid assumptions in the criticality safety evaluation, significant material accumulations were occurring inside the enclosures. The material accumulations were identified as a result of an extent of condition review from another process, and an occurrence report was filed. The NCS organization worked with Production and Operations personnel to identify additional areas of uranium accumulation in the casting area, which resulted in several iterations of cleaning and material collection. Following material recovery, a causal analysis was performed that identified several contributing factors that allowed the accumulations to go unnoticed. In order to resume operations, the criticality safety evaluation was revised to analyze and control uranium accumulations in the casting area. Additionally, improvements in nuclear material control and accountability (NMC&A) controls were required. Casting operations have since resumed with frequently required material collections, which have limited the amount of uranium material accumulation.
In December 2017, unexpected accumulations of uranium were discovered in several locations throughout the casting process area at the Y-12 National Security Complex that subsequently placed casting operations on hold. The Y-12 uranium casting process takes place in enclosures and hoods, many of which are open to a large floor surface area that has limited visibility and access. At the time of discovery, there were no Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) analyses or limits for material accumulations in the casting processing areas. Due to changes in the operation of the casting process and invalid assumptions in the criticality safety evaluation, significant material accumulations were occurring inside the enclosures. The material accumulations were identified as a result of an extent of condition review from another process, and an occurrence report was filed. The NCS organization worked with Production and Operations personnel to identify additional areas of uranium accumulation in the casting area, which resulted in several iterations of cleaning and material collection. Following material recovery, a causal analysis was performed that identified several contributing factors that allowed the accumulations to go unnoticed. In order to resume operations, the criticality safety evaluation was revised to analyze and control uranium accumulations in the casting area. Additionally, improvements in nuclear material control and accountability (NMC&A) controls were required. Casting operations have since resumed with frequently required material collections, which have limited the amount of uranium material accumulation.
Criticality Safety lessons learned in Uranium Chip Recovery, Briquettes, Reduction Sand Separator, Slag Accumulation, Holden Gas Furnace, and Accumulations in Casting Lines.
Uranium alloyed with 10 wt% molybdenum (U-10Mo) is a monolithic nuclear fuel relevant to the National Nuclear Security Administration’s nonproliferation efforts. Research has been underway to optimize processing techniques for the U-10Mo fuel. This study investigated the use of hot compression or “hot forging” on a thick (~1") cast and homogenized U-10Mo plate before standard hot and cold rolling procedures. After plates were cast and homogenized, six samples were cut and forged at 700°C at a strain rate of either 0.10 s –1 or 0.01 s –1 at six levels of reduction. After forging, all samples underwent hot and cold rolling followed by annealing to achieve a final foil thickness of about 0.0085". Samples were taken at each stage of the casting and thermomechanical processing to assess the microstructural evolution. Chemical composition, microstructure, and uranium carbide morphology are presented and assessed in this study. Upon hot forging, dislocations accumulate along the grain boundaries, which serve as nucleation sites for randomly oriented, strain-free grains during subsequent annealing steps. Hot forging and subsequent annealing produced very heterogeneous grain sizes. However, no molybdenum segregation was observed after forging. No obvious trend was observed between forging conditions (strain rate and reduction percentage) and the microstructure after final thermomechanical processing. Upon hot rolling to 0.04" and annealing (700°C for 45 min), the average grain diameters from OM was 17 ± 2 µm across the six different forged samples. The subsequent cold rolling to 0.0085" and then annealing (700°C for 45 min) resulted in an average of 13 ± 2 µm between the six samples. Thus, the starting, as-forged microstructure did not appear to significantly influence the final microstructure of the cold-rolled foil. These results will help with understanding and expanding hot working capabilities for thicker U-10Mo castings. They also provide useful information on the effects of hot forging and its potential use to minimize defects that can arise during subsequent hot and cold rolling procedures.