Human-Autonomy Teaming and Function Allocation
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Urban Air Mobility, Human Performance, Monitoring↗
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Ch. 12. A Theoretical Approach to Management of Limited Attentional Resources to Support the m:N Operation in Advanced Air Mobility Ecosystem
Advanced air mobility (AAM) technologies incorporate increasingly autonomous systems that allow fully remote, independent, and intelligent operation of air vehicles to support the transportation of goods and passengers within and across urban and rural areas. With a myriad of automated technologies enabling the AAM ecosystem, the human operator’s role will likely be a passive supervisory monitor of the air vehicles, involving increasingly fewer humans (m) that manage many more autonomous systems (N), or m:N operations. Unfortunately, the human performance literature suggests that human operators will exhibit poor supervision of numerous autonomous agents due to the limits of attentional resources in the operators. In the general human information-processing model, a human operator exercises a limited pool of attentional resources to engage various information-processing stages including detecting, perceiving, comprehending, and predicting objects around them. Yamani and Horrey (2018) expanded the human information-processing model to characterize a tradeoff between information-processing demand and resource relief that automation brings in the context of automated driving. In their model, a driver interacting with an automated driving system is assumed to reallocate resources “freed” by automation to support other information-processing stages required for successful task performance. A future AAM ecosystem enabled by an orchestration of advanced automated systems, however, requires a single operator to interact with more than one air vehicle with varying levels and degrees of automated systems, making the traditional framework of human-automation interaction insufficient. To address this gap, we provide a review of the literature on situation assessment and trust, two constructs identified as critical for a fuller understanding of intimate and intricate interactions between a human operator and multiple air vehicles equipped with increasingly autonomous systems. Then, we propose an expansion of Yamani and Horrey’s (2018) model to motivate systematic research on the human operator’s role, identify factors that influence resource allocation and guide human-centered design of an interface supporting the m:N operation in the AAM environment.
Advanced Air Mobility↗
Airspace Performance Observations of Scalable Autonomous Operations in a High Density Vertiplex Simulation
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’s) High Density Vertiplex (HDV) sub- project aims to develop and demonstrate progressive automation technologies that contribute to the Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) concept. Using Human-and-Hardware-In-The- Loop (HHITL) techniques, HDV demonstrates initial vertiport automation services at vertiports with increased air traffic volume in both simulated and live test environments. In 2023, the Scalable Autonomous Operations (SAO) simulation was conducted in which prototype vertiport, airspace, and ground control station technologies were assessed on technical performance. During the SAO simulation, an observational study captured an initial impression of the HDV airspace performance, potential disruptions to the airspace, and highlighted some capability and procedural gaps. Observations took place in two parts. In the first part, five scenario use cases (Nominal, Missed Approach, Speed Change, Divert, and Multi- Aircraft Divert) were conducted with three human operator roles (Vertiport Manager, Fleet Manager, and Ground Control Station Operator). Researchers collected metrics on throughput, closest point of approach, and airborne delay. In the second part of the study, the Missed Approach scenario was observed under three traffic density levels (20, 40, and 60 operations per hour) to challenge the automation to correctly identify slots in the vertiport arrival schedule. The results showed that the automation successfully found a slot for the Missed Approach vehicle in the 20 operations per hour condition, after some delay it found one in the 40 condition, and it did not find one in the 60 condition. The observations of technical and human performance throughout the five scenario use cases and the Missed Approach case study indicated that for HDV to increase traffic density and maintain or increase throughput, airspace monitoring services should be able to detect and resolve conflicts between aircraft. Furthermore, the roles and responsibilities of human operators need additional definition when it comes to responding to vehicle conflicts.
advanced air mobility↗
Safety Expertise and the Perils of Novelty
Emerging aviation markets such as urban air mobility are giving rise to new technologies and means of operation. However, novelty may hide ‘unknown unknowns,’ raising new hazards. This paper examines how expertise and safety techniques enable transformative technologies such as reduced crew operations, hybrid wing-borne and rotor-born flight, federated air traffic services, and urban operations. We explore how analysts use expertise to address common-cause failures, collect and interpret safety data, and perform exacting tradeoffs between dissimilarity, redundancy, independence, and diversity (human, process lifecycle, or otherwise) to ensure safety. When novelty is present, analysts might not possess the expertise needed to fully understand the implications of design decisions and tradeoffs being made, especially in early lifecycle phases, on emergent properties such as safety. Safety expertise must be carefully cultivated. The conflicting views of safety experts must be unpacked to identify the divergence in fundamental assumptions, models, means, and methods that may be causing them. Once systems venture beyond the basis of what safety expertise can reliably guarantee, projects take on risk that must be managed. The paper contains key takeaways and actionable recommendations for novel OEMs and regulators touching on topics such as robust monitoring; clear and transparent reporting; incremental approaches to fielding novel systems in hazard-rich, risk-tolerant environments; the cultivation of safety culture and expertise in an organization; and the use of scientific study to reduce epistemic uncertainty in novel operations with new technologies. Since excessive novelty in aviation can undermine the current foundation of safety, humility and incrementalism are necessary to enable emerging aviation markets safely.
safety expertise↗
Safety Expertise and the Perils of Novelty
Emerging aviation markets such as urban air mobility are giving rise to new technologies and means of operation. However, novelty may hide ‘unknown unknowns,’ raising new hazards. This paper examines how expertise and safety techniques enable transformative technologies such as reduced crew operations, hybrid wing-borne and rotor-born flight, federated air traffic services, and urban operations. We explore how analysts use expertise to address common-cause failures, collect and interpret safety data, and perform exacting tradeoffs between dissimilarity, redundancy, independence, and diversity (human, process lifecycle, or otherwise) to ensure safety. When novelty is present, analysts might not possess the expertise needed to fully understand the implications of design decisions and tradeoffs being made, especially in early lifecycle phases, on emergent properties such as safety. Safety expertise must be carefully cultivated. The conflicting views of safety experts must be unpacked to identify the divergence in fundamental assumptions, models, means, and methods that may be causing them. Once systems venture beyond the basis of what safety expertise can reliably guarantee, projects take on risk that must be managed. The paper contains key takeaways and actionable recommendations for novel OEMs and regulators touching on topics such as robust monitoring; clear and transparent reporting; incremental approaches to fielding novel systems in hazard-rich, risk-tolerant environments; the cultivation of safety culture and expertise in an organization; and the use of scientific study to reduce epistemic uncertainty in novel operations with new technologies. Since excessive novelty in aviation can undermine the current foundation of safety, humility and incrementalism are necessary to enable emerging aviation markets safely.
safety expertise↗
Airspace Performance Observations of Scalable Autonomous Operations in a High Density Vertiplex Simulation
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA’s) High Density Vertiplex (HDV) subproject aims to develop and demonstrate progressive automation technologies that contribute to the Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) concept. Using Human-and-Hardware-In-TheLoop (HHITL) techniques, HDV demonstrates initial vertiport automation services at vertiports with increased air traffic volume in both simulated and live test environments. In 2023, the Scalable Autonomous Operations (SAO) simulation was conducted in which prototype vertiport, airspace, and ground control station technologies were assessed on technical performance. During the SAO simulation, an observational study captured an initial impression of the HDV airspace performance, potential disruptions to the airspace, and highlighted some capability and procedural gaps. Observations took place in two parts. In the first part, five scenario use cases (Nominal, Missed Approach, Speed Change, Divert, and MultiAircraft Divert) were conducted with three human operator roles (Vertiport Manager, Fleet Manager, and Ground Control Station Operator). Researchers collected metrics on throughput, closest point of approach, and airborne delay. In the second part of the study, the Missed Approach scenario was observed under three traffic density levels (20, 40, and 60 operations per hour) to challenge the automation to correctly identify slots in the vertiport arrival schedule. The results showed that the automation successfully found a slot for the Missed Approach vehicle in the 20 operations per hour condition, after some delay it found one in the 40 condition, and it did not find one in the 60 condition. The observations of technical and human performance throughout the five scenario use cases and the Missed Approach case study indicated that for HDV to increase traffic density and maintain or increase throughput, airspace monitoring services should be able to detect and resolve conflicts between aircraft. Furthermore, the roles and responsibilities of human operators need additional definition when it comes to responding to vehicle conflicts.
Advanced Air Mobility↗
A Concept of Operations (ConOps) of an In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS) for Advanced Air Mobility (AAM)
The growth of new emerging operations involving Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) necessitates developing a perspective for an In-time Aviation Safety Management System (IASMS). This perspective advances from the National Academies report on IASMS and its recommendation for developing a Concept of Operations (ConOps) for IASMS. A ConOps has been developed for In-time System-Wide Safety Assurance (ISSA) from which the IASMS ConOps pivots to provide a robust scope commensurate with the broad vision defined by the National Academies. The IASMS ConOps focuses on emerging operations and spans innovations in Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) and an increasingly complex ecosystem comprised of a widening mix of vehicles and technologies, Urban Air Mobility (UAM) with industry-federated services, traditional operations, as well as new supersonic aircraft and space launch systems.The challenge for the IASMS ConOps is to be broad to encompass innovations in the coming years and decades while agile to ensure levels of safety compatible with operational and certification requirements of the National Airspace System (NAS). The IASMS ConOps interweaves increasing complexity of operational safety capabilities and unlocking UAS Maturity Levels (UMLs). The relationships between increased complexity of automation and automated systems, fewer operators who are not as traditionally higher skilled, more complex operational environments, and aviation operations management with mixed aircraft and equipage pose a multi-dimensional space for IASMS capabilities essential for safety assurance and risk management. Instantiating IASMS capabilities and how they would be integral to AAM operations and increasing maturity of UAM could be accomplished through a series of Safety Demonstrators. These Safety Demonstrators could provide increased understanding and insight into use of controls for risk mitigation, means of compliance for certification, and operational experience with safety services such as in relation to contingency management. The IASMS capabilities can be viewed as initially residing with the vehicle, airspace, and Supplemental Data Service Provider (SDSP). For example, vehicle capabilities include communications including the command and control link, Remote Identification (ID), conflict advisory/alerting, and UAS system monitoring. These capabilities monitor and assess data such as battery health, aircraft state, and human performance. Complexity of ISAMS capabilities depends on a number of factors. These factors are intendedonly as a notional categorization with the purpose being to reflect the complexity of the AAM ecosystem that would drive up the complexity of ISSA capabilities including systems, sensors, models, standards, and controls. Factors could include the Vehicle Flight Management, Environment, Airspace, and Contingency Management. Each of these factors can be comprised of multiple sub-factors that contribute to increasing complexity. For example, Airspace at a lower level of complexity could be dedicated to UTM operations that are unmonitored, and at a higher level of complexity could involve mixed UTM and ATM operations. The IASMS concept includes safety services that provide data and information to different participants in AAM. The roles and responsibilities of participants can be defined using the Responsible-Accountable-Consulted-Informed (RACI) analysis. For example, for the safety service involving the Remote ID, the Operator would be accountable for providing the data, the Vehicle would be responsible for transmitting it, and the USS, SDSP, Vertiports, FIMS (FAA), and Public Entities such as safety services would be informed by receiving the data. The IASMS ConOps identifies the capabilities needed for risk mitigation and safety assurance in the increasingly complex national airspace. The ConOps serves as a pathway for engaging with industry to gain operational experience including through the Safety Demonstrator series, the RACI analysis, and operational complexity factors. The ConOps serves to integrate these different perspectives to build a cohesive and cogent approach to an AAM safety management system.
In-Time Aviation Safety Management System↗
Designing for Advanced Aerial Mobility: Human-Autonomy Teaming and In-Time System-Wide Safety Assurance
The continued growth of aviation shall require new innovative technologies and operational concepts to meet the ever-increasing demands on air transportation. The NASA Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) project focuses on emerging aviation markets, such as Urban Air Mobility (UAM). UAM is defined as “...a safe and efficient system for air passenger and cargo transportation within an urban area. It is inclusive of small package delivery and other urban unmanned aerial system services and supports a mix of onboard/ground-piloted and increasingly autonomous operations” ([1]). The AAM project emphasizes technology development and validating system-level concepts and solutions in coordination with other NASA Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate (ARMD) projects to enable UAM metro- and micro-plex vertiport and airspace concepts of operations. The NASA AAM research portfolio includes the concepts of Remote Supervisor-in-Command (RSC) and Fleet and Airspace Manager (FAM) as possible human roles for consumer fleet providers. NASA research in RSC is focused on development of guidelines and standards for remote pilots/operators passively and actively controlling a large fleet of autonomous aircraft. For FAM, flight and ground system concepts and technologies to enable high density homogeneous operations at increased scale from vertiport(s), and coordination with other humans in the systems (e.g., UAM urban airspace manager, Air Traffic Control) are key research areas. The envisioned UAM operations are posited to require autonomous systems to enable functions ranging from fleet and resource management to vehicle control. Although automation has become increasingly sophisticated and ubiquitous in civil aviation, autonomy represents a significant evolution in automation, which has generally been limited in functional scope and capability. As autonomy takes on increasing responsibilities, humans and machines will be required to work together in new and different ways [2], rather than traditional design approaches focused on how machines (i.e., autonomy) can do the work of people. The emerging field of human-autonomy teaming (HAT) represents a comprehensive and prioritized research-driven approach to enable the success of future emerging aviation market applications through capabilities and principles that facilitate humans and machine working and thinking better together. The NASA Transformational Tools and Technologies (TTT) Autonomous System (AS) Sub-project was created to assist with the transition into higher levels of autonomy to enable new modes of air transportation, such as UAM. TTT-AS has identified HAT as a key research need to enable UAM while maintaining today’s ultra-safe aviation system safety levels. The latter challenge has been taken up by the NASA System-Wide Safety (SWS) Project, which recognizes that aviation safety, as it evolves, shall require new ways of thinking about safety to include integration of a wide-range of existing and new safety systems and practices, enhanced tools and technologies, increased access to data and data fusion, improved data analysis capabilities, enhanced in-time risk monitoring and detection, hazard prioritization and mitigation, safety assurance decision-support, and in-time integrated system analytics [3].The operational concept of UAM represents a variety of work that has been termed, “work-as-imagined” to characterize the idea that how people think that work is done and how work is actually done are often not the same [4]. To ensure design success and system safety, looking at “work-as-done” provides a comparative approach toward UAM concept and technology design through examination of corresponding analogs found today in aviation (e.g., on-demand operations) and other transportation domains (e.g., port operations). The paper shall discuss various alternative applications with specific focus on airline operation center (AOC) operations, and unmanned aerial system (UAS) command-and-control to inform scaled-versions of FAM and RSC, respectively, and with consideration of the national airspace system contextual environment. The tenets and principles of the HAT field and current NASA research efforts under the TTT-AS sub-project shall also be described. Finally, the SWS sub-project efforts to develop In-Time System-Wide Safety Assurance (ISSA) and In-Time Safety Management Systems (IASMS) are discussed in terms of how “in-time” safety assurance may be conceptualized for the on-demand mobility air taxi “work-as-imagined” operational concept [5]. As part of this effort, concepts from the emerging field of resilience engineering, are being studied. Traditional approaches to aviation safety have focused on what can go wrong and how to prevent it. Another approach to thinking about system safety should reflect not only “avoiding things that go wrong” (protective safety) but also “ensuring that things go right” (productive safety), that enables a system to exhibit the resilient performance [6] necessary for the success of the future aviation system emerging concepts of operations. The paper shall describe efforts focused on how productive safety and resilience may enable a more complete approach to system safety thinking and design of ISSA and IASMS for UAM. Future directions and research needs shall also be discussed.
resilience↗
The INSTEP Monitoring Network: Merging High-and-Low Cost Measurements to Characterize California Wildfires
Despite challenges with data quality and scope, low-cost sensor networks have skyrocketed in popularity over the last 15 years, making air quality data available on refined spatial scales. More recently, studies have leveraged both high and low-quality instruments to create stronger “hybrid” models, with most studies focusing on particulate matter. Low-cost measurements typically represent ground-level emissions only, providing context for human health issues from climate change-driven events such as wildfires. Since low-cost sensors’ capabilities are localized, daily events and microclimates tend to dominate the data rather than larger regional or atmospheric trends. Likewise, their low cost explains their high uncertainty. In contrast, some regulatory-grade instruments produce column measurements as well, providing reliable information on a broader scope. To bridge this gap while expanding into gas-phase measurements, we deployed 12 air quality sensor packages in California, USA during the 2022 wildfire season. These INSTEP (Inexpensive Network Sensor Technology Exploring Pollution) monitors measure carbon monoxide (CO), carbon dioxide (CO2), ozone (O3), nitrogen dioxide (NO2), and several hydrocarbons including methane (CH4) and formaldehyde (HCHO). Half of the monitors were co-located with remote sensing spectrometers: NASA Pandora and Total Column Carbon Observing Network (TCCON). The overlap in pollutants includes NO2, O3, and HCHO between the INSTEP monitors and the Pandora column measurements. TCCON covers column CO, CO2, and CH4, rounding out our comparison. Most of the monitors were distributed throughout the San Francisco Bay area, and an additional three were located within 100 km of Los Angeles. The sites ranged in geographic and population characteristics, including desert, mountainous, coastal, and urban locations. Since varying environmental conditions such as temperature and pressure are known to challenge sensor performance, we will apply newer sensor “calibration” techniques meant to combat this. We will normalize our sensor signals by z-scoring them prior to applying a single calibration model in the form of multivariate linear regression or an artificial neural network. While this technique has been validated for the hydrocarbon and ozone sensor types (metal oxide), it has not yet been tested on electrochemical and non-dispersive infrared sensors, which are also used in the INSTEP monitors. This will serve as a test to see if this normalization technique – or another – is most effective in accounting for environmental differences among sensors. Related data analysis efforts have found success with a variety of geospatial analysis techniques, including weighted network models in which high-quality instruments are given higher weights than their low-cost counterparts. Our preliminary analysis will focus on kriging, which uses a Gaussian algorithm to assign weights, providing estimated pollution levels at locations between monitors. Smoke trajectory and evolution will also be considered using both measurement types. We also aim to baseline subtract our emission estimates from each region to determine which portion of emissions are regional and local, further characterizing burn differences in northern and southern California fires. Future directions include using INSTEP jointly with TEMPO satellite data, and mobile deployments on aircraft and uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAV).
Low-cost sensors↗