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At least 19 records

Reliability Assessment of Remote Visual Examination

Remote visual testing (RVT) is a commonly used nondestructive examination method for inservice inspection (ISI) of reactor internals to detect cracking and gross component failures. Despite widespread use, the detection reliability of RVT and the factors that impact overall RVT performance have been unresolved issues. This report describes the results from an assessment sponsored by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and conducted by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, in cooperation with the Electric Power Research Institute, for evaluating the reliability of RVT methods currently being used for [reactor] in-vessel visual inspection. The goal was to assess the performance of commercially applied RVT examination procedures implemented by qualified personnel, as well as to identify and qualitatively assess enhancements to examination procedures for detecting flaws in test specimens. The assessment was performed over three phases of research, with the results of the first phase used to identify key controllable parameters impacting RVT performance and to design the next two phases (round-robin testing). Participants in the round-robin tests included teams of inspectors from commercial nuclear power ISI vendors. Participants were asked to determine if a specimen contained a crack and its approximate location, orientation, and length. The detection and location information were used to compute estimates of the probability of detection and false call probability for various scenarios such as the placement and orientation of the flaw on the specimen, team-to-team variations in detection performance, and effects of secondary review on RVT detection. Results showed that crack opening displacement (COD) is the dominant factor in the reliability of crack detection using commercially applied RVT procedures, with crack length being weakly correlated with detection probability. The implication is that RVT detection is likely heavily dependent on the contrast produced by the crack opening, with crack detection becoming less reliable as the COD decreases. Further, the results indicated RVT will be challenged when cracks are located in the vicinity of surface features such as scratches or weld ripples, or close to the edge of welds where shadowing and/or the presence of weld undercuts may complicate the ability to detect the crack. The assessment also reinforced earlier findings on the importance of lighting in flaw detection and appeared to align with other studies that find improved reliability when using multiple inspectors or analysts. Finally, the results pointed to the importance of practice with specimens that mimic conditions likely to be found in the field. Based on the findings and limitations of the assessment, a number of recommendations are made regarding best practices for improving the reliability of RVT in a field setting and for addressing remaining informational gaps. This report describes the design and noted limitations of the three phases of research, the analysis methodology for each phase, and the results of the research. The results of this assessment provide a benchmark set of data on the reliability of RVT for detecting cracking, assuming the implementation of field-like inspection procedures. The likely impact of several uncontrolled factors on RVT detection performance are discussed, and recommendations regarding the use of these results to assess field performance are provided. Finally, recent advances in RVT technology are briefly discussed and point to the potential need for continued research to evaluate the capability and effectiveness of the technique as improvements are implemented.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Visual Examination of Aluminum Containers for Extended Wet Storage of Non-Aluminum-Clad Spent Nuclear Fuel (FY 2021)

The goal of the Augmented Monitoring and Condition Assessment Program (AMCAP) program is to provide a condition assessment of the storage containers for non-aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (NASNF) in L Basin and demonstrate continued safe storage of all NASNF pending retrieval for ultimate disposition. The storage configuration of NASNF is vulnerable to inside-out corrosion attack. The approach being used in AMCAP is to develop and deploy examination methods for remote, in-situ inspection of the bundle storage in VTS and for OSC storage in the OSC racks. A method for Visual Examination (VE) using video-recording cameras was readied as part of the full-scale mockup development, and was deployed in L Basin for the initial condition assessment work. This report describes the development and the deployment of the VE for inspection of selected bundles in L Basin. The first deployment of the VE system was for visually examining five spent fuel bundles. Bundles were chosen based on their vulnerability in terms of inner fuel contents, history, storage duration, storage configuration, and possibility of inside out corrosion due to galvanic coupling of fuel cladding with the aluminum bundle wall.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

3013 DE Inner Container Closure Weld Corrosion Evaluation

Destructive evaluation (DE) of 3013 containers is one part of the U. S. Department of Energy Integrated Surveillance Program. During standard DE of 3013 containers, visual examinations for pitting and stress corrosion cracking (SCC) are performed on the accessible surfaces of the outer, inner, and convenience containers, which make up the 3013 container. As a result of 3013 DE additional analysis, the area near the inner container closure weld has been identified as being a region of increased corrosion susceptibility, which may provide a pathway for corrosive gases to the outer container. This area has a higher residual stress, an altered microstructure, and less corrosion resistant weld oxides as a result of the welding process as well as a lower temperature than other areas of the container, which may increase the absorption of moisture on the surface. The deposition of moisture in this stressed region could lead to pitting and stress corrosion cracking. During FY2013, the inner container closure weld area was more closely evaluated on several archived samples from DE containers. These containers included FY09 DE2, FY12 DE4, FY12 DE6 and FY12 DE7 and the Hanford High Moisture Container. The additional examinations included visual observations with a stereomicroscope, scanning electron microscopy along with energy dispersive spectroscopy for chemical analysis, and serial metallography of the sidewall and lid that are part of the inner container closure weld region. Pitting was observed in all the samples taken from the closure weld regions of the examined inner containers. This pitting was generally less 20 µm with most less than 5µm. These pits were similar in depth to those observed in the vapor exposed surfaces of teardrops in the shelf life corrosion testing. Cracking was not observed on either the vapor-exposed surfaces of the teardrop coupons or the inner container closure weld region. Further testing is necessary to determine if the conditions in the welded inner container could support SCC during the 50 year life time for the 3013 container.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

Post-Irradiation Non-Destructive Analyses of the AFIP-7 Experiment

This paper reports the results and interpretation of post-irradiation non-destructive examinations performed on four curved full-size fuel plates that comprise the AFIP-7 experiment. These fuel plates, having a U-10 wt.%Mo monolithic design, were irradiated under moderate operating conditions in the Advanced Test Reactor to assess fuel performance for geometries that are prototypic of research reactor fuel assemblies. Non-destructive examinations include visual examination, neutron radiography, profilometry, and precision gamma scanning. This article evaluates the qualitative and quantitative data taken for each plate, compares corresponding data sets, and presents the results of swelling analyses. Finally, these characterization results demonstrate that the fuel meets established irradiation performance requirements for mechanical integrity, geometric stability, and stable and predictable behavior.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

The role of acceptable knowledge in transuranic waste disposal operations - 11117

The Acceptable Knowledge (AK) process plays a key role in the delineation of waste streams destined for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP). General Electric's Vallecitos Nuclear Center (GEVNC) provides for an ideal case study of the application of AK in a multiple steward environment. In this review we will elucidate the pivotal role Acceptable Knowledge played in segregating Department of Energy (DOE) responsibilities from a commercial facility. The Acceptable Knowledge process is a necessary component of waste characterization that determines whether or not a waste stream may be considered for disposal at the WIPP site. This process may be thought of as an effort to gain a thorough understanding of the waste origin, chemical content, and physical form gleaned by the collection of documentation that concerns generator/storage site history, mission, and operations; in addition to waste stream specific information which includes the waste generation process, the waste matrix, the quantity of waste concerned, and the radiological and chemical make up of the waste. The collection and dissemination of relevant documentation is the fundamental requirement for the AK process to work. Acceptable Knowledge is the predominant process of characterization and, therefore, a crucial part of WIPP's transuranic waste characterization program. This characterization process, when conducted to the standards set forth in WIPP's operating permit, requires confirmation/verification by physical techniques such as Non-Destructive Examination (NDE), Visual Examination (VE), and Non-Destructive Assay (NDA). These physical characterization techniques may vary in their appropriateness for a given waste stream; however, nothing will allow the substitution or exclusion of AK. Beyond the normal scope of operations, AK may be considered, when appropriate, a surrogate for the physical characterization techniques in a procedure that appeals to concepts such As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) and budgetary savings. This substitution is referred to as an Acceptable Knowledge Sufficiency Determination. With a Sufficiency Determination Request, AK may supplant the need for one or all of the physical analysis methods. This powerful procedure may be used on a scale as small as a single container to that of a vast waste stream. Only under the most stringent requirements will an AK Sufficiency Determination be approved by the regulators and, to date, only six such Sufficiency Determinations have been approved. Although Acceptable Knowledge is legislated into the operational procedures of the WIPP facility there is more to it than compliance. AK is not merely one of a long list of requirements in the characterization and verification of transuranic (TRU) waste destined for the WIPP. Acceptable Knowledge goes beyond the regulatory threshold by offering a way to reduce risk, cost, time, and uncertainty on its own laurels. Therefore, AK alone can be argued superior to any other waste characterization technique.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

AFIP-7 Post-irradiation Examination Summary Report

The following report contains the results and conclusions from post irradiation examinations performed on the fuel plates irradiated as part of the AFIP-7 experiment, the first test of base monolithic fuel in a fuel assembly consisting of curved, constrained fuel plates. These examinations include visual examination; eddy-current testing to measure oxide growth; profilometry to measure dimensional changes of the fuel plates; neutron radiography for evaluating fuel condition prior to sectioning; gamma scanning to provide relative measurements of burn-up and indication of fission-product relocation; analytical chemistry to benchmark the physics burn-up calculations; metallographic examination to identify microstructural changes in the fuel, interlayer and cladding; and blister threshold testing. These characterization activities were conducted to demonstrate that the fuel meets irradiation performance requirements for mechanical integrity, geometric stability, and stable and predictable behavior. Revision 1 being reviewed for share publicly.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

A methodology to analyze photovoltaic tracker uptime

A metric is developed to analyze the daily performance of single-axis photovoltaic (PV) trackers. The metric relies on comparing correlations between the daily time series of the PV power output and an array of simulated plane-of-array irradiances for the given day. Mathematical thresholds and a logic sequence are presented, so the daily tracking metric can be applied in an automated fashion on large-scale PV systems. The results of applying the metric are visually examined against the time series of the power output data for a large number of days and for various systems. The visual inspection results suggest that overall, the algorithm is accurate in identifying stuck or functioning trackers on clear-sky days. Visual inspection also shows that there are days that are not classified by the metric where the power output data may be sufficient to identify a stuck tracker. Based on the daily tracking metric, uptime results are calculated for 83 different inverters at 34 PV sites. The mean tracker uptime is calculated at 99% based on 2 different calculation methods. The daily tracking metric clearly has limitations, but as there is no existing metrics in the literature, it provides a valuable tool for flagging stuck trackers.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF NDE METHODS ON INSPECTION OF HDPE BUTT FUSION PIPING JOINTS FOR LACK OF FUSION

Studies at the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory in Richland, Washington, are being conducted to evaluate nondestructive examination approaches for inspecting butt fusion joints in high density polyethylene (HDPE) pipe for lack of fusion (LOF). The work provides information to the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission on the effectiveness and need for volumetric inspection techniques of HDPE butt fusion joints in Section III, Division 1, Class 3, buried piping systems in nuclear power plants. This paper describes results from preliminary assessments using ultrasonic nondestructive techniques and high-speed tensile impact testing for determining joint integrity. A series of butt joints were fabricated in 3408, 12-inch IPS DR-11 material by varying the fusion parameters in attempts to provide good joints and joints containing LOF. These butt joints were visually examined and volumetrically examined with time-of-flight diffraction (TOFD) and phased-array (PA) ultrasound. A limited subset of pipe joint material was destructively analyzed by either slicing through the joint and visually examining the surface or by employing a standard high-speed tensile impact test. Initial correlation of the fusion parameters, nondestructive, and destructive evaluations have shown that areas with gross LOF were detected with both TOFD and PA ultrasound and that the tensile impact test showed a brittle failure at the joint. There is still some ambiguity in results from the less obvious LOF conditions. Current work is targeted on assessing the sensitivity of the ultrasonic volumetric examinations and validating the results with a destructive analysis. It is expected that on-going and future work will lead to quantifying the ultrasonic responses in terms of joint integrity.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Augmented Monitoring and Condition Assessment Program (AMCAP) - Proof-of-Principle (POP) Mockup for Non-Aluminum Spent Nuclear Fuel Container In-Situ Examinations

A disciplined engineering approach is being followed to develop an engineered system of tooling and sensors, characterization techniques, and deployment subsystems for in-situ inspection of the several container types used for the storage of non-aluminum spent nuclear fuel (NASNF) in L Basin under the Augmented Monitoring and Condition Assessment Program (AMCAP). Inspecting the containers to provide information on their structural condition helps ensure the safe handling and storage of the NASNF containers pending final disposition. This report describes the work performed in the initial two phases of this developmental work, namely the bench scale and proof-of-principle (POP) scale, which focus on sensor selection and the tooling design and fabrication for two remote non-destructive examination (NDE) methods. These methods include visual testing (VT) for a visual examination of the container surfaces and ultrasonic testing (UT) for a n examination to characterize container wall material thickness and flaws.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

H-Canyon Ventilation System Exhaust Tunnel Inspection at the Savannah River Site - 18052

The Department of Energy (DOE) H-Canyon Facility at the Savannah River Site (SRS) is operated by Savannah River Nuclear Solutions (SRNS). The Facility Structural Integrity Program (SIP) performs periodic visual inspections to confirm the component is capable of performing its safety function. This Program provides the process to document the conditions of safety related structural systems and components, their damage mechanisms, and recommend repairs if required before there is impact on the safety envelope. The H-Canyon Exhaust Tunnel is part of the H-Canyon Exhaust Ventilation System and is periodically inspected under the Structural Integrity Program. The Tunnel performs a Safety Class passive design feature function that is available 100% of the time. The Tunnel directs Canyon process air from the Canyon to the Sand Filter System. The radiological and chemical airborne activity coupled with the physical configuration of the tunnel precludes a manned entry into the tunnel. Tunnel inspections have been performed using cameras on a stick, referred to as pole cameras prior to CY2003. Since CY2003, five camera equipped crawlers have been used with varying levels of inspection success. With each successive crawler inspection, expectations have increased to perform tasks beyond visual examinations. The 2017 crawler performed the visual inspection but also included improvements on crawler performance, such as testing the use of wireless capability and remediation of crawler travel route, to the addition of stationary cameras and lighting at key locations. The latest 2017 crawler successfully traveled the entire length of the tunnel between the Canyon and Sand Filter System for the second time since development, thus providing key visual data for the integrity program [2]. In addition, several access ports were installed in 2017 following the removal of concrete core samples that allow for new visual inspection of the Canyon Crossover tunnel, thus providing information for an area that was generally inaccessible for monitoring. Planning for the 2019 crawler inspection is underway with the expectations to improve upon inspection cameras and also introduce mapping technologies such as LIDAR. The challenge to obtain meaningful data from the remote inspections of a 60+ year operating Canyon Exhaust tunnel continues to be a complex endeavor requiring close coordination of multiple organizations, adherence to Conduct of Operations, Radiological Safety, Worker Safety, etc. principles as well as alignment with Facility Safety Basis requirements. This paper discusses the continuing improvements in inspection techniques and the challenges associated these inspections. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

NON-DESTRUCTIVE POST IRRADIATION EXAMINATION OF FIRST CYCLE ACCIDENT TOLERANT AND ADVANCED ZIRCONIUM ALLOY HIGH BURNUP FUEL RODS

Post irradiation examination (PIE) of accident tolerant fuel concepts and high burnup uranium dioxide advanced zirconium alloy clad fuel contribute to near term nuclear industry goals of enhancing light water reactor safety and economics. Westinghouse is developing chromium coated zirconium alloy cladding as an accident tolerant fuel option for current pressurized water reactors. Examination of high burnup fuel further augments the technical foundation for extending the peak rod average burnup limits beyond the current regulatory limit of 62 MWd/kgU. Seven fuel rods were received at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory Irradiated Fuel Examination Facility. This includes three chromium coated zirconium alloy fuel rods and four high burnup advanced zirconium alloy fuel rods. Six of the seven rods were fueled with standard uranium dioxide while one of the chromium coated rods contained Westinghouse’s ADOPT fuel. The overall hot-cell PIE plan and some PIE results have been presented previously. This paper focuses on the additional non-destructive examination and fission gas release. Highlights from visual examination of these rods are presented. The chromium coating showed little to no visual change following irradiation. Observations of the axial burnup trends in the fuel rods are derived from full rod axial gamma-ray scans with additional observations related to local fission product migration. The axial dimensional changes of the seven rods are evaluated. As expected, creep down had not yet occurred in the chromium coated rods, and the maximum diameter strain in the high burnup advanced zirconium alloy cladding was less than 0.5%. Finally, the steady state fission gas release for these rods was measured ranging from 4.1% to 17.6% which matched expectation from literature. These fuel rods now await further destructive examination.

Harp, Jason↗

Insights on Fukushima Damage Progression based on PCV Inspections and Implications for Decommissioning Data Collection and Code Model Refinement [Slides]

Outline points are: Review what is known from experiments and how codes are modeling phenomena; Materials interactions are very important and key interactions will be identified and discussed; Chronology of damage progression roughly follows in order of increasing melting/liquefaction temperatures; Examine a plausible sequence to explain robotic visual examinations; Highlight MELCOR modeling observations; Highlight potential decommissioning phase data collection needs; and, Knowledge advance is iterative process of reconciling observations with code predictions, improving code models, and comparing to emerging new observations.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗

Hot Cell Examination of Weapons-Grade MOX Fuel

The U.S. Department of Energy has decided to dispose of a portion of the nation s surplus weapons-grade plutonium by reconstituting it into mixed oxide (MOX) fuel and irradiating it in commercial power reactors. Four lead assemblies were manufactured with weapons-grade MOX and irradiated to a maximum fuel rod burnup of 47.3 MWd/kg. As part of the fuel qualification process, five fuel rods with varying burnups and plutonium contents were selected from one of the assemblies and shipped to Oak Ridge National Laboratory for hot cell examination. This is the first hot cell examination of weapons-grade MOX fuel. The rods have been examined nondestructively with the ADEPT apparatus and are currently being destructively examined. Examinations completed to date include length measurements, visual examination, gamma scanning, profilometry, eddy-current testing, gas measurement and analysis, and optical metallography. Representative results of these examinations are reviewed and found to be consistent with predictions and with prior experience with reactor-grade MOX fuel. The results will be used to support licensing of weapons-grade MOX for batch use in commercial power reactors.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

BWR Spent Nuclear Fuel Acquisition and Testing to Support DOE-NE High Burnup Spent Fuel Data Project

The Office of Spent Fuel and Waste Disposition (SFWD) within the US Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Nuclear Energy (NE) established the Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) campaign to conduct research and development (R&D) activities related to the storage, transportation, and disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF) and high-level radioactive waste. The SFWST program was created within SFWD to address issues of extended or long-term SNF storage and transportation. Some near-term objectives of SFWST are to use a science-based, engineering-driven approach to: Support the enhancement of the technical bases to support the continued safe and secure dry storage of SNF for extended periods; Support the enhancement of the technical bases for retrieving SNF after extended dry storage; Support the enhancement of the technical bases for transporting high burnup (HBU) fuel and transporting low burnup fuel and HBU fuel after dry storage DOE-NE, in partnership with the Electric Power Research Institute, developed the High Burnup Spent Fuel Data Project to perform a large-scale demonstration and laboratory-scale testing of HBU pressurized water reactor (PWR) fuels (exceeding 45 gigawatt-days per metric ton of uranium [GWd/MTU]). Under this project, 25 sister rods—which are rods that have the same design, power histories, and other characteristics—were removed from assemblies at the North Anna Nuclear Power Station and sent to Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) in January 2016. ORNL performed detailed nondestructive examination (NDE) on all 25 rods. The NDE consisted of visual examinations, gamma and neutron scanning, profilometry and rod length measurements, and eddy current examinations. After completing the NDE, 10 of the sister rods were delivered to Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) in a NAC International, Inc. legal-weight truck cask in September 2018 for destructive examination (DE). To date, SFWD work has focused on the PWR fuel that is part of the Sister Rod Test program. No boiling water reactor (BWR) fuel has been tested in the program, and the data needs that were identified for the PWR fuel have not been collected for BWR fuel. The goal to obtain six to nine BWR rods and test them at ORNL will support closing this important data gap. BWR fuel comprises approximately 56% of the total fuel assemblies currently in storage at nuclear power plants in the United States. BWR nuclear fuel and cladding designs and manufacturing are significantly different from PWRs. Differences include the following: BWR fuel pellets are larger than PWR pellets; Variations of Zircaloy-2 (including liners) are used instead of the Zircaloy-4 cladding materials used in PWRs; Clad manufacturing and stress-relief processes are different between PWRs and BWRs; The fuel rod dimensions are different because larger rod diameters and thicker cladding are used in BWRs; BWR fuel typically has lower internal rod pressures and sees vastly different operating conditions than PWR fuel (i.e., two-phase flow); BWR assemblies are “canned,” meaning each assembly is surrounded by a metal fuel channel; BWR cladding is often composed of an inner pure Zr liner that has widely different mechanical properties than the Zircaloy-2 alloy and exhibits a stronger affinity for hydrogen; The BWR SNF generally has more total hydrogen in the cladding/liner than typical PWR fuel; The construction of the PWR and BWR assemblies is vastly different; BWR rods are solidly attached to the assembly nozzles and experience a much different vibration and shock load than PWR rods, which are “floating” within a grid system attached to guide tubes, and the rods sit loosely on the bottom end plates. These numerous differences will affect the way the BWR SNF responds under dry storage preparation processes (e.g., vacuum drying) and during transportation. The results collected in the PWR experimental program must be compared with a subset of similar data collected on BWR SNF to establish a technical basis for whether the larger PWR database is sufficient to bound the BWR SNF end-of-life conditions as is currently assumed for several fuel/clad properties. Changes that occur in both fuel types at HBU could exacerbate any mechanical property differences. As the fuel burnup increases, several changes occur that might affect the performance of the fuel, cladding, and assembly hardware in storage and transportation. These changes include increased cladding corrosion layer thickness, increased cladding hydrogen content, increased cladding creep strains, increased fission gas release, and the formation of the HBU structure at the surface of the fuel pellets. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) limits the current maximum rod-averaged burnup to 62 GWd/MTU due to these changes and the lack of data at higher burnups.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Key Results from Detailed Nondestructive Examinations of 25 Pressurized Water Reactor High Burnup Spent Nuclear Fuel Rods

The High Burnup Spent Fuel Data Project, sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy, is focused on understanding the effects of long-term storage and transportation on high burnup (HBU) (>45 GW days per tonne uranium) light water reactor fuel. The project includes 32 HBU spent nuclear fuel (SNF) assemblies (the project assemblies) that are stored in a typical independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI) and 25 “sister rods”—9 SNF rods that were removed from the fuel assemblies prior to insertion to the ISFSI and 16 SNF rods removed from similar HBU assemblies. The sister rods provide a baseline of the condition of the HBU rods before loading, drying, and long-term dry storage. The project assemblies will be inspected after 10 years, and the physical state of the stored rods will be compared with the condition of the sister rods to identify any changes in physical properties during the dry storage period. Our report focuses on key results from the nondestructive postirradiation examinations of the sister rods and summarizes the results of detailed visual examinations, gamma scans, dimensional measurements, and eddy current liftoff measurements of the combined Chalk River unidentified deposits and oxide layer on the waterside surface of the rod. Additionally the data are used to calculate fuel rod and pellet stack growth rates, estimated remaining fuel rod plenum volumes, and the percentage change in fuel rod cladding diameter.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Highlights from the Postirradiation Examination of AFC-3A and AFC-3B

Highlights from the postirradiation examination of the AFC-3A and AFC-3B irradiation test are presented. Baseline non-destructive and destructive examinations of these tests have been completed at this time. Results from visual examination, neutron radiography, gamma spectrometry, dimensional inspection, fission gas release, chemical burnup analysis, and optical microscopy have been collected. All the rodlets from these irradiations appear to have performed well during irradiation. Baseline PIE has been completed on rodlets from AFC- 3A, and AFC-3B. This includes visual exams, neutron radiography, gamma spectrometry. dimensional inspection, fission gas release evaluation, optical microscopy. microhardness evaluation. and chemical analysis. The results compiled here are a sampling of the full results. Baseline PIE provides an engineering or macroscopic scale evaluation of fuel performance and prepares samples for a more detailed phenomenological study of observed performance. Advanced PIE techniques are desired to obtain microscopic elemental and structural information both in the fuel, in the cladding, and in the interface where the composition of the FCCI layer is of great interest. The AFC-3 tests do appear to have performed roughly as designed during the irradiation. The FCCI behavior of Mo alloy metallic fuel versus Zr alloy metallic fuel has been confirmed. Results from this irradiation such as the FCCI observed in AFC-3A R1 and AFC-3A R2 can be used to eliminate Mo alloys as a choice in future irradiations where ultra-high burnup is a stated goal. Annular fuels are a preferred method for many high burnup core designs. The redistribution behavior of the annular U-Zr alloys should be studied further to better understand how this might impact high burnup annular fuel performance. The thermal bonding between annular fuel and cladding should also be studied further as there appear to be localized areas of FCCI forming in both AFC-3A R4 and AFC-3B R2, while no FCCI was observed in the Zr-based Na-bonded or Mo-based low smear density Na-bonded fuel. The performance of the low smear density. solid fuels is less clear. The neutron radiography and optical microscopy cross sections suggest the fuel is not forming a radially symmetric structure which may be causing undesirable localized temperature variations. Further study both by electron microscopy and by simulation to evaluate the implications of the non-symmetric fuel form are needed to better understand whether this fuel form merits further study under irradiation. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Summary of FUTURIX-FTA Non-destructive Examination

A summary of results from the non-destructive examination of the FUTURIX-FTA irradiation are presented. This irradiation was conducted under true fast spectrum conditions in the Phenix reactor. Baseline non-destructive examinations of these tests have been completed at this time. Results from visual examination, neutron radiography, gamma spectrometry, and dimensional inspection have been collected. The data collected from this irradiation will be compared to sister irradiations performed in pseudo-fast spectrum conditions at the INL Advanced Test Reactor helping to confirm fuel performance behavior observed in Advanced Test Reactor irradiations is representative of fast reactor conditions. All indications from the non-destructive examinations performed on the FUTURIX-FTA elements indicate a successful irradiation with fuel performance in line with expectations. The intact state of the nitride fuel is especially notable as these pellets were fragile after fabrication, but they appear to have survived the irradiation and extensive shipping well. These rodlets will undergo further examination to include gamma tomography to investigate the radial fission product distribution, fission gas release analysis, optical metallography, microhardness testing, and chemical burnup analysis. If possible, cross sections from optical metallography may also be examined by more advanced techniques such as scanning electron microscopy and transmission electron microscopy of specific sites through the use of focused ion beam lift outs. The results of all these examinations will be compared with the results from the AFC-1B, AFC-I1D, AFC-IF, AFC-1G, AFC-1H and AFC-LAE irradiations. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Examination of Intergranular Crack on SC0234

The microstructure of the SC0234 weld was evaluated per DA-SPEC-01067, ''General Purpose Heat Source (GPHS) Plutonium-238 Dioxide Fueled Clad Product Specification'' and it was determined that the weld microstructure conformed to the quality requirements. During the examination of weld cross section, the metallographic analysis revealed the presence of a surface crack. Prior visual examination per RPS-TA55-303 had not revealed the crack, nor did the surface photography performed per RPS-TA55-302. The presence of the crack does not violate any of the product specifications called out on DA-SPEC-01067. Although there is a well-documented history of weld hot crack susceptibility in the early development of the DOP-26 iridium alloy, a surface crack such as this had not been documented during welding at Los Alamos. In the interest of better understanding the cause; the product engineer/program recommended further examination of the crack. This report discusses the examination of the crack found in the weld cross section of simulant clad SC0234. Metallography, Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM) and Energy Dispersive Spectroscopy techniques (EDS) where used in the analysis of the crack and the surrounding weld microstructure.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗