Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “WARHEAD”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 19 records

Concept of Operations for Nuclear Warhead Embedded Sensors

Embedded arms-control-sensors provide a powerful new paradigm for managing compliance with future nuclear weapons treaties, where deployed warhead numbers will be reduced to 1000 or less. The CONOPS (Concept of Operations) for use with these sensors is a practical tool with which one may help define design parameters, including size, power, resolution, communications, and physical structure. How frequently must data be acquired and must a human be present? Will such data be acquired for only stored weapons or will it be required of deployed weapons as well? Will tactical weapons be subject to such monitoring or will only strategic weapons apply? Which data will be most crucial? Will OSI's be a component of embedded sensor data management or will these sensors stand alone in their data extraction processes? The problem space is massive, but can be constrained by extrapolating to a reasonable future treaty regime and examining the bounded options this scenario poses. Arms control verification sensors, embedded within the warhead case or aeroshell, must provide sufficient but not excessively detailed data, confirming that the item is a nuclear warhead and that it is a particular warhead without revealing sensitive information. Geolocation will be provided by an intermediate transceiver used to acquire the data and to forward the data to a central processing location. Past Chain-of-Custody projects have included such devices and will be primarily responsible for adding such indicators in the future. For the purposes of a treaty regime a TLI will be verified as a nuclear warhead by knowledge of (a) the presence and mass of SNM, (b) the presence of HE, and (c) the reporting of a unique tag ID. All of these parameters can be obtained via neutron correlation measurements, Raman spectroscopy, and fiber optic grating fabrication, respectively. Data from these sensors will be pushed out monthly and acquired nearly daily, providing one of several verification layers in depth, including on-site inspections, NTM, declarations, and semi-annual BCC meetings. Human intervention will not be necessary. The sheer numbers, small size, and wide distribution of warhead TLIs will mandate the added level of remote monitoring that Embedded Sensors can provide. This multilayer protection will limit the need to increase the frequency of OSIs, by adding confidence that declared TLIs remain as declared and that no undeclared items enter the regime without the other States Party's knowledge. Acceptance of Embedded arms control Sensor technologies will require joint development by all State's Parties involved. Principles of operation and robustness of technologies must be individually evaluated to sustain confidence in the strength of this system against attack. Weapons designers must be assured that these sensors will in no way impact weapon performance and operation, will not affect weapons security and safety, and will have a neutral impact upon weapon system surety. Each State's Party will need to conduct an in depth review of their weapons lifecycle to determine where moves may be reduced to minimize vulnerabilities and where random selection may be used to minimize the ability to make undeclared changes. In the end Verification is a political measure, not a technical one. If the potential users can gain sufficient confidence in the application of Embedded arms control Sensors, they could constitute the final layer of glue to hold together the next Nuclear Arms Control agreement.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Peptidomimetic nitrile warheads as SARS-CoV-2 3CL protease inhibitors

Tragically, the death toll from the COVID-19 pandemic continues to rise, and with variants being observed around the globe new therapeutics, particularly direct-acting antivirals that are easily administered, are desperately needed. Studies targeting the SARS-CoV-2 3CL protease, which is critical for viral replication, with different peptidomimetics and warheads is an active area of research for development of potential drugs. To date, however, only a few publications have evaluated the nitrile warhead as a viral 3CL protease inhibitor, with only modest activity reported. This article describes our investigation of P3 4-methoxyindole peptidomimetic analogs with select P1 and P2 groups with a nitrile warhead that are potent inhibitors of SARS-CoV-2 3CL protease and demonstrate in vitro SARS-CoV-2 antiviral activity. A selectivity for SARS-CoV-2 3CL protease over human cathepsins B, S and L was also observed with the nitrile warhead, which was superior to that with the aldehyde warhead. A co-crystal structure with SARS-CoV-2 3CL protease and a reversibility study indicate that a reversible, thioimidate adduct is formed when the catalytic sulfur forms a covalent bond with the carbon of the nitrile. Furthermore, this effort also identified efflux as a property limiting antiviral activity of these compounds, and together with the positive attributes described these results provide insight for further drug development of novel nitrile peptidomimetics targeting SARS-CoV-2 3CL protease.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

Warhead verification as inverse problem: Applications of neutron spectrum unfolding from organic-scintillator measurements

Verification of future warhead-dismantlement treaties will require detection of certain warhead attributes without the disclosure of sensitive design information, and this presents an unusual measurement challenge. Neutron spectroscopy—commonly eschewed as an ill-posed inverse problem—may hold special advantages for warhead verification by virtue of its insensitivity to certain neutron-source parameters like plutonium isotopics. In this article, we investigate the usefulness of unfolded neutron spectra obtained from organic-scintillator data for verifying a particular treaty-relevant warhead attribute: the presence of high-explosive and neutron-reflecting materials. Toward this end, several improvements on current unfolding capabilities are demonstrated: deuterated detectors are shown to have superior response-matrix condition to that of standard hydrogen-base scintintillators; a novel data-discretization scheme is proposed which removes important detector nonlinearities; and a technique is described for re-parameterizing the unfolding problem in order to constrain the parameter space of solutions sought, sidestepping the inverse problem altogether. These improvements are demonstrated with trial measurements and verified using accelerator-based time-of-flight calculation of reference spectra. Then, a demonstration is presented in which the elemental compositions of low-Z neutron-attenuating materials are estimated to within 10%. These techniques could have direct application in verifying the presence of high-explosive materials in a neutron-emitting test item, as well as other for treaty verification challenges.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Experimental demonstration of an isotope-sensitive warhead verification technique using nuclear resonance fluorescence

Significance We present an experimental demonstration of an isotope-sensitive warhead verification protocol. The measurement is capable of detecting tampering with a warhead’s material or geometry with high statistical confidence in realistically attainable measurement times, while simultaneously protecting sensitive warhead design information. Such a protocol could enable the verifiable elimination of nuclear warheads under a future arms reduction treaty.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Nuclear Warhead Verification: A Review of Attribute and Template Systems

Verification of current nuclear arms control treaties between United States and Russia relies primarily on the verification of delivery vehicles. Warheads are counted indirectly via the delivery vehicles that they are associated with. As states move to lower numbers of nuclear weapons in their arsenals, verification will likely pose complex challenges. Most importantly, future nuclear disarmament treaties may place limits on the total number of nuclear weapons in the arsenals. Their verification would require inspections of individual nuclear warheads without revealing secret information. By confirming the authenticity of nuclear warheads and perhaps also of warhead components we show the verification challenge for future reductions in the nuclear arsenals. Our paper provides an overview of the development of verification systems, and highlights the challenges and the opportunities for future research in this area.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Using simulation to evaluate warhead monitoring system effectiveness

There is a need to develop and demonstrate technical approaches for verifying potential future agreements to limit and reduce total warhead stockpiles. To facilitate this aim, warhead monitoring systems employ both concepts of operations (CONOPS) and technologies. A systems evaluation approach can be used to assess the relative performance of CONOPS and technologies in their ability to achieve monitoring system objectives which include: 1) confidence that a treaty accountable item (TAI) initialized by the monitoring system is as declared; 2) confidence that there is no undetected diversion from the monitoring system; and 3) confidence that a TAI is dismantled as declared. Although there are many quantitative methods that can be used to assess system performance for the above objectives, this paper focuses on a simulation perspective primarily for the ability to support analysis of the probabilities that are used to define operating characteristics of CONOPS and technologies. This paper describes a discrete event simulation (DES) model, comprised of three major sub-models: including TAI lifecycle flow, monitoring activities, and declaration behavior. The DES model seeks to capture all processes and decision points associated with the progressions of virtual TAIs, with notional characteristics, through the monitoring system from initialization through dismantlement. The simulation updates TAI progression (i.e., whether the generated test objects are accepted and rejected at the appropriate points) all the way through dismantlement. Evaluation of TAI lifecycles primarily serves to assess how the order, frequency, and combination of functions in the CONOPS affect system performance as a whole. It is important, however, to note that discrete event simulation is also capable (at a basic level) of addressing vulnerabilities in the CONOPS and interdependencies between individual functions as well. This approach is beneficial because it does not rely on complex mathematical models, but instead attempts to recreate the real world system as a decision and event driven simulation. Finally, because the simulation addresses warhead confirmation, chain of custody, and warhead dismantlement in a modular fashion, a discrete-event model could be easily adapted to multiple CONOPS for the exploration of a large number of “what if” scenarios.

Perkins, Casey J.↗

A Zero Knowledge Protocol For Nuclear Warhead Verification

The verification of nuclear warheads for arms control faces a paradox: International inspectors must gain high confidence in the authenticity of submitted items while learning nothing about them. Conventional inspection systems featuring ''information barriers'', designed to hide measurments stored in electronic systems, are at risk of tampering and snooping. Here we show the viability of fundamentally new approach to nuclear warhead verification that incorporates a zero-knowledge protocol, designed such that sensitive information is never measured so does not need to be hidden. We interrogate submitted items with energetic neutrons, making in effect, differential measurements of neutron transmission and emission. Calculations of diversion scenarios show that a high degree of discrimination can be achieved while revealing zero information. Timely demonstration of the viability of such an approach could be critical for the nexxt round of arms-control negotiations, which will likely require verification of individual warheads, rather than whole delivery systems.

70 PLASMA PHYSICS AND FUSION TECHNOLOGY↗

Non-nuclear Component Signatures for Warhead Dismantlement Confirmation

The verification of warhead dismantlement is expected to be an important component in future arms reduction treaties. Historic approaches developed with future arms control treaty verification in mind often involve intrusive measurements, process monitoring, and/or inspector presence to provide confidence that an authentic warhead has been dismantled. This work explores the possibility of reducing the negative impacts of these invasive approaches while also delivering a method that is more likely to provide non-sensitive data that can be shared with not only other nuclear weapons states but also non-nuclear weapons states partners. This work explores a novel approach for verifying dispositioned non-nuclear weapon components, providing confidence post-dismantlement that a treaty accountable item that was dismantled was in fact a treaty-relevant nuclear weapon system as declared. This method provides an alternative to intrusive inspection processes in nuclear weapons production environments, which would require significant changes to the host’s operational behaviors. It achieves this by identifying intrinsic neutron-induced signatures of non-nuclear components to determine their authenticity and estimate the duration they were exposed within a nuclear weapons system using technologies that are already in use for other national security applications. Intrinsic radiation effects studies are already a part of the stockpile aging and surveillance evaluations. However, none of these technologies and approaches have been previously considered for verification applications of non-nuclear component disposition. In this report, we introduce modeling studies that have been used to identify the most promising candidate parts and materials with signatures that are measurable and actionable. These models have been validated with laboratory measurements of signatures induced by the exposure of candidate materials to neutrons over a range of times. Predictive modeling then demonstrates the methodology for estimating exposure times and/or limits. Laboratory measurements of authentic non-nuclear parts from a dismantled warhead demonstrate the feasibility of employing these signature measurements. And finally, a concept of operations (CONOPS) for the potential use of this methodology is presented.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

A new method of passive counting of nuclear missile warheads -a white paper for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Cosmic ray muon imaging has been studied for the past several years as a possible technique for nuclear warhead inspection and verification as part of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation. The Los Alamos team has studied two different muon imaging methods for this application, using detectors on two sides and one side of the object of interest. In this report we present results obtained on single sided imaging of configurations aimed at demonstrating the potential of this technique for counting nuclear warheads in place with detectors above the closed hatch of a ballistic missile submarine.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Applied radiation tags for warhead dismantlement transparency

Here, this study explores the feasibility of applying radiation tags as a Chain of Custody tool to confirm the dismantlement of individual warheads by investigating time dependent emissions from special nuclear material. Precedents of photon and neutron sources that have been used to irradiate warhead components are presented. Measurements of irradiated Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) are used to benchmark simulations with the CINDER90 library for MCNP. Delayed gamma emissions are simulated as a function of time since irradiation of moderated HEU and Weapons Grade Plutonium with photon and neutron sources. Models of commercial 9 MV and 15 MV linacs were found to induce ~10 9 fissions/g and ~10 11 fissions/g, respectively, creating 3 to 4 orders of magnitude more delayed gammas than neutron sources, modeled at 10 10 n/s. However, a DT neutron source was found to induce sufficient fissions, ~10 7 fissions/g, to create quantifiable signatures relative to intrinsic emissions. Applied radiation tagging is determined to be technically feasible, but its operational context and practical implementation requires significant development.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

A zero-knowledge protocol for nuclear warhead verification

The verification of nuclear warheads for arms control involves a paradox: international inspectors will have to gain high confidence in the authenticity of submitted items while learning nothing about them. Proposed inspection systems featuring ‘information barriers’, designed to hide measurements stored in electronic systems, are at risk of tampering and snooping. Here we show the viability of a fundamentally new approach to nuclear warhead verification that incor-porates a zero-knowledge protocol, which is designed in such a way that sensitive information is never measured and so does not need to be hidden. We interrogate submitted items with energetic neutrons, making, in effect, differential measurements of both neutron transmission and emission. Calculations for scenarios in which material is diverted from a test object show that a high degree of discrimination can be achieved while revealing zero information. Our ideas for a physical zero-knowledge system could have applications beyond the context of nuclear disarmament. The proposed technique suggests a way to perform comparisons or computations on personal or confidential data without measuring the data in the first place.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

A physically cryptographic warhead verification system using neutron induced nuclear resonances

Arms control treaties are necessary to reduce the large stockpiles of the nuclear weapons that constitute one of the biggest dangers to the world. However, an impactful treaty hinges on effective inspection exercises to verify the participants’ compliance to the treaty terms. Such procedures would require verification of the authenticity of a warhead undergoing dismantlement. Previously proposed solutions lacked the combination of isotopic sensitivity and information security. Here we present the experimental feasibility proof of a technique that uses neutron induced nuclear resonances and is sensitive to the combination of isotopics and geometry. The information is physically encrypted to prevent the leakage of sensitive information. Our approach can significantly increase the trustworthiness of future arms control treaties while expanding their scope to include the verified dismantlement of nuclear warheads themselves.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

New Developments and Applications of Superheated Emulsions: Warhead Verification and Special Nuclear Material Interdiction

In recent years, neutron detection with superheated emulsions has received renewed attention thanks to improved detector manufacturing and read-out techniques, and thanks to successful applications in warhead verification and special nuclear material (SNM) interdiction. Detectors are currently manufactured with methods allowing high uniformity of the drop sizes, which in turn allows the use of optical read-out techniques based on dynamic light scattering. Furthermore, small detector cartridges arranged in 2D matrices are developed for the verification of a declared warhead without revealing its design. For this application, the enabling features of the emulsions are that bubbles formed at different times cannot be distinguished from each other, while the passive nature of the detectors avoids the susceptibility to electronic snooping and tampering. Large modules of emulsions are developed to detect the presence of shielded special nuclear materials hidden in cargo containers ‘interrogated’ with high energy X-rays. In this case, the enabling features of the emulsions are photon discrimination, a neutron detection threshold close to 3 MeV and a rate-insensitive read-out.

d’Errico, Francesco↗

Low-Intrusion Techniques and Sensitive Information Management for Warhead Counting and Verification: FY2011 Annual Report

Future arms control treaties may push nuclear weapons limits to unprecedented low levels and may entail precise counting of warheads as well as distinguishing between strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Such advances will require assessment of form and function to confidently verify the presence or absence of nuclear warheads and/or their components. Imaging with penetrating radiation can provide such an assessment and could thus play a unique role in inspection scenarios. Yet many imaging capabilities have been viewed as too intrusive from the perspective of revealing weapon design details, and the potential for the release of sensitive information poses challenges in verification settings. A widely held perception is that verification through radiography requires images of sufficient quality that an expert (e.g., a trained inspector or an image-matching algorithm) can verify the presence or absence of components of a device. The concept of information barriers (IBs) has been established to prevent access to relevant weapon-design information by inspectors (or algorithms), and has, to date, limited the usefulness of radiographic inspection. The challenge of this project is to demonstrate that radiographic information can be used behind an IB to improve the capabilities of treaty-verification weapons-inspection systems.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Warhead Confirmation: A Follow-on to New START

This presentation's slides are comprised of the following: Warhead Confirmation: A Follow-on to New START; What May Change?; Generic Arms Reduction Treaty; Challenges; Dismantlement and Warhead Confirmation; Confirmation Approaches; Certification; Information Barriers (IBs); The Fissile Material Transparency Technology Demonstration (FMTTD); More Recent Implementations; The Monitor’s View; Authentication; Authentication Options; Authentication in Phases; and Future Treaties.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Mechanical Analysis of W78/88-1 Life Extension Program Warhead Design Options

Life Extension Program (LEP) is a program to repair/replace components of nuclear weapons to ensure the ability to meet military requirements. The W78/88-1 LEP encompasses the modernization of two major nuclear weapon reentry systems into an interoperable warhead. Several design concepts exist to provide different options for robust safety and security themes, maximum non-nuclear commonality, and cost. Simulation is one capability used to evaluate the mechanical performance of the designs in various operational environments, plan for system and component qualification efforts, and provide insight into the survivability of the warhead in environments that are not currently testable. The simulation efforts use several Sandia-developed tools through the Advanced Simulation and Computing program, including Cubit for mesh generation, the DART Model Manager, SIERRA codes running on the HPC TLCC2 platforms, DAKOTA, and ParaView. Several programmatic objectives were met using the simulation capability including: (1) providing early environmental specification estimates that may be used by component designers to understand the severity of the loads their components will need to survive, (2) providing guidance for load levels and configurations for subassembly tests intended to represent operational environments, and (3) recommending design options including modified geometry and material properties. These objectives were accomplished through regular interactions with component, system, and test engineers while using the laboratory's computational infrastructure to effectively perform ensembles of simulations. Because NNSA has decided to defer the LEP program, simulation results are being documented and models are being archived for future reference. However, some advanced and exploratory efforts will continue to mature key technologies, using the results from these and ongoing simulations for design insights, test planning, and model validation.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Warhead Monitoring Planning and Execution

The Warhead Measurement Campaign is a multi-laboratory project lead by the Los Alamos National Laboratory. The project will measure several items of the US nuclear weapons stockpile with a wide range of radiation detection systems. This report provides a brief summary of those LLNL executed activities for the Warhead Measurement Campaign from FY11 through FY16. A more detailed description of all of LLNL’s activiites for the WMC will be presented in the final report of a follow-on project, , LA17-V-Wx.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗