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At least 19 records

Characterization of Uranium-Contaminated Sediments From Beneath A Nuclear Waste Storage Tank From Hanford, Washington: Implications for Contaminant Transport and Fate

The concentration and distribution of uranium (U) in sediment samples from three boreholes recovered near radioactive waste storage tanks at Hanford, Washington State, USA, were determined in detail using bulk and micro-analytical techniques. The source of contamination was a plume that contained an estimated 7000 kg of dissolved U that seeped into the subsurface as a result of an accident that occurred during filling of tank BX-102. The desorption character and kinetics of U were also determined by experiment in order to assess the mobility of U in the vadose zone. Most samples contained too little moisture to obtain quantitative information on pore water compositions. Concentrations of U (and contaminant phosphate—P) in pore waters were therefore estimated by performing 1:1 sediment-to-water extractions and the data indicated concentrations of these elements were above that of uncontaminated “background” sediments. Further extraction of U by 8 N nitric acid indicated that a significant fraction of the total U is relatively immobile and may be sequestered in mobilization-resistant phases. Fine- and coarse-grained samples in sharp contact with one another were sub-sampled for further scrutiny and identification of U reservoirs. Segregation of the samples into their constituent size fractions coupled with microwave-assisted digestion of bulk samples showed that most of the U contamination was sequestered within the fine-grained fraction. Isotope exchange ( 233 U) tests revealed that ~51 to 63% of the U is labile, indicating that the remaining fund of U is locked up in mobilization-resistant phases. Analysis by micro-X-Ray Fluorescence and micro-X-Ray Absorption Near-Edge Spectroscopy (μ-XRF and μ-XANES) showed that U is primarily associated with Ca and is predominately U(VI). The spectra obtained on U-enriched “hot spots” using Time-Resolved Laser-Induced Fluorescence Spectroscopy (TRLIFS) provide strong evidence for uranophane-type [Ca(UO 2 ) 2 (SiO 3 OH) 2 (H 2 O) 5 ] and uranyl phosphate [Ca(UO 2 ) 2 (PO 4 ) 2 (H 2 O) 10-12 ] phases. These data show that disseminated micro-precipitates can form in narrow pore spaces within the finer-grained matrix and that these objects are likely not restricted to lithic fragment environments. Uranium mobility may therefore be curtailed by precipitation of uranyl silicate and phosphate phases, with additional possible influence exerted by capillary barriers. Consequently, equilibrium-based desorption models that predict the concentrations and mobility of U in the subsurface matrix at Hanford are unnecessarily conservative.

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Case study in corporate memory recovery: Hanford tank farms miscellaneous underground waste storage tanks - 15344

In addition to managing the 177 underground waste storage tanks containing 212,000 m{sup 3} (56 million gal) of radioactive waste at the U. S. Department of Energy's Hanford Site 200 Area Tank Farms, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC is responsible for managing numerous small catch tanks and special surveillance facilities. These are collectively known as 'MUSTs' - Miscellaneous Underground Storage Tanks. The MUSTs typically collected drainage and flushes during waste transfer system piping changes; special surveillance facilities supported Tank Farm processes including post-World War II uranium recovery and later fission product recovery from tank wastes. Most were removed from service following deactivation of the single-shell tank system in 1980 and stabilized by pumping the remaining liquids from them. The MUSTs were isolated by blanking connecting transfer lines and adding weatherproofing to prevent rainwater entry. Over the next 30 years MUST operating records were dispersed into large electronic databases or transferred to the National Archives Regional Center in Seattle, Washington. During 2014 an effort to re-acquire the historical bases for the MUSTs' published waste volumes was undertaken. Corporate Memory Recovery from a variety of record sources allowed waste volumes to be initially determined for 21 MUSTs, and waste volumes to be adjusted for 37 others. Precursors and symptoms of Corporate Memory Loss were identified in the context of MUST records recovery. (authors)

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Case Study in Corporate Memory Recovery: Hanford Tank Farms Miscellaneous Underground Waste Storage Tanks - 15344

In addition to managing the 177 underground waste storage tanks containing 212,000 m3 (56 million gal) of radioactive waste at the U. S. Department of Energy’s Hanford Site 200 Area Tank Farms, Washington River Protection Solutions LLC is responsible for managing numerous small catch tanks and special surveillance facilities. These are collectively known as “MUSTs” - Miscellaneous Underground Storage Tanks. The MUSTs typically collected drainage and flushes during waste transfer system piping changes; special surveillance facilities supported Tank Farm processes including post-World War II uranium recovery and later fission product recovery from tank wastes. Most were removed from service following deactivation of the single-shell tank system in 1980 and stabilized by pumping the remaining liquids from them. The MUSTs were isolated by blanking connecting transfer lines and adding weatherproofing to prevent rainwater entry. Over the next 30 years MUST operating records were dispersed into large electronic databases or transferred to the National Archives Regional Center in Seattle, Washington. During 2014 an effort to reacquire the historical bases for the MUSTs’ published waste volumes was undertaken. Corporate Memory Recovery from a variety of record sources allowed waste volumes to be initially determined for 21 MUSTs, and waste volumes to be adjusted for 37 others. Precursors and symptoms of Corporate Memory Loss were identified in the context of MUST records recovery.

Washenfelder, D. J.↗

METHODOLOGY AND CALCULATIONS FOR THE ASSIGNMENT OF WASTE GROUPS FOR THE LARGE UNDERGROUND WASTE STORAGE TANKS AT THE HANFORD SITE

The Hanford Site contains 177 large underground radioactive waste storage tanks (28 double-shell tanks and 149 single-shell tanks). These tanks are categorized into one of three waste groups (A, B, and C) based on their waste and tank characteristics. These waste group assignments reflect a tank's propensity to retain a significant volume of flammable gases and the potential of the waste to release retained gas by a buoyant displacement gas release event. Assignments of waste groups to the 177 double-shell tanks and single-shell tanks, as reported in this document, are based on a Monte Carlo analysis of three criteria. The first criterion is the headspace flammable gas concentration following release of retained gas. This criterion determines whether the tank contains sufficient retained gas such that the well-mixed headspace flammable gas concentration would reach 100% of the lower flammability limit if the entire tank's retained gas were released. If the volume of retained gas is not sufficient to reach 100% of the lower flammability limit, then flammable conditions cannot be reached and the tank is classified as a waste group C tank independent of the method the gas is released. The second criterion is the energy ratio and considers whether there is sufficient supernatant on top of the saturated solids such that gas-bearing solids have the potential energy required to break up the material and release gas. Tanks that are not waste group C tanks and that have an energy ratio < 3.0 do not have sufficient potential energy to break up material and release gas and are assigned to waste group B. These tanks are considered to represent a potential induced flammable gas release hazard, but no spontaneous buoyant displacement flammable gas release hazard. Tanks that are not waste group C tanks and have an energy ratio {ge} 3.0, but that pass the third criterion (buoyancy ratio < 1.0, see below) are also assigned to waste group B. Even though the designation as a waste group B (or A) tank identifies the potential for an induced flammable gas release hazard, the hazard only exists for specific operations that can release the retained gas in the tank at a rate and quantity that results in reaching 100% of the lower flammability limit in the tank headspace. The identification and evaluation of tank farm operations that could cause an induced flammable gas release hazard in a waste group B (or A) tank are included in other documents. The third criterion is the buoyancy ratio. This criterion addresses tanks that are not waste group C double-shell tanks and have an energy ratio {ge} 3.0. For these double-shell tanks, the buoyancy ratio considers whether the saturated solids can retain sufficient gas to exceed neutral buoyancy relative to the supernatant layer and therefore have buoyant displacement gas release events. If the buoyancy ratio is {ge} 1.0, that double-shell tank is assigned to waste group A. These tanks are considered to have a potential spontaneous buoyant displacement flammable gas release hazard in addition to a potential induced flammable gas release hazard. This document categorizes each of the large waste storage tanks into one of several categories based on each tank's waste characteristics. These waste group assignments reflect a tank's propensity to retain a significant volume of flammable gases and the potential of the waste to release retained gas by a buoyant displacement event. Revision 8 is the annual update of the calculations of the flammable gas Waste Groups for DSTs and SSTs.

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ADMINISTRATIVE AND ENGINEERING CONTROLS FOR THE OPERATION OF VENTILATION SYSTEMS FOR UNDERGROUND RADIOACTIVE WASTE STORAGE TANKS

Liquid radioactive wastes from the Savannah River Site are stored in large underground carbon steel tanks. The majority of the waste is confined in double shell tanks, which have a primary shell, where the waste is stored, and a secondary shell, which creates an annular region between the two shells, that provides secondary containment and leak detection capabilities should leakage from the primary shell occur. Each of the DST is equipped with a purge ventilation system for the interior of the primary shell and annulus ventilation system for the secondary containment. Administrative flammability controls require continuous ventilation to remove hydrogen gas and other vapors from the waste tanks while preventing the release of radionuclides to the atmosphere. Should a leak from the primary to the annulus occur, the annulus ventilation would also serve this purpose. The functionality of the annulus ventilation is necessary to preserve the structural integrity of the primary shell and the secondary. An administrative corrosion control program is in place to ensure integrity of the tank. Given the critical functions of the purge and annulus ventilation systems, engineering controls are also necessary to ensure that the systems remain robust. The system consists of components that are constructed of metal (e.g., steel, stainless steel, aluminum, copper, etc.) and/or polymeric (polypropylene, polyethylene, silicone, polyurethane, etc.) materials. The performance of these materials in anticipated service environments (e.g., normal waste storage, waste removal, etc.) was evaluated. The most aggressive vapor space environment occurs during chemical cleaning of the residual heels by utilizing oxalic acid. The presence of NO{sub x} and mercury in the vapors generated from the process could potentially accelerate the degradation of aluminum, carbon steel, and copper. Once identified, the most susceptible materials were either replaced and/or plans for discontinuing operations are executed.

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LABORATORY TESTING TO SIMULATE VAPOR SPACE CORROSION IN RADIOACTIVE WASTE STORAGE TANKS

Radioactive liquid waste has been stored in underground carbon steel tanks for nearly 70 years at the Hanford nuclear facility. Vapor space corrosion of the tank walls has emerged as an ongoing challenge to overcome in maintaining the structural integrity of these tanks. The interaction between corrosive and inhibitor species in condensates/supernates on the tank wall above the liquid level, and their interaction with vapor phase constituents as the liquid evaporates from the tank wall influences the formation of corrosion products and the corrosion of the carbon steel. An effort is underway to gain an understanding of the mechanism of vapor space corrosion. Localized corrosion, in the form of pitting, is of particular interest in the vapor space. CPP testing was utilized to determine the susceptibility of the steel in a simulated vapor space environment. The tests also investigated the impact of ammonia gas in the vapor space area on the corrosion of the steel. Vapor space coupon tests were also performed to investigate the evolution of the corrosion products during longer term exposures. These tests were also conducted at vapor space ammonia levels of 50 and 550 ppm NH{sub 3} (0.005, and 0.055 vol.%) in air. Ammonia was shown to mitigate vapor space corrosion.

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Refinement of Modeling Techniques for the Structural Evaluation of Hanford Single-Shell Nuclear Waste Storage Tanks

Abstract: A total of 149 tanks out of 177 at the Hanford Site (in Washington State, USA) belong to the first generation of underground nuclear waste storage tanks known as single shell tanks (SSTs). These tanks were constructed between 1943 and 1964 and are well beyond their design life. All the SSTs had been removed from active service by November 1980 and have been later interim stabilized by removing the pumpable liquids. The remaining waste in the tanks is in the form of salt cake and sludge awaiting r permanent disposal.. The evaluation of the structural integrity of these tanks is of utmost importance not only for the continued safe storage of the waste until waste retrieval and closure, but also to assure safe retrieval and closure operations. This article discusses the structural analysis approach, modeling challenges and issues encountered during the ongoing analysis of record (AOR) for evaluating the structural integrity of the SSTs. There are several geometrical and material nonlinearities and uncertainties to be dealt with while performing the modern finite element analysis of these tanks. Several studies were conducted to refine the models in order to minimize modeling artifacts introduced by soil arching, boundary effects, concrete cracking, and concrete-soil interface behavior. The analysis takes into account the temperature history of the tanks and allowable mechanical operating loads of these tanks for proper estimation of creep strains and thermal degradation of material properties. The loads imposed in the AOR models also include anticipated loads that these tanks may see during waste retrieval and closure. Due to uncertainty in a number of inputs to the models, sensitivity studies were conducted to address questions related to the boundary conditions to realistically or conservatively represent the influence of surrounding tanks in a tank farm, the influence of backfill excavation slope, the extent of backfill and the total extent of undisturbed soil surrounding the backfill. The article also discusses the criteria and design standards used for evaluating the structural integrity of these underground concrete tanks. Because of the non-availability of complete data on the thermal and operating history for many of the individual tanks, some of the data was assumed or interpolated. However, the models developed for the analysis of record represent the bounding scenarios and include the worst and extreme loading cases that the tanks were subjected to or anticipated. The modeling refinement techniques followed in the AOR resulted in conservative estimates for force and moment demands at various sections in the concrete tanks. The SSTs are classified into 4 types as per their configuration and capacity. This article discusses the modeling aspects related to two types of SSTs that have been analyzed until now. The TOLA results combined with seismic demands from seismic analysis for the analysis of record indicate that the tanks analyzed are structurally stable as per the evaluation criteria established. These results are presented in a separate article. The modeling techniques, methodology and evaluation criteria developed for evaluating the structural integrity of SSTs at Hanford are in general applicable to any similar tanks or underground concrete storage structures.

Single Shell Tank, Structural analysis, Structural↗

Refinement of Modeling Techniques for the Structural Evaluation of Hanford Single-Shell Nuclear Waste Storage Tanks

ABSTRACT Several tanks at the Hanford Site (in Washington State, USA) belong to the first generation of underground nuclear waste storage tanks known as single shell tanks (SSTs). These tanks were constructed between 1943 and 1964 and are well beyond their design life. This article discusses the structural analysis approach and modeling challenges encountered during the ongoing analysis of record (AOR) for evaluating the structural integrity of the SSTs. There are several geometrical and material nonlinearities and uncertainties to be dealt with while performing the modern finite element analysis of these tanks. The analysis takes into account the temperature history of the tanks and allowable mechanical operating loads of these tanks for proper estimation of creep strains and thermal degradation of material properties. The loads prescribed in the AOR models also include anticipated loads that these tanks may see during waste retrieval and closure. Due to uncertainty in a number of inputs to the models, sensitivity studies were conducted to address questions related to the boundary conditions to realistically or conservatively represent the influence of surrounding tanks in a tank farm, the influence of backfill excavation slope, the extent of backfill and the total extent of undisturbed soil surrounding the backfill. Because of the limited availability of data on the thermal and operating history for many of the individual tanks, some of the data was assumed or interpolated. However, the models developed for the analysis of record represent the bounding scenarios and include the loading conditions that the tanks were subjected to or anticipated. The modeling refinement techniques followed in the AOR resulted in conservative estimates for force and moment demands at various sections in the concrete tanks. This article discusses the modeling aspects related to Type-II and Type-III SSTs. The modeling techniques, methodology and evaluation criteria developed for evaluating the structural integrity of SSTs at Hanford are in general applicable to any similar tanks or underground concrete storage structures.

Waste Managament, Single Shell Tanks, Structural E↗

Structural Integrity Program for the 300,000-Gallon Radioactive Liquid Waste Storage Tanks at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center

This report provides a record of the Structural Integrity Program for the 300,000-gal liquid waste storage tanks and associated equipment at the Idaho Nuclear Technology and Engineering Center, as required by U.S. Department of Energy M 435.1-1, “Radioactive Waste Management Manual.” This equipment is known collectively as the Tank Farm Facility. This report is an update, and replaces the previous report by the same title issued April 2003. The conclusion of this report is that the Tank Farm Facility tanks, vaults, and transfer systems that remain in service for storage are structurally adequate, and are expected to remain structurally adequate over the remainder of their planned service life through 2012. Recommendations are provided for continued monitoring of the Tank Farm Facility.

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CORROSION MONITORING IN HANFORD NUCLEAR WASTE STORAGE TANKS DESIGN AND DATA FROM 241-AN-102 MULTI-PROBE CORROSION MONITORING SYSTEM

In 2008, a new Multi-Probe Corrosion Monitoring System (MPCMS) was installed in double-shell tank 241-AN-102 on the U.S. Department of Energy's Hanford Site in Washington State. Developmental design work included laboratory testing in simulated tank 241-AN-102 waste to evaluate metal performance for installation on the MPCMS as secondary metal reference electrodes. The MPCMS design includes coupon arrays as well as a wired probe which facilitates measurement of tank potential as well as corrosion rate using electrical resistance (ER) sensors. This paper presents the MPCMS design, field data obtained following installation of the MPCMS in tank 241-AN-102, and a comparison between laboratory potential data obtained using simulated waste and tank potential data obtained following field installation.

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Application of QMU to the design of a nuclear waste storage tank

Defining the reliability of complex physical systems is crucial for system certification and guaranteeing safety, but is often complicated by the presence of many uncertainties and system sub-components. One such example is the certification of the Hanford Waste Treatment Plant, where radioactive and toxic chemical waste that spontaneously generates flammable gases is stored in large tanks. We introduce the QMU methodology to quantify the system safety of waste storage tanks in the event of a loss of tank ventilation, which poses a safety risk to workers. We also show how QMU can be used as a design tool to find operating regimes that maintain a desired confidence level. A simplified physical model is used to analyze the build-up of hydrogen gas in storage tanks and conduct an uncertainty propagation study to quantify the operating margin with respect to the flammability conditions. A demonstration problem is shown in which the radiation loading in a waste tank is iteratively modified until a desired confidence ratio is achieved. The results show that the resulting designs are sensitive to the use of interval or full QMU to achieve a confidence ratio, and it is not always possible to realize a design at a particular confidence ratio.

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SAVANNAH RIVER SITE INCIPIENT SLUDGE MIXING IN RADIOACTIVE LIQUID WASTE STORAGE TANKS DURING SALT SOLUTION BLENDING

This paper is the second in a series of four publications to document ongoing pilot scale testing and computational fluid dynamics (CFD) modeling of mixing processes in 85 foot diameter, 1.3 million gallon, radioactive liquid waste, storage tanks at Savannah River Site (SRS). Homogeneous blending of salt solutions is required in waste tanks. Settled solids (i.e., sludge) are required to remain undisturbed on the bottom of waste tanks during blending. Suspension of sludge during blending may potentially release radiolytically generated hydrogen trapped in the sludge, which is a safety concern. The first paper (Leishear, et. al. [1]) presented pilot scale blending experiments of miscible fluids to provide initial design requirements for a full scale blending pump. Scaling techniques for an 8 foot diameter pilot scale tank were also justified in that work. This second paper describes the overall reasons to perform tests, and documents pilot scale experiments performed to investigate disturbance of sludge, using non-radioactive sludge simulants. A third paper will document pilot scale CFD modeling for comparison to experimental pilot scale test results for both blending tests and sludge disturbance tests. That paper will also describe full scale CFD results. The final paper will document additional blending test results for stratified layers in salt solutions, scale up techniques, final full scale pump design recommendations, and operational recommendations. Specifically, this paper documents a series of pilot scale tests, where sludge simulant disturbance due to a blending pump or transfer pump are investigated. A principle design requirement for a blending pump is UoD, where Uo is the pump discharge nozzle velocity, and D is the nozzle diameter. Pilot scale test results showed that sludge was undisturbed below UoD = 0.47 ft{sup 2}/s, and that below UoD = 0.58 ft{sup 2}/s minimal sludge disturbance was observed. If sludge is minimally disturbed, hydrogen will not be released. Installation requirements were also determined for a transfer pump which will remove tank contents, and which is also required to not disturb sludge. Testing techniques and test results for both types of pumps are presented.

08 HYDROGEN↗

Review of Mercury in the SRS Tank Waste Storage and Treatment Processes for Applicability to Hanford Waste Processing

The Savannah River Site (SRS) and Hanford produced large quantities of plutonium and other radioisotopes. The separations processes recovered plutonium and produced large quantities of High- Level Waste (HLW) that accumulated at each site in large, underground storage tanks. SRS has been retrieving the stored HLW, pretreating the waste for immobilization, and immobilizing the waste in glass or grout waste forms since the mid-1990s. Treatment of the waste at Hanford is expected to start in the early 2020s. Mercury is present in both the SRS and Hanford tank waste. SRS has recently completed an evaluation of mercury speciation throughout the tank waste treatment and immobilization flowsheet. This study was reviewed to determine what information from the study can be applied to the Hanford tank waste treatment program.

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Refinement of Modeling Techniques for the Structural Evaluation of Hanford Single-Shell Nuclear Waste Storage Tanks - 12288

The single-shell tanks at the Hanford Site (in Washington State, USA) were constructed between 1943 and 1964 and are well beyond their estimated 25 year design life. This article discusses the structural analysis approach and modeling challenges encountered during the ongoing analysis of record for evaluating the structural integrity of the single-shell tanks. There are several geometrical and material nonlinearities and uncertainties to be dealt with while performing the modern finite element analysis of these tanks. The analysis takes into account the temperature history of the tanks and allowable mechanical operating loads for proper estimation of creep strains and thermal degradation of material properties. The loads prescribed in the analysis of record models also include anticipated loads that may occur during waste retrieval and closure. Due to uncertainty in a number of modeling details, sensitivity studies were conducted to address questions related to boundary conditions that realistically or conservatively represent the influence of surrounding tanks in a tank farm, the influence of backfill excavation slope, the extent of backfill and the total extent of undisturbed soil surrounding the backfill. Because of the limited availability of data on the thermal and operating history for many of the individual tanks, some of the data was assumed or interpolated. However, the models developed for the analysis of record represent the bounding scenarios and include the loading conditions that the tanks were subjected to or anticipated. The modeling refinement techniques followed in the analysis of record resulted in conservative estimates for force and moment demands at various sections in the concrete tanks. This article discusses the modeling aspects related to Type-II and Type-III single-shell tanks. The modeling techniques, methodology and evaluation criteria developed for evaluating the structural integrity of single-shell tanks at Hanford are in general applicable to other similar tanks or underground concrete storage structures. This article presented the details of the finite element models and analysis approach followed during the ongoing effort to establish structural integrity of single shell tanks at the Hanford site. The details of the material constitutive models applicable to the underground Hanford concrete tanks that capture the thermal and creep induce degradation are also presented. The thermal profiles were developed based on the available tank temperature data for the Type II and Type III single-shell tanks, and they were chosen to yield conservative demands under the thermal and operating loads analysis of these tanks. Sensitivity studies were conducted to address two issues regarding the soils modeled around the single-shell tanks. The results indicate that excluding the boundary separating the backfill soil from the undisturbed soil will result in conservative demands (plots 14b and 14c green lines for circumferential Demand/Capacity ratios). The radial extent study indicated that the soil model extending to 240 ft gave more conservative results than the model with 62 ft of soil (plots 17a and 17c magenta lines for hoop Demand/Capacity ratios). Based on these results, a 240 ft far-field soil boundary with backfill throughout the lateral extent was recommended and used for the finite element models used in the Type-II and Type-III analyses of record. The modeling effort and sensitivity studies discussed in this article helped in developing bounding models for the structural integrity evaluation of single shell tanks at the Hanford site. (authors)

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Corrosion Control Measures For Liquid Radioactive Waste Storage Tanks At The Savannah River Site

The Savannah River Site has stored radioactive wastes in large, underground, carbon steel tanks for approximately 60 years. An assessment of potential degradation mechanisms determined that the tanks may be vulnerable to nitrate- induced pitting corrosion and stress corrosion cracking. Controls on the solution chemistry and temperature of the wastes are in place to mitigate these mechanisms. These controls are based upon a series of experiments performed using simulated solutions on materials used for construction of the tanks. The technical bases and evolution of these controls is presented in this paper.

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The Performance of Underground Radioactive Waste Storage Tanks at the Savannah River Site: A 60-Year Historical Perspective

The Savannah River Site produced weapons-grade materials for nearly 35 years between 1953 and 1988. The legacy of this production is nearly 37 million gallons of radioactive waste. Since the 1950s, the liquid waste has been stored in large, underground carbon steel waste tanks. During the past 20 years, the site has begun to process the waste so that it may be stored in vitrified and grout forms, which are more suitable for long-term storage. Over the history of the site, some tanks have experienced leakage of the waste to the secondary containment. This article is a review of the instances of leakage and corrosion degradation that the tanks and associated equipment have experienced since the first tanks were built. Furthermore, the activities that the site has taken to mitigate the degradation and manage the service life of the tank for its anticipated lifetime are reviewed.

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