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The approach outlined in this paper conservatively bounds the ionospheric errors even for the worst observed ionospheric conditions to date, using data sets taken from the operational receivers in the WAAS reference station network.
The United States’ Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) broadcasts data to facilitate aircraft navigation. This paper examines the spatial dependence of ionospheric disturbances that have threatened the accuracy and reliability of position estimates derived from these data over the period 2000 – 2019. We address two distinct aspects of this spatial dependence: (1) the geographic distribution of these threats, in particular, in relation to geomagnetic latitude, and (2) the geometric dependence of threats relative to the locations of the receiver sites that comprise the WAAS network. We analyze threat distributions in terms of the various means that WAAS employs to mitigate these threats, including the Extreme Storm Detector, the Moderate Storm Detector, local irregularity detectors, and the ionospheric threat model. Distinct distributions are presented for threats occurring in Solar Cycle 23 and those of Solar Cycle 24. To study the geometric dependence of threats on receiver locations, we use as a metric the distance separating a threat from the centroid of the nearest Ncentroid receivers. Large values of this metric identify threats at or beyond the edge of coverage. We conclude by discussing the implications of our results for WAAS operations.
The Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS), an augmentation of the Global Positioning System (GPS), provides safe and reliable use of GPS signals for airline navigation over much of North America. Currently the largest source of positioning error in the system is signal delay caused by the ionosphere. To allow the user to take account of such error, WAAS computes and broadcasts ionospheric vertical delays at a set of regularly-spaced grid points. In addition, WAAS computes and broadcasts a safety-critical integrity bound at each ionospheric grid point (IGP) called the Grid Ionospheric Vertical Error (GIVE). GIVEs are constructed to be sufficiently large to protect the user against positioning error due to the presence of ionospheric irregularity. In the initial operating capability (IOC) of WAAS, the vertical delay estimate at each IGP is determined from a planar fit of neighboring slant delay measurements, projected to vertical using an obliquity factor specified by the standard thin-shell model of the ionosphere. In WAAS Follow-On (WFO) Release 3, however, the vertical delay will be estimated by an established, geo-statistical technique known as kriging. Compared to the planar fit model, the kriging model is found, in general, to match better the observed random structure of the vertical delay. This paper presents the kriging methodology that will be used to estimate the vertical delay and its uncertainty at each IGP, and it assesses the subsequent improvement in WAAS availability enabled by kriging.