Y-12: The Electromagnetic Plant
Y-12 was built as a facility to separate U-235 for the first atomic bomb.
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Y-12 was built as a facility to separate U-235 for the first atomic bomb.
Mercury is present in various forms in the environments. Mercuric compounds, Hg(II) are found predominant species in soil and water, while elemental mercury, Hg0 is the major species in the atmosphere, and organo-mercury is present mostly in food-chain. The speciation of Hg is important to understand its mobility, bioavailability in soils, sediments and biota and potential toxicity on human and environmental health. A catastrophic Hg spill occurred at the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12 Plant) at the Oak Ridge Reservation of the Department of Energy (DOE) in 1960's that contaminated facilities, soil, sediment, surface water, and groundwater within the boundaries of the Y-12 Plant and the downstream environment along the East Fork Poplar Creek (EFPC) at the city of Oak Ridge. It is estimated that 350,000 kg of Hg was released to the environment. The EFPC floodplain soils were reported to contain predominantly cinnabar (HgS) form, but other inorganic and organic Hg species, including Hg0 , HgCl{sub 2}, Hg{sub 2}Cl{sub 2}, HgO and CH{sub 3}Hg{sup +} have been found within the Y-12 Facility boundaries and the 23-km long contaminated EFPC. Over the last 25 years, Hg fluxes from the Y-12 Plant have been reduced by various remediation efforts, nonetheless Hg concentration in water and fish have not declined due to the persistent leaching of Hg from contaminated floodplain soils and sediments. In this work, we performed total elemental analyses and Hg speciation in the floodplain soils and sediments collected along EFPC in Oak Ridge, TN. The objective of the study was to elucidate the distribution of Hg in floodplain soil fractions and the relation with metals including arsenic, copper, zinc and lead. Total elemental; characterization was performed by ICP-MS analysis after with HNO{sub 3} and HF dissolution. Sequential extractions were carried out to extract water-soluble (F1), cation-exchangeable (F2) fractions and those bound to carbonates (F3), reducible oxides (F4) (Mn-oxides), organic matter (F5), amorphous (F6) and crystalline iron oxides (F7) and the residual fraction (F8) containing elemental Hg, non-cinnabar Hg and humic acid-bound Hg. Preliminary studies were conducted with artificially spiked and incubated soils as well as soils contaminated with enriched {sup 200}Hg isotope. The results indicated that Hg is predominantly associated with organic matter, amorphous iron and crystalline oxides and the residual fraction. The total Hg in the first four fractions (F1, F2, F3, and F4) were about 1% of the total Hg, while Hg was found equally bound to organic matter (F5) and crystalline Fe-oxides (F7) that accounted about 20% of total Hg. The Hg associated with amorphous iron oxides (F6) accounted as much as 26% of the total Hg and non-cinnabar Hg accounted about 24% of total Hg (non-cinnabar Hg). The results also indicated positive correlation for As, Cu, Pb and Zn levels with those of Hg. Most As was associated with amorphous Fe-oxides. Cu and Pb were dominant both in organic matter and amorphous oxide fractions. Zn was mostly bound to amorphous Fe-oxide but significant amount of Zn was also found to be associated with organic matter and crystalline Fe-oxides. (authors)
The KENO codes have been used extensively around the world since their initial development in the 1960s. Therefore, a large number and wide range of validation reports have been generated for KENO by a variety of organizations. This section provides a synopsis of recent validation reports generated at ORNL, along with a brief list of some older validation reports generated in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. Some of the oldest reports are not attributed directly to ORNL, as the Y-12 Plant (currently the Y-12 National Security Complex), the K-25 Gaseous Diffusion Plant (now the East Tennessee Technology Park), and the X-10 Site (ORNL) were operated as a single entity.
For many years, chlorofluorocarbons (CFC's) have been used by the Department of Energy's (DOE) Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant in air conditioning and process refrigeration systems. However, Title 6 of the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) and Executive Order 12843 (Procurement Requirements and Policies for Federal Agencies for Ozone Depleting Substances) signed by President Clinton require, as policy, that all federal agencies maximize their use of safe, alternate refrigerants and minimize, where economically practical, the use of Class 1 refrigerants. Unfortunately, many government facilities and industrial plants have no plan or strategy in place to make this changeover, even though their air conditioning and process refrigeration equipment may not be sustainable after CFC production ends December 31, 1995. The Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, has taken an aggressive approach to complying with the CAAA and is working with private industry and other government agencies to solve tough manufacturing and application problems associated with CFC and hydrochlorofluorocarbon (HCFC) alternatives. Y-12 was the first DOE Defense Program (DP) facility to develop a long-range Stratospheric Ozone Protection Plan for refrigerant management for compliance with the CAAA. It was also the first DOE DP facility to complete detailed engineering studies on retrofitting and replacing all air conditioning and process refrigeration equipment to enable operation with alternate refrigerants. The management plan and engineering studies are models for use by other government agencies, manufacturing plants, and private industry. This presentation identifies some of the hidden pitfalls to be encountered in the accelerated phaseout schedule of CFC's and explains how to overcome and prevent these problems. In addition, it outlines the general issues that must be considered when addressing the phase-out of ozone depleting substances and gives some 'lessons learned' by Y-12 from its Refrigerant Management Program. Discussion topics include requirements for developing a refrigerant management plan and establishing priorities for cost-effective compliance with the CAAA, as well as ways in which employees can be empowered to develop a comprehensive refrigerant management plan. The result of this employee empowerment was a cooperative labor-management effort that is beneficial for Y-12, DOE, and the environment.
Building 9204-4 is associated with the Y-12 Plant located on the Oak Ridge Reservation, which was originally developed during World War II. Building 9204-2 (Beta-4) functioned as a uranium enrichment facility during World War II and furthered the plant’s mission of producing enriched uranium for the atomic bomb. Following the Manhattan era, Building 9204-4 functioned as a nuclear weapons production facility. As a Beta processing facility associated with the Manhattan Project, and later serving as the site for the production of nuclear weapon components during the Cold War years. Building 9204-4 aided in the development of wholly new technology and substantially advanced the field of nuclear science. In terms of facility planning, project engineers originally designed all Alpha and Beta buildings with “zero tolerance” for building for movement or settling as the successful operation of the Y-12 Plant’s calutrons depended on absolute structural stability.
Building 9201-5 (Alpha-5) functioned as a uranium enrichment facility during World War II and furthered the plant's mission of producing enriched uranium for the atomic bomb. As an Alpha processing facility associated with the Manhattan Project, Building 9201-5 aided in the development of wholly new technology and substantially advanced the field of nuclear science. In terms of facility planning, project engineers originally designed all Alpha and Beta buildings with "zero tolerance" for building movement or settling as the successful operation of the Y-12 Plant's calutrons depended on absolute structural stability. After World War II, the building was used in the plant’s COLEX process of the 1950s which separated the element Lithium-6 (Li-6). This was an important component in the manufacture of hydrogen bombs and the COLEX process is of notable significance in Cold War history. Building 9201-5 is eligible for inclusion in the National Register.
The thin ~15 in. diameter highly enriched uranium (HEU) metal plates were assembled to delayed criticality at the Oak Ridge Critical Experiments Facility (ORCEF) in 1969 with various thicknesses of polyethylene (varying from 1/16 to 2$\frac{3}{8}$ inches) between uranium metal plates. The average 235 U enrichment was 93.27 wt. %. These unreflected critical configurations contained 4$\frac{2}{3}$ to 20$\frac{5}{6}$ thin 15 in. diameter HEU metal plates (on loan from Los Alamos National Laboratory [LANL] and shipped to Oak Ridge National Laboratory [ORNL] on June 3, 1969). Depending on the thickness of polyethylene, the enriched uranium masses varying from 28,053 to 135,148 grams. Fractional plate sections consisted of the appropriate number of 60° pie sections. In addition to the measurement at delayed criticality, subcritical measurements were also performed by the inverse kinetic rod drop method. Prompt neutron decay constant measurements were also performed by the Rossi alpha and randomly pulsed neutron method using a time-tagged spontaneous fission californium neutron source; these are briefly reported here. At the time of these measurements in 1969, the thin HEU metal plates were in near-pristine condition with extremely little oxidation, allowing better descriptions of the uranium plates than the use of these plates in a heavily oxidized and deteriorated condition in recent reflected benchmark experiments at the LANL facility at the Nevada Test Site with these same thin highly enriched uranium metal plates. This report documents the experimental information for the measurements performed so that later researchers can perform the required uncertainty and calculational analyses and documentation to use these data for an International Nuclear Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Program (ICSBEP) or a Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) benchmark. Data from the experiments described should be acceptable for use as criticality safety benchmark experiments for the ICSBEP and the NEA nuclear criticality safety benchmark program once the uncertainty analysis on the measured neutron multiplication factors is completed. Additional data—such as the dimensional inspection reports, uranium isotopic information, and other relevant particulars—should be retrieved from the Y-12 Plant or LANL and incorporated in the final ICSBEP benchmark. Based on previous ICSBEP benchmarks with this enriched uranium metal at ORCEF, the uncertainties in $k_{eff}$ could be as low as ± 0.0002 for some configurations. Other experiments with smaller-diameter than 15 in. diameter HEU metal plates have been benchmarked in HEU-METFAST-001. The prompt neutron time decay measurements could be the basis for an International Reactor Physics Benchmark Program. Preparation of the present report is part of an effort at ORNL to document more than 15 undocumented critical and subcritical experiments enumerated in ORNL/TM-2019/18 and performed by ORNL at ORCEF and other US Department of Energy critical experiments facilities using more than 500 operational days of critical facility time. This work for this report publication was supported by the Nuclear Criticality, Radiation Transport and Safety NCSP Program at ORNL.
Because of health and environmental concerns, many regulations have been passed in recent years regarding the use of chlorinated solvents. The Oak Ridge Y-12 Plant has had an active program to find alternatives for these solvents used in cleaning applications for the past 7 years. During this time frame, the quantity of solvents purchased has been reduced by 92 percent. The program has been a twofold effort. Vapor degreasers used in batch cleaning operations have been replaced by ultrasonic cleaning with aqueous detergent, and other organic solvents have been identified for use in hand-wiping or specialty operations. In order to qualify these alternatives for use, experimentation was conducted on cleaning ability as well as effects on subsequent operations such as welding, painting, and bonding. Cleaning ability was determined using techniques such as x-ray photoelectron spectroscopy (XPS) and Fourier transform infrared spectroscopy (FTIR) which are capable of examining monolayer levels of contamination on a surface. Solvents have been identified for removal of rust preventative oils, lapping oils, machining coolants, lubricants, greases, and mold releases. Solvents have also been evaluated for cleaning urethane foam spray guns, swelling of urethanes, and swelling of epoxies.
The goal of this project was to conduct an evaluation of F-500 Multi-Purpose Encapsulator Agent for viability as a contamination fixative and fire suppression agent for specific applications related to work performed at the Pantex Plant and Y-12 National Security Complex.
This report contains the groundwater and surface water monitoring data obtained during calendar year (CY) 2019 at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) on the DOE Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) in Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The monitoring data were obtained from wells, springs, and surface water sampling locations in three hydrogeologic regimes at Y-12. The Bear Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (Bear Creek Regime) encompasses a section of Bear Creek Valley (BCV) between the west end of Y-12 and the west end of the Bear Creek Watershed (directions are in reference to the Y-12 grid system, shown as Plant North. The Upper East Fork Poplar Creek Hydrogeologic Regime (East Fork Regime) encompasses the Y-12 industrial facilities and support structures in BCV. The Chestnut Ridge Hydrogeologic Regime (Chestnut Ridge Regime) encompasses a section of Chestnut Ridge directly south of Y-12. Background information in Section 2 of this report outlines the hydrogeologic framework for groundwater and surface water quality monitoring at Y-12 and includes an overview of the groundwater contamination in each hydrogeologic regime. Section 3 provides details regarding the groundwater and surface water sampling and analysis activities implemented under the Y-12 GWPP, including sampling locations and frequency, sample collection and handling, field measurements and laboratory analytes, quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) sampling, data management, and data quality assessment (DQA). However, the equivalent QA/QC or DQA information for the groundwater and surface water data associated with the monitoring programs implemented by UCOR are not included in this report and instead are deferred to referenced programmatic plans and reports issued by OREM and UCOR. Section 4 of this report presents a summary evaluation of the CY 2019 monitoring data with regard to the respective objectives of surveillance monitoring and exit pathway/perimeter monitoring. The evaluation is based primarily on the analytical results for the following principal groundwater contaminants at Y-12: nitrate, uranium, gross alpha activity, gross beta activity, and volatile organic compounds (VOCs). Section 5 summarizes the most significant findings with respect to the principal contaminants along with recommendations for any proposed changes to the ongoing groundwater and surface water quality monitoring performed under the Y-12 GWPP. Technical reports and plans cited in the narrative sections of the report are listed in Section 6. Narrative sections of this report reference several appendices. Figures (maps and diagrams) and data tables (excluding data summary tables incorporated in the narrative sections) are in Appendix A and Appendix B, respectively. Appendix C contains construction details for each well sampled during CY 2019 by either the Y-12 GWPP or UCOR, along with schematic diagrams for wells equipped with Westbay™ multiport sampling equipment or Barcad® pump systems. Appendix D supports the background summary discussion in Section 2 and provides more detailed information about the hydrogeologic framework for groundwater and surface water monitoring at Y-12, including the primary sources of groundwater contamination in each hydrogeologic regime. Results for all field measurements and laboratory analyses obtained by the Y-12 GWPP and UCOR are presented in Appendix E, which also includes the sample numbers for the QA/QC samples associated with groundwater and surface water monitoring performed by the Y-12 GWPP.
The Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) has implemented process modeling for various accountable nuclear materials operations that are performed throughout the plant. Using a discrete, event-based dynamic simulation program, key nuclear material streams are modeled, allowing Y-12 to effectively manage numerous points of interest within the plant’s production operations. Integration of the various material processes into a single, interdependent supply and demand model is one of the ongoing focuses within Y-12’s process modeling effort. The primary purpose of using dynamic simulation modeling is to allow for analysis of the nuclear materials inventories and forecasted supplies based on future demands. Analysis of these inventories includes capacity evaluation, bottleneck mitigation, and assessments of individual pieces of equipment to inform future facility investment decisions and associated project schedules. Modeling of the nuclear materials processes throughout the complex also allows for incorporation of changes relevant to production capabilities such as the upcoming transition of specific operations to the new Uranium Processing Facility. Prior to implementation of process modeling, Y-12 forecasted supply and demand of accountable nuclear materials streams using Microsoft Excel. With deterministic models such as Microsoft Excel, the annual forecasts, generated within data input condition parameters, can only provide a fixed point of data. Fixed data cannot simulate integrated material streams and account for the possibility of occurrences and other changes that dynamic simulations take into consideration. Y-12’s dynamic process modeling allows integrated simulations of multiple accountable nuclear materials processes, including supply and demand forecasting and analysis, and is a coordinated effort involving many steps of verification and validation (V&V), site briefings, testing, reporting, data mining, planning, and documentation that spans various programs throughout the Y-12 complex.
The Nuclear Systems Kilopower Project was initiated by NASA's Space Technology Mission Directorate Game Changing Development Program in fiscal year 2015 to demonstrate subsystem-level technology readiness of small space fission power in a relevant environment (Technology Readiness Level 5) for space science and human exploration power needs. The Nuclear Systems Kilopower Project centerpiece is the Kilopower Reactor Using Stirling Technology (KRUSTY) test, which consists of the development and testing of a fission ground technology demonstrator of a 1 kWe-class fission power system. The technologies to be developed and validated by KRUSTY are extensible to space fission power systems from 1 to 10 kWe, which can enable higher power future potential deep space science missions, as well as modular surface fission power systems for exploration. The Kilopower Project is cofounded by NASA and the Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).KRUSTY include the reactor core, heat pipes to transfer the heat from the core to the power conversion system, and the power conversion system. Los Alamos National Laboratory leads the design of the reactor, and the Y-12 National Security Complex is fabricating it. NASA Glenn Research Center (GRC) has designed, built, and demonstrated the balance of plant heat transfer and power conversion portions of the KRUSTY experiment. NASA MSFC developed an electrical reactor simulator for non-nuclear testing, and the design of the reflector and shielding for nuclear testing. In 2016, an electrically heated non-fissionable Depleted Uranium (DU) core was tested at GRC in a configuration identical to the planned nuclear test. Once the reactor core has been fabricated and shipped to the Device Assembly Facility at the NNSAs Nevada National Security Site, the KRUSTY nuclear experiment will be assembled and tested. Completion of the KRUSTY experiment will validate the readiness of 1 to 10 kWe space fission technology for NASAs future requirements for sunlight-independent space power. An early opportunity for demonstration of In-Situ Resource Utilization (ISRU) capability on the surface of Mars is currently being considered for 2026 launch. Since a space fission system is the leading option for power generation for the first Mars human outpost, a smaller version of a planetary surface fission power system could be built to power the ISRU demonstration and ensure its end-to-end validity. Planning is underway to start the hardware development of this subscale flight demonstrator in 2018.
With threats to nuclear facilities continuously evolving, the development and implementation of insider threat mitigation programs (ITMPs) are increasingly important. The Office of International Nuclear Security (INS) within the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA’s) developed Capability Building Progression of an Insider Threat Mitigation Program at an International Nuclear Power Plant to assist newcomers and existing nuclear power plant (NPP) operators in addressing insider threats and establishing effective response measures for insider activities.
With threats to nuclear facilities continuously evolving, the development and implementation of insider threat mitigation programs is increasingly important. The Office of International Nuclear Security within the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA’s) developed the “Insider Threat Mitigation Program: Facility Implementation Handbook” to assist organizations to be better positioned to minimize the risks posed by malicious insiders. The handbook identified eight elements that contribute to the development and implementation of insider threat mitigation programs. This report outlines the development of a capability building progression of an insider threat mitigation program at international nuclear power plants. This information can be stand-alone or be accompanied by a technical exchange with subject matter experts to support development and implementation of programs with interested international partners.
This report documents the experimental conditions and results for the testing of the Mirion Technologies CAAS-3S Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) for the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) and Uranium Processing Facility (UPF). The testing was conducted at the Godiva IV Burst Reactor at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) during the week of January 11, 2021. The testing was conducted in accordance with 25774-QL-POA-JR00-00002-VDE-27.0, CAAS-3S Radiation Testing of Cabinet Components Test Plan. The tests subjected the CAAS-3S system to intense and short duration mixed neutron and gamma radiation fields and to high integrated radiation doses. The purpose of the test was to environmentally qualify various CAAS-3S components in a radiation environment. Successful completion of the tests was predicated on the collaborative efforts of several organizations. Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) provided dosimetry to estimate photon and neutron dose. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) manages the NCERC facility, operated the Godiva IV reactor, and provided field support for CAAS-3S placement and communications interface for data acquisition systems supplied by Mirion Technologies. Throughout the test campaign, Y-12 and UPF personnel provided technical support in determining changes to the test schedule, as needed, interpretation of the results, and comparison between the measured dosimetry data and predicted results. Throughout the test campaign, Mirion personnel provided technical support in the operation of the CAAS-3S system itself.
Nuclear criticality experiments are essential to the validation of nuclear data used in simulation software. The quality of nuclear data becomes paramount as simulation software becomes more relied upon for criticality safety studies and designs of nuclear systems. To improve the quality of nuclear data, experimenters can design critical experiments that are sensitive to isotope reaction pairs in materials of interest. The efforts conducted by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development - Nuclear Energy Agency (OECD-NEA) Working Party on Nuclear Criticality Safety (WPNCS) Subgroup 8: Preservation of Expert Knowledge and Judgement Applied to Criticality Benchmarks (SG8) to categorize benchmarks according to their usefulness for nuclear data validation have been of great importance. Based on the OECD studies benchmark experiments included in the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) Handbook are concisely used by nuclear data evaluators, criticality safety engineers and others to validate nuclear data and simulation results. A lack of benchmarks sensitive to molybdenum in the (ICSBEP), particularly in the intermediate range, was noted by Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), the French Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN), and Y-12 National Security Site prompting them to submit a joint integral experiment request to the Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) in 2019. The request included both HEU and Plutonium systems in order to validate differential nuclear data focusing on the intermediate energy range but also includes thermal and fast configurations. This document represents the preliminary design work for a series of molybdenum integral experiments known as Molybdenum Optimized Benchmark System Demonstrating Integral Correlations (MOBY DICK).
Completion of the originally planned critical facility has been considered as part of the High Flux Isotope Reactor (HFIR) Sustaining and Enhancing Neutron Science Initiative at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL). A working group of ORNL staff members was formed to develop the idea and to recommend one or more configurations to best support future HFIR operations and scientific capacities. HFIR was designed with a critical pool in the reactor bay that was projected to be outfitted as a critical facility. The primary purpose of the planned critical facility was to measure the subcritical worth of fresh fuel elements to support startup requirements. However, the Y-12 National Security Complex already housed a critical facility that was used for this purpose. This report presents the working group’s efforts, including determination of the proposed critical facility’s high-impact benefits. A generic low-power critical facility would be employed for reactor physics measurements, code and data validation, reactor operator and staff training, and education. This facility would be instrumental in supporting current HFIR operations, conversion of HFIR to low-enriched uranium, existing light water reactor operations, and advanced reactor development and deployment.
This panel discussion addressed the current efforts to develop an integrated strategy for managing the mercury (Hg) challenges across the DOE complex, including challenges in remediation of Hg contamination and related ongoing or planned technology development efforts across the EM complex. Panel members discussed opportunities for collaboration in defining and implementing a mercury management strategy for the various sites, national laboratories, and contractors and for all to provide technical information for DOE to develop an integrated, cost effective Hg management strategy. Emphasis of the panel was placed on challenges at the Oak Ridge Reservation and the Savannah River Site. Opening remarks were made by Ming Zhu. Ming stated that the Academy of Sciences recently released a report on the challenges of addressing Hg in the environment; the report leveraged recent remedial efforts. Presentations proposed include: 1 - Approach to Addressing Mercury at Y-12 (Brian Henry, US DOE OREM (USA)); 2 - Mercury Management Strategy (Renee Echols, FireWater Associates, LLC (USA)); 3 - Integration of Science to Address Mercury Clean-up Challenge (Eric Pierce, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (USA)); 4 - Mercury Related Research and Development by CRESP (Kevin Brown, Vanderbilt University - CRESP (USA)); 5 - Lessons Learned from D and D of West COLEX (Kent Fortenberry, UCOR (USA)); 6 - Mercury in the SRS Liquid Waste System (Richard Edwards, Savannah River Remediation (USA)); 7 - TDD Program on Mercury at Savannah River (Bill Wilmarth, Savannah River National Laboratory (USA))