Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “Zero Trust Architecture”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

15 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2024

Designing a Comprehensive IDS Strategy for a Zero Trust Architecture Environment

Zero Trust Architecture or ZTA is a cybersecurity model for enterprises to structure their networked resources around to maintain total security externally and internally. In a Zero Trust environment, no part of the network is considered "trustworthy" and thus should be scrutinized and monitored extensively as is done in traditional "Trust But Verify" schemes at the network's perimeter. In this way, Zero Trust Architecture is a superior model for securing access to networked resources at the enterprise level. Fermilab, in pursuit of a better security posture, has decided to embrace this model of architecture for its network. Attaining this goal requires tremendous infrastructural, policy, and procedural adjustments that will affect all the lab's personnel and resources.

D'Antonio, Lucas↗
NASA NTRS2021

Accessible Telemetry Streams using a Zero Trust Architecture for the Flight Operations Directorate

As a result of information technology based work becoming increasingly distributed, unique challenges have been presented within the realm of defined network perimeters, namely with respect to secure access to resources. Historically, and from a simplistic abstract perspective, the common approach has been to adopt the, so-called, moat model whereby a physical network perimeter (or interconnected perimeters) is defined to encapsulate resources behind a boundary protected by a firewall. Users are provisioned access through a virtual private network (VPN) and may be further constrained to resources through specific firewall allow and disallow rulesets. Virtual Private Networks and firewall rulesets lead to common problems, particularly at scale and, as a result, perimeter-less architectures provided over the public internet are increasingly becoming prevalent, particularly with its more popular implementation, the Zero Trust Architecture. We present a proposed implementation of the Zero Trust Architecture with a particular concrete example utilizing a de-perimeterized network that requires authentication and authorization for each action between nodes and does not operate within an implicit trust boundary. It should be noted that this paper is not an attempt at providing comprehensive resolutions for the specific problem space with respect to perimeter based security and is more directed at providing information with regard to our proposed implementation of a Zero Trust Architecture for the Flight Operations Directorate. We direct the reader to our Introduction and Background section for more details on specific documentation and where it can be located as it relates to de-perimeterization and Zero Trust.

Paul Shoemaker↗
DOE OSTI2024

The Design and Evaluation of Zero Trust Architecture for Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure: EVs @ Scale Series on EV Charging Station Cybersecurity

Implementing a zero trust architecture can significantly bolster the security of electric vehicle (EV) charging infrastructure. EV charging infrastructure includes numerous networked interfaces, each of which can present potential vulnerabilities. When these vulnerabilities are exploited, they can compromise the entire system, leading to severe operational and security risks. Zero trust is a security model that operates on the principle of "never trust, always verify," which helps manage the attack surface and limit the scope of any potential compromises. Fundamentally, this model ensures that no entity, whether inside or outside the network, is trusted by default. The design principles of zero trust include continuous verification, strict deny-by-default access controls, and micro-segmentation. Continuous verification ensures that every request is thoroughly checked, regardless of its origin. Strict access controls enforce the principle of least privilege, allowing users and devices only the minimum necessary access to perform their functions. Micro-segmentation involves dividing the network into smaller, isolated segments to prevent lateral movement in case of a breach. In the context of EV charging infrastructure, zero trust can be implemented through various strategies. For example, multi-factor authentication (MFA) can be required for engineers to access the management interfaces and control systems of charging stations. Real-time monitoring and analysis of network traffic can help detect and respond to anomalies. Systems that do not need to communicate with each other can be micro-segmented to enhance security. All communications should adhere to predefined policies to be permitted. Additionally, encrypting communications can protect sensitive information exchanged between chargers and management systems. This paper presents a zero trust architecture specifically designed for EV charging infrastructure. Implementing zero trust not only mitigates risks but also builds a resilient infrastructure capable of withstanding and quickly recovering from cyber threats. The architecture addresses six defined security objectives. A comprehensive test plan is developed to assess the architecture against these objectives, and the results of the evaluation are reported. This approach is essential for maintaining the reliability and integrity of EV charging services in an increasingly interconnected and vulnerable digital landscape. This is the first in a planned series of papers exploring the implementation of zero trust in EV charging infrastructure. Each paper will delve into different aspects and applications of zero trust, highlighting how various work processes and requirements can lead to distinct architectural designs. These architectures will be tailored to address specific security challenges and operational needs within the EV charging ecosystem, ensuring a robust and adaptable security framework.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Zero-Trust Architecture for Autonomous Edge Computing

We are at the apex of an aviation revolution where autonomy will play a central role in enabling complex, multi-agent systems to communicate, interact, and collaborate on a myriad of applications spanning autonomous swarms to wild-fire management. Autonomy is not an absolute but rather a spectrum ranging from a system requiring significant human intervention to one requiring little to none [1]. For example, the extreme, in the case of an autonomous aircraft, is one that operates independently in the airspace interacting with all other elements (air traffic controllers, other pilots) as if it were a human pilot. Critical to this vision is an architecture that enables autonomous agents to interact with minimal latency. Edge computing is an emerging architecture where compute and storage is pushed to the ‘edge’ of the network in order to minimize the round-trip time from agent to resource thereby mitigating the latency associated with cloud-only based approaches. Additionally, services can generate massive amounts of data (e.g., video feeds), which may require analysis in near real-time. Moving this data to the cloud for further processing may not be feasible due to latency, bandwidth, and cost. Privacy, security, and reliability can also be improved by edge computing architectures. However, this geo-distributed and dynamic* architecture complicates the establishment of unambiguous network security boundaries and can lead to vulnerabilities including man in the middle attacks, replay attacks, physical security breaches of edge nodes, signal interception, etc. This motivates the need for zero-trust architectures [2–4] which de-emphasize the notion of static network perimeters and, as the name implies, do not instill any innate trust in any particular agent. It is required that all agents must be authorized and approved in every transaction. In this paper, we present a zero-trust architecture suitable for edge-computing applications that demand significant low-latency, security, privacy, and reliability.

zero trust↗
DOE OSTI2024

Cybersecurity Considerations for Emerging Energy Technologies

AI, cloud computing, post-quantum cryptography, zero-trust architectures, microgrids, and virtual power plants. What do these things have in common? They are all emerging technologies in the clean energy space that will be a critical part of grid modernization efforts. As we work towards clean energy and decarbonization targets, these technologies, developed to solve real-world problems, will help us reach goals and achieve new efficiencies as the paradigm of grid operation shifts. However, there are growing concerns about the cybersecurity risks associated with these trending topics as they are used in critical infrastructure applications. This talk will cover gaps, challenges, and opportunities for the secure implementation of grid modernization solutions and novel energy applications of state-of-the-art networking and communications. Proactive risk mitigation strategies, including the application of cyber-informed engineering, will be discussed. Practical applications of these techniques will help provide countermeasures to the impact of cyberattacks on critical infrastructure technologies in a new, digitized grid landscape.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2025

Braxton Marlatt Intern Poster

The Internet of Things (IoT) encompasses a vast network of interconnected devices embedded with software, sensors, and network connectivity, enabling data collection and exchange. While IoT technology revolutionizes various industries, it also introduces significant security challenges. This research focuses on enhancing IoT security through the implementation of Zero Trust Architecture concepts, specifically targeting the Network and Device pillars of the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency’s Zero Trust Maturity Model. By generating Codified Attack Surfaces (CAS) using custom Structured Threat Information eXpression bundles, this project aims to provide enhanced visibility into network communications, detect vulnerabilities in device firmware, and improve the overall security posture for IoT devices and networks. The methodology involves defining custom STIX schema and objects, collecting data from intra-IoT traffic, external network traffic, and firmware analysis, and automating the conversion and correlation of this data into STIX bundles. The automated generation of attack surfaces offers comprehensive insights into activity, vulnerabilities, and anomalies within an IoT environment, enabling proactive threat identification and mitigation.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

Zero Trust Strategies for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Detection Systems: D.1 Cyber Scenarios

The evolving landscape of cybersecurity necessitates a paradigm shift to a Zero Trust (ZT) model, which assumes breaches and continuously verifies trust. This approach reshapes how trust boundaries are established, focusing on identities, devices, networks, applications, and data, rather than solely relying on perimeter defenses such as firewalls. Central to this transformation is the National Institute of Standards and Technology's (NIST) Special Publication 800-207, outlining the Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA), along with Executive Order 14028, which mandates federal agencies to adopt ZT principles. Complementary to these efforts, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) developed the Zero Trust Maturity Model (ZTMM), providing a framework with five pillars and three cross-cutting capabilities to guide agencies toward enhanced cybersecurity maturity. In support of these initiatives, the DHS Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) is applying ZT principles to secure Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) detection systems. Recognizing the diverse deployment models and network connectivity of these systems—from stationary, non-networked units to mobile, cloud-connected devices—the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing cybersecurity scenarios specifically for CBRN environments. These scenarios examine various configurations and technological capabilities, offering insights into the application of ZTMM pillars in enhancing the security postures of CBRN devices. The cybersecurity scenarios presented by PNNL are hypothetical, crafted to explore theoretical situations and stimulate discussion on the potential use or compromise of CBRN detection systems in varied contexts. These narratives are illustrative and do not reference any real events or actual networks. Instead, they employ generalized reference models to highlight concepts and potential issues within CBRN security, focusing on how Zero Trust strategies can be adapted to address these challenges effectively.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

Formally Verified ZTA Requirements for OT/ICS Environments with Isabelle/HOL

The clean energy transformation includes the integration of distributed energy resources with the power grid, which has led to a substantial increase in the complexity of power grids infrastructure and the underlying operational technology environment. Power grids infrastructure represents an operational technology environment that has become a system of systems, integrating heterogeneous devices which are both software-and hardware-intensive; as a result, there are increasing demands to exploit advances in the commodity of software-hardware infrastructures to improve energy systems requirements such as cybersecurity and resilience. In such a setting, system requirements at different levels mix, which leads to vulnerabilities and undesirable outcomes. The use of formal methods to characterize and prove system requirements removes ambiguity, increases automation, and provides high levels of assurance and reliability. In this paper, we contribute a methodology and a framework for the system-level verification of zero trust architecture requirements in operational technology environments. We define a formal specification for the core functionalities of operational technology environments, the corresponding invariants, and security proofs. Of particular note is our modular approach for the formal verification of asynchronous interactions in operational technology environments. The formal specification and the proofs have been mechanized using the interactive theorem proving environment Isabelle/HOL.

formal methods↗
DOE OSTI2025

GridSTIX

SF-25-112 Grid-STIX is a comprehensive extension of the STIX (Structured Threat Information Expression) 2.1 ontology specifically designed for electrical grid cybersecurity applications. This ontology provides a standardized, machine-readable framework for modeling grid assets, operational technology devices, threats, vulnerabilities, supply chain risks, and security relationships in electrical power systems. ## Key Features - **Comprehensive Grid Coverage**: Physical assets, OT devices, grid components, sensors, and energy storage systems - **Zero Trust Architecture**: Policy decision points, enforcement points, trust brokers, and continuous monitoring - **AMI Infrastructure**: Advanced metering networks, head-end systems, mesh gateways, and MDM systems - **Advanced Security Modeling**: Attack patterns, vulnerabilities, mitigations, and supply chain risks - **Critical Grid Relationships**: Power flow, protection, control, and synchronization relationships - **Supply Chain Security**: Supplier modeling, country of origin tracking, and risk assessment - **Protocol Support**: DNP3, Modbus, IEC 61850, IEC 60870-5-104, OPC-UA, and IEEE standards - **Python Code Generation**: Automated STIX-compliant Python class generation from ontologies - **Interactive Visualization**: Enhanced HTML network graphs with grid-specific categorization - **STIX 2.1 Compliance**: Full compatibility with STIX threat intelligence ecosystem

Blakely, Benjamin [Argonne National Laboratory (AN↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Zero Trust and Identity Access Management in Support of Service-Based Urban Air Mobility Applications

Urban Air Mobility environments will contain of a collection of service-based services, which will be typically hosted within cloud infrastructures. The underlying data for these UAM services will need to be secured. One approach to securing these UAM services would be to leverage the Zero Trust framework, that focuses on securing services and associated data, instead of securing the network. An early step in moving towards a Zero Trust framework is to standardize identity access manage support for an ever-widening set of services, where users must explicitly be granted access to each service.

UAM↗
DOE OSTI2024

A Privacy-Preserving Cyber Threat Intelligence Sharing System

Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) is a key resource for developing defensive strategies against potential cyber adversaries. Entities typically access CTI through open-source platforms, national agencies, or specialized commercial services. However, the bi-directional exchange of CTI is hindered by organizational trust boundaries, which complicate the sharing processes between entities and CTI providers. Centralized CTI services benefit from receiving suspicious cyber observables such as IP addresses, domain names, and email addresses from various entities. The aggregation allows for the correlation of widespread adversarial activities to enhance the alert and response mechanisms across the network of involved parties. Despite these benefits, openly sharing such observables incurs potential legal, regulatory, and reputational risks for the disclosing entities.This paper introduces a system designed to facilitate the secure exchange of cyber observables across trust boundaries without compromising the anonymity of the sharing entities. Here, we propose an architecture that leverages common web protocols alongside zero-knowledge proofs to authenticate members while maintaining anonymity. Additionally, we outline a privacy model tailored for STIX (Structured Threat Information eXpression) cyber observables to minimize the risk of inadvertently disclosing private information. Through our threat models, we assess the privacy implications of our proposed system and demonstrate its potential to enhance collaborative cyber defense efforts without exposing entities to undue risk.

BBS+ Signatures↗
DOE OSTI2025

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Zero Trust Framework: CWMD Zero Trust Principles Model

The research focuses on the critical need for enhanced cybersecurity within the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) Office, specifically targeting Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear devices. Traditional perimeter-based security models are insufficient against modern cyber threats, prompting a shift toward Zero Trust principles (ZTP) that emphasize continuous verification and stringent security for all devices. Federal directives mandate the adoption of Zero Trust (ZT) across agencies, supported by guidelines from National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and National Security Agency (NSA). The research involved mapping ZT guidance from these agencies to develop tailored CWMD ZTP. The study identified gaps and areas for improvement, including clear transitional guidance from traditional to ZT architectures and the focus on explicit cross cutting capabilities. Design improvements are recommended to ensure increased comprehensive protection and resilience against sophisticated cyber threats for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) devices. Collaborative efforts among federal agencies are essential for the successful deployment of an optimized ZT guidance.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2026

Building a Trusted Roaming Hub [Slides]

The Trusted Roaming Hub is a U.S. Department of Energy-backed initiative led by the National Laboratory of the Rockies (NLR) to address one of the most persistent challenges in electric vehicle (EV) charging: fragmented roaming, inconsistent interoperability, and insufficient digital trust across charging networks. As EV adoption accelerates and charging infrastructure scales nationwide, today's many-to-many integration model between eMobility Service Providers (eMSPs) and Charge Point Operators (CPOs) has become increasingly brittle, costly, and difficult to secure. The Trusted Roaming Hub introduces a neutral, cybersecurity-forward "switchboard" architecture that enables standardized, secure, and scalable roaming interactions across the EV charging ecosystem. Rather than replacing existing networks or commercial relationships, the hub acts as a trusted intermediary that enforces consistent identity, authentication, authorization, and routing across participants improving reliability for drivers, lowering integration burden for industry, and creating a foundation for future grid-interactive charging services. This read-ahead provides an overview of the problem the hub is designed to solve, the core functional and security concepts behind the architecture, the value proposition to key stakeholders, and the near-term trajectory of the work.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Zapiary: Creating Visibility in IOT Networks

Zigbee and Z-Wave are the main networking protocols used by low-power Internet of Things (IOT) devices. These protocols use low frequencies. Mesh architecture, and unique address formats that make them not compatible with traditional network traffic tools like IX-Discovery Tools. Zapiary is a software that takes CSV files with Zigbee and Z-Wave traffic and generates Structured Threat Information eXpression (STIX) JSON bundles illustrating the communication within IOT networks. The bundles can then be viewed within Structured Threat Intelligence Graph (STIG) or used with AI/ML models to provide deeper visibility into nodes that make up the network and the ability to trend the mesh network over time.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2026

EVs-at-RISC: A Secure and Resilient Interoperable SCM Control System Architecture for Electric Vehicle’s-at-Scale (Final Technical Report)

The EVs-at-RISC project was a five-year research, development, and demonstration initiative to create foundational tools for utility-scale fleet aggregation and Smart Charge Management (SCM) of Electric Vehicles (EV), Electric Vehicle Charging Infrastructure (EVCI), and related Distributed Energy Resources (DER). Rather than seeking to develop and demonstrate highly perfected SCM algorithms and control strategies, this project instead focused on creating foundational software solutions that enable unprecedented digital interoperability across the communications technologies and vendor platforms used to manage EV , EVCI, and DER, as well as existing energy management infrastructure operated by utilities, grid operators, and aggregators. This project then extends these novel interoperability capabilities to develop and deploy powerful middleware abstractions across grid edge networks and EVCI/DER fleet aggregations incorporating modern software tools and best practices, such as CI/CD, to bring the immense capabilities of infrastructure-as-code and policy-as-code to modern grid edge network environments. This addresses the foremost systemic issues preventing realization of any net operational benefits from scaled deployment of behind-the-meter EV, EVCI, and DER assets in electric power grids and markets today. The results of this approach and project unlock massive potential for new SCM capabilities to be easily prototyped, evaluated, and deployed at-scale within the existing grid edge network infrastructure and EVCI/DER technology ecosystem. The EVs-at-RISC project achieves this by extending Open Field Message Bus (OpenFMB), a conceptual model for digital interoperability and distributed intelligence in traditional front-of-meter utility SCADA networks, validating our hypothesis that OpenFMB could be similarly used to solve systemic digital interoperability issues in behind-the-meter environments and unlock real-world utility-scale SCM capabilities without requiring any new proprietary vendor solutions or significant infrastructure reconfiguration.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗