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Enhanced Evaluation Criteria to Meet the WIPP Waste Acceptance Criteria - 18655

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) is a deep geologic repository for the disposal of Transuranic (TRU) waste and the only such disposal facility of its kind. TRU waste is radioactive mixed waste generated by the U. S. Department of Energy in support of National Defense. In 2014, the WIPP facility was shut down when two separate accidents occurred in the repository. The two accidents were a fire on a large underground haul truck that prompted evacuation and filled the mine with smoke and soot, and a radiation release that contaminated the exhaust ventilation and disposal areas of the mine. DOE performed two accident investigations in 2014 that resulted in many corrective actions. Some of the corrective actions resulted in significant changes in the WIPP Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) and are required to be applied to all TRU waste upon the resumption of shipments to WIPP. WIPP re-opened and began taking shipments again in 2017 and a large backlog of over 25,000 TRU waste containers that were certified prior to the new WAC have been undergoing re-evaluation since the re-opening. This paper will focus on the new WAC criteria that TRU waste must meet above-and-beyond previous WAC criteria and the implementation of new processes for approval. The primary area for these changes is in the area of waste characterization using Acceptable Knowledge (AK) and new detailed analyses required for chemical compatibility. The accident investigation revealed that the radiation release was due to a thermal runaway and bursting of the waste container due to inadvertent mixtures of nitrates and combustibles resulting in ignitable waste forms. In other words, the TRU waste container had incompatible contents that went undiscovered and created a hazard characteristic that was prohibited at WIPP. Through detailed chemical compatibility evaluations and new oversight, the DOE should be able to prevent a similar accident (see Figure 1). The new chemical compatibility evaluations and evaluations of oxidizing chemicals combined with combustibles are complex and detailed. Chemical compatibility is not a new requirement, but a much more detailed evaluation is a new requirement. And, obtaining historical information about the generation of the final waste form for legacy packaged waste can be very challenging. Specifically, determining possible amounts of chemicals in the waste can be extremely challenging. This paper does not explore in depth, the details of oxidizing chemicals. Other papers presented will discuss oxidizing chemicals. (author)

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Strain-Based Acceptance Criteria for Energy-Limited Events

The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel (B&PV) Code was primarily written with stress-based acceptance criteria. These criteria are applicable to force, displacement, and energy-controlled loadings and ensure a factor of safety against failure. However, stress-based acceptance criteria are often quite conservative for one time energy-limited events such as accidental drops and impacts. For several years, the ASME Working Group on Design of Division 3 Containments has been developing the Design Articles for Section III, Division 3, “Containments for Transportation and Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel and High-Level Radioactive Material and Waste,” and has wanted to establish strain-based acceptance criteria for accidental drops of containments. This Division 3 working group asked the Working Group on Design Methodology (WGDM) to assist in developing these strain-based acceptance criteria. This paper discusses the current proposed strain-based acceptance criteria, associated limitations of use, its background development, and the current status.

42 ENGINEERING↗

SU-E-T-60: A Plan Quality Index in IMRT QA That Is Independent of the Acceptance Criteria

Purpose: In IMRT QA, plan quality evaluation is made based on pass rate under preset acceptance criteria, mostly using gamma-values. This method is convenient but, its Result highly depends on what the acceptance criteria are and suffers from the lack of sensitivity in judging how good the plan is. In this study, we introduced a simple but effective plan quality index of IMRT QA based on dose difference only to supplement such shortcomings, and investigated its validity. Methods: The proposed index is a single value which is calculated mainly based on point-by-point comparison between planned and measured dose distributions, and it becomes “1” in an ideal case. A systematic evaluation was performed with one-dimensional test dose distributions. For 3 hypothetical dose profiles, various displacements (in both dose and space) were introduced, the proposed index was calculated for each case, and the behavior of obtained indices was analyzed and compared with that of gamma evaluation. In addition, the feasibility of the index was assessed with clinical IMRT/VMAT/SBRT QA cases for different sites (prostate, head & neck, liver, lung, spine, and abdomen). Results: The proposed index showed more robust correlation with the amount of induced displacement compared to the gamma evaluation method. No matter what the acceptance criteria are (e.g., whether 3%/3mm or 2%/2mm), it was possible to clearly rank every case with the proposed index while it was difficult to do with the gamma evaluation method. Conclusion: IMRT plan quality can be evaluated quantitatively by the proposed index. It is considered that the proposed index would provide useful information for better judging the level of goodness of each plan and its Result is independent of the acceptance criteria. This work was supported by the Radiation Technology R&D program (No. 2013M2A2A7043498) and the Mid-career Researcher Program (2014R1A2A1A10050270) through the National Research Foundation of Korea funded by the Ministry of Science, ICT&Future Planning.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗

The evolution of the Nevada National Security site waste acceptance criteria - 15312

The Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (DOE/NV--325) is an evolution of requirements spanning almost three decades of waste acceptance at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The original waste acceptance criteria (WAC) document was written in 1978 (document NVO-185) and underwent multiple revisions as time passed and disposal experience was gained. This document came into being when the NNSS first started receiving significant quantities of low-level radioactive waste (LLW) from offsite U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) generators, such as the Mound and Rocky Flats Plants. The original WAC was far less prescriptive and rigorous than the current criteria since many of the current DOE order directives, Federal/State laws, and regulations did not exist. The current WAC reflects the results of numerous revisions in order to address the nuances of the varied waste streams and package configurations accepted for disposal at the NNSS. This includes waste streams that exhibit challenges not previously faced or covered by the WAC and therefore, from time to time, require new information and or changes to be made to the WAC. These wastes now represent a growing percentage of the remaining waste at cleanup sites across the DOE Complex. These waste streams present challenges, such as the technical basis for ensuring safe transportation to and disposal at the NNSS. The current WAC (Rev. 10 dated June 2013), is Available online at: http://www.nv.energy.gov/library/publications/Environmental/DOENV{sub 3}25.pdf). Other challenges for the NNSS include incorporating new and emerging technologies and addressing stakeholder concerns. Addressing these challenges sometimes results in changes to the NNSS WAC. Drivers for revising the NNSS WAC over the years have included operating experience improvements, the need to specify waste origin/ownership, and identifying preferred transportation routing. This paper will discuss various aspects of the NNSS WAC, and how it has evolved based upon DOE orders and requirements, acceptance of offsite mixed wastes, acceptance of non-radioactive classified wastes, stakeholder concerns and agreements, and the changing face of the remaining legacy waste at DOE sites across the United States. (authors)

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Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria

This document establishes the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Office (NNSA/NSO), Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NNSSWAC). The NNSSWAC provides the requirements, terms, and conditions under which the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) will accept DOE non-radioactive classified waste, DOE non-radioactive hazardous classified waste, DOE low-level radioactive waste (LLW), DOE mixed low-level waste (MLLW), and U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) classified waste for permanent disposal. Classified waste is the only waste accepted for disposal that may be non-radioactive and will be required to meet the waste acceptance criteria for radioactive waste as specified in this document. The NNSA/NSO and support contractors are available to assist you in understanding or interpreting this document. For assistance, please call the NNSA/NSO Waste Management Project (WMP) at (702) 295-7063, and your call will be directed to the appropriate contact.

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Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria

This document establishes the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO), Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NNSSWAC). The NNSSWAC provides the requirements, terms, and conditions under which the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) will accept the following: • DOE hazardous and non-hazardous non-radioactive classified waste • DOE low-level radioactive waste (LLW) • DOE mixed low-level waste (MLLW) • U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) classified waste The LLW and MLLW listed above may also be classified waste. Classified waste is the only waste accepted for disposal that may be non-radioactive and shall be required to meet the waste acceptance criteria for radioactive waste as specified in this document. Classified waste may be sent to the NNSS as classified matter. Section 3.1.18 provides the requirements that must be met for permanent burial of classified matter. The NNSA/NFO and support contractors are available to assist the generator in understanding or interpreting this document. For assistance, please call the NNSA/NFO Environmental Management Operations (EMO) at (702) 295-7063, and the call will be directed to the appropriate contact.

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Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NNSS/WAC)

This document establishes the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO), Nevada National Security Site Waste Acceptance Criteria (NNSSWAC). The NNSSWAC provides the requirements, terms, and conditions under which the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) will accept the following: DOE low-level radioactive waste (LLW); DOE mixed low-level waste (MLLW); DOE classified waste/matter; U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) classified waste/matter The LLW and MLLW listed above may also be classified waste. Non-radioactive classified waste is accepted for disposal and shall meet the waste acceptance criteria for radioactive waste as specified in this document. Classified matter may be shipped to the NNSS for permanent burial as classified waste in accordance with the provisions in Section 3.1.18 of this document.

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PACT Module Design Acceptance Criteria (Industry)

For the PACT center to both develop testing protocols and provide service to the metal halide perovskite (MHP) PV community, PACT will seek modules (mini and full-sized) for testing purposes. To ensure both safety and high-quality samples PACT publishes acceptance criteria to define the minimum characteristics of modules the center will accept for testing. These criteria help to ensure we are accepting technologies that are compatible with our technical facilities and testing equipment and can transition to large scale commercial manufacturing. This module design acceptance criteria document is for industry partners and is different from the acceptance criteria for research partners (academia, national laboratories) partners.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

PACT Module Design Acceptance Criteria (Research)

For the PACT center to both develop testing protocols and provide service to the metal halide perovskite (MHP) PV community, PACT will seek modules (mini and full-sized) for testing purposes. To ensure both safety and high-quality samples PACT publishes acceptance criteria to define the minimum characteristics of modules the center will accept for testing. These criteria help to ensure we are accepting technologies that are compatible with our technical facilities and testing equipment and can transition to large scale commercial manufacturing. This module design acceptance criteria document is for research partners (academia, national laboratories) and is different from the acceptance criteria for industry partners.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗

STRUCTURAL MODELING TO SUPPORT POST-YIELD ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA FOR SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL CLADDING

Spent nuclear fuel (SNF) is evaluated for structural failure during storage and transportation scenarios. The U.S. Department of Energy’s Spent Fuel and Waste Science and Technology (SFWST) program has sponsored significant research in quantifying mechanical loads on SNF during storage and transportation scenarios using experimental and modeling methods. The SFWST program has also performed significant research on measuring the mechanical behavior of irradiated SNF as defueled cladding segments and cladding with fuel pellets to measure composite behavior. This paper considers some of the key material data from the Sibling Pin testing and uses structural modeling and analysis methods that have been informed by testing to consider post-yield acceptance criteria for SNF cladding structural analysis. Test data published by Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) are the foundation for informing the material behavior of the models developed in this study. In particular, four-point bend (4PB) tests of fueled and defueled cladding segments provide significant information about the bending failure mode of SNF. ORNL’s 4PB test data is on fueled cladding segments, so the composite behavior of SNF is demonstrated. This paper describes PNNL’s coincident beam model that was developed to approximate the composite behavior of SNF. This paper also presents PNNL’s structural dynamic finite element models of a cask tip-over scenario, which is predicted to cause the strongest mechanical loads on SNF of all postulated storage and transportation scenarios. SNF bending loads predicted in the cask tip-over scenario and cladding acceptance criteria beyond yield are considered, with justification based on the Sibling Pin test data. ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel code stress intensity limits are also considered. The ultimate goal of this work is to aid in the justification of structural acceptance criteria for SNF cladding beyond the cladding’s irradiated yield strength for use in structural analysis of all storage and transportation scenarios.

Klymyshyn, Nicholas A.↗

Technical Basis For Radiological Acceptance Criteria For Uranium At The Y-12 National Security Complex

The purpose of this report is to establish radiological acceptance criteria for uranium. Other factors for acceptance not considered include criticality safety concerns, contaminants to the process stream, and impacts to the Safety Basis for the affected facilities. Three types of criteria were developed in this report. They include limits on external penetrating and non-penetrating radiation and on the internal hazard associated with inhalation of the material. These criteria are intended to alleviate the need for any special controls beyond what are normally utilized for worker protection from uranium hazards. Any proposed exceptions would require case-by-case evaluations to determine cost impacts and feasibility. Since Y-12 has set rigorous ALARA goals for worker doses, the external limits are based on assumptions of work time involved in the movement of accepted material plus the desire that external doses normally received are not exceeded, and set so that no special personnel monitoring would be required. Internal hazard controls were established so that dose contributions from non-uranium nuclides would not exceed 10% of that expected from the uranium component. This was performed using a Hazard Index (HI) previously established for work in areas contaminated with non-uranium nuclides. The radiological acceptance criteria for uranium are summarized in Table 1. Note that these limits are based on the assumption that radioactive daughter products have reached equilibrium.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

ASNF Engineering Scale Drying Experiment Acceptance Criteria for Fabricated Items

This document specifies the acceptance criteria for items fabricated by Holtec International under the scope of INL Contract # 215725, consistent with the parameters described in INL/EXT-19-56017, Aluminum-clad Spent Nuclear Fuel Engineering Scale Drying Experiment Design. Verification is confirmed with initials (or the need for remediation may be identified) along with the date of inspection for each requirement. Verification may be performed by independent proxy (University of South Carolina participant, under INL Contract Number 207046) or by an INL employee, remotely by camera images.

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Evaluation of Sludge Batch 5 Qualification with ISDP Salt Batch 1 Compliance to DWPF Waste Acceptance Criteria

The purpose of this report is to document the acceptability of Sludge Batch 5 with the initial macrobatch operation of the Interim Salt Disposition Project (ISDP) waste to the Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF). This report was prepared to comply with the requirements listed in the Waste Acceptance Criteria for Sludge, Actinide Removal Process (ARP), and Modular Caustic Side Solvent Extraction Unit (MCU) Process Transfers to 512-S and DWPF. The requirements for transfers to 512-S were evaluated during ISDP Salt Batch 1 qualification. The calculations of sludge concentrations are based entirely on the Tank 51 sample processed at SRNL. This is conservative because Tank 51 is blended with the dilute feed in the DWPF Feed Tank (Tank 40). This report documents the acceptability of sludge only as well as Sludge Batch 5 sludge slurry combined with ARP/MCU products for feed to DWPF. All criteria were met for unblended Tank 51 material.

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Evaluation of ISDP Batch 2 Qualification Compliance to 512-S, DWPF, Tank Farm, and Saltstone Waste Acceptance Criteria

The purpose of this report is to document the acceptability of the second macrobatch (Salt Batch 2) of Tank 49H waste to H Tank Farm, DWPF, and Saltstone for operation of the Interim Salt Disposition Project (ISDP). Tank 49 feed meets the Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) requirements specified by References 11, 12, and 13. Salt Batch 2 material is qualified and ready to be processed through ARP/MCU to the final disposal facilities.

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APPLICATION OF THE FAVOR-OCI FRACTURE MECHANICS COMPUTER PROGRAM TO ASME CODE SECTION XI, IWB-3610 FLAW ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA EVALUATIONS

This paper presents an overview of added features in a new version of the FAVOR (Fracture Analysis of Vessels Oak Ridge) computer code called FAVOR-OCI. The original FAVOR code was developed at the US Department of Energy’s Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) under the sponsorship of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). FAVOR is applied by US and international nuclear power industries to perform deterministic and probabilistic fracture mechanics analyses of commercial nuclear reactor pressure vessels (RPVs). Appli-cations of FAVOR are focused on insuring that the structural integrity of aging, and increasingly embrittled, RPVs is main-tained throughout their licensed service life. Based on the final ORNL release of FAVOR, v16.1, FAVOR-OCI extends existing deterministic features of FAVOR while preserving all prev-iously-existing probabilistic capabilities of FAVOR.The objective of this paper is to describe new deterministic features in FAVOR-OCI that can be applied to analytical evaluations of planar flaws. These evaluations are consistent with the acceptance criteria of ASME Code, Section XI, Article IWB-3610, including Subarticles IWB-3611 (acceptance based on flaw size) and IWB-3612 (acceptance based on applied stress intensity factor). The linear elastic fracture mechanics (LEFM) capabilities of FAVOR-OCI also incorporate the analytical procedures presented in the Nonmandatory Appendix A, Analysis of Flaws, Article A-3000, Method of KI Determination, for both surface and subsurface (embedded) flaws.The paper describes a computational methodology for determining critical values of fracture-related parameters that satisfy ASME Code Section XI acceptance criteria for flaws exposed to multiple thermal-hydraulic transients. These com-pute-intensive analyses can be carried out with a single execution of FAVOR-OCI. The new methodology determines critical values by solving for either the point of tangency or point of intersection between applied KI versus time histories and a user-selected fracture toughness material property (e.g., ASME KIc, FAVOR Weibull KIc, or Master Curve Weibull KJc) for surface or subsurface flaws. Situations where warm prestress conditions apply can also be addressed. The paper highlights a need for this new capability via applications to a recent independent review of safety cases for RPVs in two Belgian nuclear power plants (NPPs). That review required ASME Section XI assessments of several thousand embedded, quasi-laminar flaws in the wall of each RPV. Analysis results provided by the new capability contributed to the technical bases compiled from several sources by the Belgian nuclear regulatory agency (FANC) and eventually used by FANC to justify the restart of these NPPs.

Dickson, Terry L.↗

Preliminary Mark-18A (Mk-18A) Target Material Recovery Program Product Acceptance Criteria

The Mk-18A Target Material Recovery Program (MTMRP) was established in 2015 to preserve the unique materials, e.g. 244 Pu, in 65 previously irradiated Mk-18A targets for future use. This program utilizes existing capabilities at SRS and Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL) to process targets, recover materials from them, and to package the recovered materials for shipping to ORNL. It also utilizes existing capabilities at ORNL to receive and store the recovered materials, and to provide any additional processing of the recovered materials or residuals required to prepare them for future beneficial use. The MTMRP is presently preparing for the processing of these valuable targets which is expected to begin in ~2019. As part of the preparations for operations, this report documents the preliminary acceptance criteria for the plutonium and heavy curium materials to be recovered from the Mk-18A targets at SRNL for transport and storage at ORNL. These acceptance criteria were developed based on preliminary concepts developed for processing, transporting, and storing the recovered Mk-18A materials. They will need to be refined as these concepts are developed in more detail.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗