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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2016

Report on July 2015 Additional Protocol Coordinators Best Practices Workshop

After 10 years of implementation experience, the Office of Nonproliferation and Arms Control (NPAC) within the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) conducted the Additional Protocol (AP) Coordinators Best Practices Workshop at Oak Ridge National Laboratory from July 29-30, 2015. The goal of this workshop was to identify implementation best practices, lessons learned, and compliance challenges from the various Additional Protocol Coordinators (APCs) at each laboratory in the DOE/NNSA complex and associated sites. The workshop provided the opportunity for participants to share their insights and establish networks that APCs can utilize to continue to discuss challenges (new and old), identify best practices, and enhance communication and coordination for reporting multi-lab research projects during review activities. Workshop participants included DOE/NNSA HQ, laboratory and site APCs, seasoned experts, members of the original implementation outreach team, and Field Element and site security representatives.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2011

Implementation of the IAEA Additional Protocol in the Philippines: USDOE/PNRI Cooperation

The Philippines entered into force the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol (AP) in February 2010. The Philippine Nuclear Research Institute (PNRI) is the government agency responsible for implementing the AP. In June 2010 the IAEA invited the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to help conduct a joint national training seminar on the AP. DOE presented to PNRI its AP international technical assistance program, administered by the International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP), which helps partner countries implement the AP. In coordination with the IAEA, DOE established this program in 2008 to complement IAEA AP seminars with long-term country-specific cooperation from the perspective of a Member State. The US version of the AP is the same version as that of non-nuclear weapon states except for the addition of a national security exclusion. Due to this, DOE cooperation with other countries enables the sharing of valuable lessons learned in implementing the AP. DOE/INSEP described to PNRI the various areas of cooperation it offers to interested countries, whether they are preparing for entry into force or already implementing the AP. Even countries that have entered the AP into force are sometimes not fully prepared to implement it well, and welcome cooperation to improve their implementation process. PNRI and DOE/INSEP subsequently agreed to cooperate in several areas to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the Philippines AP implementation. These areas include providing working-level training to PNRI staff and preparing an information document that details that training for future reference, assisting with the development of an outreach program and procedures for AP reporting and complementary access, and identifying Annex II equipment and non-nuclear materials whose export must be reported under the AP. DOE laboratory representatives, funded by INSEP, met again with PNRI in February 2011 to provide training for PNRI AP staff and investigate specific ways to improve implementation. Another meeting in July 2011 focused on preparations for outreach to industry and universities. In this paper PNRI describes current implementation of the AP in the Philippines, and both DOE/INSEP and PNRI provide their perspectives on their cooperation to enhance that implementation.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2010

Developments in Assisting Countries in Implementing the IAEA Additional Protocol

In 2008, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) began assisting selected non-nuclear weapon states in planning and preparing for implementation of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Additional Protocol (AP). Since then, the AP international implementation program has contributed to the substantial progress made by Vietnam, Thailand, Iraq, and Malaysia in preparing for entry-into-force of the AP. An overall engagement plan has been developed with components designed to train government AP implementing agencies, inform policy makers, conduct outreach to industry and universities, make AP reporting software available and useful, and plan a detailed approach for implementing the declaration and complementary access provisions of the AP. DOE recently began collaborating with Indonesia, which has already entered the AP into force, requiring a second method of engagement somewhat different from that taken with countries that have not entered the AP into force. The AP international implementation program, administered by the International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program, is working more closely with DOE’s International Nonproliferation Export Control Program to ensure countries are aware of and prepared to implement the export/import provisions of the AP. As the AP implementation program matures and helps move countries closer to entry-into-force or improved AP implementation, it is identifying characteristics of a country’s “end-state” that indicate that DOE assistance is no longer required. The U.S. AP Implementation Act and Senate Resolution of Ratification require the Administration to report annually to Congress on measures taken to achieve the adoption of the AP in non-nuclear weapon states. DOE’s AP international implementation program is a significant part of these measures. This paper describes recent developments to increase the scope and effectiveness of the program.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2014

Additional Protocol (AP) Protocol Reporter version 3.0 (PR3) System Requirements Specification (SRS)

The Protocol Reporter (PR) was developed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to assist Member States in the creation and preparation of declarations pursuant to articles 2 and 3 of the model Additional Protocol (AP, INFCIRC/540, corrected), and was designed to be a complete tool for compiling, arranging, editing, managing, and submitting State declarations in support of the AP.

Cain, Ronald A.↗
DOE OSTI2016

Automated analysis of hot spot X-ray images at the National Ignition Facility

At the National Ignition Facility, the symmetry of the hot spot of imploding capsules is diagnosed by imaging the emitted x-rays using gated cameras and image plates. The symmetry of an implosion is an important factor in the yield generated from the resulting fusion process. The x-ray images are analyzed by decomposing the image intensity contours into Fourier and Legendre modes. This paper focuses on the additional protocols for the time-integrated shape analysis from image plates. For implosions with temperatures above ∼4 keV, the hard x-ray background can be utilized to infer the temperature of the hot spot.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2011

Case Study: Iran, Islam, the NPT, and the Bomb

The goals of this case study are: (1) To examine the correlation between Iran's nuclear program and clerical statements; (2) To evaluate the importance of these statements; (3) To understand the relationship between policy and fatwas (Islamic decrees); (4) To address the issue of a 'nuclear fatwa'; and (5) To examine how, if at all, Sharia (Islamic law) has influenced Iran's actions or inactions with respect to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and Iran's adherence to its IAEA Safeguards Agreements and the Additional Protocol. The Islamic Republic of Iran (hereinafter Iran) is one of two theocracies in the world, the second being Vatican City. Iran's government derives its constitutional, moral, and political legitimacy from Islam. As a result of this theocratic culture, rules are set and interpreted with a much different calibrator than that of the Western world. Islam affects all aspects of Iranian life. This is further complicated by the fact that Islam is not a nationalistic faith, in that many people all over the world believe in and adhere to Islamic principles. As a result, a political system that derives much of its fervor from being nationalistic is caught between two worlds, one within the land boundaries of Iran and the other within a faith that transcends boundaries. Thus, any understanding of Islamic law must first be understood within this delicate balance of nationalism and transcendence. Iran has found itself on the international stage concerning its nuclear program. Because Iran is a theocratic state, it is imperative to examine its political moves, speeches, rights, and obligations through the lens of Islam. This study will examine how Islam plays a role in Iran's dealing with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), its understanding of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), including parties obligations under Safeguards Agreements and the Additional Protocol, and also provide a recommendation on how to move forward in dealings with Iran based in part on an understanding of Islamic principles.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2013

Information Filters for Safeguards Applications: A Scoping Study

A core concern of the Department of Energy is protecting sensitive information in the face of verification agreements that may make use of increasingly sophisticated and intrusive sensors. The conflict between intrusiveness and information protection is evident in existing treaties, such as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the Additional Protocol (AP), where Congress has seen a need to step in and enact implementing legislation to protect, for example, sensitive information such as certain unique chemical signatures, but in so doing has introduced complexities into U.S. treaty compliance policy. Information barriers or filters (IFs) – broadly defined as physical and/or encryption mechanisms that preclude acquisition of sensitive, quantitative information while allowing the acquisition of treaty-relevant qualitative information by an inspectorate – could play a useful role in avoiding this type of conflict. In order to stimulate new thinking on ways to meet existing and future safeguard challenges, this scoping study investigates how IFs – a technique borrowed from the realm of arms control verification - might contribute to international safeguards activities. Information filters (IFs) have long been recognized as an important tool for the protection of sensitive signals and other data in the verification of bilateral and multilateral arms control treaties. The implementation of NPT safeguards, while differing somewhat in context from arms control verification, involves similar sensitivity concerns. This report examines whether or not IFs can be useful in the world of international safeguards, and provides a survey of methods of barring or filtering information that could be applied. The study finds that while many safeguards activities involve non sensitive data, there are also a number of areas where IFs are already in use and others where IFs could make a useful contribution. Examples include verification of enrichment plants, complementary access inspections, and the Additional Protocol (AP) to Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs) under the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT).

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2017

Research on the IAEA State-Level Safeguards Approach in KAERI

The IAEA has verified the declared nuclear material according to the comprehensive safeguards agreement under NPT between the Republic of Korea and the IAEA, as well as the undeclared nuclear material and nuclear activities under the Additional Protocol. In the safeguards Implementation Report for 2007, the Agency drew a broader conclusion for Korea that all nuclear material has remained in peaceful activities in Korea because there was no indication of the diversion of declared nuclear material, and no indication of undeclared nuclear material and activities in the ROK. The IAEA also informed that the implementation of Integrated Safeguards (IS) in Korea started on 1 July, 2008 in accordance with the state level IS approach after a drawing of the broader conclusion. In addition, for now, a State-Level Safeguards Approach (SLA) is adopted for the ROK, including 11 Material Balance Areas (MBAs) in KAERI. This paper describes a comparison analysis between IS and SLA.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2010

The evolution of information-driven safeguards

From the adoption of the Model Additional Protocol and integrated safeguards in the 1990s, to current International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) efforts to deal with cases of noncompliance, the question of how the Agency can best utilize all the information available to it remains of great interest and increasing importance. How might the concept of 'information-driven' safeguards (IDS) evolve in the future? The ability of the Agency to identify and resolve anomalies has always been important and has emerged as a core Agency function in recent years as the IAEA has had to deal with noncompliance in Iran and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). Future IAEA safeguards implementation should be designed with the goal of facilitating and enhancing this vital capability. In addition, the Agency should utilize all the information it possesses, including its in-house assessments and expertise, to direct its safeguards activities. At the State level, knowledge of proliferation possibilities is currently being used to guide the analytical activities of the Agency and to develop inspection plans. How far can this approach be extended? Does it apply across State boundaries? Should it dictate a larger fraction of safeguards activities? Future developments in IDS should utilize the knowledge resident within the Agency to ensure that safeguards resources flow to where they are most needed in order to address anomalies first and foremost, but also to provide greater confidence in conclusions regarding the absence of undeclared nuclear activities. The elements of such a system and related implementation issues are assessed in this paper.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2013

The Case for the Application of Worldwide Marine Radioactivity Studies In the Search for Undeclared Facilities and Activities

Undeclared nuclear facilities unequivocally remain the most difficult safeguards challenge facing the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Recent cases of undeclared facilities revealed in Iran and Syria, which are NPT signatory States, show both the difficulty and the seriousness of this threat to nonproliferation. In the case of undeclared nuclear facilities, the most effective deterrent against proliferation is the application of Wide-Area Environmental Sampling (WAES); however, WAES is currently cost-prohibitive. As with any threat, the most effective countering strategy is a multifaceted approach. Some of the approaches applied by the IAEA include: open source analysis, satellite imagery, on-site environmental sampling, complementary access under the Additional Protocol (where in force), traditional safeguards inspections, and information provided by member States. These approaches, naturally, are focused on specific States. Are there other opportunities not currently within the IAEA purview to assess States that may provide another opportunity to detect clandestine facilities? In this paper, the author will make the case that the IAEA Department of Safeguards should explore the area of worldwide marine radioactivity studies as one possible opportunity. One such study was released by the IAEA Marine Environment Laboratory in January 2005. This technical document focused on 90Sr, 137Cs, and 239/240Pu. It is clearly a challenging area because of the many sources of anthropogenic radionuclides in the world’s oceans and seas including: nuclear weapons testing, reprocessing, accidents, waste dumping, and industrial and medical radioisotopes, whose distributions change based on oceanographic, geochemical, and biological processes, and their sources. It is additionally challenging where multiple States share oceans, seas, and rivers. But with the application of modern science, historical sampling to establish baselines, and a focus on the most relevant radionuclides, the potential is there to support this challenging IAEA safeguards mission.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2023

Exploring Future Storage Options for ATLAS at the BNL/SDCC facility

The ATLAS experiment is expected to deliver an unprecedented amount of scientific data in the High Luminosity(HL-LHC) era. As the demand for disk storage capacity in ATLAS continues to rise steadily, the BNL Scientific Data and Computing Center (SDCC) faces challenges in terms of cost implications for maintaining multiple disk copies and adapting to the coming ATLAS storage requirements. To address these challenges, the SDCC Storage team has undertaken a thorough analysis of the ATLAS experiment's requirements, matching them to suitable storage options and strategies, and has explored alternatives to enhance or replace the current storage solution. This paper aims to present the main challenges encountered while supporting big data experiments such as ATLAS. We describe the experiment's specific requirements and priorities, particularly focusing on the critical storage system characteristics of the high-luminosity run and how the key storage components provided by the Storage team work together: the dCache disk storage system; its archival back-end, HPSS; and its OS-level backend Storage. Specifically, we investigate a novel approach to integrate Lustre and XRootD. In this setup, Lustre serves as backend storage and XRootD acts as an access layer frontend, supporting various grid access protocols. Additionally, we also describe the validation and commissioning tests, including the performance comparison between dCache and XRootd. Furthermore, we provide a performance and cost analysis comparing OpenZFS and LINUX MD RAID, evaluate different storage software stacks, and showcase stress tests conducted to validate Third Party Copy (TPC) functionality.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2015

Dosimetric characterization and organ dose assessment in digital breast tomosynthesis: Measurements and Monte Carlo simulations using voxel phantoms

Purpose: Due to its capability to more accurately detect deep lesions inside the breast by removing the effect of overlying anatomy, digital breast tomosynthesis (DBT) has the potential to replace the standard mammography technique in clinical screening exams. However, the European Guidelines for DBT dosimetry are still a work in progress and there are little data available on organ doses other than to the breast. It is, therefore, of great importance to assess the dosimetric performance of DBT with respect to the one obtained with standard digital mammography (DM) systems. The aim of this work is twofold: (i) to study the dosimetric properties of a combined DBT/DM system (MAMMOMAT Inspiration Siemens{sup ®}) for a tungsten/rhodium (W/Rh) anode/filter combination and (ii) to evaluate organs doses during a DBT examination. Methods: For the first task, measurements were performed in manual and automatic exposure control (AEC) modes, using two homogeneous breast phantoms: a PMMA slab phantom and a 4 cm thick breast-shaped rigid phantom, with 50% of glandular tissue in its composition. Monte Carlo (MC) simulations were performed using Monte Carlo N-Particle eXtended v.2.7.0. A MC model was implemented to mimic DM and DBT acquisitions for a wide range of x-ray spectra (24 –34 kV). This was used to calculate mean glandular dose (MGD) and to compute series of backscatter factors (BSFs) that could be inserted into the DBT dosimetric formalism proposed by Dance et al. Regarding the second aim of the study, the implemented MC model of the clinical equipment, together with a female voxel phantom (“Laura”), was used to calculate organ doses considering a typical DBT acquisition. Results were compared with a standard two-view mammography craniocaudal (CC) acquisition. Results: Considering the AEC mode, the acquisition of a single CC view results in a MGD ranging from 0.53 ± 0.07 mGy to 2.41 ± 0.31 mGy in DM mode and from 0.77 ± 0.11 mGy to 2.28 ± 0.32 mGy in DBT mode. Regarding the BSF, the results achieved may lead to a MGD correction of about 6%, contributing to the improvement of the current guidelines used in these applications. Finally, considering the MC results obtained for the organ dose study, the radiation doses found for the tissues of the body other than the breast were in the range of tens of μSv, and are in part comparable to the ones obtained in standard DM. Nevertheless, in a single DBT examination, some organs (such as lung and thyroid) receive higher doses (of about 9% and 21%, respectively) with respect to the CC DM acquisition. Conclusions: Taking into account an average breast with a thickness of 4.5 cm, the MGDs for DM and DBT acquisitions were below the achievable value (2.0 mGy) defined by the European protocol. Additionally, in the case of a fusion imaging study (DM + DBT), the MGD for a 4.5 cm thick breast is of the order of 1.88 ± 0.36 mGy. Finally, organ dose evaluations underline the need to improve awareness concerning dose estimation of DBT exams for some organs, especially when radiation risk is assessed by using the effective dose.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2025

otsdaq

otsdaq is a Ready-to-Use data-acquisition (DAQ) solution aimed at scaling down to test-beam, detector development, and other rapid-deployment scenarios; and scaling up through the development cycle to fullscale production and operation. otsdaq uses the artdaq DAQ framework under-the-hood, providing flexibility and scalability to meet evolving DAQ needs. otsdaq provides a library of supported front-end boards and firmware modules which implement a custom UDP protocol. Additionally, an integrated Run Control GUI and readout software are provided, preconfigured to communicate with otsdaq firmware.

Rivera, Ryan [Fermi National Accelerator Laborator↗