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DOE OSTI2024

Advanced Reactor Safeguards & Security 2024 Program Roadmap

The Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security (ARSS) program was established to provide research support addressing near term challenges that advanced nuclear reactor vendors face in meeting domestic Material Control and Accounting (MC&A), Physical Protection System (PPS), and Cybersecurity requirements for U.S. construction. The technical work in the program is meant to (1) support nuclear reactor vendors with advanced MC&A, PPS, and Cybersecurity designs for next generation reactors, (2) provide technical bases for the regulator, and (3) promote the integration of Safeguards and Security by Design early in the design process. Existing domestic regulations for safeguards and security, as outlined in the Code of Federal Regulations, were written for large light water reactors, and rule-making efforts are underway to develop regulations more suited to different reactor designs. The ARSS program seeks to remove roadblocks in the deployment of new and advanced reactors by solving regulatory challenges, reducing safeguards and security costs, and utilizing the latest technologies and approaches for robust plant monitoring and protection. This roadmap discusses the goals of the ARSS program, current research, and program plan for the next five years.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Advanced Reactor Safeguards & Security Program: Cybersecurity Scenarios

The use of digital control systems and automation in advanced nuclear power systems introduces different types of vulnerabilities compared to legacy (i.e. analog) control systems that cyber adversaries can exploit. These vulnerabilities pose a challenge to reactor operators and cyber operations staff due to the dynamic nature of the event in which a human response or a lack of response can potentially evolve into a worsening plant condition. Using the Department of Homeland Security Cyber and Infrastructure Security Agency’s (CISA) critical infrastructure exercise framework, this document presents several cyber security scenarios typical of digital control systems that could be used in advanced reactor designs. These scenarios can be used in tabletop exercises to evaluate cyber security posture or conduct training on different aspects of cyber security, including detection, threat hunting using indicators of compromise, evaluating incident response, risk mitigation, incident reporting, information sharing and recovery.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security - Advanced Delay Technologies

As a new generation of reactors is developed, reducing the cost of physical security without impacting the required system effectiveness will help to make new reactors economical. This report discusses several access delay technologies available to help improve the overall effectiveness of the physical security system. These technologies include both passive and active delay elements, as well as guidance on best practices related to security by design principles.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Small Modular Reactor and Microreactor Security-by-Design Lessons Learned: Integrated PPS Designs

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping costs reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. The past approach has often included implementing security features after a facility has been designed and without attention to optimization, which can lead to cost overruns. Incorporating security into the design process can provide robust, cost-effective, and sufficient physical protection systems. The purpose of this report is to capture lessons learned by the Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security (ARSS) program that may be beneficial for other advanced and small modular reactor (SMR) vendors to use when developing security systems and postures. This report will capture relevant information that can be used in the security-by-design (SeBD) process for SMR and microreactor vendors.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Deliberate Motion Analytics Applied to CUAS Sensor Fusion

The Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security (ARSS) program in the Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE) seeks to identify new technology solutions for safeguards and security challenges associated with domestic deployment of advanced nuclear reactors. Research in the ARSS program is investigating alternative physical protection system (PPS) approaches that leverage new detection technologies. This report shows test results from a new form of artificial intelligence (AI) that is called deliberate motion analytics (DMA) when used to spatially and temporally fuse active radar and passive radio frequency (RF) detection that significantly improves detection of uncrewed aircraft systems (UASs). DMA is designed to filter out false positive alarms yet provide highly reliable intrusion detection at nuclear power plants (NPPs) and advanced small modular reactor (ASMR) perimeters. This form of AI is considered to be an enabling technology for security of the future and supports the ARSS investigation of alternative PPSs.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2026

2026 Annual Molten Salt Reactor Campaign Review

This report documents the 2026 Annual Molten Salt Reactor (MSR) Campaign Review held in Albuquerque, New Mexico, from April 21–24, 2026. The review was organized by Dr. Patricia Paviet, National Technical Director of the Advanced Reactor Technology (ART) MSR program for the U.S. Department of Energy Office of Nuclear Energy (DOE-NE), and included participation from principal investigators, federal managers, developers, regulators, and members of the broader MSR community. The 2026 review expanded beyond the ART-MSR campaign to include related DOE-NE programs supporting molten salt reactor advancement, including the Nuclear Energy Advanced Modeling and Simulation (NEAMS) program, the Advanced Materials and Manufacturing Technologies (AMMT) program, Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security (ARSS), Material Protection, Accounting and Control Technologies (MPACT), and relevant advanced fuels activities. Three days were dedicated to technical presentations and panel discussions covering thermal properties, off-gas management, modeling and simulation, safety and licensing, safeguards and security, materials and corrosion, and irradiation activities. A fourth day was dedicated to technical tours of Sandia National Laboratories and Kairos Power facilities. Attendance was strong and comparable to the prior annual review, with approximately 75 in-person participants per day, 75–80 virtual attendees per day, and approximately 30 participants in the tour day. The review fostered significant technical exchange across national laboratories, universities, industry, regulators, and international participants. This report summarizes the review structure, technical themes, participation, tours, feedback, and conclusions relevant to future planning for the MSR campaign.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Advanced Facility Design and AI/ML Enabled Safeguards to Establish Secure, Economical Recycling of Fast Reactor Fuels (Final Scientific/Technical Report)

The project, "Advanced Facility Design and AI/ML Enabled Safeguards to Establish Secure, Economical Recycling of Fast Reactor Fuels," represents a significant advancement in nuclear fuel recycling technology. It integrates cutting-edge multimodal sensor fusion, machine learning (ML), and digital twin (DT) technologies to address challenges in material safeguarding, process optimization, and regulatory compliance for pyroprocessing facilities. This research has significantly enhanced the understanding of pyrochemical fuel recycling processes by developing innovative tools and methodologies. The Multimodal Safeguards Monitoring Unit (MSMU) combines electroanalytical techniques, Raman spectroscopy, and differential thermal analysis (DTA) to enable high-fidelity, near-real-time material accountancy measurements. Machine learning techniques, such as Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) autoencoders, are utilized to detect anomalies in material balances and sensor data, improving the reliability of safeguards monitoring. Additionally, digital twin technology has been established to provide real-time system-level monitoring and diagnostics, integrating physics-based models with sensor data to optimize process safety and efficiency.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2024

The Meaning of Risk for Safety, Security, and Safeguards in the Design of Advanced Nuclear Reactors

What is the meaning of risk as it applies to the design of advanced reactors in the disciplines of safety, security, and safeguards? How can we find common terminology for the concept of risk and how can we find interfaces between these disciplines? These are important questions that should be explored in order that they may be applied in an integrated manner for the most effective and efficient design approaches. Eliminating or minimizing risks is a key design driver that motivates and informs the development of nuclear reactors. For safety, risk is well understood and applied in Probabilistic Risk Assessments. For security, the risk-based concepts of vulnerability assessments and vital areas are all considered in designing security systems. For safeguards, the concept of risk is not formally defined, as it relates to the design and operation of nuclear reactors. International nuclear safeguards seek to reduce the risk of proliferation in the nuclear fuel cycle and as such the concept of risk does exist. Therefore, the current understanding of the “3S’ approach, which seeks to find the interfaces and conflicts between safety, security, and safeguards requires a thorough understanding of the role that the reduction of risk plays in all three disciplines. The intersection of risk for safety and security is now being developed as there is a strong correlation between reactor design and operations and their vulnerability to sabotage. The intersection of risk for security and safeguards has to date chiefly been focused on the nuclear material control and accounting systems, which are relied on by both the operator (State) and the IAEA. This paper explores the concept of risk in each of the three disciplines, how they interact, potential conflicts and interfaces , how these might be addressed and leveraged, and a notional framework for how this could be achieved.

Kovacic, Donald N↗
DOE OSTI2025

Cyber-Physical Tabletop Exercise for Small Modular Reactor Facilities

U.S. nuclear power facilities face increasing challenges in meeting dynamic security requirements caused by evolving and expanding threats while keeping costs reasonable to make nuclear energy competitive. This evolving threat landscape includes adversaries having offensive cyber capabilities to attack information technology (IT) systems and operation technology (OT) systems. These adversaries may have the ability to attack the physical protection system (PPS) networks with potential consequential impacts that could degrade the effectiveness of the PPS. These cyber attacks may also be used to attack the safety and operational systems used to operate and ensure the safety of the reactor. Additionally, adversaries may gain access to unmanned aerial systems (UAS) that may be used to provide reconnaissance and surveillance of the facility, provide information to the adversaries, and be equipped with kinetic capabilities such as explosives or weapons that can be used to directly attack the facility. The Department of Energy’s Office of Nuclear Energy’s Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security (ARSS) program funded Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) and Idaho National Laboratory (INL) to develop a cyber-physical tabletop exercise (TTX). This exercise was conducted on a hypothetical small modular reactor (SMR) facility, and only considered a potential adversary cyber attack on the PPS to a physical attack on the hypothetical facility to achieve a radiological release. This cyber-physical TTX is meant to provide lessons learned to integrate the cyber security system design and the physical protection system (PPS) design to decrease design, operation, and maintenance costs as well as increase effectiveness for defending against design basis threat attacks at the facility. This TTX will also provide a framework and method for SMR and microreactor vendors to conduct their own cyber-physical TTX and gain impactful insights to improving the cyber and physical protection system design for their SMR or microreactor facility design.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Nuclear Material Control & Accounting for Pebble Bed Reactors (FY 2023 Summary Report)

This report discusses the work done under the US Department of Energy NE-5 Advanced Reactor Safeguards and Security Program during FY 2023. It provides a summary of material control and accounting (MC&A) for pebble bed reactors (PBRs) and addresses some of the main challenges with current PBR MC&A approaches that will inform safeguards and security by design efforts. The efforts to date have focused on tristructural isotropic (TRISO) pebble fuel material accounting and control including working with partners in industry, loss and production of nuclear material as part of reactor operations, burnup modeling and measurements, uncertainty quantifications for such modeling and measurements, statistical approaches needed, and measurement methods. The unique fuel management and utilization in a PBR, where the fuel in spherical form is introduced and circulates through the reactor, poses special challenges for MC&A. This contrasts with traditional water-cooled reactors in which the fuel is contained in large assemblies and can be easily identified and counted. Even online fueled reactors, such as the CANDU reactors (none of which operate in the United States), are significantly different because the fuel is still contained in relatively large assemblies, is uniquely identified, and the number of assemblies that pass through the core on an annual basis is much fewer than the hundreds of thousands that circulate in a PBR, none of which are uniquely identified. Additionally, the nature of the TRISO fuel results in very low heavy metal loading with each pebble containing less than 10 g of uranium and on the order of less than 1 g of fissile material. This low fuel density and the robustness of the TRISO particles are major features of the TRISO fuel from a safety basis as each TRISO particle and pebble acts as a containment for the nuclear material and fission products during normal and accident conditions. This also results in very low plutonium loading per pebble during normal operations, which is on the order of 0.1 g at full burnup. A major feature of PBRs is that they will allow for significantly higher burnup, on the order of 160 GWd/THM compared to the burnup of traditional LWRs, which is on the order of 45 GWd/THM. This is achieved by monitoring the pebbles as they circulate through the reactor and allowing them to be reintroduced into the core until the desired burnup is achieved and they are removed from the reactor and enter the spent fuel storage areas.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Artificial Intelligence in Nuclear Safeguards; Evaluating Safeguards and Security Risks and Benefits for Advanced and Small Modular Reactor Deployments

Rapidly growing interest in advanced and small modular reactor (A/SMR) technologies presents challenges as well as opportunities for implementing international safeguards and security. A/SMR deployments are expected to be more numerous, more geographically dispersed, and more varied in their designs, placing new demands on the data systems and analytical tools used to support oversight (Alberti et al., 2023; Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission et al., 2024). Because of this variability, the importance and reliance on data systems for A/SMR deployments is expected to be higher than for previous reactor generations. Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning (AI/ML) offer potential capabilities to address the high variability inherent in A/SMR technology. The beneficiaries of AI-assisted tools include facility operators, government regulators, IAEA inspectors, and A/SMR vendors. This report analyzes how AI/ML-assisted technologies can strengthen the implementation of IAEA safeguards and security measures. It also identifies AI-assisted tools to strengthen operator, facility, and regulator knowledge management practices and examines the potential risks AI/ML-based tools may introduce to IAEA safeguards and security efforts. It concludes with a set of hypothetical, standards-style requirements for AI/ML systems used in safeguards contexts, grounded in an inspector-centric view of system verification. Despite the potential benefits of AI/ML systems, understanding potential intentional and unintentional failure modes is critical for ensuring adequate protection of nuclear materials and facilities. Unique features of A/SMRs including sealed cores, remote and novel paradigms of operation, off-site reactor fabrication, novel fuel forms, and varied refueling requirements, introduce challenges for traditional safeguards technological approaches (Pensado et al., 2024; Federation of American Scientists, 2025). AI/ML systems deployed to address these challenges may introduce new risks requiring systematic evaluation rooted in both AI-specific risk frameworks, such as the NIST AI Risk Management Framework (NIST AI RMF), and established cyber risk management standards such as NIST SP 800-30 (National Institute of Standards and Technology [NIST], 2023; NIST, 2012).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗