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NALMS is an alarm system application designed for availability, integrability, and extensibility. The NALMS development was driven by SLAC's efforts to replace the Alarm Handler, due for deprecation as a Motif-based application, and to introduce process improvements addressing hierarchy implementation overhead, limited operator engagement, and operator display integration.
RadiaSoft and Jefferson Laboratory are working together to develop a machine-learning-based smart alarm system for the CEBAF injector. Because of the injector’s large number of parameters and possible fault scenarios, it is highly desirable to have an autonomous alarm system that can quickly identify and diagnose unusual machine states. We present our work on artificial neural networks designed to identify such undesirable machine states. In particular, we test both auto-encoders and inverse models as possible tools for differentiating between normal and abnormal states. These models are being developed using both supervised and unsupervised learning techniques, and are being trained using CEBAF injector data collected during dedicated machine studies as well as during regular operations. Lastly, we discuss tradeoffs between the two types of models.
The CS-Studio alarm system was originally based on a relational database and the Apache ActiveMQ message service. The former was necessary to store configuration and state, while the latter communicated state updates and user actions. In a recent update, the combination of relational database and ActiveMQ have been replaced by Apache Kafka. We present how this simplified the implementation while at the same time improving performance.
Presentation topics include: Criticality Calculations with MCNP6.2 Results Compared with Experiments and Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) Analysis with MCNP6.2 Results using Hybrid Geometry and Varian Reduction.
The Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) for the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) provides coverage for two primary processing facilities. For UPF, detailed documentation and drawings of the design are readily available. While this design information allows for some CAAS modeling features to match the actual design with a high level of accuracy, assumptions and simplifications are necessary as it is unrealistic and unnecessary to replicate many aspects of the design. A set of modeling guidelines and techniques were used to develop consistency between the MCNP6 models. While ensuring conservatism, overly conservative choices must be avoided to demonstrate the minimum accident of concern can be detected. To ensure proper modeling choices were made for the final models, a group of parametric studies were performed to evaluate the impact on the dose rates detected at the individual detectors. Some of these modeling choices and/or associated parametric studies include: - Modeling the grid steel area above the detectors as homogeneous stainless steel and determining the impact on detectability with an increasing density. - Modeling the presence of equipment in close proximity to the CAAS detectors. - Determining an appropriate material density to represent miscellaneous items not specifically modeled. - Evaluating the impact of sprinkler activation. The results of UPF CAAS analyses show that the modeling assumptions made based on the detailed design and parametric studies are appropriate and demonstrate accurate yet conservative models have been developed for detecting minimum accident of concern within the UPF.
The Idaho Chemical Processing Plant (ICPP) has a number of criticality alarm systems (CAS) in the various facilities. The complexity of the plant creates some unique CAS problems. A detailed review of the CAS has been made to determine the level of compliance with ANSI 8.3-1986. A major CAS upgrade project is currently in the design stage which will expand coverage and bring all CAS monitoring unshielded areas into full compliance with ANSI 8.3-1986. Because DOE Orders do not contain an exclusion that exempts the need for CAS coverage in shielded areas as provided in ANSI 8.3-1986, a future CAS upgrade project is in the planning stage which will also upgrade the CAS coverage in shielded portions of the plant.
Abstract for publication as part of copyright assertion for electronic alarm system designs to satisfy prime contract requirements. Approval to assert copyright was provided by NNSA HQ on 3/17.
The smallest accident, in terms of fission yield and dose rate, that a criticality alarm system is required to detect. Need for a CAS shall be evaluated for all activities in which the inventory in individual unrelated areas exceeds 700g U-235, 500g U-233, 450 g Pu-239 OR 450g of any combination of these three isotopes. Unique configurations exist such that critical mass requirements may be less than the limits noted above.
This presentation discusses the Health Physics Research Reactor (HPRR) or Fast Burst Reactor (FBR) and how available data from Health Physics Research Reactor (HPRR) operation to can be used to create a benchmark report for inclusion in the ICSBEP, as a Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) shielding benchmark. The evaluation of experimental data is also presented, specifically four experimental candidates are considered of potential value for the benchmark: 1. Neutron source estimation from a HPRR pulse (energy spectrum, fission yield), 2. Threshold Detector Unit (TDU) measurements at different distances from a HPRR pulse, shielded and unshielded, 3. Sulfur pellet activation at different distances from a HPRR pulse, shielded and unshielded, and 4. Total neutron fluence from a HPRR pulse measured by Bonner Sphere Spectrometry, shielded and unshielded. Additionally, a benchmark model overview is discussed as are sample calculation results.
From the countless critical experiments performed in the world during the past century, high-quality integral benchmarks experiments have been collected and gathered into the International Handbook of Evaluated Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiments (ICSBEP Handbook), managed by the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) Working Group. This information preservation and dissemination effort is crucial for reactor licensing as well as criticality and radiation transport modeling validation. This summary reports on the status of a tentative benchmark addition to the ICSBEP Handbook. The proposed benchmark arises from legacy operation data of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) Health Physics Research Reactor (HPRR). The HPRR was a small, unmoderated, unshielded fast burst reactor that was used for research in health physics and radiobiology as well as teaching and training. As part of a comprehensive investigation of the available HPRR operation data and characteristics, different possibilities for use of the valuable results were studied. A critical experiment benchmark evaluation was performed, analyzing data coming from sub-critical and critical operation of the HPRR during operator training, steady-state irradiation of samples and before critical bursts. The results of the evaluation do not satisfy for the ICSBEP standards as the benchmark relative standard uncertainty is of about 4% for k eff , and the relative difference between sample calculations and expected k eff results is of about 1.5%. Due to those unsatisfactory results, it was decided not to pursue critical experiments evaluation of the HPRR presently and to focus instead on shielding type data for the creation of a criticality accident alarm system (CAAS) and shielding category benchmark, which is currently very scarce in the ICSBEP handbook—especially concerning critical, pulsed assembly, or reactor operation data. Several dosimetry and shielding experiments from HPRR burst operation were evaluated, with different benchmark metrics as sulfur fluence, Element 57 dose, or neutron fluence at different distances and under different shield materials conditions. An evaluation focusing on the Element 57 neutron dose as a benchmark metric was submitted to the ICSBEP Technical Review Group (TRG) meeting in October 2021, and the inclusion of the evaluation in the ICSBEP Handbook was deferred. The main change proposed by the international experiment evaluation experts is to use the neutron fluence measured by Bonner spheres as a benchmark metric. This represents a quantity closer to that actually measured by the experimentalists of the HPRR compared to the Element 57 dose, which adds another step of data transformation, thus potentially adding uncertainty to the benchmark. The evaluation has been updated and will be submitted to the 2022 ICSBEP TRG meeting for inclusion in the 2023 edition of the ICSBEP Handbook. The evaluation is performed using the KENO and MAVRIC combination from the SCALE 6.2.4 code suite which was previously used in similar CAAS benchmarks to allow for the use of variance reduction techniques.
This report documents the experimental conditions and results for the testing of the Mirion Technologies CAAS-3S Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS) for the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) and Uranium Processing Facility (UPF). The testing was conducted at the Godiva IV Burst Reactor at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) during the week of January 11, 2021. The testing was conducted in accordance with 25774-QL-POA-JR00-00002-VDE-27.0, CAAS-3S Radiation Testing of Cabinet Components Test Plan. The tests subjected the CAAS-3S system to intense and short duration mixed neutron and gamma radiation fields and to high integrated radiation doses. The purpose of the test was to environmentally qualify various CAAS-3S components in a radiation environment. Successful completion of the tests was predicated on the collaborative efforts of several organizations. Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) provided dosimetry to estimate photon and neutron dose. Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) manages the NCERC facility, operated the Godiva IV reactor, and provided field support for CAAS-3S placement and communications interface for data acquisition systems supplied by Mirion Technologies. Throughout the test campaign, Y-12 and UPF personnel provided technical support in determining changes to the test schedule, as needed, interpretation of the results, and comparison between the measured dosimetry data and predicted results. Throughout the test campaign, Mirion personnel provided technical support in the operation of the CAAS-3S system itself.
A workable design to perform a CAAS benchmark experiment is detailed herein. Key dimensions, materials, source intensity levels, and detectors are listed in this report. Sensitivity to 21 perturbations was determined to be acceptable. The next step will be for NCSP management to determine whether procurement should occur and if the experiment should proceed. The perturbation study suggests that the room return shield cavity radius and runout should be maintained to within a millimeter, the room return shield should be positioned carefully (perhaps with a laser range finder), and that the detectors should be mounted in a lightweight fixture such as aluminum, so their positioning is assured. Using a 3D scanner or photogrammetry to record part shapes may be beneficial. Further work is also needed to verify source reproducibility.
The following is a summary of advice for CAAS modeling in SCALE. Refer to the SCALE Criticality Safety and Radiation Shielding training slides or to the SCALE manual for exact syntax. Use a mesh for the fission source that is the most adequate for the problem to solve (coarse/fine). Don’t spend unnecessary resources; simplify the model if it does not impact the final results of interest. Be careful to deactivate secondary fissions in MAVRIC or the calculation may never end. Check that k eff and $\overline{\upsilon}$ calculated results are logical. Between KENO and MAVRIC, cross section libraries, materials, geometry, and mesh grid can be the same or different. Iterative calculations are usually complex problems that need variance reduction. It will be hard to find the best solving parameters in the first attempt; expert judgement is needed. Check each step separately. Use Fulcrum to visualize fission source, mesh source, and spatial/energy distributions to find potential errors or impactful imprecisions.
Idaho National Laboratory (INL) has contracted IFE to support human factors research and the development of leading-edge technology to support control room operators as the U.S. fleet undergoes modernization and digitalization in legacy plants and control rooms. As the nuclear industry starts to shift to more digital controls and systems, these upgrades provide more information to the main control room in the form of digital signals and values. Also, an increase in the number of alarms points is provided by the vendors. New digital control rooms shift from main control boards to soft controls, and alarm panels to a single display. This change to a single display has created a problem of alarm waterfall, a situation in which the addition of new alarm points causes an overload of information to the operator during either a plant disturbance or other than normal full power operations. IFE’s goal is to find a workable solution to assist operators in both handling and understanding incoming alarms during emergency situations under these waterfall conditions.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) is developing a multiphysics sensor package for automatic live arms fire detection for use in schools, houses of worship, hospi tals, etc. The goal is to have a package the size of a common smoke or CO2 detector with a price point of $50 or less which may be deployed throughout the aforementioned facilities. The commercial device will detect live gun fire with low probability of false alarm and auto matically alert first responders. A prototype board with four accelerometers, two infrared (IR) and two microphones has been developed and deployed at two experiments at LLNL’s Small Firearms Training Facility (SFTF). The device successfully and consistently measured signals on the accelerometer and acoustic channels. IR responses were measured depending upon the environment and sound source.
Motivations for EPDs as a CAAS: Key features of the 2022 revision of ANS 8.3; Review of the relevant criteria in ANS-8.3 2022–How does (or could) an EPD based CAAS comply; Advantages & Disadvantages of Permanently Installed CAAS; Advantages & Disadvantages of EPD Based CAAS; Suggested Decision Criteria; Conclusions & Recommendations.
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Over the last few decades, the International Criticality Safety Benchmark Evaluation Project (ICSBEP) Working Group has focused on gathering critical and subcritical benchmark experiment data from different facilities around the world for inclusion in the International Handbook of Evaluated Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiments (ICSBEP Handbook). The compiled data can be used by criticality safety analysts to help validate their calculation tools and cross-section libraries for a variety of applications.