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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2014

EXAMINING THE ROLE AND RESEARCH CHALLENGES OF SOCIAL MEDIA AS A TOOL FOR NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL TREATY VERIFICATION

Traditional arms control treaty verification activities typically involve a combination of technical measurements via physical and chemical sensors, state declarations, political agreements, and on-site inspections involving international subject matter experts. However, the ubiquity of the internet, and the electronic sharing of data that it enables, has made available a wealth of open source information with the potential to benefit verification efforts. Open source information is already being used by organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency to support the verification of state-declared information, prepare inspectors for in-field activities, and to maintain situational awareness . The recent explosion in social media use has opened new doors to exploring the attitudes, moods, and activities around a given topic. Social media platforms, such as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube, offer an opportunity for individuals, as well as institutions, to participate in a global conversation at minimal cost. Social media data can also provide a more data-rich environment, with text data being augmented with images, videos, and location data. The research described in this paper investigates the utility of applying social media signatures as potential arms control and nonproliferation treaty verification tools and technologies, as determined through a series of case studies. The treaty relevant events that these case studies touch upon include detection of undeclared facilities or activities, determination of unknown events recorded by the International Monitoring System (IMS), and the global media response to the occurrence of an Indian missile launch. The case studies examine how social media can be used to fill an information gap and provide additional confidence to a verification activity. The case studies represent, either directly or through a proxy, instances where social media information may be available that could potentially augment the evaluation of an event. The goal of this paper is to instigate a discussion within the verification community as to where and how social media can be effectively utilized to complement and enhance traditional treaty verification efforts. In addition, this paper seeks to identify areas of future research and development necessary to adapt social media analytic tools and techniques, and to form the seed for social media analytics to aid and inform arms control and nonproliferation policymakers and analysts. While social media analysis (as well as open source analysis as a whole) will not ever be able to replace traditional arms control verification measures, they do supply unique signatures that can augment existing analysis.

nonproliferation, arms control, social media↗
DOE OSTI2025

Arms Control Development Criteria (ACDCs)

The Arms Control Development Criteria (ACDC) have been developed to provide a consistent framework for understanding the readiness of a technology or capability for use in arms control as poten>al components of a verifica>on system. More importantly, they are also intended to serve as a guide for technology developers to beCer address the development needs of a technology from the start of the development process, rather than trying to adapt a technology to arms control aDer it is developed.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2021

The Future of Arms Control in a Multilateral and Multi-Domain Environment

The crisis of arms control is obvious and broadly discussed among states, within the world’s expert community and to a lesser extent the media. This crisis has at least three building blocks: Russia continues to violate or undermine key arms control treaties and commitments; China rejects to join the existing arms control architecture; and both countries heavily invest in the modernization of their armed forces, including development of the nuclear arsenals. In the current highly competitive environment, arms control is more difficult to achieve and is likely to accomplish less than what was optimistically anticipated a generation ago. The growing pressure to “save arms control at all cost”, often expressed by the Western expert community, further complicates the situation. The excessively aspirational and ideological approach to arms control – in which arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation (ADN) become a silver bullet solution – is as dangerous as security and defence policies which entirely exclude ADN. As James Cameron rightly points out, “history should teach policy-makers to look beyond formulae for strategic stability to other ways in which arms control can help to contain disruptive challenges to the balance of power and minimize the chances of war”.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2014

A Visual Analytics Approach to Structured Data Analysis to Enhance Nonproliferation and Arms Control Verification Activities

Analysis activities for Nonproliferation and Arms Control verification require the use of many types of data. Tabular structured data, such as Excel spreadsheets and relational databases, have traditionally been used for data mining activities, where specific queries are issued against data to look for matching results. The application of visual analytics tools to structured data enables further exploration of datasets to promote discovery of previously unknown results. This paper discusses the application of a specific visual analytics tool to datasets related to the field of Arms Control and Nonproliferation to promote the use of visual analytics more broadly in this domain. Visual analytics focuses on analytical reasoning facilitated by interactive visual interfaces (Wong and Thomas 2004). It promotes exploratory analysis of data, and complements data mining technologies where known patterns can be mined for. Also with a human in the loop, they can bring in domain knowledge and subject matter expertise. Visual analytics has not widely been applied to this domain. In this paper, we will focus on one type of data: structured data, and show the results of applying a specific visual analytics tool to answer questions in the Arms Control and Nonproliferation domain. We chose to use the T.Rex tool, a visual analytics tool developed at PNNL, which uses a variety of visual exploration patterns to discover relationships in structured datasets, including a facet view, graph view, matrix view, and timeline view. The facet view enables discovery of relationships between categorical information, such as countries and locations. The graph tool visualizes node-link relationship patterns, such as the flow of materials being shipped between parties. The matrix visualization shows highly correlated categories of information. The timeline view shows temporal patterns in data. In this paper, we will use T.Rex with two different datasets to demonstrate how interactive exploration of the data can aid an analyst with arms control and nonproliferation verification activities. Using a dataset from PIERS (PIERS 2014), we will show how container shipment imports and exports can aid an analyst in understanding the shipping patterns between two countries. We will also use T.Rex to examine a collection of research publications from the IAEA International Nuclear Information System (IAEA 2014) to discover collaborations of concern. We hope this paper will encourage the use of visual analytics structured data analytics in the field of nonproliferation and arms control verification. Our paper outlines some of the challenges that exist before broad adoption of these kinds of tools can occur and offers next steps to overcome these challenges.

arms control↗
DOE OSTI2024

Perspectives on Next Steps in Arms Control and Non-Proliferation

Much has happened in arms control over the last year as this chapter has been in development. The prospects for arms control as a viable national security tool have, if anything, grown darker. Russia has falsely equated tearing down the remaining arms control edifice with creating potential leverage vis-à-vis its actions in Ukraine. China has failed to update its talking points on being a responsible arms control actor with its massive nuclear force expansion. The United States has stated clearly that it is open for business on arms control and risk reduction, but it unfortunately has no customers in Russia and China. It remains unclear what specifically the United States is selling in terms of what it wants in a potential agreement. Competitive dynamics and an atmosphere of great power competition are driving all parties further away from the table.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2012

The Challenge for Arms Control Verification in the Post-New START World

Nuclear weapon arms control treaty verification is a key aspect of any agreement between signatories to establish that the terms and conditions spelled out in the treaty are being met. Historically, arms control negotiations have focused more on the rules and protocols for reducing the numbers of warheads and delivery systems - sometimes resorting to complex and arcane procedures for counting forces - in an attempt to address perceived or real imbalances in a nation's strategic posture that could lead to instability. Verification procedures are generally defined in arms control treaties and supporting documents and tend to focus on technical means and measures designed to ensure that a country is following the terms of the treaty and that it is not liable to engage in deception or outright cheating in an attempt to circumvent the spirit and the letter of the agreement. As the Obama Administration implements the articles, terms, and conditions of the recently ratified and entered-into-force New START treaty, there are already efforts within and outside of government to move well below the specified New START levels of 1550 warheads, 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles, and 800 deployed and nondeployed strategic launchers (Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) silos, Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) tubes on submarines, and bombers). A number of articles and opinion pieces have appeared that advocate for significantly deeper cuts in the U.S. nuclear stockpile, with some suggesting that unilateral reductions on the part of the U.S. would help coax Russia and others to follow our lead. Papers and studies prepared for the U.S. Department of Defense and at the U.S. Air War College have also been published, suggesting that nuclear forces totaling no more than about 300 warheads would be sufficient to meet U.S. national security and deterrence needs. (Davis 2011, Schaub and Forsyth 2010) Recent articles by James M. Acton and others suggest that the prospects for maintaining U.S. security and minimizing the chances of nuclear war, while deliberately reducing stockpiles to a few hundred weapons, is possible but not without risk. While the question of the appropriate level of cuts to U.S. nuclear forces is being actively debated, a key issue continues to be whether verification procedures are strong enough to ensure that both the U.S. and Russia are fulfilling their obligations under the current New Start treaty and any future arms reduction treaties. A recent opinion piece by Henry Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft (2012) raised a number of issues with respect to governing a policy to enhance strategic stability, including: in deciding on force levels and lower numbers, verification is crucial. Particularly important is a determination of what level of uncertainty threatens the calculation of stability. At present, that level is well within the capabilities of the existing verification systems. We must be certain that projected levels maintain - and when possible, reinforce - that confidence. The strengths and weaknesses of the New START verification regime should inform and give rise to stronger regimes for future arms control agreements. These future arms control agreements will likely need to include other nuclear weapons states and so any verification regime will need to be acceptable to all parties. Currently, China is considered the most challenging party to include in any future arms control agreement and China's willingness to enter into verification regimes such as those implemented in New START may only be possible when it feels it has reached nuclear parity with the U.S. and Russia. Similarly, in keeping with its goals of reaching peer status with the U.S. and Russia, Frieman (2004) suggests that China would be more willing to accept internationally accepted and applied verification regimes rather than bilateral ones. The current verification protocols specified in the New START treaty are considered as the baseline case and are contrasted with possible alternative verification protocols that could be effective in a post-New START era of significant reductions in U.S. and other countries nuclear stockpiles. Of particular concern is the possibility of deception and breakout when declared and observed numbers of weapons are below the level considered to pose an existential threat to the U.S. In a regime of very low stockpile numbers, 'traditional' verification protocols as currently embodied in the New START treaty might prove less than adequate. I introduce and discuss a number of issues that need to be considered in future verification protocols, many of which do not have immediate solutions and so require further study. I also discuss alternatives and enhancements to traditional verification protocols, for example, confidence building measures such as burden sharing against the common threat of weapon of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism, joint research and development.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2020

A secure measurement unit for an inspection system used in nuclear arms-control verification

Verification of arms control treaties may require information barriers to protect sensitive data acquired during the verification process. These information barriers are commonly implemented in software, but must store and operate on data that are vulnerable to attack and tampering. Here, we present a new Secure Measurement Unit based on a modified pipeline SAR ADC architecture. The idea is to move the information barrier back into the digitization process so that prohibited data is never created. A prototype 65nm CMOS Secure Measurement Unit (SMU) was tested using U-235, U-238, Co-60, Cs-137 and Am-241 sources. Here, the prototype accurately digitized allowable signals while being immune to side-channel attacks on signals within preset forbidden regions.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2013

Identifying, Visualizing, and Fusing Social Media Data to Support Nonproliferation and Arms Control Treaty Verification: Preliminary Results

While international nonproliferation and arms control verification capabilities have their foundations in physical and chemical sensors, state declarations, and on-site inspections, verification experts are beginning to consider the importance of open source data to complement and support traditional means of verification. One of those new, and increasingly expanding, sources of open source information is social media, which can be ingested and understood through social media analytics (SMA). Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is conducting research to further our ability to identify, visualize, and fuse social media data to support nonproliferation and arms control treaty verification efforts. This paper will describe our preliminary research to examine social media signatures of nonproliferation or arms control proxy events. We will describe the development of our preliminary nonproliferation and arms control proxy events, outline our initial findings, and propose ideas for future work.

social media, arms control, nonproliferation↗
DOE OSTI2012

Simultaneous Authentication and Certification of Arms-Control Measurement Systems

Most arms-control-treaty-monitoring scenarios involve a host party that makes a declaration regarding its nuclear material or items and a monitoring party that verifies that declaration. A verification system developed for such a use needs to be trusted by both parties. The first concern, primarily from the host party's point of view, is that any sensitive information that is collected must be protected without interfering in the efficient operation of the facility being monitored. This concern is addressed in what can be termed a 'certification' process. The second concern, of particular interest to the monitoring party, is that it must be possible to confirm the veracity of both the measurement system and the data produced by this measurement system. The monitoring party addresses these issues during an 'authentication' process. Addressing either one of these concerns independently is relatively straightforward. However, it is more difficult to simultaneously satisfy host party certification concerns and monitoring party authentication concerns. Typically, both parties will want the final access to the measurement system. We will describe an alternative approach that allows both parties to gain confidence simultaneously. This approach starts with (1) joint development of the measurement system followed by (2) host certification of several copies of the system and (3) random selection by the inspecting party of one copy to be use during the monitoring visit and one (or more) copy(s) to be returned to the inspecting party's facilities for (4) further hardware authentication; any remaining copies are stored under joint seal for use as spares. Following this process, the parties will jointly (5) perform functional testing on the selected measurement system and then (6) use this system during the monitoring visit. Steps (1) and (2) assure the host party as to the certification of whichever system is eventually used in the monitoring visit. Steps (1), (3), (4), and (5) increase the monitoring party's confidence in the authentication of the measurement system.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2021

Nuclear Arms Control: History & Policy Context [Slides]

This presentation provides an overview of key concepts in arms control, a history of nuclear arms control agreements, some of the contemporary challenges and opportunities in the field, a discussion of the process for negotiating arms control agreements, and updates on recent developments.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2020

Treaties and Arms Control [Slides]

This presentations provides an overview of arms control including aims and methods of arms control, the treaty process, treaties, new START inspections, and future treaty considerations: strategic vs. nonstrategic.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2012

High-Resolution Fast-Neutron Spectrometry for Arms Control and Treaty Verification

Many nondestructive nuclear analysis techniques have been developed to support the measurement needs of arms control and treaty verification, including gross photon and neutron counting, low- and high-resolution gamma spectrometry, time-correlated neutron measurements, and photon and neutron imaging. One notable measurement technique that has not been extensively studied to date for these applications is high-resolution fast-neutron spectrometry (HRFNS). Applied for arms control and treaty verification, HRFNS has the potential to serve as a complimentary measurement approach to these other techniques by providing a means to either qualitatively or quantitatively determine the composition and thickness of non-nuclear materials surrounding neutron-emitting materials. The technique uses the normally-occurring neutrons present in arms control and treaty verification objects of interest as an internal source of neutrons for performing active-interrogation transmission measurements. Most low-Z nuclei of interest for arms control and treaty verification, including 9Be, 12C, 14N, and 16O, possess fast-neutron resonance features in their absorption cross sections in the 0.5- to 5-MeV energy range. Measuring the selective removal of source neutrons over this energy range, assuming for example a fission-spectrum starting distribution, may be used to estimate the stoichiometric composition of intervening materials between the neutron source and detector. At a simpler level, determination of the emitted fast-neutron spectrum may be used for fingerprinting 'known' assemblies for later use in template-matching tests. As with photon spectrometry, automated analysis of fast-neutron spectra may be performed to support decision making and reporting systems protected behind information barriers. This paper will report recent work at Idaho National Laboratory to explore the feasibility of using HRFNS for arms control and treaty verification applications, including simulations and experiments, using fission-spectrum neutron sources to assess neutron transmission through composite low-Z attenuators.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2021

Active Neutron Interrogation as a Method for Verification of the Absence of Special Nuclear Material in Arms Control Dismantlement

The next step in arms control reductions will deal with both strategic and non-strategic weapons, presenting new and hard challenges for verification. One verification approach that might be used in support of these reductions is the concept of deferred verification, which forgoes inspections at sensitive nuclear sites and relies on an inspection regime having access to the open segment of a State's nuclear sector, in "monitored transfer zones." A component of this approach is the anticipated need for an instrument suite capable of detecting well-shielded highly-enriched uranium or plutonium where it isn't supposed to be. This specific need was recently identified by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research in an enabling operating concept they call "contain and dispose." At the foundation of this approach is the idea that items declared as "not nuclear" are, by definition, not treaty limited and are thus "fair-game" for inspection and questioning. Active Neutron Interrogation (ANI), using beta-delayed neutron emissions as the signature for special nuclear material (SNM) detection, is a promising method to address this challenge. The method is quick, has high sensitivity and high specificity for detecting shielded SNM, is robust against changing background radiation environments, is robust against the presence of unknown shielding, and avoids the use of gamma-ray spectrometry which may introduce complications due to the potential release of sensitive information. This paper will present recent research activities exploring technical aspects of using ANI as a FAIRGAME verification method and discuss future prospects and research needs

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗
DOE OSTI2015

Systems Approach to Arms Control Verification

Using the decades of experience of developing concepts and technologies for verifying bilateral and multilateral arms control agreements, a broad conceptual systems approach is being developed that takes into account varying levels of information and risk. The IAEA has already demonstrated the applicability of a systems approach by implementing safeguards at the State level, with acquisition path analysis as the key element. In order to test whether such an approach could also be implemented for arms control verification, an exercise was conducted in November 2014 at the JRC ITU Ispra. Based on the scenario of a hypothetical treaty between two model nuclear weapons states aimed at capping their nuclear arsenals at existing levels, the goal of this exercise was to explore how to use acquisition path analysis in an arms control context. Our contribution will present the scenario, objectives and results of this exercise, and attempt to define future workshops aimed at further developing verification measures that will deter or detect treaty violations.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2013

Beyond Arms-Control Monitoring

Expanded monitoring of the environment, everywhere and at all times, can advance arms control around the world, enhancing transparency among nations. In particular, improved characterization of the atmosphere now offers powerful opportunities for global monitoring, with multiple societal benefits. It may be useful to think of environmental monitoring as a long-term objective of arms-control verification.

arms-control monitoring↗
DOE OSTI2018

Annotated Bibliography: "U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control: Crisis and Collapse or Crossroads?"

Key questions posed for the workshop: 1. Is there an opportunity to renew the bilateral arms control framework in a manner acceptable to both sides and supporting mutually beneficial objectives? If not at present, can one be created? How? 2. What, if anything, does President Putin want out of a re-constructed arms control approach? 3. What new agreements or processes would serve the interests of the United States and its allies and partners? 4. What might be the benefits and risks of a new U.S. proposal for a follow-on to New START? 5. What if traditional arms control collapses? Are there any less formal, other approaches to achieve U.S. objectives? Russian objectives? Center for Global Security Research is hosting eight panels over two days at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The list of readings included provides some overview and background for the topics covered in the workshop. While some references are to books or materials not available online, where possible references include links to accessible versions of articles.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2018

U.S.-Russian Nuclear Arms Control: Crisis and Collapse or Crossroads? Workshop Summary August 2018

In this context, the first day of the workshop was dedicated to assessing the incentives and disincentives the United States and Russia face in pursuing further arms control agreements as well as the role of arms control in the two countries’ foreign policies and security strategies.On the second day, the workshop participants explored four pathways for a renewal of U.S.-Russian arms control, including:New START extension or a New START follow-on agreement; an agreement which meets Russia at least half way in the strategic space; an agreement addressing challenges to European nuclear stability; and unusual mix-and-match approaches that might be taken. The discussions and their results are summarized here.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗