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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records

Policy choices and outcomes for offshore wind auctions globally

Offshore wind energy is rapidly expanding, facilitated largely through auctions run by governments. We provide a detailed quantified overview of utilised auction schemes, including geographical spread, volumes, results, and design specifications. Our comprehensive global dataset reveals heterogeneous designs. Although most auction designs provide some form of revenue stabilisation, their specific instrument choices vary and include feed-in tariffs, one-sided and two-sided contracts for difference, mandated power purchase agreements, and mandated renewable energy certificates. We review the schemes used in all eight major offshore wind jurisdictions across Europe, Asia, and North America and evaluate bids in their jurisdictional context. We analyse cost competitiveness, likelihood of timely construction, occurrence of strategic bidding, and identify jurisdictional aspects that might have influenced auction results. We find that auctions are embedded within their respective regulatory and market design context, and are remarkably diverse, though with regional similarities. Auctions in each jurisdiction have evolved and tend to become more exposed to market price risks over time. Less mature markets are more prone to make use of lower-risk designs. Still, some form of revenue stabilisation is employed for all auctioned offshore wind energy farms analysed here, regardless of the specific policy choices. Our data confirm a coincidence of declining costs and growing diffusion of auction regimes.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

Auction Mechanism to Allocate Air Traffic Control Slots

This article deals with an auction mechanism for airspace slots, as a means of solving the European airspace congestion problem. A disequilibrium, between Air Traffic Control (ATC) services supply and ATC services demand are at the origin of almost one fourth of delays in the air transport industry in Europe. In order to tackle this congestion problem, we suggest modifying both pricing and allocation of ATC services, by setting up an auction mechanism. Objects of the auction will be the right for airlines to cross a part of the airspace, and then to benefit from ATC services over a period corresponding to the necessary time for the crossing. Allocation and payment rules have to be defined according to the objectives of this auction. The auctioneer is the public authority in charge of ATC services, whose aim is to obtain an efficient allocation. Therefore, the social value will be maximized. Another objective is to internalize congestion costs. To that end, we apply the principle of Clarke-Groves mechanism auction: each winner has to pay the externalities imposed on other bidders. The complex context of ATC leads to a specific design for this auction.

Raffarin, Marianne↗

Flexibility Auctions: A Framework for Managing Imbalance Risk

As the electricity generated by variable resources grows, system operators and variable resources have to manage challenging imbalances between forward and real-time markets. The Flexibility Auction is a novel approach for managing imbalances as it will allow resources with imbalance risk to hedge their production by buying flexibility options. The flexibility options are offered by grid-connected resources that can provide physical flexibility. This presentation will focus on the design of the Flexibility Auction, its properties, and how it can complement system-level services such as CAISO's proposed imbalance reserves. The presentation will include simple examples to illustrate the impact of the Flexibility Auction on the market participants and the system's imbalance risk.

auction↗

Auctioning Airport Slots?

The current allocation of slots on congested European airports constitutes an obstacle to the effective liberalisation of air transportation undertaken in Europe. With a view to favouring effluent slot utilisation and competition, as is the goal of the Euopean commission, we propose to use a market mechanism, based on temporary" utilisation licences. In order to allocate those licences, we propose and describe an iterated combinatorial auction mechanism where a percentage of licences would be reallocated each season. A secondary market would also be set up in order to reallocate slots during a season. Since a combinatorial auction involve a complex optimisation procedure, we describe how it can be made to work in the case of auctions.

Gruyer, Nicolas↗

A Fair, Economically-Efficient, Incentive-Aligned, Scalable Airspace Auction Mechanism for UAV Traffic Management

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are increasingly used in a wide range of applications such as cinematography, package delivery, and surveying. As a result, regulators have become interested in developing UAV Traffic Management (UTM) systems to coordinate UAV traffic. One possible framework for UTM is a combinatorial auction. Under this framework, airspace is modeled as a grid of space-time cells. UAV operators bid on sets of cells which collectively form flight paths for their UAVs. An ideal airspace auction should: be fair, be incentive-aligned, be scalable, allocate airspace economically-efficiently, enable price discovery, and reduce the work required to participate where possible. In this paper, we propose the first auction mechanism for airspace allocation that meets the criteria above. Our mechanism: (a) is provably economically-efficient, fair and incentive-aligned, (b) shares pricing information with bidders and (c) has features which reduce the burden of participating. We evaluate our mechanism on scenarios based on a Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) case study and find that it can scale to 26,000 bids.

Robert Allan Morris↗

Combinatorial Auction-Based Strategic Deconfliction of Federated UTM Airspace

Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) have become commonly used to perform a wide range of commercial activities such as cinematography and medical supply delivery. Consequently, regulators have become interested in designing UAV Traffic Management systems (UTMs) to coordinate UAV traffic among a collection of UAV operators. One framework which has been recently proposed for a UTM system is a combinatorial auction. In this framework, airspace is modelled as a 4D grid of space-time cells. UAV operators bid on cells which collectively form paths for their UAVs. Ideally, an airspace auction should reveal information about the current price of flight paths to bidders, allowing bidders to identify and bid on a select number of paths instead of placing as many bids as possible in the hopes of stumbling on a cheap path. Revealing too much information, however, can allow bad actors to place bids which are intended not to win but to raise the price that a rival bidder must pay. We address these twin challenges with a new information revelation framework which provides bidders with wide-ranging pricing information while suppressing bad actors. We evaluate our framework on scenarios based on a Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) case study and find that it can scale to thousands of bids.

Christopher J C Leet↗

Day-ahead continuous double auction-based peer-to-peer energy trading platform incorporating trading losses and network utilisation fee

Integration of distributed energy resources, such as photovoltaic solar (PV), introduces new opportunities to establish local energy market frameworks to improve renewable energy utilisation in residential sectors. Such peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading refers to a local market structure where customers (and prosumers) interact to share excess PV generation to enhance the individual and community social welfare. In this work, a day-ahead continuous double auction (CDA)-based P2P market structure considering network losses and network utilisation fees was designed. Day-ahead PV energy is modelled using fractional integral polynomials and the output is forecasted using an autoregressive integrated moving average model for each market interval. Based on the customer load and excess PV energy, the CDA market is cleared using a bid/ask matching mechanism. The performance of the P2P market was evaluated by computing different welfare metrics while analysing the effect of network constraints. The results show that the designed CDA-based P2P market structure increases the social welfare of all participants by an average of 17.75% compared to the baseline for the presented cases. Moreover, the impact of the forecasting error between the day-ahead and real-time market was also quantified.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Distribution Network Capacity Market Design: Marginal Distribution Capacity Pricing Mechanism for Efficient Investment and Cost Allocation

As electricity markets begin to shift from reliance on large, centralized power plants and towards distributed energy resources (DERs), there is a growing acknowledgement that more efficient planning, operations, and oversight is needed in the distribution system. This paper addresses one step in that direction by proposing an auction mechanism that uses a detailed distribution system planning model that allocates permits to end-used customers who request capacity to install new devices at their location and network upgrade contracts to utilities or 3rd-party companies who offer to upgrade system components. The resulting plan maximizes market surplus, that is, maximizes the total benefit to consumers minus the cost of network upgrades. We apply a marginal pricing scheme to the auction’s results such that the cost of each permits or contracts is differentiated by time and location, based on the Lagrangian multipliers of binding network constraints. These prices are shown to be no greater than the bid price of any awarded contract and no less than the offered cost of any awarded upgrade contract. Furthermore, the nonlinearity of power flows in the planning model result in an additional surplus that would be collected by the entity that hosts the auction, which could then be refunded to market participants or used to cover overhead costs of running the market. We provide four example auction results in a simple three-node distribution feeder to demonstrate the properties of the design. Results suggest that larger or more realistic case studies could be a promising next step.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Power Management in Regenerative Life Support Systems

Effective management of power can reduce the cost of launch and operation of regenerative life support systems. Variations in power may be quite severe and may manifest as surges or spikes, While the power plant may have some ability to deal with these variations, with batteries for example, over-capacity is expensive and does nothing to address the fundamental issue of excessive demand. Because the power unit must be sized to accommodate the largest demand, avoiding power spikes has the potential to reduce the required size of the power plant while at the same time increasing the dependability of the system. Scheduling of processors can help to reduce potential power spikes. However, not all power-consuming equipment is easily scheduled. Therefore, active power management is needed to further decrease the risk of surges or spikes. We investigate the use of a hierarchical scheme to actively manage power for a model of a regenerative life support system. Local level controllers individually determine subsystem power usage. A higher level controller monitors overall system power and detects surges or spikes. When a surge condition is detected, the higher level controller conducts an 'auction' and describes subsystem power usage to re-allocate power. The result is an overall reduction in total power during a power surge. The auction involves each subsystem making a 'bid' to buy or sell power based on local needs. However, this re-allocation cannot come at the expense of life support function. To this end, participation in the auction is restricted to those processes meeting certain tolerance constraints. These tolerances represent acceptable limits within which system processes can be operated. We present a simulation model and discuss some of our results.

Crawford, Sekou↗

Safe, Efficient, and Fair UTM Airspace Management

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) are increasingly used to perform crucial commercial activities such as various types of inspections (crops, railroads, and bridges), surveillance, and package delivery. Regulators have become interested in developing UAS Traffic Management (UTM) systems. One promising framework for UTM allocates airspace to UAS operators via an auction. To succeed, an airspace auction must be economically efficient, fair, scalable, incentive-aligned, simple, and capable of continuously modeling airspace and sharing bid status and pricing information. This paper introduces the first airspace auction mechanism that meets these criteria. In the process, we introduce new spatial-temporal fairness constraints and a new abstraction for communicating airspace pricing information, the airspace price field. We evaluate our mechanism on UAS delivery scenarios taken from a Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency(JAXA) study and show that it scales to 1000s of bids.

Strategic deconfliction↗

Assessment of Offshore Wind Energy Leasing Areas for Humboldt and Morro Bay Wind Energy Areas, California

The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) is providing scientific and technical services to the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) under an interagency agreement. The purpose of this report is to provide technical assistance in delineating potential lease areas from the California wind energy areas (WEAs) that can be competitively auctioned to wind energy developers. Each wind energy area is presumed to be technically and economically feasible for wind energy development based on the economic cost study performed by NREL in 2020. The subsequent analysis summarized in this report is intended to help BOEM maximize efficient offshore wind energy resource use and ensure fair return to the Government for use of the lease areas, by making recommendations for viable ways to divide the WEAs into auctionable commercial lease areas of approximately equal value. We considered several factors that affect the value of lease areas for wind energy development, including mean wind speeds, water depth, seafloor gradient, seismicity, hard substrate, and access to infrastructure. The largest impact to generating capacity came from the choice of mooring technology and the resulting setback from the lease area boundaries. Based on our setback assumptions, the generating capacity for a wind plant using catenary moorings could be nearly 30% less than with vertical moorings in Humboldt, or approximately 20% less in Morro Bay. The likely range of generating capacity is 1.5 to 3 GW in Humboldt and 3 to 5 GW in Morro Bay.

17 WIND ENERGY↗

An empirical analysis of supply offers in the ERCOT operating reserves markets

Here, this paper seeks to improve theoretical and empirical understanding of supplier dynamics in wholesale markets for operating reserves, which have been understudied compared to energy markets. We begin by identifying several economic factors that unit owners may consider when submitting offers into operating reserves auctions in two-stage, co-optimized markets common across much of North America. Next, we analyze historical offer data from the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) market to assess whether actual reserve market behavior aligns with expectations based on economic theory, as well as with commonly used assumptions in electricity market modeling efforts. We find that the aggregate supply of operating reserves in ERCOT varies meaningfully over time, becoming more expensive during summer afternoons, which is consistent with theoretical expectations but contradicts the typical modeling assumption of temporally invariant reserve offers. Analysis of offers made by individual units uncovers additional insights, such as the existence of large offer pattern differences by unit owner and the tendency of battery storage units to submit very low offer prices. We conclude by discussing how our findings can be integrated into electricity market modeling assumptions to improve alignment with observed operating reserve offer inputs and pricing outcomes.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Blockchain Smart Contract Reference Framework and Program Logic Architecture for Transactive Energy Systems

This paper proposes a reference framework for a transactive energy market based on blockchain. The framework was designed based on the engineering requirements of a distribution-scale market; including participant needs, expected market transactions, and the cybersecurity constructs required to support a fair, secure and efficient market operation. It leverages the existing blockchain primitives to provide clear value propositions to the transactive market, including identity management (access control), data security (integrity), resiliency (decentralization, scalability and performance). The validity of the proposed framework is demonstrated using a real-time 5-min double-auction market. The results highlight its benefits while providing strong validation of applicability to blockchain within transactive energy systems.

Gourisetti, Sri Nikhil Gupta↗

Funding a Just Transition Away from Coal in the U.S. Considering Avoided Damage from Air Pollution

Abstract Coal is declining in the U.S. as part of the clean energy transition, resulting in remarkable air pollution benefits for the American public and significant costs for the industry. Using the AP3 integrated assessment model, we estimate that fewer emissions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and primary fine particulate matter driven by coal’s decline led to $300 billion in benefits from 2014 to 2019. Conversely, we find that job losses driven by less coal plant and mining activity resulted in $7.84 billion in foregone wages over the same timeframe. While the benefits were greatly distributed (mostly throughout the East), costs were highly concentrated in coal communities. Transferring a small fraction of the benefits to workers could cover these costs while maintaining societal net benefits. Forecasting coal fleet damages from 2020 to 2035, we find that buying out or replacing these plants would result in $589 billion in air quality benefits, which considerably outweigh the costs. The return on investment increases when policy targets the most damaging capacity, and net benefits are maximized when removing just facilities where marginal benefits exceed marginal costs. Evaluating competitive reverse auction policy designs akin to Germany’s Coal Exit Act, we find that adjusting bids based on monetary damages rather than based only on carbon dioxide emissions – the German design – provides a welfare advantage. Our benefit–cost analyses clearly support policies that drive a swift and just transition away from coal, thereby clearing the air while supporting communities needing assistance.

Dennin, Luke R. (ORCID:0000000205405520)↗

Distribution System Congestion Management - A Survey of Reliable Integration for Aggregated Resources and Microgrids

Rising penetration of consumer-owned Distribution Grid Resources (DGRs), increasingly managed by third party aggregators and enrolled in grid services and wholesale market programs, can create localized congestion in distribution networks. Managing these constraints is challenging due to a persistent coordination and information gap: utilities are accountable for reliability and have network topology and state visibility, while aggregators control the DGR capability needed to relieve congestion. This survey synthesizes congestion management solutions for distribution systems with high DGR penetration, covering both market-based mechanisms (distribution level markets, locational pricing, flexibility auctions) and non-market-based solutions (network reconfiguration, direct DGR control, demand response, curtailment, etc.). The literature is organized across three decision horizons: long term planning, operational planning, and real-time operation. Special attention is devoted to emerging distribution system operator architectures and coordination frameworks spanning transmission system operators, aggregators, and microgrids. Drawing on recent case studies and implementations, we distill best practices, identify key technical and economic barriers, and outline research directions. The evidence points to a shift toward integrated congestion management that combines market signals with technical controls, enabled by improved monitoring, forecasting, and closed loop control capabilities.

Active Distribution Networks (ADN)↗

Rethinking the Price Formation Problem–Part 2: Rewarding Flexibility and Managing Price Risk

In this study, part 1 of this two-part paper describes the impact that uncertainty has on the design and analysis of price formation policies in the non-convex auctions conducted by U.S. wholesale electricity market operators. Using first a toy model and then a large-scale test system, Part 2 demonstrates the difference in prices under the idealized benchmark of ex ante convex hull pricing defined in Part 1 versus existing methods, in particular documenting the potential for suppression of volatility and therefore under-compensation of flexibility by existing methods. The examples highlight that inefficient spot price formation can induce inefficient forward commitments of generators, necessitating out-of-market intervention to restore a reliable and efficient operating plan.Given the potential side effects of existing policies for investment and operation, we suggest two elements in a reoriented approach to the price formation problem: first ensuring that prices exhibit full-strength volatility, and second ensuring that risk-averse market participants have sufficient ability to manage this volatility.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Allocation Mechanisms in Rationed Markets

Economic theory has come to play an important role in power system operations through the design of wholesale markets that are central to their operation. Furthermore, transactive energy places economic theory as a cornerstone in its operational concept as it seeks to integrate the technical needs of the power system with the preferences of its participants. Traditionally the mechanism employed is the continuous double-auction but de-pending on the circumstances the power system find itself in, this mechanism may or may not be the most appropriate, i.e. a one-size fits all market institution cannot be recommended without regard for the features of the underlying trading environment. This paper seeks to explain the economic rationale that guides the choice of a market institution and takes recourse to a theoretical demonstration in the context of a rationed power system scenario where demand exceeds generation (due to any number of events such as outages, microgrid operation, etc) and electrical energy must be rationed to better understand which types of mechanisms are most appropriate.

transactive energy, power system economics, econom↗