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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

Cyber threat assessment of machine learning driven autonomous control systems of nuclear power plants

We report advanced cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure and the energy sector are becoming more common. With the invention of autonomous control systems (ACS) within advanced nuclear reactor designs, system designers, reactor operators, and regulators must consider cybersecurity during the design and operational phases. This article provides a cyber threat assessment of machine learning (ML)-based digital twinning (DT) technologies in the context of advanced reactor ACS. A cyber–physical testbed was created to emulate nuclear reactor digital instrumentation and controls (I&C) and act as a basis for the ACS. The ACS was designed as two plant-level DTs predicting reactor malfunctions and determining control actions and two component-level DTs responsible for classifying component states and forecasting component inputs and outputs (I/O). Two duplicate ACS designs– one using a traditional ML framework and one using an automated ML (AutoML) framework– were created and tested against cyber-attacks on training data, real-time process data, and ML model architectures to determine their respective qualitative cyber-risk in terms of likelihood and impact. Both frameworks showed similar cyber-resilience against training, real-time, and ML architecture attacks, proving that neither is inherently more secure. Recommended safeguard and security measures are posed to system designers, reactor operators, and regulators to maintain the cybersecurity of ML-based DT technologies such as ACS, prompting a holistic view of shared responsibility for maintaining cyber-secure ML-based systems.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Data coverage assessment on neural network based digital twins for autonomous control system

We report in a recently developed Nearly Autonomous Management and Control (NAMAC) system, neural networks (NNs) are used to develop digital twins for diagnosis (DT-Ds). However, NNs are not usually considered extrapolation models and may result in large errors if they are applied to unseen data outside the training data (uncovered). In this study, we propose a data coverage assessment (DCA) to determine if the NN-based DT-Ds are extrapolated based on their epistemic uncertainty. The uncertainty quantification algorithms and uncertainty thresholds are selected based on the confusion matrix of classifying evaluation data into covered or uncovered data. To demonstrate the adaptability of the proposed framework, we applied it to a basic feedforward neural network and a more advanced recurrent neural network based on a more nonlinear database. Case studies show that the proposed framework can distinguish unseen data for both basic and advanced applications with proper uncertainty quantification algorithms and thresholds.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Protecting and Defending against Autonomous Control Systems and Digital Twin Cyber Attacks: Response Strategy for Hyperparameter attacks of Digital Twin Machine Learning Models in Nuclear Power Plants (Final)

Navigating through the complex tapestry of technological advancements, "Response Strategy for Hyperparameter attacks of Digital Twin Machine Learning Model in Nuclear Power Plants" stands at the intersection of cybersecurity and nuclear power plant operations, embarking on a journey through the intricacies of securing digital twins against malicious cyber activities. As nuclear power plants progressively integrate digital twin technology and machine learning models to optimize operations and ensure system reliability, they inadvertently expose themselves to a new spectrum of vulnerabilities, notably in the realm of hyperparameter attacks. Hyperparameters, integral in machine learning model tuning and optimal performance of digital twins, have emerged as a target for adversaries aiming to destabilize the predictive capabilities and therefore, the operational accuracy of these digital entities within critical infrastructures like nuclear plants. This paper, therefore, meticulously threads the needle through the development of a robust response strategy, poised to shield these digital reflections against calculated hyperparameter manipulations, ensuring that the digital twin can effectively and securely function as a reliable proxy for its physical counterpart. The ensuing sections delve into the orchestrated maelstrom of multi-rate time-changing intelligent coordinated hyperparameter attacks and the implementation of event-triggered predictive control, laying down a structured, predictive, and responsive framework that safeguards the nexus where the digital and physical realms of nuclear power plants coalesce. The operational integrity of digital twins in nuclear power plants depends critically on the security of machine learning hyperparameters. This study makes two different contributions. First, a decision-based idea known as a multi-rate time changing intelligent coordinated hyperparameter attack is put forth. In this attack, many hyperparameters are repeatedly changed using both random and intelligent optimal techniques by the attacker. These assaults introduce varied rates at different attack steps, compromise various amounts of hyperparameters, and improve stealth and flexibility. Second, a technique is developed for event triggered predictive control to rapidly respond to potential hyperparameter attacks. This control integrates a sliding window framework, retaining a history of previous data points and employing linear regression to predict the next data point from the current dataset. The control gain K is determined using the Lyapunov-Krasovskii method, and subsequently, an action is developed. Finally, the outcome of the simulation demonstrates the viability of the proposed method for defending nuclear power plant digital twins from hyperparameter attacks.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

On the Formalization of Development and Assessment Process for Digital Twins in the Nearly Autonomous Management and Control System

In recent years, the autonomous control system has been encouraged in advanced reactors for restoring economic viability, simplifying the operation and maintenance, and enabling remote-site power generations [1]. Since the reactor is expected to be operated for a long period of time with a limited number of individuals onsite, it is recommended that the autonomous control system should have access to very realistic models of the state of processes in the whole lifecycle, together with these process behaviors in interaction with their environment in the real world. As a result, digital twin (DT) technology is suggested in autonomous control systems. DT is defined as a digital representation of a physical object or system, which contains a record for the histories of loads, operation and maintenance status, predictions for the near-term transient of important state variables, and decision-making process [2]. Since machine learning (ML) can recognize patterns within a complex system in real-time applications, it has been used to build DTs in the autonomous control systems for advanced reactors. Meanwhile, due to the rareness of operation data in accident scenarios, the development and assessment of DTs is expected to be mainly driven by simulations. Although the capability and feasibility of ML-based DTs are recognized in improving the safety and efficiency of reactor control, a major concern from the regulatory commission and the nuclear industry is whether the information from a DT is developed and assessed in accordance with expectation and requirements by the target decision. Such concerns not only affect the acceptance criteria for DTs, but also values that can be extracted from DTs and autonomous control system during operations. Inspired by the success of formal methods in improving the reliability and robustness of computer programming and software development, it is suggested that the development and assessment process (DAP) for both separate DTs and integral control system should be formalized in a transparent, consistent, and improvable manner. In this study, a digital-twin development and assessment process (DT-DAP) is proposed by adapting the evaluation model development and assessment process (EMDAP) [3] to requirements by the autonomous control system, ML algorithms, and DT technology. To demonstrate the framework, a baseline nearly autonomous management and control (NAMAC) system with ML-based DTs for diagnosis and prognosis is developed and assessed based on the framework. It is found that with selected testing methods and techniques, the DT-DAP can help identify errors in DTs and NAMAC which would otherwise be left unverified. Meanwhile, it is found that the DT-DAP can improve the DTs and NAMAC by continuously learning and iterating through different elements.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Trustworthiness modeling and evaluation for a nearly autonomous management and control system

The Nearly Autonomous Management and Control (NAMAC) system supports the advanced reactor operation by recommending control actions to operators based on real-time measurements and digital twins (DTs) learning from the knowledge base. To enable the safe and reliable use of autonomous technologies, NAMAC and its recommendations should be trustworthy to operators and regulators at both the design and operation stages. This study proposes a NAMAC trustworthiness modeling and evaluation framework supported by trustworthiness ontologies and evidence-based approaches. The development-time and run-time ontologies are separately constructed and then converted to Bayesian networks to quantitatively evaluate the NAMAC trustworthiness. This evaluation is demonstrated by collecting and characterizing evidence from NAMAC practices, such as the development and assessment of the NAMAC system, data coverage assessment, and the training and optimizations of neural-network-based DTs. Our proposed approach can aggregate various trustworthiness attributes of complex artificial-intelligence-supported systems for safety-critical applications. It also considers the interaction between different DTs and extends beyond the trustworthiness evaluation of a single DT. In conclusion, the evidence-based method enhances the transparency of the trustworthiness modeling and evaluation processes and helps identify uncertainties and subjectivity involved in the processes.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Development of a nearly autonomous management and control system for advanced reactors

This presentation discusses the development of a Nearly Autonomous Management and Control (NAMAC) system for advanced reactors. This presentation first introduces the NAMAC-enabled plant control. Next, this presentation introduces major technologies of implementing NAMAC, including operational workflow, digital twin, and advanced machine learning algorithms. To demonstrate the capability of the NAMAC system, NAMAC is connected with a simulator of the Experimental Breeder Reactor II, where NAMAC is activated to provide recommendations during a single loss of flow accident.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Space Nuclear Power Autonomous Control Algorithm and Control Element Test Bed

Nuclear thermal rockets are currently NASA’s preferred option for use in a manned mission to Mars in the 2040s. The communication delay between an Earth ground station and a spacecraft heading toward Mars can be up to 20 min. Therefore, controlling the nuclear rocket engine would require either a full-time reactor operator on the mission or an autonomous control system for the reactor. The latter idea of making space nuclear reactors fully autonomous has drawn more interest from stakeholders, but such an autonomous control system must be rigorously tested and validated before it is certified for human use. The cost of a full ground test for a space nuclear reactor is tremendous, so a nonnuclear mock reactor test bed was created to test and validate control elements and control algorithms for space nuclear reactors. The test bed consists of control element hardware that inputs physical measurement data into a reactor emulator to produce the reactor’s performance under steady-state, transient, and fault conditions. The control element hardware consists of six full-sized control drums equipped with servo drives and motors and is instrumented with optical encoders, resolvers, and torque sensors for drum movement characterization. In addition to the drums, a two-phase flow loop was designed and built to mimic the valves and turbomachinery associated with the propellant flow through a nuclear thermal rocket engine; components such as pressure sensors, flow meters, thermocouples, and tachometers are instrumented throughout the loop to characterize the fluid flow, valve, and turbomachinery behavior of the system. The data from the physical hardware (e.g., drum position, propellant flow rates) are input to a nuclear reactor simulator to determine the actual nuclear reactor parameters, and the data are sent back to a control algorithm to complete the control loop. The ability to conduct numerous tests of the control systems and autonomous algorithms can help validate the instrumentation and control aspects for a space nuclear reactor for every possible fault situation.

Wilson, Brandon↗
DOE OSTI2022

Design of a supervisory control system for autonomous operation of advanced reactors

Advanced reactors to be deployed in the coming decades will face deregulated energy markets, and may adopt flexible operation to boost profitability. To aid in the transition from baseload to flexible operation paradigm, autonomous operation is sought. This work focuses on the control aspect of autonomous operation. Specifically, a hierarchical control system is designed to support constraint enforcement during routine operational transients. Within the system, data-driven modeling, physics-based state observation, and classical control algorithms are integrated to provide an adaptable and robust solution. A 320 MW Fluoride-cooled High-temperature Pebble-bed Reactor is the design basis for demonstrating the proposed control system. The hierarchical control system consists of a supervisory layer and low-level layer. The supervisory layer receives requests to change the system's operating conditions (e.g., the current reactor power to meet a load -follow), and accepts or rejects them based on constraints that have been assigned. Constraints are issued to keep the plant within an optimal operating region. The low-level layer interfaces with the actuators of the system to fulfill requested changes, while maintaining tracking and regulation duties. Further, to accept requests at the supervisory layer, the Reference Governor algorithm was adopted. To model the dynamics of the reactor, a system identification algorithm, Dynamic Mode Decomposition, was utilized. To estimate the evolution of process variables that cannot be directly measured (e.g., the propagation of delayed neutron precursors), the Unscented Kalman Filter, incorporating a nonlinear model of nuclear dynamics, was adopted. The composition of these algorithms led to a numerical demonstration of constraint enforcement during a 40% power drop transient (at a rate of 5 %/min). Uncontrolled secondary-side temperatures were successfully constrained. Adaptability of the proposed system was demonstrated by modifying the constraint values, and enforcing them during the transient. Robustness was also demonstrated by enforcing constraints under noisy environments.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Neutronic impact of Autonomous Reactivity Control system inclusion in a breed-and-burn core

This work examines the impacts induced in a large breed-and-burn core through the inclusion of Autonomous Reactivity Control (ARC) systems from the neutronics perspective. A combination of numerical and analytical techniques are used to conservatively quantify the reactivity penalty, amount of additional tritium production, and depletion of the system absorber fluid. The reactivity penalty is found to be negligibly small, with the largest impact resulting from the removal of fuel material to make room for the ARC system tubes. Similarly, the depletion of the absorber fluid is found to be negligible compared to the amount of fluid present. It is found that the production of tritium within the active core is also small in comparison to that which is nominally produced, while tritium production within the lower ARC system reservoir may be of concern if not adequately considered during the assembly design phase. This issue is explored and a mitigation technique is proposed. Ultimately this study concludes that there are no issues from the steady-state neutronics perspective preventing incorporation of ARC systems into typical breed-and-burn cores.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Application of Artificial Intelligence in Detection and Mitigation of Human Factor Errors in Nuclear Power Plants: A Review

Human factors and ergonomics have played an essential role in increasing the safety and performance of operators in the nuclear energy industry. In this critical review, we examine how artificial intelligence (AI) technologies can be leveraged to mitigate human errors, thereby improving the safety and performance of operators in nuclear power plants (NPPs). First, we discuss the various causes of human errors in NPPs. Next, we examine the ways in which AI has been introduced to and incorporated into different types of operator support systems to mitigate these human errors. We specifically examine (1) operator support systems, including decision support systems, (2) sensor fault detection systems, (3) operation validation systems, (4) operator monitoring systems, (5) autonomous control systems, (6) predictive maintenance systems, (7) automated text analysis systems, and (8) safety assessment systems. Finally, we provide some of the shortcomings of the existing AI technologies and discuss the challenges still ahead for their further adoption and implementation to provide future research directions.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Autonomous System Inference, Trojan, and Adversarial Reprogramming Attack and Defense (Final)

In the world of ever-advancing technology, Autonomous Systems (AS) find extensive application, bolstering functionalities of critical infrastructures such as nuclear power plants. These systems, however, are increasingly becoming a target for nefarious activities, namely through inference attacks, trojan attacks, and adversarial reprogramming. This paper delves into a comprehensive exploration of machine learning (ML)-driven autonomous control systems within advanced nuclear reactor designs, revealing the vulnerabilities and proposing strategies for defense against potential cyber-attacks. Advanced cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure and the energy sector are becoming more common. With the invention of autonomous control systems (ACS) within advanced nuclear reactor designs, system designers, reactor operators, and regulators must consider cybersecurity during the design and operational phases. This article provides a cyber threat assessment of machine learning (ML)- based digital twinning (DT) technologies in the context of advanced reactor ACS. A cyber-physical testbed was created to emulate nuclear reactor digital instrumentation and controls (I&C) and act as a basis for the ACS. The ACS was designed as two plant-level DTs predicting reactor malfunctions and determining control actions and two component-level DTs responsible for classifying component states and forecasting component inputs and outputs (I/O). Two duplicate ACS designs– one using a traditional ML framework and one using an automated ML (AutoML) framework– were created and tested against cyber-attacks on training data, real-time process data, and ML model architectures to determine their respective qualitative cyber-risk in terms of likelihood and impact. Both frameworks showed similar cyber-resilience against training, real-time, and ML architecture attacks, proving that neither is inherently more secure. Recommended safeguard and security measures are posed to system designers, reactor operators, and regulators to maintain the cybersecurity of ML-based DT technologies such as ACS, prompting a holistic view of shared responsibility for maintaining cyber-secure ML-based systems. As global reliance on generation III reactors begins to be critically assessed, the evolution towards advanced reactor systems utilizing digital instrumentation and controls (I&C) becomes not merely preferable, but essential. The integration of semi and fully autonomous control systems (ACS), powered by digital I&C and machine learning (ML)-based digital twinning (DT) technologies, emerges as a potent strategy to mitigate operations and maintenance costs, thereby enhancing the economic feasibility of novel reactor designs. However, with a staggering 500% and 380% increase in cyber-attacks reported against the energy sector by the United States Department of Energy (DoE) and the European Union respectively, a surge in cyber vulnerabilities specifically targeting the nuclear industry has been 2 markedly observed. Notable incidents, such as the W32.Ramnit spyware infiltration at the Gundremmingen nuclear power plant in Germany and the Dtrack spyware intrusion at the Kudankulam nuclear power plant in India, while not directly compromising core industrial control systems (ICS), underscore a compelling necessity to fortify cybersecurity protocols in safeguarding reactor systems against increasingly adept digital adversaries. In light of this, our investigation extends beyond conventional cybersecurity parameters, diving into the intricate web of potential vulnerabilities woven into ML-based DTs and ACS in advanced reactor systems. A crafted cyber-physical testbed and preliminary ACS were devised to act as a mirror, reflecting potential configurations of advanced reactor control designs. Moreover, this study is intertwined with a scrutinization of ML models, developed either through conventional, manually tuned methodologies or via automated means through AutoML, probing into their cyber-risk profiles within operational technology (OT) environments. Expanding on this, two distinct ACS blueprints were forged – one navigating through the corridors of traditional ML and the other traversing the path of AutoML – in an effort to holistically encapsulate the considerations pivotal to ML-based DT control system design. Employing the SANS Institute Industrial Control System (ICS) Kill Chain and the MITRE ATT&CK Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) framework, a structured analysis was conducted, launching three targeted attacks against the training dataset, real-time dataset, and ML models, therein dissecting the potential cyber-attack implications against both ML frameworks within an ACS milieu. It is essential to note that three distinct categories of attacks were conducted against both ACS configurations, each encompassing three distinct ML-based DTs, cumulating in a total of 18 varied attacks. This exploration extends into the realms of Autonomous System Inference, Trojan, and Adversarial Reprogramming Attack and Defense, unraveling vulnerabilities, and opportunities for fortified defenses against such intrusions, particularly where ML-driven technologies, and by extension, ACS, are deployed. Final recommendations, articulated through a lens of security, safeguard, and implementation considerations, are presented for both traditional and AutoML models, anchoring upon the existing knowledge landscape and ML-based DT modeling for ACS, and are offered as a beacon to guide the nuclear industry through the intricate cybersecurity challenges that lie ahead.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Digital-twin-based improvements to diagnosis, prognosis, strategy assessment, and discrepancy checking in a nearly autonomous management and control system

We report the Nearly Autonomous Management And Control System (NAMAC) is a comprehensive control system to assist plant operations by furnishing control recommendations to operators in a broad class of situations. This study refines a NAMAC system for making reasonable recommendations during complex loss of flow (LOF) scenarios with a validated EBR-II simulator, digital twins improved by machine-learning algorithms, a multi-attribute decision-making scheme, and a discrepancy checker for identifying unexpected recommendation effects. The performance of each NAMAC component is assessed, while the capability of NAMAC is demonstrated and evaluated in a class of LOF scenarios.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Intelligent Surrogate Model Development: Boosting Computational Efficiency for Autonomous Control of Advanced Reactors

Advanced reactors promise enhanced safety, greater efficiency, and waste reductions. To fully realize these benefits, it is crucial to address the need for autonomous or semi-autonomous control systems that require fewer operators. This research primarily supports the MARVEL autonomous control system, which requires real-time operation. However, the current RELAP5 reactor thermal hydraulic transient simulation is excessively time-consuming. Therefore, this study aims to leverage deep learning techniques to develop a surrogate model, providing a more efficient and accurate alternative for real-time performance. The model was trained using a combination of one-timestep prediction and scheduled sampling. It was then used for recursive prediction of the reactor state. This developed surrogate model significantly improves computational efficiency, achieving a 12 times acceleration.

46 - INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AN↗
DOE OSTI2022

Autonomous System Subversion Tactics: Prototypes and Recommended Countermeasures

One of the fielding requirements for Advanced and Small Modular Reactors (AR/SMR) is the ability to support remote and autonomous operations. Autonomous Control Systems (ACS) are found on platforms such as Autonomous Space Vehicles, Cruise Missiles, and advanced driver-assistance systems. Each of these ACS implementations depends upon a set of decision support subsystems responsible for supporting Autonomous Mission Managers (names vary based upon field and author preferences). These Autonomous Mission Managers receive inputs from system sensors (e.g., LIDAR collection from an automobile travelling down a street; transients from a nuclear reactor), and perform a set of classifications (e.g., Red Traffic Light; Small Pedestrian at 10m; Load Rejection; Single Coolant Pump Trip), and then use these classifications in combination with recommendation algorithms to achieve platform goals (e.g., Stop the Vehicle at the Traffic Light, Avoid the Small Pedestrian; Trip the Reactor to prevent a Safety Event). The design, implementation, and fielding of an ACS capability will alter the cyber-attack surface such that existing risk management plans will need to be updated to include how to protect and defend against data-science and decision-support-system attack classes. These attack classes would include protection of the design and training environments where algorithm selection and testing and training data would be obvious attack vectors. These attack classes would also require an informed set of detection and response procedures to identify anomalous behaviors and document best practices for anomaly assessment and vulnerability mitigation and remediation. Last year we published a Cyber Threat Assessment Methodology for Autonomous and Remote Operations for AR/SMRs along with a companion publication on Cyber Attack and Defense Use Cases. The focus of the methodology was on describing and enumerating ACS processes, components, and functions such that security engineers could: evaluate subversion options against the target; identify threat actor attributes and capabilities derived from each subversion option; and identify security controls and response countermeasures. The Use Cases document offered detailed methodology examples including an assessment of a Military Base SMR, an Autonomous System Decision Loop, and implementation of AR/SMR Machine Learning algorithms. Our proposal at the end of last year was to focus on implementation of subversion prototypes related to the last Use Case area: AR/SMR Machine Learning (ML) Algorithms. We included six attack scenarios in our Use Cases paper: a Poisoning Attack against ML functions implemented using an FPGA; a Trojaning Attack against ML classifiers exploiting the excitability of Nuclear Engineers; a Backdooring Attack against ML Training environments to ensure persistence of an attack vector; a False Positive Evasion Attack against multi-factor Access Control Systems using clever inputs; an Inference Attack against ML models by an Insider with access to the Operational environment; and an Adversarial Reprogramming Attack against a Material Access Control Video Surveillance System. At the beginning of this year these six attack scenarios were provided to our research teams at Georgia Tech and Idaho State University and each team successfully implemented a subversion attack against a ML implementation to include transient misclassifications. While this is a notable outcome from this type of research, this paper offers the reader insight into not only how to structure and execute these types of attacks, but into the thought process behind how the researcher investigated the problem space, performed initial algorithm implementation, and the trial-and-error behind arriving at the successful subversion prototypes. We include in this paper a set of associated Scenarios on how these subversion prototypes could be implemented and an initial set of guidance for AR/SMR architects, Nuclear Regulators, and Cyber Defenders to implement awareness and defense capabilities into their current operational portfolios.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Development and assessment of a reactor system prognosis model with physics-guided machine learning

Autonomous control systems provide recommendations to help operators in decision-making during plant operations ranging from normal operation to accident management. An important step of autonomous control is prognosis. In nuclear engineering domain, prognosis is the process of predicting future conditions of a system or equipment based on present signs and symptoms of a fault. The prognosis model allows predicting future reactor states for possible candidate control strategies so that the outcomes can be evaluated to determine the best control strategy. The prognosis model requires representing direct relationships between the symptoms and the predictions. In nuclear engineering, computational simulations are approximate representations of the operation of the real system. However, prognosis with computational simulations requires high computation power and time due to possible large number of scenarios. Necessary computation resources can be reduced with machine learning (ML) approach for fast predictions by building a surrogate function using the simulation data. A critical issue is, ML models are ignorant of physical knowledge, and these models approximate statistical relationships between the system variables. This ignorance can produce results that are inconsistent with physical laws, even if an optimal result is achieved from a mathematical point of view. Physics-guided machine learning (PGML) is an approach to tackle this issue. Here, this work formulates and illustrates a framework to guide development and assessment of the ML-based prognosis model for autonomous control systems. The development of the prognosis model considers the training of a ML model which consists of optimizing many aspects of the ML approach. The assessment of the prognosis model considers training data limitations and uncertainties of the ML approach. Prognosis models with standalone ML and PGML are developed and assessed on the loss-of-flow scenario of Experimental Breeder Reactor II. The results indicate that PGML based prognosis model has the best performance compared to other prognosis models.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Method for automatic correction of offset drift in online sensors

Abstract Successful operation and optimization of water treatment systems hinge on the availability of high-quality online sensor measurements. Ideally, the available measurements should be simultaneously accurate (i.e., unbiased and precise), representative, voluminous, and timely. This remains a pain-point in current water infrastructures, forming a barrier to a wider adoption of advanced and autonomous control systems. While short-lived symptoms, such as outliers and spikes, can be detected or corrected with state-of-the-art tools for fault detection and identification, it is much more difficult to detect, diagnose, and correct the symptoms of slow faults, such as changes in offset or sensitivity due to drift. The time scale of drift is often longer than the time scales of the system dynamics of interest. Moreover, sensor drift has been shown to occur at the same time and with similar rates when sensors are exposed to the same conditions. This challenges data quality management strategies based on redundancy. In this contribution, we develop a new method, including both a hands-off sensor calibration mechanism and an information-seeking control architecture that can handle the unique challenge of simultaneous and similar drift in online sensors.

Chowdhury, Dhrubajit↗