Ours or Mars? Understanding Microbial Bioloading on the InSight Mars Lander
A review of planetary protection approaches to the reduction of "harmful contamination" in the form of endospores for the InSIght Mars Lander.
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A review of planetary protection approaches to the reduction of "harmful contamination" in the form of endospores for the InSIght Mars Lander.
Under existing COSPAR policy adopted in 1984, missions to Mars (landers, probes, and some orbiters) are designated as Category IV missions. As such, the procedures for implementing planetary protection requirements could include trajectory biasing, cleanrooms, bioload reduction, sterilization of hardware, and bioshields, i. e. requirements could be similar to Viking. However, in 1992, a U. S. National Academy of Sciences study recommended that controls on forward contamination of Mars be tied to specific mission objectives. The report recommended that Mars landers with life detection instruments be subject to at least Viking-level sterilization procedures for bioload reduction, while spacecraft (including orbiters) without life detection instruments be subject to at least Viking-level pre sterilization procedures for bioload reduction but need not be sterilized. In light of this, it is proposed that the current policy's Category IV missions and their planetary protection requirements be divided into two subcategories as follows: Category IV A, for missions comprising landers and probes without life detection experiments and some orbiters, which will meet a specified bioburden limit for exposed surfaces; Category IV B, for landers and probes with life detection experiments, which will require complete system sterilization. For Category IV A missions, bioburden specifications will be proposed and implementing procedures discussed. A resolution will be proposed to modify the existing COSPAR policy to reflect these changes. Similar specifications, procedures, and resolution for Category IV B missions will be the subject of a later study.
Under existing COSPAR policy adopted in 1984, missions to Mars (landers, probes, and some orbiters) are designated as Category IV missions. As such, the procedures for implementing planetary protection requirements could include trajectory biasing, cleanrooms, bioload reduction, sterilization of hardware, and bioshields. In 1992, a U.S. National Research Council study recommended that controls on forward contamination of Mars be tied to specific mission objectives. The report recommended that Mars landers with life detection instruments be subject to at least Viking-level sterilization procedures for bioload reduction, while spacecraft (including orbiters) without life detection instruments be subject to at least Viking-level pre-sterilization procedures for bioload reduction but need not be sterilized. In light of this, it is proposed that the current policy's Category IV and its planetary protection requirements be divided into two sub-categories as follows: Category IVa, for missions comprising landers and probes without life detection experiments, which will meet a specified bioburden limit for exposed surfaces, and Category IVb, for landers and probes with life detection experiments, which will require sterilization of landed systems. In addition, Category III orbiter mission specifications are expanded to be consistent with these recommendations.
The maintenance of a NASA policy, is consistent with international agreements. The planetary protection policy management in OSS, with Field Center support. The advice from internal and external advisory groups (NRC, NAC/Planetary Protection Task Force). The technology research and standards development in bioload characterization. The technology research and development in bioload reduction/sterilization. This presentation focuses on: forward contamination - research on the potential for Earth life to exist on other bodies, improved strategies for planetary navigation and collision avoidance, and improved procedures for sterile spacecraft assembly, cleaning and/or sterilization; and backward contamination - development of sample transfer and container sealing technologies for Earth return, improvement in sample return landing target assessment and navigation strategy, planning for sample hazard determination requirements and procedures, safety certification, (liaison to NEO Program Office for compositional data on small bodies), facility planning for sample recovery system, quarantine, and long-term curation of 4 returned samples.
The various factors about space missions and spacecraft involved in the study of nonsterile space flight hardware with respect to their effects on planetary quarantine are reviewed. It is shown that methodology currently exists to evaluate the various potential contamination sources and to take appropriate steps in the design of spacecraft ha rdware and mission parameters so that quarantine constraints are met. This work should be done for each program so that the latest knowledge pertaining to various biological questions is utilized, and so that the specific hardware designs of the program can be assessed. The general trend of specific recommendations include: (1) biasing the launch trajectory away from planet to assure against accidental impact of the spacecraft; (2) selecting planetary orbits that meet quarantine requirements - both for accidental impact and for minimizing contamination probabilities due to ejecta; and (3) manufacturing and handling spacecraft under cleanliness conditions assuring minimum bioload.
A workshop was convened to discuss the subject of planetary protection implementation for Mars lander missions. It was sponsored and organized by the Exobiology Implementation Team of the U.S./Russian Joint Working Group on Space Biomedical and Life Support Systems. The objective of the workshop was to discuss planetary protection issues for the Russian Mars '94 mission, which is currently under development, as well as for additional future Mars lander missions including the planned Mars '96 and U.S. MESUR Pathfinder and Network missions. A series of invited presentations was made to ensure that workshop participants had access to information relevant to the planned discussions. The topics summarized in this report include exobiology science objectives for Mars exploration, current international policy on planetary protection, planetary protection requirements developed for earlier missions, mission plans and designs for future U.S. and Russian Mars landers, biological contamination of spacecraft components, and techniques for spacecraft bioload reduction. In addition, the recent recommendations of the U.S. Space Studies Board (SSB) on this subject were also summarized. Much of the discussion focused on the recommendations of the SSB. The SSB proposed relaxing the planetary protection requirements for those Mars lander missions that do not contain life detection experiments, but maintaining Viking-like requirements for those missions that do contain life detection experiments. The SSB recommendations were found to be acceptable as a guide for future missions, although many questions and concerns about interpretation were raised and are summarized. Significant among the concerns was the need for more quantitative guidelines to prevent misinterpretation by project offices and better access to and use of the Viking data base of bioassays to specify microbial burden targets. Among the questions raised were how will the SSB recommendations be integrated with existing Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) policy and how will they apply to and affect Mars '94, Mars '96, MESUR Pathfinder, and MESUR Network missions? One additional topic briefly considered at the workshop was the identification of some issues related to planetary protection considerations for Mars sample return missions. These issues will form the basis for a follow-on joint U.S./Russian workshop on that subject.
An understanding of the various sources of non-methane volatile organic compounds (NMVOCs) is one facet to ensuring the habitability of crewed spacecraft. Even though the International Space Station (ISS) atmosphere is relatively well characterized in terms of what is in the atmosphere and approximately how much, linking the majority of these trace contaminants detected to their source is virtually impossible. Albeit a few of can be associated to a single source, the majority of these trace contaminants have their origins from multiple sources. On crewed spacecraft such as ISS, trace contaminants are broadly categorized as either coming from equipment, which includes systems and payloads, or from the metabolic processes of the crew members. Such widely encompassing categories clearly illustrate the difficulty in linking air contaminants to their source(s). It is well known that microbial growth in ISS can flourish if left unchecked. Although processes are in place to limit microbial growth, in reality, microbial growth has pervaded the habitable environment of ISS. This is simply a consequence of having crewed spacecraft, as humans are the largest contributor to the bioload. As with crew members, microbes also have metabolic processes which, in many ways, are comparable to human metabolism. As such, it can be expected that microbial growth can lead to the release of volatile organic compounds into the ISS atmosphere. Given a large enough microbial population, the impact to the air quality of ISS can be potentially large. A survey of the microbiology found in ISS will be presented as well as the possible types of volatile organic compounds that can result from such organisms. This will be correlated to the observations provided by ground-based analysis of ISS atmosphere samples.
An understanding of the various sources of non-methane volatile organic compounds (NMVOCs) is one facet to ensuring the habitability of crewed spacecraft. Even though the International Space Station (ISS) atmosphere is relatively well characterized in terms of what is in the atmosphere and approximately how much, linking the majority of these trace contaminants detected to their source is virtually impossible. Albeit a few of can be associated to a single source, the majority of these trace contaminants have their origins from multiple sources. On crewed spacecraft such as ISS, trace contaminants are broadly categorized as either coming from equipment, which includes systems and payloads, or from the metabolic processes of the crew members. Such widely encompassing categories clearly illustrate the difficulty in linking air contaminants to their source(s). It is well known that microbial growth in ISS can flourish if left unchecked. Although processes are in place to limit microbial growth, in reality, microbial growth has pervaded the habitable environment of ISS. This is simply a consequence of having crewed spacecraft, as humans are the largest contributor to the bioload. As with crew members, microbes also have metabolic processes which, in many ways, are comparable to human metabolism. As such, it can be expected that microbial growth can lead to the release of volatile organic compounds into the ISS atmosphere. Given a large enough microbial population, the impact to the air quality of ISS can be potentially large. A survey of the microbiology found in ISS will be presented as well as the possible types of volatile organic compounds that can result from such organisms. This will be correlated to the observations provided by ground-based analysis of ISS atmosphere samples
This presentation is being presented to the 15th Annual International Planetary Probe Workshop. Some of the topics of discussion will include a Brief History of Planetary Protection, U.S. Signatory to United Nations Outer Space Treaty (OST), COSPAR Panel on Planetary Protection, Validating Science and Protecting Earth's Biosphere, Viking-Level Bioload Is Still the Gold Standard, Provisions for Robotic Extraterrestrial Missions, Temporary Assay Labs, A Viable Organism Is One That Can Replicate, Non-Nominal Landing in a Special Region, Mars 2020 Category IVb, Europa and Enceladus.
Since 1967, a policy has been in place to control contamination of planets from both terrestrial organisms and organic constituents. The policy, implemented by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, lays out a framework of guidelines for implementing future missions. During the course of structuring an active program to explore our solar system, it has become increasingly apparent that planetary protection factors will have a significant impact on future missions design, cost and complexity.