Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “biosafety”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2009

Basics of Biosafety

This slide presentation reviews the basics of biosafety and the importance of assuring proper biosafety practices. The objectives of the presentation are to review regulations about biosafety, and the different biosafety levels; the biosafety facilities at Johnson Space Center; the usage and maintenance of the biosafety cabinet, the proper methods to handle biologically hazardous materials upon exposure, and the methods of cleanup in the event of a spill, and the training requirements that are mandated for personnel handling biologically hazardous materials.

Wong, Willy↗
NASA NTRS2016

Draft Genome Sequences of Biosafety Level 2 Opportunistic Pathogens Isolated From the Environmental Surfaces of the International Space Station

The draft genome sequences of 20 biosafety level 2 (BSL-2) opportunistic pathogens isolated from the environmental surfaces of the International Space Station (ISS) were presented. These genomic sequences will help in understanding the influence of microgravity on the pathogenicity and virulence of these strains when compared with Earth strains.

Aleksandra Checinska Sielaff↗
NASA NTRS2018

Mobile/Modular BSL-4 Containment Facilities Integrated into a Curation Receiving Laboratory for Restricted Earth Return Missions

NASA robotic sample return missions designated Category V Restricted Earth Return by the NASA Planetary Protection (PP) Office require sample containment and biohazard testing upon return to Earth. Since the 1960s, sample containment from an unknown extraterrestrial biohazard have been related to the highest containment standards and protocols known to modern science. Today, this is Biosafety Level (BSL) 4 containment. In the U.S., the Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories publication authored by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS): Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the National Institutes of Health houses the primary recommendations, standards, and design requirements for all BSL labs. Past mission concept studies for constructing a NASA Curation Receiving Laboratory with an integrated BSL-4 quarantine and biohazard testing facility have been estimated in the hundreds of millions of dollars (USD). As an alternative option, we have conducted a trade study for constructing a mobile and/or modular sample containment laboratory that would meet all BSL-4 and planetary protection standards and protocols at a fraction of the cost. Mobile and modular BSL-2 and 3 facilities have been successfully constructed and deployed world-wide for government testing of pathogens and pharmaceutical production. Our study showed that a modular BSL-4 construction could result in ~ 90% cost reduction when compared to traditional BSL-4 construction methods without compromising the preservation of the samples or Earth. For the design/construction requirements of a mobile/modular BSL-4 containment, we used the established HHS document standards and protocols for manipulation of agents in Class III Biosafety Cabinets (BSC; i.e., negative pressure gloveboxes) that are currently followed in operational BSL-4 facilities in the U.S.

Calaway, Michael J.↗
DOE OSTI2023

Computational Fluid Dynamics Simulations to Assess Spatial Variability and Optimal Ventilation Scenarios for Biological Laboratory Exposures

A significant amount of uncertainty exists regarding potential human exposure to laboratory biomaterials and organisms in Biosafety Level 2 (BSL-2) research laboratories. Computational fluid dynamics (CFD) modeling is proposed as a way to better understand potential impacts of different combinations of biomaterials, laboratory manipulations, and exposure routes on risks to laboratory workers. Here, in this study, we use CFD models to simulate airborne concentrations of contaminants in an actual BSL-2 laboratory under different configurations. Results show that ventilation configuration, sampling location, and contaminant source location can significantly impact airborne concentrations and exposures. Depending on the source location and airflow patterns, the transient and time-integrated concentrations varied by several orders of magnitude. Contaminant plumes from sources located near a return vent (or exhaust like a fume hood or ventilated biosafety cabinet) are likely to be more contained than sources that are further from the exhaust. Having a direct flow between the source and the exhaust (through-flow condition) may reduce potential exposures to individuals outside the air flow path. Designing a BSL-2 room with ventilation and airflow patterns that maximize through-flow conditions to the return/exhaust vents and minimize dispersion and mixing throughout the room is, therefore, recommended. CFD simulations can also be used to assist in characterizing the impacts of supply and return vent locations, room layout, and source locations on spatial and temporal contaminant concentrations. In addition, proper placement of particle sensors can also be informed by CFD simulations to provide additional characterization and monitoring of potential exposures in BSL-2 facilities.

63 RADIATION, THERMAL, AND OTHER ENVIRON. POLLUTAN↗
DOE OSTI2024

Transboundary determinants of avian zoonotic infectious diseases: challenges for strengthening research capacity and connecting surveillance networks

As the climate changes, global systems have become increasingly unstable and unpredictable. This is particularly true for many disease systems, including subtypes of highly pathogenic avian influenzas (HPAIs) that are circulating the world. Ecological patterns once thought stable are changing, bringing new populations and organisms into contact with one another. Wild birds continue to be hosts and reservoirs for numerous zoonotic pathogens, and strains of HPAI and other pathogens have been introduced into new regions via migrating birds and transboundary trade of wild birds. With these expanding environmental changes, it is even more crucial that regions or counties that previously did not have surveillance programs develop the appropriate skills to sample wild birds and add to the understanding of pathogens in migratory and breeding birds through research. For example, little is known about wild bird infectious diseases and migration along the Mediterranean and Black Sea Flyway (MBSF), which connects Europe, Asia, and Africa. Focusing on avian influenza and the microbiome in migratory wild birds along the MBSF, this project seeks to understand the determinants of transboundary disease propagation and coinfection in regions that are connected by this flyway. Through the creation of a threat reduction network for avian diseases (Avian Zoonotic Disease Network, AZDN) in three countries along the MBSF (Georgia, Ukraine, and Jordan), this project is strengthening capacities for disease diagnostics; microbiomes; ecoimmunology; field biosafety; proper wildlife capture and handling; experimental design; statistical analysis; and vector sampling and biology. Here, we cover what is required to build a wild bird infectious disease research and surveillance program, which includes learning skills in proper bird capture and handling; biosafety and biosecurity; permits; next generation sequencing; leading-edge bioinformatics and statistical analyses; and vector and environmental sampling. Creating connected networks for avian influenzas and other pathogen surveillance will increase coordination and strengthen biosurveillance globally in wild birds.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
NASA NTRS2007

Assessing the Biohazard Potential of Putative Martian Organisms for Exploration Class Human Space Missions

Exploration Class missions to Mars will require precautions against potential contamination by any native microorganisms that may be incidentally pathogenic to humans. While the results of NASA's Viking biology experiments of 1976 have been generally interpreted as inconclusive for surface organisms, the possibility of native surface life has never been ruled out and more recent studies suggest that the case for biological interpretation of the Viking Labeled Release data may now be stronger than it was when the experiments were originally conducted. It is possible that, prior to the first human landing on Mars, robotic craft and sample return missions will provide enough data to know with certainty whether or not future human landing sites harbor extant life forms. However, if native life is confirmed, it will be problematic to determine whether any of its species may present a medical risk to astronauts. Therefore, it will become necessary to assess empirically the risk that the planet contains pathogens based on terrestrial examples of pathogenicity and to take a reasonably cautious approach to bio-hazard protection. A survey of terrestrial pathogens was conducted with special emphasis on those pathogens whose evolution has not depended on the presence of animal hosts. The history of the development and implementation of Apollo anticontamination protocol and recent recommendations of the NRC Space Studies Board regarding Mars were reviewed. Organisms can emerge in nature in the absence of indigenous animal hosts and both infectious and non-infectious human pathogens are theoretically possible on Mars. The prospect of Martian surface life, together with the existence of a diversity of routes by which pathogenicity has emerged on Earth, suggests that the possibility of human pathogens on Mars, while low, is not zero. Since the discovery and study of Martian life can have long-term benefits for humanity, the risk that Martian life might include pathogens should not be an obstacle to human exploration. As a precaution, however, it is recommended that EVA suits be decontaminated when astronauts enter surface habitats when returning from field activity and that biosafety protocol approximating laboratory BSL 2 be developed for astronauts working in laboratories on the Martian surface. Quarantine of astronauts and Martian materials arriving on Earth should also be part of a human Mars mission and this and the surface biosafety program should be integral to human expeditions from the earliest stages of the mission planning.

Warmflash, David↗
NASA NTRS2016

Evolution of the Lunar Receiving Laboratory to the Astromaterial Sample Curation Facility: Technical Tensions Between Containment and Cleanliness, Between Particulate and Organic Cleanliness

The Lunar Receiving Laboratory (LRL) was planned and constructed in the 1960s to support the Apollo program in the context of landing on the Moon and safely returning humans. The enduring science return from that effort is a result of careful curation of planetary materials. Technical decisions for the first facility included sample handling environment (vacuum vs inert gas), and instruments for making basic sample assessment, but the most difficult decision, and most visible, was stringent biosafety vs ultra-clean sample handling. Biosafety required handling of samples in negative pressure gloveboxes and rooms for containment and use of sterilizing protocols and animal/plant models for hazard assessment. Ultra-clean sample handling worked best in positive pressure nitrogen environment gloveboxes in positive pressure rooms, using cleanable tools of tightly controlled composition. The requirements for these two objectives were so different, that the solution was to design and build a new facility for specific purpose of preserving the scientific integrity of the samples. The resulting Lunar Curatorial Facility was designed and constructed, from 1972-1979, with advice and oversight by a very active committee comprised of lunar sample scientists. The high precision analyses required for planetary science are enabled by stringent contamination control of trace elements in the materials and protocols of construction (e.g., trace element screening for paint and flooring materials) and the equipment used in sample handling and storage. As other astromaterials, especially small particles and atoms, were added to the collections curated, the technical tension between particulate cleanliness and organic cleanliness was addressed in more detail. Techniques for minimizing particulate contamination in sample handling environments use high efficiency air filtering techniques typically requiring organic sealants which offgas. Protocols for reducing adventitious carbon on sample handling surfaces often generate particles. Further work is needed to achieve both minimal particulate and adventitious carbon contamination. This paper will discuss these facility topics and others in the historical context of nearly 50 years' curation experience for lunar rocks and regolith, meteorites, cosmic dust, comet particles, solar wind atoms, and asteroid particles at Johnson Space Center.

Allton, J. H.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Tours of High-containment and Pristine Facilities in Support of Mars Sample Return (MSR) Sample Receiving Facility (SRF) Definition Studies

During 2019 and 2020, the NASA Tiger Team RAMA (acronym of the authors) toured several high-containment biosafety laboratories and pristine space-mission facilities worldwide to better understand their practices, capabilities, and lessons-learned to aid in planning a Sample Receiving Facility (SRF) in support of Mars Sample Return (MSR). The team also included tours of a manufacturer of mobile and modular high-containment facilities as well as manufacturers of isolators and gloveboxes. In addition, the team visited the European Space Agency (ESA)ultraclean and sterile ISO 3 / airborne molecular contamination -9 (AMC-9) isolator line to clean and assemble the most critical hardware for ESA’s ExoMars Mars Lander System, and researchers developing a novel double-walled isolator (DWI) and robotic handling techniques in support of an MSR SRF. The RAMA team visits covered several construction modalities for an MSR SRF: (1) a new traditional fixed facility; (2) use of an existing fixed Biosafety Level 4(BSL-4) facility; (3) a novel modular BSL-4 approach; and (4) a hybrid combination of fixed, modular, and existing facilities. A new fixed facility approach can be tailored to MSR’s needs and is the approach used by all U.S. BSL-4 laboratories constructed to date. However, this approach could be the most expensive modality, take the longest to implement (8-12 years), and have significant programmatic risk of delay. The utilization of an existing BSL-4 facility may be possible depending on the final contamination control and science requirements for the MSR SRF. Due to the internal dimensions of the labs visited and facility structural requirements, it is unlikely that any modification can be made to the facility to meet cleanliness requirements. Furthermore, due to possible construction delays, possible capacity issues, and potential cross contamination vectors from in-house select agents, there may also be significant programmatic risks for sharing an existing facility. Another approach is building a contemporary modular facility. This is a novel approach that has recently been used for a BSL-3/3Ag facilities. The modular elements would be installed in a traditional building or shell structure. A modular facility has many advantages over a traditional fixed facility with lower costs, shorter design/construction/ commissioning schedule, and flexibility for easier retrofits and future expansion. Lastly, a hybrid approach of combining the use of either: (1) a modular facility inside a new fixed facility or (2) a modular and/or fixed BSL-4 annex in conjunction with an existing BSL-4 space should be considered. The advantage of a hybrid approach is that the facility could leverage the strengths of other approaches. Beyond facility construction approaches, the RAMA team investigated technologies and techniques for isolating and handling Martian samples in pristine environments. For example, ESA has been studying and developing a DWI breadboard along with other sample-handling technologies. The research and development investment for clean, remote manipulation and robotics at the start of the facility design phase would be beneficial to the SRF. Additionally, under-standing the lessons learned from Thales Alenia Space during the construction and operation of the most advanced state-of-the-art precision cleaning, sterilization, and assembly glovebox isolators ever developed for spacecraft hardware are also critical for the SRF. The RAMA team lays out a summary of the 18 facilities toured, and includes 43 observations,18 findings, and 22 areas of possible follow-up that the RAMA team and others could pursue to enable further findings. The observations and findings illustrate that constructing an MSR SRF would combine the complexity of both high-containment and pristine facilities, and merging these technologies would be challenging, but achievable.

Mars Sample Return↗
DOE OSTI2024

Ongoing Cooperative Engagement Facilitates Agile Pandemic and Outbreak Response: Lessons Learned Through Cooperative Engagement Between Uganda and the United States

Pathogens threaten human lives and disrupt economies around the world. This has been clearly illustrated by the current COVID-19 pandemic and outbreaks in livestock and food crops. Here, to manage pathogen emergence and spread, cooperative engagement programs develop and strengthen biosafety, biosecurity, and biosurveillance capabilities among local researchers to detect pathogens. In this case study, we describe the efforts of a collaboration between the Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Uganda Virus Research Institute, the primary viral diagnostic laboratory in Uganda, to implement and ensure the sustainability of sequencing for biosurveillance. We describe the process of establishing this capability along with the lessons learned from both sides of the partnership to inform future cooperative engagement efforts in low- and middle-income countries. We found that by strengthening sequencing capabilities at the Uganda Virus Research Institute before the COVID-19 pandemic, the institute was able to successfully sequence SARS-CoV-2 samples and provide data to the scientific community. We highlight the need to strengthen and sustain capabilities through in-country training, collaborative research projects, and trust.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

A review of experimental methods to determine bioaerosol transfer in energy recovery ventilators

Increasing ventilation is an effective method to reduce indoor airborne disease transmission. An Energy recovery ventilator (ERV) is a passive energy recovery device used to reduce the energy consumption of heating, ventilation and air-conditioning (HVAC) systems for conditioning the ventilation air. It preconditions the ventilation air by transferring energy from building exhaust air. Therefore, the ventilation and exhaust air streams interact directly/indirectly in the ERV for energy transfer. It is surmised that the ERV may transfer bioaerosols (with pathogens) from the exhaust air to ventilation air, resulting in the spread of infectious diseases. Consequently, many pandemic HVAC guidelines recommend that the use of ERVs be limited. This is a highly unsustainable direction given the increased energy requirements associated with the high ventilation provision advocated for pandemic operation. It must be noted that no validated experimental evidence exists in literature for bioaerosol transfer in ERVs. Hence, it is necessary to conduct extensive bioaerosol transfer research before adopting the unsustainable practice of limiting the utilization of ERVs. The main objective of this review study is to summarize the experimental methods and instrumentation for bioaerosol transfer research in ERVs. This comprehensive article provides a detailed overview of the generation, sampling, and analysis of bioaerosols for conducting the experiments. Further, it explains the possible mechanisms for bioaerosol transfer in various types of ERVs based on which the ERVs that need immediate attention are identified. The main contribution of this research paper is that it provides a novel experimental method which encompasses the biosafety aspects, instrumentation, performance parameters and uncertainties in conducting virus contained bioaerosol transfer study in ERVs. The findings from this review will be helpful in designing bioaerosol transfer experiments and developing future ERV test standards for such experiments.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2024

A frugal CRISPR kit for equitable and accessible education in gene editing and synthetic biology

Equitable and accessible education in life sciences, bioengineering, and synthetic biology is crucial for training the next generation of scientists, fostering transparency in public decision-making, and ensuring biotechnology can benefit a wide-ranging population. As a groundbreaking technology for genome engineering, CRISPR has transformed research and therapeutics. However, hands-on exposure to this technology in educational settings remains limited due to the extensive resources required for CRISPR experiments. Here, we develop CRISPRkit, an affordable kit designed for gene editing and regulation in high school education. CRISPRkit eliminates the need for specialized equipment, prioritizes biosafety, and utilizes cost-effective reagents. By integrating CRISPRi gene regulation, colorful chromoproteins, cell-free transcription-translation systems, smartphone-based quantification, and an in-house automated algorithm (CRISPectra), our kit offers an inexpensive (~$2) and user-friendly approach to performing and analyzing CRISPR experiments, without the need for a traditional laboratory setup. Experiments conducted by high school students in classroom settings highlight the kit’s utility for reliable CRISPRkit experiments. Furthermore, CRISPRkit provides a modular and expandable platform for genome engineering, and we demonstrate its applications for controlling fluorescent proteins and metabolic pathways such as melanin production. We envision CRISPRkit will facilitate biotechnology education for communities of diverse socioeconomic and geographic backgrounds.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2026

Phenogenomics reveals the ecology and evolution of Trichoderma fungi for sustainable agriculture

Trichoderma fungi support sustainable agriculture by suppressing plant diseases and improving crop performance. However, emerging pathogenicity of Trichoderma warrants further ecological and genetic characterization. Here we used machine learning to correlate genomic data from 37 Trichoderma strains with over 140 phenotypic traits, spanning metabolic versatility, biotic interactions, stress tolerance and reproductive strategies. We determined Trichoderma to be an ancient, genetically cohesive and physiologically diverse genus with spores capable of germination in water and dispersal via air and water droplets. Metabolic preferences indicate universal adaptation to mycoparasitism and to niches like arboreal microbial mats, alongside broader saprotrophic versatility. Our analyses are consistent with character displacement among close relatives and convergent evolution in distant lineages, with both processes shaping ecological plasticity and traits including dispersal modes, terrestrialization or endophytism. Our findings reveal that while some Trichoderma species show traits of biosafety concern, its vast ecophysiological diversity enables the development of safe, targeted bioeffectors.

Steindorff, Andrei S. [USDOE Joint Genome Institut↗
DOE OSTI2023

Comparison of phage-derived recombinases for genetic manipulation of Pseudomonas species

ABSTRACT Several strains in the Pseudomonas genus are categorized as plant growth-promoting rhizobacteria (PGPR). Although several of these strains are strong candidates for applications as biofertilizers or biopesticides, genome editing approaches are generally limited and require further development. Editing genomes in PGPR could enable more robust agricultural applications, persistence, and biosafety measures. In this study, we investigate the use of five phage-encoded recombinases to develop a recombineering workflow in three PGPR strains: Pseudomonas protegens Pf-5, Pseudomonas protegens CHA0, and Pseudomonas putida KT2440. Using point mutations in the rpoB gene, we reach maximum recombineering efficiencies of 1.5 × 10 −4 , 3 × 10 −4 , and 5 × 10 −5 , respectively, in these strains using λ-Red Beta recombinase from Escherichia coli . We further examine recombineering efficiencies across these strains as a function of selected mutation, editing template concentration, and phosphorothiolate bond protection. This work validates the use of these tools across several environmentally and biotechnologically relevant strains to expand the possibilities of genetic manipulation in the Pseudomonas genus. IMPORTANCE The Pseudomonas genus contains many members currently being investigated for applications in biodegradation, biopesticides, biocontrol, and synthetic biology. Though several strains have been identified with beneficial properties, chromosomal manipulations to further improve these strains for commercial applications have been limited due to the lack of efficient genetic tools that have been tested across this genus. Here, we test the recombineering efficiencies of five phage-derived recombinases across three biotechnologically relevant Pseudomonas strains: P. putida KT2440, P. protegens Pf-5, and P. protegens CHA0. These results demonstrate a method to generate targeted mutations quickly and efficiently across these strains, ideally introducing a method that can be implemented across the Pseudomonas genus and a strategy that may be applied to develop analogous systems in other nonmodel bacteria.

59 BASIC BIOLOGICAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

A scoping review of zoonotic parasites and pathogens associated with abattoirs in Eastern Africa and recommendations for abattoirs as disease surveillance sites

Abattoirs are facilities where livestock are slaughtered and are an important aspect in the food production chain. There are several types of abattoirs, which differ in infrastructure and facilities, sanitation and PPE practices, and adherence to regulations. In each abattoir facility, worker exposure to animals and animal products increases their risk of infection from zoonotic pathogens. Backyard abattoirs and slaughter slabs have the highest risk of pathogen transmission because of substandard hygiene practices and minimal infrastructure. These abattoir conditions can often contribute to environmental contamination and may play a significant role in disease outbreaks within communities. To assess further the risk of disease, we conducted a scoping review of parasites and pathogens among livestock and human workers in abattoirs across 13 Eastern African countries, which are hotspots for zoonoses. Our search results (n = 104 articles) showed the presence of bacteria, viruses, fungi, and macroparasites (nematodes, cestodes, etc.) in cattle, goats, sheep, pigs, camels, and poultry. Most articles reported results from cattle, and the most frequent pathogen detected was Mycobacterium bovis, which causes bovine tuberculosis. Some articles included worker survey and questionnaires that suggested how the use of PPE along with proper worker training and safe animal handling practices could reduce disease risk. Based on these findings, we discuss ways to improve abattoir biosafety and increase biosurveillance for disease control and mitigation. Abattoirs are a ‘catch all’ for pathogens, and by surveying animals at abattoirs, health officials can determine which diseases are prevalent in different regions and which pathogens are most likely transmitted from wildlife to livestock. We suggest a regional approach to biosurveillance, which will improve testing and data gathering for enhanced disease risk mapping and forecasting. Next generation sequencing will be key in identifying a wide range of pathogens, rather than a targeted approach.

60 APPLIED LIFE SCIENCES↗
NASA NTRS1999

Mars Sample Handling and Requirements Panel (MSHARP)

In anticipation of the return of samples from Mars toward the end of the first decade of the next century, NASA's Office of Space Sciences chartered a panel to examine how Mars samples should be handled. The panel was to make recommendations in three areas: (1) sample collection and transport back to Earth; (2) certification of the samples as nonhazardous; and (3) sample receiving, curation, and distribution. This report summarizes the findings of that panel. The samples should be treated as hazardous until proven otherwise. They are to be sealed within a canister on Mars, and the canister is not to be opened until within a Biosafety Hazard Level 4 (BSL-4) containment facility here on Earth. This facility must also meet or exceed the cleanliness requirements of the Johnson Space Center (JSC) facility for curation of extraterrestrial materials. A containment facility meeting both these requirements does not yet exist. Hazard assessment and life detection experiments are to be done at the containment facility, while geochemical characterization is being performed on a sterilized subset of the samples released to the science community. When and if the samples are proven harmless, they are to be transferred to a curation facility, such as that at JSC.

Carr, Michael H.↗
NASA NTRS2000

Clean and Cold Sample Curation

Curation of Mars samples includes both samples that are returned to Earth, and samples that are collected, examined, and archived on Mars. Both kinds of curation operations will require careful planning to ensure that the samples are not contaminated by the instruments that are used to collect and contain them. In both cases, sample examination and subdivision must take place in an environment that is organically, inorganically, and biologically clean. Some samples will need to be prepared for analysis under ultra-clean or cryogenic conditions. Inorganic and biological cleanliness are achievable separately by cleanroom and biosafety lab techniques. Organic cleanliness to the <50 ng/sq cm level requires material control and sorbent removal - techniques being applied in our Class 10 cleanrooms and sample processing gloveboxes.

Allen, C. C.↗
NASA NTRS2001

Facility Concepts for Mars Returned Sample Handling

Samples returned from Mars must be held in quarantine until their biological safety has been determined. A significant challenge, unique to NASA's needs, is how to contain the samples (to protect the blaspheme) while simultaneously protecting their pristine nature. This paper presents a comparative analysis of several quarantine facility concepts for handling and analyzing these samples. The considerations in this design analysis include: modes of manipulation; capability for destructive as well as non-destructive testing; avoidance of cross-contamination; linear versus recursive processing; and sample storage and retrieval within a closed system. The ability to rigorously contain biologically hazardous materials has been amply demonstrated by facilities that meet the specifications of the Center for Disease Control Biosafety Level 4. The newly defined Planetary Protection Level Alpha must provide comparable containment while assuring that the samples remain pristine; the latter requirement is based on the need to avoid compromising science analyses by instrumentation of the highest possible sensitivity (among other things this will assure that there is no false positive detection of organisms or organic molecules - a situation that would delay or prevent the release of the samples from quarantine). Protection of the samples against contamination by terrestrial organisms and organic molecules makes a considerable impact upon the sample handling facility. The use of glove boxes appears to be impractical because of their tendency to leak and to surges. As a result, a returned sample quarantine facility must consider the use of automation and remote manipulation to carry out the various functions of sample handling and transfer within the system. The problem of maintaining sensitive and bulky instrumentation under the constraints of simultaneous sample containment and contamination protection also places demands on the architectural configuration of the facility that houses it.

Cohen, Marc M.↗