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Basics of Biosafety

This slide presentation reviews the basics of biosafety and the importance of assuring proper biosafety practices. The objectives of the presentation are to review regulations about biosafety, and the different biosafety levels; the biosafety facilities at Johnson Space Center; the usage and maintenance of the biosafety cabinet, the proper methods to handle biologically hazardous materials upon exposure, and the methods of cleanup in the event of a spill, and the training requirements that are mandated for personnel handling biologically hazardous materials.

Wong, Willy↗

Draft Genome Sequences of Biosafety Level 2 Opportunistic Pathogens Isolated From the Environmental Surfaces of the International Space Station

The draft genome sequences of 20 biosafety level 2 (BSL-2) opportunistic pathogens isolated from the environmental surfaces of the International Space Station (ISS) were presented. These genomic sequences will help in understanding the influence of microgravity on the pathogenicity and virulence of these strains when compared with Earth strains.

Aleksandra Checinska Sielaff↗

Mobile/Modular BSL-4 Containment Facilities Integrated into a Curation Receiving Laboratory for Restricted Earth Return Missions

NASA robotic sample return missions designated Category V Restricted Earth Return by the NASA Planetary Protection (PP) Office require sample containment and biohazard testing upon return to Earth. Since the 1960s, sample containment from an unknown extraterrestrial biohazard have been related to the highest containment standards and protocols known to modern science. Today, this is Biosafety Level (BSL) 4 containment. In the U.S., the Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories publication authored by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS): Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and the National Institutes of Health houses the primary recommendations, standards, and design requirements for all BSL labs. Past mission concept studies for constructing a NASA Curation Receiving Laboratory with an integrated BSL-4 quarantine and biohazard testing facility have been estimated in the hundreds of millions of dollars (USD). As an alternative option, we have conducted a trade study for constructing a mobile and/or modular sample containment laboratory that would meet all BSL-4 and planetary protection standards and protocols at a fraction of the cost. Mobile and modular BSL-2 and 3 facilities have been successfully constructed and deployed world-wide for government testing of pathogens and pharmaceutical production. Our study showed that a modular BSL-4 construction could result in ~ 90% cost reduction when compared to traditional BSL-4 construction methods without compromising the preservation of the samples or Earth. For the design/construction requirements of a mobile/modular BSL-4 containment, we used the established HHS document standards and protocols for manipulation of agents in Class III Biosafety Cabinets (BSC; i.e., negative pressure gloveboxes) that are currently followed in operational BSL-4 facilities in the U.S.

Calaway, Michael J.↗

Assessing the Biohazard Potential of Putative Martian Organisms for Exploration Class Human Space Missions

Exploration Class missions to Mars will require precautions against potential contamination by any native microorganisms that may be incidentally pathogenic to humans. While the results of NASA's Viking biology experiments of 1976 have been generally interpreted as inconclusive for surface organisms, the possibility of native surface life has never been ruled out and more recent studies suggest that the case for biological interpretation of the Viking Labeled Release data may now be stronger than it was when the experiments were originally conducted. It is possible that, prior to the first human landing on Mars, robotic craft and sample return missions will provide enough data to know with certainty whether or not future human landing sites harbor extant life forms. However, if native life is confirmed, it will be problematic to determine whether any of its species may present a medical risk to astronauts. Therefore, it will become necessary to assess empirically the risk that the planet contains pathogens based on terrestrial examples of pathogenicity and to take a reasonably cautious approach to bio-hazard protection. A survey of terrestrial pathogens was conducted with special emphasis on those pathogens whose evolution has not depended on the presence of animal hosts. The history of the development and implementation of Apollo anticontamination protocol and recent recommendations of the NRC Space Studies Board regarding Mars were reviewed. Organisms can emerge in nature in the absence of indigenous animal hosts and both infectious and non-infectious human pathogens are theoretically possible on Mars. The prospect of Martian surface life, together with the existence of a diversity of routes by which pathogenicity has emerged on Earth, suggests that the possibility of human pathogens on Mars, while low, is not zero. Since the discovery and study of Martian life can have long-term benefits for humanity, the risk that Martian life might include pathogens should not be an obstacle to human exploration. As a precaution, however, it is recommended that EVA suits be decontaminated when astronauts enter surface habitats when returning from field activity and that biosafety protocol approximating laboratory BSL 2 be developed for astronauts working in laboratories on the Martian surface. Quarantine of astronauts and Martian materials arriving on Earth should also be part of a human Mars mission and this and the surface biosafety program should be integral to human expeditions from the earliest stages of the mission planning.

Warmflash, David↗

Evolution of the Lunar Receiving Laboratory to the Astromaterial Sample Curation Facility: Technical Tensions Between Containment and Cleanliness, Between Particulate and Organic Cleanliness

The Lunar Receiving Laboratory (LRL) was planned and constructed in the 1960s to support the Apollo program in the context of landing on the Moon and safely returning humans. The enduring science return from that effort is a result of careful curation of planetary materials. Technical decisions for the first facility included sample handling environment (vacuum vs inert gas), and instruments for making basic sample assessment, but the most difficult decision, and most visible, was stringent biosafety vs ultra-clean sample handling. Biosafety required handling of samples in negative pressure gloveboxes and rooms for containment and use of sterilizing protocols and animal/plant models for hazard assessment. Ultra-clean sample handling worked best in positive pressure nitrogen environment gloveboxes in positive pressure rooms, using cleanable tools of tightly controlled composition. The requirements for these two objectives were so different, that the solution was to design and build a new facility for specific purpose of preserving the scientific integrity of the samples. The resulting Lunar Curatorial Facility was designed and constructed, from 1972-1979, with advice and oversight by a very active committee comprised of lunar sample scientists. The high precision analyses required for planetary science are enabled by stringent contamination control of trace elements in the materials and protocols of construction (e.g., trace element screening for paint and flooring materials) and the equipment used in sample handling and storage. As other astromaterials, especially small particles and atoms, were added to the collections curated, the technical tension between particulate cleanliness and organic cleanliness was addressed in more detail. Techniques for minimizing particulate contamination in sample handling environments use high efficiency air filtering techniques typically requiring organic sealants which offgas. Protocols for reducing adventitious carbon on sample handling surfaces often generate particles. Further work is needed to achieve both minimal particulate and adventitious carbon contamination. This paper will discuss these facility topics and others in the historical context of nearly 50 years' curation experience for lunar rocks and regolith, meteorites, cosmic dust, comet particles, solar wind atoms, and asteroid particles at Johnson Space Center.

Allton, J. H.↗

Tours of High-containment and Pristine Facilities in Support of Mars Sample Return (MSR) Sample Receiving Facility (SRF) Definition Studies

During 2019 and 2020, the NASA Tiger Team RAMA (acronym of the authors) toured several high-containment biosafety laboratories and pristine space-mission facilities worldwide to better understand their practices, capabilities, and lessons-learned to aid in planning a Sample Receiving Facility (SRF) in support of Mars Sample Return (MSR). The team also included tours of a manufacturer of mobile and modular high-containment facilities as well as manufacturers of isolators and gloveboxes. In addition, the team visited the European Space Agency (ESA)ultraclean and sterile ISO 3 / airborne molecular contamination -9 (AMC-9) isolator line to clean and assemble the most critical hardware for ESA’s ExoMars Mars Lander System, and researchers developing a novel double-walled isolator (DWI) and robotic handling techniques in support of an MSR SRF. The RAMA team visits covered several construction modalities for an MSR SRF: (1) a new traditional fixed facility; (2) use of an existing fixed Biosafety Level 4(BSL-4) facility; (3) a novel modular BSL-4 approach; and (4) a hybrid combination of fixed, modular, and existing facilities. A new fixed facility approach can be tailored to MSR’s needs and is the approach used by all U.S. BSL-4 laboratories constructed to date. However, this approach could be the most expensive modality, take the longest to implement (8-12 years), and have significant programmatic risk of delay. The utilization of an existing BSL-4 facility may be possible depending on the final contamination control and science requirements for the MSR SRF. Due to the internal dimensions of the labs visited and facility structural requirements, it is unlikely that any modification can be made to the facility to meet cleanliness requirements. Furthermore, due to possible construction delays, possible capacity issues, and potential cross contamination vectors from in-house select agents, there may also be significant programmatic risks for sharing an existing facility. Another approach is building a contemporary modular facility. This is a novel approach that has recently been used for a BSL-3/3Ag facilities. The modular elements would be installed in a traditional building or shell structure. A modular facility has many advantages over a traditional fixed facility with lower costs, shorter design/construction/ commissioning schedule, and flexibility for easier retrofits and future expansion. Lastly, a hybrid approach of combining the use of either: (1) a modular facility inside a new fixed facility or (2) a modular and/or fixed BSL-4 annex in conjunction with an existing BSL-4 space should be considered. The advantage of a hybrid approach is that the facility could leverage the strengths of other approaches. Beyond facility construction approaches, the RAMA team investigated technologies and techniques for isolating and handling Martian samples in pristine environments. For example, ESA has been studying and developing a DWI breadboard along with other sample-handling technologies. The research and development investment for clean, remote manipulation and robotics at the start of the facility design phase would be beneficial to the SRF. Additionally, under-standing the lessons learned from Thales Alenia Space during the construction and operation of the most advanced state-of-the-art precision cleaning, sterilization, and assembly glovebox isolators ever developed for spacecraft hardware are also critical for the SRF. The RAMA team lays out a summary of the 18 facilities toured, and includes 43 observations,18 findings, and 22 areas of possible follow-up that the RAMA team and others could pursue to enable further findings. The observations and findings illustrate that constructing an MSR SRF would combine the complexity of both high-containment and pristine facilities, and merging these technologies would be challenging, but achievable.

Mars Sample Return↗

Mars Sample Handling and Requirements Panel (MSHARP)

In anticipation of the return of samples from Mars toward the end of the first decade of the next century, NASA's Office of Space Sciences chartered a panel to examine how Mars samples should be handled. The panel was to make recommendations in three areas: (1) sample collection and transport back to Earth; (2) certification of the samples as nonhazardous; and (3) sample receiving, curation, and distribution. This report summarizes the findings of that panel. The samples should be treated as hazardous until proven otherwise. They are to be sealed within a canister on Mars, and the canister is not to be opened until within a Biosafety Hazard Level 4 (BSL-4) containment facility here on Earth. This facility must also meet or exceed the cleanliness requirements of the Johnson Space Center (JSC) facility for curation of extraterrestrial materials. A containment facility meeting both these requirements does not yet exist. Hazard assessment and life detection experiments are to be done at the containment facility, while geochemical characterization is being performed on a sterilized subset of the samples released to the science community. When and if the samples are proven harmless, they are to be transferred to a curation facility, such as that at JSC.

Carr, Michael H.↗

Clean and Cold Sample Curation

Curation of Mars samples includes both samples that are returned to Earth, and samples that are collected, examined, and archived on Mars. Both kinds of curation operations will require careful planning to ensure that the samples are not contaminated by the instruments that are used to collect and contain them. In both cases, sample examination and subdivision must take place in an environment that is organically, inorganically, and biologically clean. Some samples will need to be prepared for analysis under ultra-clean or cryogenic conditions. Inorganic and biological cleanliness are achievable separately by cleanroom and biosafety lab techniques. Organic cleanliness to the <50 ng/sq cm level requires material control and sorbent removal - techniques being applied in our Class 10 cleanrooms and sample processing gloveboxes.

Allen, C. C.↗

Facility Concepts for Mars Returned Sample Handling

Samples returned from Mars must be held in quarantine until their biological safety has been determined. A significant challenge, unique to NASA's needs, is how to contain the samples (to protect the blaspheme) while simultaneously protecting their pristine nature. This paper presents a comparative analysis of several quarantine facility concepts for handling and analyzing these samples. The considerations in this design analysis include: modes of manipulation; capability for destructive as well as non-destructive testing; avoidance of cross-contamination; linear versus recursive processing; and sample storage and retrieval within a closed system. The ability to rigorously contain biologically hazardous materials has been amply demonstrated by facilities that meet the specifications of the Center for Disease Control Biosafety Level 4. The newly defined Planetary Protection Level Alpha must provide comparable containment while assuring that the samples remain pristine; the latter requirement is based on the need to avoid compromising science analyses by instrumentation of the highest possible sensitivity (among other things this will assure that there is no false positive detection of organisms or organic molecules - a situation that would delay or prevent the release of the samples from quarantine). Protection of the samples against contamination by terrestrial organisms and organic molecules makes a considerable impact upon the sample handling facility. The use of glove boxes appears to be impractical because of their tendency to leak and to surges. As a result, a returned sample quarantine facility must consider the use of automation and remote manipulation to carry out the various functions of sample handling and transfer within the system. The problem of maintaining sensitive and bulky instrumentation under the constraints of simultaneous sample containment and contamination protection also places demands on the architectural configuration of the facility that houses it.

Cohen, Marc M.↗

Cleanroom Robotics: Appropriate Technology for a Sample Receiving Facility?

NASA is currently pursuing a vigorous program that will collect samples from a variety of solar system environments. The Mars Exploration Program is expected to launch spacecraft that are designed to collect samples of martian soil, rocks, and atmosphere and return them to Earth, perhaps as early as 2016. International treaty obligations mandate that NASA conduct such a program in a manner that avoids cross-contamination both Earth and Mars. Because of this requirement, Mars sample curation will require a high degree biosafety, combined with extremely low levels inorganic, organic, and biological contamination.

Bell, M. S.↗

Persistent Seroconversion after Accidental Eye Exposure to Calcifying Nanoparticles

Biosafety of nanomaterials has attracted much attention recently. We report here a case where accidental human eye exposure to biogenic nanosized calcium phosphate in the form of calcifying nanoparticles (CNP) raised a strong IgG immune response against proteins carried by CNP. The antibody titer has persisted over ten years at the high level. The IgG was detected by ELISA using CNPs propagated in media containing bovine and human serum as antigen. The exposure incident occurred to a woman scientist (WS) at a research laboratory in Finland at 1993. CNP, also termed "nanobacteria", is a unique self-replicating agent that has not been fully characterized and no data on biohazards were available at that time. Before the accident, her serum samples were negative for both CNP antigen and anti-CNP antibody using specific ELISA tests (Nanobac Oy, Kuopio, Finland). The accident occurred while WS was harvesting CNP cultures. Due to a high pressure in pipetting, CNP pellet splashed into her right eye. Both eyes were immediately washed with water and saline. The following days there was irritation and redness in the right eye. These symptoms disappeared within two weeks without any treatment. Three months after the accident, blood and urine samples of WS were tested for CNP cultures (2), CNP-specific ELISA tests, and blood cell counts. Blood cell counts were normal, CNP antigen and culture tests were negative. A high IgG anti-CNP antibody titer was detected (see Figure). The antibodies of this person have been used thereafter as positive control and standard in ELISA manufacturing (Nano-Sero IgG ELISA, Nanobac Oy, Kuopio, Finland).

Ciftcioglu, Neva↗

Technology Development and Advanced Planning for Curation of Returned Mars Samples

NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) curates extraterrestrial samples, providing the international science community with lunar rock and soil returned by the Apollo astronauts, meteorites collected in Antarctica, cosmic dust collected in the stratosphere, and hardware exposed to the space environment. Curation comprises initial characterization of new samples, preparation and allocation of samples for research, and clean, secure long-term storage. The foundations of this effort are the specialized cleanrooms (class 10 to 10,000) for each of the four types of materials, the supporting facilities, and the people, many of whom have been doing detailed work in clean environments for decades. JSC is also preparing to curate the next generation of extraterrestrial samples. These include samples collected from the solar wind, a comet, and an asteroid. Early planning and R\&D are underway to support post-mission sample handling and curation of samples returned from Mars. One of the strong scientific reasons for returning samples from Mars is to search for evidence of current or past life in the samples. Because of the remote possibility that the samples may contain life forms that are hazardous to the terrestrial biosphere, the National Research Council has recommended that all samples returned from Mars be kept under strict biological containment until tests show that they can safely be released to other laboratories. It is possible that Mars samples may contain only scarce or subtle traces of life or prebiotic chemistry that could readily be overwhelmed by terrestrial contamination . Thus, the facilities used to contain, process, and analyze samples from Mars must have a combination of high-level biocontainment and organic / inorganic chemical cleanliness that is unprecedented. JSC has been conducting feasibility studies and developing designs for a sample receiving facility that would offer biocontainment at least the equivalent of current maximum containment BSL-4 (BioSafety Level 4) laboratories, while simultaneously maintaining cleanliness levels equaling those of state-of-the-art cleanrooms. Unique requirements for the processing of Mars samples have inspired a program to develop handling techniques that are much more precise and reliable than the approach (currently used for lunar samples) of employing gloved human hands in nitrogen-filled gloveboxes. Individual samples from Mars are expected to be much smaller than lunar samples, the total mass of samples returned by each mission being 0.5- 1 kg, compared with many tens of kg of lunar samples returned by each of the six Apollo missions. Smaller samples require much more of the processing to be done under microscopic observation. In addition, the requirements for cleanliness and high-level containment would be difficult to satisfy while using traditional gloveboxes. JSC has constructed a laboratory to test concepts and technologies important to future sample curation. The Advanced Curation Laboratory includes a new-generation glovebox equipped with a robotic arm to evaluate the usability of robotic and teleoperated systems to perform curatorial tasks. The laboratory also contains equipment for precision cleaning and the measurement of trace organic contamination.

Lindstrom, David J.↗

Mobile/Modular BSL-4 Facilities for Meeting Restricted Earth Return Containment Requirements

NASA robotic sample return missions designated Category V Restricted Earth Return by the NASA Planetary Protection Office require sample containment and biohazard testing in a receiving laboratory as directed by NASA Procedural Requirement (NPR) 8020.12D - ensuring the preservation and protection of Earth and the sample. Currently, NPR 8020.12D classifies Restricted Earth Return for robotic sample return missions from Mars, Europa, and Enceladus with the caveat that future proposed mission locations could be added or restrictions lifted on a case by case basis as scientific knowledge and understanding of biohazards progresses. Since the 1960s, sample containment from an unknown extraterrestrial biohazard have been related to the highest containment standards and protocols known to modern science. Today, Biosafety Level (BSL) 4 standards and protocols are used to study the most dangerous high-risk diseases and unknown biological agents on Earth. Over 30 BSL-4 facilities have been constructed worldwide with 12 residing in the United States; of theses, 8 are operational. In the last two decades, these brick and mortar facilities have cost in the hundreds of millions of dollars dependent on the facility requirements and size. Previous mission concept studies for constructing a NASA sample receiving facility with an integrated BSL-4 quarantine and biohazard testing facility have also been estimated in the hundreds of millions of dollars. As an alternative option, we have recently conducted an initial trade study for constructing a mobile and/or modular sample containment laboratory that would meet all BSL-4 and planetary protection standards and protocols at a faction of the cost. Mobile and modular BSL-2 and 3 facilities have been successfully constructed and deployed world-wide for government testing of pathogens and pharmaceutical production. Our study showed that a modular BSL-4 construction could result in approximately 90% cost reduction when compared to traditional construction methods without compromising the preservation of the sample or Earth.

Calaway, M. J.↗

Advanced Curation of Astromaterials for Planetary Science Over the Next Decade

Advanced curation is a cross-disciplinary field of research and development aiming to improve curation and sample acquisition practices in existing astromaterials collections and to enable future sample return activities.The primary result of advanced curation is to both reduce and quantify contamination to astromaterials and preserve the scientific integrity of all samples from mission inception to scientific analysis. Over the next decade, NASA should support advanced curation research and monitoring efforts as they pertain to improving our current collections and preparing for samples from current and future astromaterials acquisition activities.We highlight here five advanced curation activities of critical importance for the success of sample science supported by NASA over the coming decade, including: 1) supporting efforts to build contamination knowledge collections as part of sample return missions, which requires curation involvement from the earliest stages of sample return mission planning;2) supporting Earth-based astromaterials collection campaigns of meteorites and cosmic dust as they represent relatively inexpensive sample acquisition activities that continue to grow NASA’s astromaterials collections and enable new discoveries;3) preparing to curate and process samples under “cold” conditions to enable return of samples from volatile-rich Solar System targets like permanently shadowed regions on the lunar surface orcomets;4) determining how best to combine clean room technology and biosafety technology into one infrastructure to support curation of samples from bodies designated as Category V:Restricted Earth Return; and 5) supporting real-time monitoring and testing of curation labs to verify that sample processing environments remain clean from the standpoint of inorganic, organic, and biological contamination

Francis M. McCubbin↗

Guidelines for Assessing the Toxic Hazard of Spacecraft Chemicals and Test Materials

This document describes the criteria and procedural guidelines used by the NASA/JSC Toxicology Office (JSCSTO), to perform toxicological evaluations. The JSCSTO is responsible for conducting toxicological assessments and assigning toxic hazard levels (THLs) for essentially all chemicals and test materials to be used in or transported to the habitable areas of U.S. spacecraft, non‐U.S. spacecraft inhabitaed by U.S. crew members or habitable areas of off‐Earth habitats where U.S. crew members would be present, including chemicals carried by visiting spacecraft(visiting vehicles) to and from the International Space Station (ISS). Biohazard assessments for biological materials used in payload experiments are performed by the NASA Biosafety Review Board. Radioactive materials are assessed by the Space Radiation Analysis Group for radiation hazards; the flammability rating on flammable materials is assessed by the JSC Materials and Processes Branch, ES4. This document will focus on the assessment of chemically‐induced toxicity hazards. The toxicological assessments, together with assessments on radioactive, biological, physical, and flammability hazards, are incorporated into a mission‐specific Hazardous Materials Summary Table (HMST).

Valerie Elizabeth Ryder↗

Microbial Monitoring of New Cleanrooms Used to Curate Astrobiologically Relevant Asteroid Samples from Bennu and Ryugu

Introduction: NASA has constructed two new cleanrooms to house materials from the OSRIS-REx and Hayabusa2 missions to the asteroids Ryugu (162173) and Bennu (101955), respectively. In accordance with standard astromaterials curation practices, these cleanrooms will be monitored for particulate contamination and maintained to ISO 5 equivalent standards1. Since the samples in these collections are expected to contain prebiotic organic compounds that may help explain the origin of life on Earth, these labs will also be monitored for organic and biological contamination2. Samples from Ryugu arrived on Earth in December, 2020. After basic characterization in Japan, NASA received a subset of these samples at the astromaterials curation facility in Houston in December of 2021. OSIRIS-REx is expected to return samples in September, 2023. Here we present preliminary microbial monitoring results from monthly monitoring of these new labs and the connected microtomy and staging areas that support them, as they are being commissioned. We also compare these results to baseline values for other astromaterials curation labs. We will also briefly describe additional cleaning efforts employed to reduce the bioburden in these new cleanrooms. Methods: Microbial samples were collected from surfaces using a dry macrofoam swab (Puritan Brand 2518051PFRNDFD). Swabs were also opened in the lab but not touched to any surfaces to function as negative controls. Samples and controls were processed inside a class II biosafety cabinet to avoid inadvertent cross contamination. The swabs were suspended in 15 ml of PBS (Phosphate Buffered Saline) and vortexed for 20 seconds to remove cells from the swab surface. The PBS was used to inoculate Petri dishes filled with TSA (Tryptic Soy Agar), Blood Agar, or Reasoners 2 agar to check for microbial growth. Each plate was inoculated with 0.1 ml of PBS. The TSA and blood agar plates were incubated at 35˚C and the Reasoners 2 agar plates were incubated at 25˚C for seven days. Petri dishes filled with Potato dextrose agar, Saboraud dextrose agar, or Saboraud dextrose agar with 0.1 mg/ml of chloramphenicol, an antibiotic, were used to check for fungal growth. These plates were inoculated with 0.3 ml of PBS and incubated at 30˚C. The remaining PBS was frozen at -80 ˚C for DNA sequencing. After incubation, isolates were counted and reisolated for identification. Isolates were identified using the VITEK23 system or by sequencing a portion of the 16S rRNA gene for bacteria or the ribosomal internal transcribed spacer (ITS) for fungi. Sequencing was performed with an ABI 3500 Sanger sequencer. Results: During our initial sampling, six of the seven sites sampled (86%) displayed bacterial or fungal growth. Samples collected from the staging areas and microtomy labs are not included in this calculation since those areas are maintained at a lower ISO 7 equivalent cleanliness standard. A month later, only three of the seven sites (43%) displayed bacterial growth. No fungal growth was detected in the second sampling. Since new equipment had been introduced to the Hayabusa2 lab since the first round of sampling, an additional three sampling sites were included in the second round of sampling. None of these sites displayed microbial growth. These sites will be included in all future sampling efforts. Bacterial isolates have been identified from the following genera at multiple time points: Micrococcus, Staphylococcus, and Bacillus. Isolates from the genera: Microbacterium, Nocardioides, Methylocystis, and Microvirga were identified in the initial sampling, but were not present at later time points. Identification of fungal isolates is in progress. Results are summarized in Table 1. Discussion: The recovery rate or percentage of positive samples4 was initially 86%, which is higher than the median recovery rate for comparable ISO 5 equivalent curation labs like Stardust (33%), Hayabusa (33%), and Cosmic Dust (50%). However, after a month of operation, the recovery rate for these same sites decreased to 43%, which is similar to what we observe in comparable curation cleanrooms with no microbial control requirements. Adding in the new sampling sites further decreases the recovery rate to 30%. With the reduction in recovery rate, we also observed a decrease in microbial diversity. At the first time point, we observed at least 10 different bacterial species and at least two different fungi. This is a higher diversity than the median values for comparable ISO 5 equivalent labs (2-4 isolates per sampling event). After the second sampling, we observed at least 4 bacterial species and no fungi, which is more consistent with comparable labs. We expect the recovery rate and diversity in both labs to continue to decrease as routine operation continues. We will use ultrapure hydrogen peroxide to disinfect equipment and work areas prior to opening any sample containers. Most of the bacterial and fungal isolates were detected on samples from the cleanroom floors. This is consistent with baseline results from other curation labs. Organisms from the genera Bacillus, Staphylococcus, and Micrococcus that were repeatedly detected are common in cleanrooms and on human skin5,6. These organisms are generally thought to be introduced when people enter the cleanroom. Microbacterium, Nocardioides, and Microvirga have also previously been identified in astromaterials cleanrooms, but not as frequently as Bacillus, Staphylococcus, and Micrococcus. Methylocystis is a novel genus in the astromaterials cleanrooms, but it was identified with low accuracy (93% match in the sequenced region of the 16S rRNA gene) and further work is needed to confirm this identification. Microbacterium is a diverse genus with isolates identified from terrestrial and aquatic sediments. Some species of Microbacterium are capable of degrading complex organic compounds found in crude oil. The presence of these bacteria in the OSIRIS REx and Hayabusa2 cleanrooms should be closely monitored. Methylocystis is a genus of methanotrophic bacteria capable of oxidizing methane. If this identification proves to be correct and it is detected again, it should be closely monitored as well. Under nominal operating conditions, samples should not ever encounter the cleanroom floor or other high traffic areas. If we observe an increase in the bioburden in sensitive work areas that appears to be influenced by organism transfer from high traffic areas like the floors, we can employ additional hydrogen peroxide treatments to disinfect high traffic areas. Routine microbial monitoring of these labs will ensure that NASA’s astromaterials collections remain pristine and useful for scientific study. Table 1. Sampling Locations and Colony Counts Bacterial CFUa Fungal CFU Bacterial CFU Fungal CFU Lab - Location 11/2/2021 11/2/2021 12/13/2021 12/13/2021 H2b-Floor 4 8 1 0 H2-staging pass through 3 0 0 0 H2-microtomy pass through TNTCc 0 0 0 H2 Microscope 1 NA NA 0 0 H2 Microscope 2 NA NA 0 0 H2-Table NA NA 0 0 OREXd- microtomy pass through 0 0 6 0 OREX – Anteroom pass through 0 0 0 0 OREX – Floor 1 2 0 0 OREX Witness Foil Table 3 0 1 0 Staging-Floor 16 0 15 0 Microtomy-Floor 3 0 2 0 a: CFU = Colony Forming Unit b: H2 = Hayabusa2 Lab c: TNTC = too numerous to count d: OREX = OSIRIS-REx Lab References: 1. ISO 14644-1:2015 - Cleanrooms and associated controlled environments -- Part 1: Classification of air cleanliness by particle concentration. 37 (2015). 2. McCubbin, F. M. et al. Space Sci Rev 215, (2019). 3. Pincus, D. H. Encyclopedia of Rapid Microbiological Methods (2005). 4. The United States Pharmacopeial Convention. USP General Chapter <1116> 17, 784–794 (2013). 5. Sheraba, N. S., Yassin, A. S. & Amin, M. BMC Research Notes 3, 278 (2010). 6. Utescher, C. L. de A., Franzolin, M. R., Trabulsi, L. R. & Gambale, V. Brazilian Journal of Microbiology 38, 710–716 (2007).

A B Regberg↗

Mars Sample Return (MSR) Sample Receiving Facility (SRF) Assessment Study (MSAS)

The Mars Sample Return (MSR) campaign, initiated in 2020 with the launch of the Per-severance Rover, is an international partnership be-tween NASA and the European Space Agency (ESA) to return Martian geological samples to Earth for scientific study in the early 2030s. Not only is MSR the first mission to bring samples back to Earth from an-other planet, it is the first time since Apollo 14to have a mission classified as a Category V: Restricted Earth Return by the NASA Planetary Protection Office due to the possibility that the samples could harbor extra-terrestrial life. As a result of this classification, the Sample Receiving Facility (SRF)must not only pro-vide a pristine environment to ensure samples are protected from terrestrial contamination for scientific investigations, it must also provide high-containment (biosafety level 4 [BSL-4]-equivalence)to isolate the samples from Earth’s biosphere until the samples are deemed safe for release and/or sterilized.

Mars Sample Return↗