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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Development Strategies for Uncertainty Quantification to Enable Aircraft Certification by Analysis

Aircraft Certification by Analysis (CbA) is a broad term that describes the process by which engineering analysis tools are used to supplement flight testing to demonstrate compliance with regulatory requirements. For each requirement that is to be met through this process, the analysis tools must be sufficiently accurate to ensure that an equivalent level of safety is obtained as if the aircraft to be certified had been flight tested for the requirement. In recent decades, the ability of analysis tools to accurately predict aircraft performance has improved dramatically, leading to increasing interest and limited early adoption of Certification by Analysis across the aerospace industry. However, rigorously demonstrating the credibility of analysis tools remains a challenge for many types of certification requirements, yet is necessary for widespread adoption of CbA approaches in the future. The field of uncertainty quantification is well-suited to address this problem, but will require substantial advances in order to achieve the ambitious industry goals for Certification by Analysis. The objective of this position paper is to highlight gaps in the current technical and programmatic state of uncertainty quantification. Four main categories – Mindset & Awareness, Tools & Capabilities, Data and Benchmarks for V&V, and Applied Research & Established Processes – will be introduced. Each of these categories contains several shortcomings and impediments which, if overcome, will enable more widespread possibilities for Certification by Analysis in the 2040-2050 timeframe.

Uncertainty Quantification↗
NASA NTRS2006

Crash Certification by Analysis - Are We There Yet?

This paper addresses the issue of crash certification by analysis. This broad topic encompasses many ancillary issues including model validation procedures, uncertainty in test data and analysis models, probabilistic techniques for test-analysis correlation, verification of the mathematical formulation, and establishment of appropriate qualification requirements. This paper will focus on certification requirements for crashworthiness of military helicopters; capabilities of the current analysis codes used for crash modeling and simulation, including some examples of simulations from the literature to illustrate the current approach to model validation; and future directions needed to achieve "crash certification by analysis."

Jackson, Karen E.↗
NASA NTRS2021

A Guide for Aircraft Certification by Analysis

Analysis-based means of compliance for airplane and engine certification, commonly known as "Certification by Analysis" (CbA), provides a strong motivation for the development and maturation of current and future flight and engine modeling technology. The many benefits of CbA include streamlined product certification testing programs at lower cost while maintaining equivalent levels of safety. Flight and engine testing represent a substantial cost to airplane and engine development programs. This report provides a far-reaching vision for CbA and presents a research roadmap for computational technology development to enable CbA.

certification by analysis↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

TPS Certification by Analysis: Model-Driven Characterization of Properties and Failure in Woven Thermal Protection Systems

Woven, ablative thermal protection system (TPS) materials provide a robust option for aggressive (re)entries and thus have been baselined for the upcoming Mars Sample Return (MSR) mission's Earth Entry System (EES). The reliability requirements for MSR-EES necessitate understanding of material property variability, which could be significant given the complex structure and anisotropic nature of properties in TPS weaves, as well as the response to potential impact with micrometeoroids or orbital debris during the EES re-entry. The TPS Certification by Analysis effort within the Entry Systems Modeling project seeks to provide computational models and analyses that support the certification against such material-based risks. For the present talk, focus will be given to the characterization of baseline woven TPS material properties and mechanical failure limits, which entails (1) use of computational techniques (e.g., machine learning) to interpret computed tomography images of the weave to generate representative structural models and (2) application of multiscale material modeling approaches to characterize thermomechanical and failure properties.

thermal protection systems↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

TPS Certification by Analysis: Model-Driven Characterization of Properties and Failure in Woven Thermal Protection Systems

Woven, ablative thermal protection system (TPS) materials provide a robust option for aggressive (re)entries and thus have been baselined for the upcoming Mars Sample Return (MSR) mission’s Earth Entry System (EES). The reliability requirements for MSR-EES necessitate understanding of material property variability, which could be significant given the complex structure and anisotropic nature of properties in TPS weaves, as well as the response to potential impact with micrometeoroids or orbital debris during the EES re-entry. The TPS Certification by Analysis effort within the Entry Systems Modeling project seeks to provide computational models and analyses that support the certification against such material-based risks. For the present talk, focus will be given to the characterization of baseline woven TPS material properties and mechanical failure limits, which entails (1) use of computational techniques (e.g., machine learning) to interpret computed tomography images of the weave to generate representative structural models and (2) application of multiscale material modeling approaches to characterize thermomechanical and failure properties.

Justin B. Haskins↗
NASA NTRS2004

Toward Synthesis, Analysis, and Certification of Security Protocols

Implemented security protocols are basically pieces of software which are used to (a) authenticate the other communication partners, (b) establish a secure communication channel between them (using insecure communication media), and (c) transfer data between the communication partners in such a way that these data only available to the desired receiver, but not to anyone else. Such an implementation usually consists of the following components: the protocol-engine, which controls in which sequence the messages of the protocol are sent over the network, and which controls the assembly/disassembly and processing (e.g., decryption) of the data. the cryptographic routines to actually encrypt or decrypt the data (using given keys), and t,he interface to the operating system and to the application. For a correct working of such a security protocol, all of these components must work flawlessly. Many formal-methods based techniques for the analysis of a security protocols have been developed. They range from using specific logics (e.g.: BAN-logic [4], or higher order logics [12] to model checking [2] approaches. In each approach, the analysis tries to prove that no (or at least not a modeled intruder) can get access to secret data. Otherwise, a scenario illustrating the &tack may be produced. Despite the seeming simplicity of security protocols ("only" a few messages are sent between the protocol partners in order to ensure a secure communication), many flaws have been detected. Unfortunately, even a perfect protocol engine does not guarantee flawless working of a security protocol, as incidents show. Many break-ins and security vulnerabilities are caused by exploiting errors in the implementation of the protocol engine or the underlying operating system. Attacks using buffer-overflows are a very common class of such attacks. Errors in the implementation of exception or error handling can open up additional vulnerabilities. For example, on a website with a log-in screen: multiple tries with invalid passwords caused the expected error message (too many retries). but let the user nevertheless pass. Finally, security can be compromised by silly implementation bugs or design decisions. In a commercial VPN software, all calls to the encryption routines were incidentally replaced by stubs, probably during factory testing. The product worked nicely. and the error (an open VPN) would have gone undetected, if a team member had not inspected the low-level traffic out of curiosity. Also, the use secret proprietary encryption routines can backfire, because such algorithms often exhibit weaknesses which can be exploited easily (see e.g., DVD encoding). Summarizing, there is large number of possibilities to make errors which can compromise the security of a protocol. In today s world with short time-to-market and the use of security protocols in open and hostile networks for safety-critical applications (e.g., power or air-traffic control), such slips could lead to catastrophic situations. Thus, formal methods and automatic reasoning techniques should not be used just for the formal proof of absence of an attack, but they ought to be used to provide an end-to-end tool-supported framework for security software. With such an approach all required artifacts (code, documentation, test cases) , formal analyses, and reliable certification will be generated automatically, given a single, high level specification. By a combination of program synthesis, formal protocol analysis, certification; and proof-carrying code, this goal is within practical reach, since all the important technologies for such an approach actually exist and only need to be assembled in the right way.

Schumann, Johann↗
NASA NTRS2019

Certification Gap Analysis

This report describes a generic method for addressing any new technology to its associated set of regulations and certification criteria. The result is a framework under which a detailed assessment can be conducted. Using just such a framework, the report maps the detailed updated regulations and evolving ASTM standards to the particular technology planning and tests. As a result, a roadmap of NASA technology is documented that shows clear transfer of technology data to industry (standards developers, as well as technology developers) and the FAA regulatory policy and certification staff upon whom certification and policy will be data-driven. A clear description of benefits and gaps are identified, as well.

Herbert Schlickenmaier↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Soyuz Landing Reconstructions

Introduction: Recent data show a landing-attributed injury rate among Soyuz crew members to be higher than predicted in original certification analysis. New vehicles being developed for NASA are being certified using analytical tools to quantify injury risk. This assessment will provide data to allow the Agency to evaluate whether these tools are able to capture true injury risk and allow a comparison between Soyuz landings and upcoming vehicles. Methods: A finite element model (FEM) of the Soyuz descent module (DM) and its landing environment were developed to recreate Soyuz landing conditions. Occupant breakout models composed of the Soyuz seat and Sokol helmet were then developed to evaluate occupant response. These models included both anthropomorphic test device (ATD) and human body model (HBM) surrogates in three anthropometric sizes. A generalized distribution analysis of the Soyuz landing environment was performed using landing variable distributions from available literature. Results were used to identify trends in vehicle landing acceleration with landing conditions and to compare landing model injury risk predictions with those estimated in vehicle certification analysis. Next, historic Soyuz landings identified as inducing occupant injury during were reconstructed using the developed landing model and estimated landing conditions. Results and Discussion: This assessment demonstrated the capability of certification metrics, which include a combination of vehicle- and occupant-level injury risk analysis, to identify elevated injury risk landing conditions. However, the developed landing load predictions were limited by available vehicle and landing condition data. Additional data, particularly landing acceleration data specific to historic Soyuz landing conditions, would greatly enhance this assessment’s findings.

Preston Greenhalgh↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Towards Thermal Protection System Certification by Analysis: Identification and Implication of Features

The thermal protection systems (TPS) to be used for upcoming sample return missions (e.g., Mars Sample Return) and future crewed missions to the Moon and Mars are subject to stringent reliability criteria. The certification of TPS is conducted through extensive testing, which can include Arc Jet testing to understand ablative behavior and non-destructive evaluation (NDE) to identify features that could lead to sub-optimal performance during entry. Unexpected features observed during fabrication of large-scale articles often require additional testing to certify, which in the very worst cases can impact schedule and contribute to cost.

J. B. Haskins↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Combining Data with Physical Knowledge for Uncertainty Quantification in Certification and Reliability Analysis

Unifying empirical data with predictive models can enable engineering cost-savings through certification by analysis and reliability-based design. Both concepts require rigorous uncertainty quantification (UQ) and robust understanding and treatment of relevant physics. Combining sampling-based UQ algorithms with high-fidelity simulations creates a computational bottleneck that is often alleviated through the use of machine learning (ML). ML can be used to create computationally efficient surrogates for simulations of complex or high-dimensional physical interactions (e.g., multi-phase interactions associated with melt pools in laser powder bed fusion or spatially-dependent material properties in functionally graded materials). However, negative side effects of ML may include a lack of interpretability and negative correlation between event rarity and simulation accuracy due to a lack of training data. As such, it is important to infuse ML algorithms with physics-based guardrails to provide confidence in their predictions. This talk will provide a brief review of recent NASA research at this intersection of physics-based simulation, ML, and UQ with a focus on certification and reliability analysis.

uncertainty quantification↗
NASA NTRS2013

Certification-Based Process Analysis

Space mission architects are often challenged with knowing which investment in technology infusion will have the highest return. Certification-based analysis (CBA) gives architects and technologists a means to communicate the risks and advantages of infusing technologies at various points in a process. Various alternatives can be compared, and requirements based on supporting streamlining or automation can be derived and levied on candidate technologies. CBA is a technique for analyzing a process and identifying potential areas of improvement. The process and analysis products are used to communicate between technologists and architects. Process means any of the standard representations of a production flow; in this case, any individual steps leading to products, which feed into other steps, until the final product is produced at the end. This sort of process is common for space mission operations, where a set of goals is reduced eventually to a fully vetted command sequence to be sent to the spacecraft. Fully vetting a product is synonymous with certification. For some types of products, this is referred to as verification and validation, and for others it is referred to as checking. Fundamentally, certification is the step in the process where one insures that a product works as intended, and contains no flaws.

Knight, Russell L.↗
NASA NTRS1984

Large space structures ground and flight progress

Unprecedented challenges arise in connection with the design and certification of space systems which are too large to be transported into orbit fully assembled. Special situations arising in the case of such systems make it necessary to rely much more on analysis than in past programs. The present investigation is concerned with the status of some research activities oriented primarily to the improvement of analysis capabilities through coordinated ground and flight testing. Aspects of system identification are explored, taking into account an eigensystem realization algorithm, and the Hoop-Column Antenna concept. Attention is also given to a suitable method for analyzing the Hoop-Column antenna structure, a deployment analysis, certification issues for large space structures, a generic space station model, and the use of actuators.

Pinson, L. D.↗