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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2015

Common Cause Failure Modeling

Common Cause Failures (CCFs) are a known and documented phenomenon that defeats system redundancy. CCFS are a set of dependent type of failures that can be caused by: system environments; manufacturing; transportation; storage; maintenance; and assembly, as examples. Since there are many factors that contribute to CCFs, the effects can be reduced, but they are difficult to eliminate entirely. Furthermore, failure databases sometimes fail to differentiate between independent and CCF (dependent) failure and data is limited, especially for launch vehicles. The Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of NASA's Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate at Marshall Space Flight Center (MFSC) is using generic data from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's database of common cause failures at nuclear power plants to estimate CCF due to the lack of a more appropriate data source. There remains uncertainty in the actual magnitude of the common cause risk estimates for different systems at this stage of the design. Given the limited data about launch vehicle CCF and that launch vehicles are a highly redundant system by design, it is important to make design decisions to account for a range of values for independent and CCFs. When investigating the design of the one-out-of-two component redundant system for launch vehicles, a response surface was constructed to represent the impact of the independent failure rate versus a common cause beta factor effect on a system's failure probability. This presentation will define a CCF and review estimation calculations. It gives a summary of reduction methodologies and a review of examples of historical CCFs. Finally, it presents the response surface and discusses the results of the different CCFs on the reliability of a one-out-of-two system.

Hark, Frank↗
NASA NTRS2016

Common Cause Failure Modeling

Common Cause Failures (CCFs) are a known and documented phenomenon that defeats system redundancy. CCFS are a set of dependent type of failures that can be caused by: system environments; manufacturing; transportation; storage; maintenance; and assembly, as examples. Since there are many factors that contribute to CCFs, the effects can be reduced, but they are difficult to eliminate entirely. Furthermore, failure databases sometimes fail to differentiate between independent and CCF (dependent) failure and data is limited, especially for launch vehicles. The Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) of NASA's Safety and Mission Assurance Directorate at Marshal Space Flight Center (MFSC) is using generic data from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's database of common cause failures at nuclear power plants to estimate CCF due to the lack of a more appropriate data source. There remains uncertainty in the actual magnitude of the common cause risk estimates for different systems at this stage of the design. Given the limited data about launch vehicle CCF and that launch vehicles are a highly redundant system by design, it is important to make design decisions to account for a range of values for independent and CCFs. When investigating the design of the one-out-of-two component redundant system for launch vehicles, a response surface was constructed to represent the impact of the independent failure rate versus a common cause beta factor effect on a system's failure probability. This presentation will define a CCF and review estimation calculations. It gives a summary of reduction methodologies and a review of examples of historical CCFs. Finally, it presents the response surface and discusses the results of the different CCFs on the reliability of a one-out-of-two system.

Hark, Frank↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Common Cause Failures Dominate and Defeat Redundancy

Common cause failures occur when several malfunctions are produced by a single event or process. They are especially damaging when they eliminate an entire set of redundant systems and disable their intended function. Redundancy is used when the individual system failure probability is unacceptably high. Redundancy can improve the overall system failure probability if the failures are independent, but the reliability gain is limited if there are dependent failures having a common cause. No amount of redundancy can reduce the total failure probability below the common cause failure probability. Common cause failures defeat redundancy. Systems with high reliability requirements often use extensive redundancy. These highly redundant systems rarely fail unless all the redundant components providing a particular function fail. Complete failures of such highly redundant systems are then usually common cause failures. Common cause failures are prevalent in highly redundant, high reliability systems. Common cause failures dominate redundancy. Redundant systems may fail due to specification, design, manufacturing, operations, or maintenance problems that disable all the identical redundant systems. Common cause failures typically account for one tenth of all failures. If the failure probability is relatively low and common cause failures are significant, adding more than two or three redundant identical units usually gives little added reliability improvement. Common cause failures can be reduced by using diverse components with different technologies and manufacturers, by separating and shielding subsystems, and by avoiding shared control, power, or location. External events and shared vulnerabilities may still cause common cause failures.

common cause failures↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Common Cause Failures Dominate and Defeat Redundancy

Common cause failures occur when several malfunctions are produced by a single event or process. They are especially damaging when they eliminate an entire set of redundant systems and disable their intended function. Redundancy is used when the individual system failure probability is unacceptably high. Redundancy can improve the overall system failure probability if the failures are independent, but the reliability gain is limited if there are dependent failures having a common cause. No amount of redundancy can reduce the total failure probability below the common cause failure probability. Common cause failures defeat redundancy. Systems with high reliability requirements often use extensive redundancy. These highly redundant systems rarely fail unless all the redundant components providing a particular function fail. Complete failures of such highly redundant systems are then usually common cause failures. Common cause failures are prevalent in highly redundant, high reliability systems. Common cause failures dominate redundancy. Redundant systems may fail due to specification, design, manufacturing, operations, or maintenance problems that disable all the identical redundant systems. Common cause failures typically account for one tenth of all failures. If the failure probability is relatively low and common cause failures are significant, adding more than two or three redundant identical units usually gives little added reliability improvement. Common cause failures can be reduced by using diverse components with different technologies and manufacturers, by separating and shielding subsystems, and by avoiding shared control, power, or location. External events and shared vulnerabilities may still cause common cause failures.

common cause failures↗
NASA NTRS2012

Common Cause Failures and Ultra Reliability

A common cause failure occurs when several failures have the same origin. Common cause failures are either common event failures, where the cause is a single external event, or common mode failures, where two systems fail in the same way for the same reason. Common mode failures can occur at different times because of a design defect or a repeated external event. Common event failures reduce the reliability of on-line redundant systems but not of systems using off-line spare parts. Common mode failures reduce the dependability of systems using off-line spare parts and on-line redundancy.

reliability↗
NASA NTRS2015

Common Cause Failure Modeling in Space Launch Vehicles

Common Cause Failures (CCFs) are a known and documented phenomenon that defeats system redundancy. CCFs are a set of dependent type of failures that can be caused for example by system environments, manufacturing, transportation, storage, maintenance, and assembly. Since there are many factors that contribute to CCFs, they can be reduced, but are difficult to eliminate entirely. Furthermore, failure databases sometimes fail to differentiate between independent and dependent CCF. Because common cause failure data is limited in the aerospace industry, the Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) Team at Bastion Technology Inc. is estimating CCF risk using generic data collected by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Consequently, common cause risk estimates based on this database, when applied to other industry applications, are highly uncertain. Therefore, it is important to account for a range of values for independent and CCF risk and to communicate the uncertainty to decision makers. There is an existing methodology for reducing CCF risk during design, which includes a checklist of 40+ factors grouped into eight categories. Using this checklist, an approach to produce a beta factor estimate is being investigated that quantitatively relates these factors. In this example, the checklist will be tailored to space launch vehicles, a quantitative approach will be described, and an example of the method will be presented.

Hark, Frank↗
NASA NTRS2015

Common Cause Failure Modeling

Space Launch System (SLS) Agenda: Objective; Key Definitions; Calculating Common Cause; Examples; Defense against Common Cause; Impact of varied Common Cause Failure (CCF) and abortability; Response Surface for various CCF Beta; Takeaways.

Hark, Frank↗
NASA NTRS2010

Common Cause Failure Modeling: Aerospace Versus Nuclear

Aggregate nuclear plant failure data is used to produce generic common-cause factors that are specifically for use in the common-cause failure models of NUREG/CR-5485. Furthermore, the models presented in NUREG/CR-5485 are specifically designed to incorporate two significantly distinct assumptions about the methods of surveillance testing from whence this aggregate failure data came. What are the implications of using these NUREG generic factors to model the common-cause failures of aerospace systems? Herein, the implications of using the NUREG generic factors in the modeling of aerospace systems are investigated in detail and strong recommendations for modeling the common-cause failures of aerospace systems are given.

Stott, James E.↗
NASA NTRS2014

Modeling Common Cause Failures of Thrusters on ISS Visiting Vehicles

This paper discusses the methodology used to model common cause failures of thrusters on the International Space Station (ISS) Visiting Vehicles. The ISS Visiting Vehicles each have as many as 32 thrusters, whose redundancy makes them susceptible to common cause failures. The Global Alpha Model (as described in NUREG/CR‐5485) can be used to represent the system common cause contribution, but NUREG/CR‐5496 supplies global alpha parameters for groups only up to size six. Because of the large number of redundant thrusters on each vehicle, regression is used to determine parameter values for groups of size larger than six. An additional challenge is that Visiting Vehicle thruster failures must occur in specific combinations in order to fail the propulsion system; not all failure groups of a certain size are critical.

Haught, Megan↗
NASA NTRS2014

Modeling Common Cause Failures of Thrusters on ISS Visiting Vehicles

This paper discusses the methodology used to model common cause failures of thrusters on the International Space Station (ISS) Visiting Vehicles. The ISS Visiting Vehicles each have as many as 32 thrusters, whose redundancy and similar design make them susceptible to common cause failures. The Global Alpha Model (as described in NUREG/CR-5485) can be used to represent the system common cause contribution, but NUREG/CR-5496 supplies global alpha parameters for groups only up to size six. Because of the large number of redundant thrusters on each vehicle, regression is used to determine parameter values for groups of size larger than six. An additional challenge is that Visiting Vehicle thruster failures must occur in specific combinations in order to fail the propulsion system; not all failure groups of a certain size are critical.

Haught, Megan↗
NASA NTRS2011

Common Cause Failure Modes

High technology industries with high failure costs commonly use redundancy as a means to reduce risk. Redundant systems, whether similar or dissimilar, are susceptible to Common Cause Failures (CCF). CCF is not always considered in the design effort and, therefore, can be a major threat to success. There are several aspects to CCF which must be understood to perform an analysis which will find hidden issues that may negate redundancy. This paper will provide definition, types, a list of possible causes and some examples of CCF. Requirements and designs from NASA projects will be used in the paper as examples.

Wetherholt, Jon↗
NASA NTRS2005

Common Cause Case Study: An Estimated Probability of Four Solid Rocket Booster Hold-Down Post Stud Hang-ups

Until Solid Rocket Motor ignition, the Space Shuttle is mated to the Mobil Launch Platform in part via eight (8) Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) hold-down bolts. The bolts are fractured using redundant pyrotechnics, and are designed to drop through a hold-down post on the Mobile Launch Platform before the Space Shuttle begins movement. The Space Shuttle program has experienced numerous failures where a bolt has hung up. That is, it did not clear the hold-down post before liftoff and was caught by the SRBs. This places an additional structural load on the vehicle that was not included in the original certification requirements. The Space Shuttle is currently being certified to withstand the loads induced by up to three (3) of eight (8) SRB hold-down experiencing a "hang-up". The results of loads analyses performed for (4) stud hang-ups indicate that the internal vehicle loads exceed current structural certification limits at several locations. To determine the risk to the vehicle from four (4) stud hang-ups, the likelihood of the scenario occurring must first be evaluated. Prior to the analysis discussed in this paper, the likelihood of occurrence had been estimated assuming that the stud hang-ups were completely independent events. That is, it was assumed that no common causes or factors existed between the individual stud hang-up events. A review of the data associated with the hang-up events, showed that a common factor (timing skew) was present. This paper summarizes a revised likelihood evaluation performed for the four (4) stud hang-ups case considering that there are common factors associated with the stud hang-ups. The results show that explicitly (i.e. not using standard common cause methodologies such as beta factor or Multiple Greek Letter modeling) taking into account the common factor of timing skew results in an increase in the estimated likelihood of four (4) stud hang-ups of an order of magnitude over the independent failure case.

Cross, Robert↗
NASA NTRS2005

Common Cause Case Study: An Estimated Probability of Four Solid Rocket Booster Hold-down Post Stud Hang-ups

Until Solid Rocket Motor ignition, the Space Shuttle is mated to the Mobil Launch Platform in part via eight (8) Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) hold-down bolts. The bolts are fractured using redundant pyrotechnics, and are designed to drop through a hold-down post on the Mobile Launch Platform before the Space Shuttle begins movement. The Space Shuttle program has experienced numerous failures where a bolt has "hung-up." That is, it did not clear the hold-down post before liftoff and was caught by the SRBs. This places an additional structural load on the vehicle that was not included in the original certification requirements. The Space Shuttle is currently being certified to withstand the loads induced by up to three (3) of eight (8) SRB hold-down post studs experiencing a "hang-up." The results af loads analyses performed for four (4) stud-hang ups indicate that the internal vehicle loads exceed current structural certification limits at several locations. To determine the risk to the vehicle from four (4) stud hang-ups, the likelihood of the scenario occurring must first be evaluated. Prior to the analysis discussed in this paper, the likelihood of occurrence had been estimated assuming that the stud hang-ups were completely independent events. That is, it was assumed that no common causes or factors existed between the individual stud hang-up events. A review of the data associated with the hang-up events, showed that a common factor (timing skew) was present. This paper summarizes a revised likelihood evaluation performed for the four (4) stud hang-ups case considering that there are common factors associated with the stud hang-ups. The results show that explicitly (i.e. not using standard common cause methodologies such as beta factor or Multiple Greek Letter modeling) taking into account the common factor of timing skew results in an increase in the estimated likelihood of four (4) stud hang-ups of an order of magnitude over the independent failure case.

Cross, Robert↗
NASA NTRS2002

Orbital Noise in the Earth System is a Common Cause of Climate and Greenhouse-Gas Fluctuation

The mismatch between fossil isotopic data and climate models known as the cool-tropic paradox implies that either the data are flawed or we understand very little about the climate models of greenhouse warming. Here we question the validity of the climate models on the scientific background of orbital noise in the Earth system. Our study shows that the insolation pulsation induced by orbital noise is the common cause of climate change and atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide and methane. In addition, we find that the intensity of the insolation pulses is dependent on the latitude of the Earth. Thus, orbital noise is the key to understanding the troubling paradox in climate models.

Liu, H. S.↗
NASA NTRS1975

Secondary task for full flight simulation incorporating tasks that commonly cause pilot error: Time estimation

The task of time estimation, an activity occasionally performed by pilots during actual flight, was investigated with the objective of providing human factors investigators with an unobtrusive and minimally loading additional task that is sensitive to differences in flying conditions and flight instrumentation associated with the main task of piloting an aircraft simulator. Previous research indicated that the duration and consistency of time estimates is associated with the cognitive, perceptual, and motor loads imposed by concurrent simple tasks. The relationships between the length and variability of time estimates and concurrent task variables under a more complex situation involving simulated flight were clarified. The wrap-around effect with respect to baseline duration, a consequence of mode switching at intermediate levels of concurrent task distraction, should contribute substantially to estimate variability and have a complex effect on the shape of the resulting distribution of estimates.

Rosch, E.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Data Mining and Analysis

The Data Mining project seeks to bring the capability of data visualization to NASA anomaly and problem reporting systems for the purpose of improving data trending, evaluations, and analyses. Currently NASA systems are tailored to meet the specific needs of its organizations. This tailoring has led to a variety of nomenclatures and levels of annotation for procedures, parts, and anomalies making difficult the realization of the common causes for anomalies. Making significant observations and realizing the connection between these causes without a common way to view large data sets is difficult to impossible. In the first phase of the Data Mining project a portal was created to present a common visualization of normalized sensitive data to customers with the appropriate security access. The tool of the visualization itself was also developed and fine-tuned. In the second phase of the project we took on the difficult task of searching and analyzing the target data set for common causes between anomalies. In the final part of the second phase we have learned more about how much of the analysis work will be the job of the Data Mining team, how to perform that work, and how that work may be used by different customers in different ways. In this paper I detail how our perspective has changed after gaining more insight into how the customers wish to interact with the output and how that has changed the product.

iss↗