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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Common-Cause Component Group Modeling Issues in Probabilistic Risk Assess

Common cause failures (CCFs) have been recognized as significant risk contributors in probabilistic risk assessments (PRAs) for commercial nuclear power plants (NPPs) since 1980s. A series of reports including those of United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulations (NUREGs) have been published from late 1980s to early 2000s to provide guidelines for performing CCF event data analysis and modeling CCF in PRA. However, there are still some issues existed in CCF modeling and CCF parameter estimations. One of such issues is the modeling of multiple common-cause component group (CCCG) for the same component in a PRA model. This paper exams the CCCG definition and the requirements from the PRA standard, investigates the CCCG modeling practices and issues existing in PRAs, and presents systematic approaches and guidelines to model CCCG in PRA properly and consistently.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2022

An Application of a Modified Beta Factor Method for the Analysis of Software Common Cause Failures

This paper presents an approach for modeling software common cause failures (CCFs) within digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems. CCFs consist of a concurrent failure between two or more components due to a shared failure cause and coupling mechanism. This work emphasizes the importance of identifying software-centric attributes related to the coupling mechanisms necessary for simultaneous failures of redundant software components. The groups of components that share coupling mechanisms are called common cause component groups (CCCGs). Most CCF models rely on operational data as the basis for establishing CCCG parameters and predicting CCFs. This work is motivated by two primary concerns: (1) a lack of operational and CCF data for estimating software CCF model parameters; and (2) the need to model single components as part of multiple CCCGs simultaneously. A hybrid approach was developed to account for these concerns by leveraging existing techniques: a modified beta factor model allows single components to be placed within multiple CCCGs, while a second technique provides software-specific model parameters for each CCCG. This hybrid approach provides a means to overcome the limitations of conventional methods while offering support for design decisions under the limited data scenario.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

Common Cause Failure Analysis for Nuclear Power Plant Instrumentation and Control Systems

This presentation is prepared for the IAEA Virtual Consultancy Meeting on Preparation of a Coordinated Research Project on Common Cause Failures in Nuclear Power Plant Instrumentation and Control Systems from February 5 ? 8, 2024. It provides an overview of the INL activities on the common cause failure analysis for instrumentation and control system in nuclear power plants.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Developing Component-Specific Prior Distributions for Common Cause Failure Alpha Factors

This report presents the development of component-specific common cause failure (CCF) prior distributions for five component categories: pump, valve, strainer, generator, and other. For ease in comparing these component-specific CCF priors with the 2015 generic CCF priors, the same method used to develop the 2015 generic CCF priors was also employed in this report, along with the same set of failure data (1997–2015) featured in INL/EXT-21-43723. For selected CCF templates, this report also evaluates the effects of applying component-specific priors to CCF parameters.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Analyzing Hardware and Software Common Cause Failures in Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems using Dual Error Propagation Method

This paper develops a methodology for quantifying software common cause failures (CCFs) in digital instrumentation and control (I&C) systems of nuclear power plants. To support the transition of analog I&C systems to digital in nuclear power plants, probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) techniques are used. The hardware components of the I&C systems have reliability databases that can be used in the PRA studies. However, the failure data for redundant software components of the systems is sparse. Failure of components constitutes a CCF, wherein two or more components or systems fail due to a single shared cause and coupling mechanism. This paper proposes a quantification approach that can simultaneously model hardware and software components, incorporate the CCFs of software systems in the models, and bridge the gap between the failure quantification of models and the development of CCF parametric databases. We demonstrate the dual error propagation method (DEPM) by developing I&C systems failure models for a representative digital reactor trip system. The DEPM models are built to simulate the control and data flows within the systems and can accommodate failure states. By expanding DEPM to software CCFs, we generated alpha factor parameter estimates for each of the modeled error propagation mechanisms.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Common Cause Failure Evaluation of High Safety-significant Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems

Digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) systems in nuclear power plants (NPPs) have many advantages over analog systems but also pose different engineering and technical challenges, such as potential threats due to common cause failures (CCFs). This paper proposes a Platform for Risk Assessment of DI&C (PRADIC) developed by Idaho National Laboratory for dealing with potential software CCFs in DI&C systems of NPPs. The methodology development of PRADIC on the quantitative evaluation of software CCFs in high safety-significant safety-related DI&C systems in NPPs is illustrated in this paper. In PRADIC, qualitative hazard analysis and quantitative reliability and consequence analysis are successively implemented to obtain quantitative risk information, compare with respective risk evaluation acceptance criteria, and provide suggestions for risk reduction and design optimization. A comprehensive case study was also performed and documented in this paper. Results show that PRADIC can effectively identify potential digital-based CCFs, estimate their failure probabilities, and evaluate their impacts to system and plant safety.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Common Cause Failure Evaluation of High Safety Significant Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems using IRADIC Technology

Digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) systems in nuclear power plants (NPPs) have many advantages over analog systems but also pose different engineering and technical challenges, such as potential threats due to common cause failures (CCFs). This paper proposes an integrated risk assessment technology for DI&C systems (IRADIC) developed by Idaho National Laboratory for dealing with potential software CCFs in DI&C systems of NPPs. The methodology development of the IRADIC technology on the quantitative evaluation of software CCFs in high safety-significant safety-related DI&C systems in NPPs is illustrated in this paper. In IRADIC, qualitative hazard analysis and quantitative reliability and consequence analysis are successively implemented to obtain quantitative risk information, compare with respective risk evaluation acceptance criteria, and provide suggestions for risk reduction and design optimization. A comprehensive case study was also performed and documented in this paper. Results show that the IRADIC technology can effectively identify potential digital-based CCFs, estimate their failure probabilities, and evaluate their impacts to system and plant safety.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Feasibility Study of Developing Alternative Common-Cause Failure Model for Event Assessment

This report is a revision of the original report, INL/LTD-14-33376. The original report, which was a limited distribution to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) only and not available to the public, was revised as this report for public distribution. The report presents the feasibility study of alternative common-cause failure (CCF) models that could be used for event assessment in the Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) models. The current CCF model used by the SPAR models is the alpha factor model. The proposed alternative CCF models are the partial alpha factor model and general dependency model. These alternative CCF models are reviewed and compared to the current alpha factor model, with the partial alpha factor model being identified as the preferred CCF model that could be used for event assessment in the SPAR models.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Developing Generic Prior Distributions for Common Cause Failure Alpha Factors and Causal Alpha Factors

This report is a revision of the original report, INL/LTD-17-43723. Distribution of the original report was to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) only, and the report was not made available to the public. The original report was revised as this report for public distribution. This report presents the latest update of generic prior distributions for common cause failure (CCF) alpha factors, as well as the development of new generic prior distributions for CCF causal alpha factors. The history of CCF treatment and parameter estimations is reviewed. The existing process for developing generic prior distributions is reviewed and used to develop new priors for CCF alpha factors and causal alpha factors. For causal alpha factors, different priors are developed for the five different CCF cause groups: Component (GC), Design (GD), Environment (GE), Human (GH), and Other (GO). These generic prior distributions could be used in the Standardized Plant Analysis Risk (SPAR) models for CCF parameter estimation. The issues and preliminary thoughts regarding prior distribution development are documented. Potential future work is then proposed for improving the process of developing priors.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Quantitative evaluation of common cause failures in high safety-significant safety-related digital instrumentation and control systems in nuclear power plants

Digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) systems at nuclear power plants (NPPs) have many advantages over analog systems. They are proven to be more reliable, cheaper, and easier to maintain given obsolescence of analog components. However, they also pose new engineering and technical challenges, such as possibility of common cause failures (CCFs) unique to digital systems. Here this paper proposes a Platform for Risk Assessment of DI&C (PRADIC) that is developed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL). A methodology for evaluation of software CCFs in high safety-significant safety-related DI&C systems of NPPs was developed as part of the framework. The framework integrates three stages of a typical risk assessment—qualitative hazard analysis and quantitative reliability and consequence analyses. The quantified risks compared with respective acceptance criteria provide valuable insights for system architecture alternatives allowing design optimization in terms of risk reduction and cost savings. A comprehensive case study performed to demonstrate the framework's capabilities is documented here in this paper. Results show that the PRADIC is a powerful tool capable to identify potential digital-based CCFs, estimate their probabilities, and evaluate their impacts on system and plant safety.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Hazard analysis for identifying common cause failures of digital safety systems using a redundancy-guided systems-theoretic approach

Replacing the existing aging analog instrumentation and control (I&C) systems with modern safety control and protection, digital technology offers one of the foremost means of performance improvements and cost reductions for the existing nuclear power plants (NPPs). However, the qualification of digital I&C systems remains a challenge, especially considering the issue of software common-cause failures (CCFs), which are difficult to address. With the application and upgrades of advanced digital I&C systems, software CCFs have become a potential threat to plant safety because most redundant designs use similar digital platforms or software in the operating and application systems. With complex designs of multilayer redundancy to meet the single-failure criterion, digital I&C safety systems (e.g., engineered safety-features actuation system [ESFAS]) are of a particular concern in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing procedures. Here, this paper applies a modularized approach to conduct redundancy-guided systems-theoretic hazard analysis for an advanced digital ESFAS with multilevel redundancy designs. Systematic methods and risk-informed tools are incorporated to address both hardware and software CCFs, which provide guidance to eliminate the causal factors of potential single points of failure in the design of digital safety systems in advanced plant designs.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Investigation of the Use of Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment Methodologies for Identifying Digital I&C System Common Cause Failures

Digital Instrumentation and Control (I&C) systems have a key role in nuclear power plants in the upgrade of aging analog systems. Digital systems improve plant safety and reliability through features such as increased hardware reliability and stability and improved failure detection capability. There is no consensus on which of the current probabilistic risk assessment methods are most suitable for use in the reliability analysis of digital I&C systems. While the traditional event-tree/fault-tree (ET/FT) approach is still used for their reliability modeling, there are concerns regarding this approach in properly accounting for dynamic interactions among system components since potentially significant dependencies among failure events may not be identified and/or their likelihood may not be properly quantified. Dynamic methodologies are expected to provide a much more accurate representation of probabilistic evolution of the I&C systems in time due to their capability to more properly account for complex interactions than the static approach. The applicability of dynamic PRA methodologies for digital I&C system is investigated using the criteria presented in the NUREG/CR-6901, and the comparisons made in NUREG/CR-6901 are updated in light of the latest studies. The Dynamic Event Tree (DET) approach has been identified as one of the top dynamic methods when evaluated against the requirements for the reliability modeling of digital I&C systems. The DET method is a strong candidate for integration into existing PRA studies, as it bears many similarities to the traditional ET approach. In this study, the DET approach has been applied to the Plant Protection System of the APR1400 design, and the results are compared to results from its available traditional ET/FT analysis. Possible approaches to evaluate and quantify the effects of common cause failures on system safety using dynamic methods are also examined.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2024

Compound Flooding in Halmstad: Common Causes, Interannual Variability and the Effects of Climate Change

Compound flooding was investigated in Halmstad on the Swedish west coast. The highest sea level ever recorded in Sweden was recorded by the Halmstad tide gauge. Moreover, through the city runs Nissan, one of the largest hydropower-producing rivers in southern Sweden. Together these features make the city an interesting location to study compound flooding. Co-variability between different hazards are studied using a unique set of downscaled climate scenario projections produced using state-of-the-art regional atmosphere, ocean and hydrological models. River discharge and sea level annual maxima are found to be correlated with peak strength on interannual time scales. This co-variability is found to derive from a mutual dependence that these hazards have on the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO). Precipitation also shares this dependence in winter months and acts as a driver, building up the fluvial river hazard, while potentially adding additional pluvial hazard. Trends are also assessed, and it was found that future changes in compound flooding will most likely be driven primarily by mean sea level rise and secondarily by increases in mean river discharge.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

HAZARD ANALYSIS OF DIGITAL ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES ACTUATION SYSTEM IN ADVANCED NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS USING A REDUNDANCY-GUIDED APPROACH

Replacing the existing aging analog instrumentation and control (I&C) systems with modern safety control and protection digital technology offers one of the foremost means of performance improvements and cost reductions for the existing nuclear power plants (NPPs). However, the qualification of digital I&C systems remains a challenge, especially considering the issue of software common-cause failures (CCFs), which are difficult to address. With the application and upgrades of advanced digital I&C systems, software CCFs have become a potential threat to plant safety because most redundant designs use similar digital platforms or software in the operating and application systems. With complex designs of multilayer redundancy to meet the single-failure criterion, digital I&C safety systems (e.g., engineered safety-features actuation system [ESFAS]) are of a particular concern in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licensing procedures. This paper applies a modularized approach to conduct redundancy-guided systems-theoretic hazard analysis for an advanced digital ESFAS with multilevel redundancy designs. Systematic methods and risk-informed tools are incorporated to address both hardware and software CCFs, which provide guidance to eliminate the triggers of potential single points of failure in the design of digital safety systems in advanced plant designs.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗
DOE OSTI2023

Causal CCF Parameter Estimations 2020

This report documents the quantitative results of the causal common-cause failure (CCF) parameter estimations for the failure cause groups “component,” “design,” “environment,” “human,” and “other,” based on CCF data through 2020 in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) CCF database: https://rads.inl.gov/Pages/CCF.aspx. This report utilizes the same data period (2006–2020) and CCF templates as INL/EXT-21-62940, Revision 1, CCF Parameter Estimations, 2020 Update. The 2015 causal CCF prior distributions for the specific failure cause groups (instead of the 2015 generic CCF prior distributions) were used in this report to estimate the associated causal CCF parameters. All the 2015 causal CCF prior distributions and generic CCF prior distributions were developed in INL/EXT-21-43723, Developing Generic Prior Distributions for Common Cause Failure Alpha Factors and Causal Alpha Factors, using CCF data from 1997 to 2015. These quantitative results were developed to support the causal alpha factor model and should be used as appropriate in probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) studies such as the NRC Significance Determination Process for commercial nuclear power plants in the United States.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Limitations of traditional tools for beyond design basis external hazard PRA

Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is being used increasingly by the nuclear industry for safety during normal operations as well as for the protection against external hazards. Computation of total risk in an external hazard PRA is dependent on hazard assessment, fragility assessment, and systems analysis. A systems analysis for propagation of component fragilities is conducted using event and fault trees. The event and fault trees for an actual power plant can be fairly large in size, which imposes computational challenges. Hence, certain assumptions are employed for computational efficiency. These assumptions typically represent the conditions imposed during the design basis (DB) scenario. The traditional PRA tools based on these assumptions are also widely applied to perform risk assessment in the context of beyond design basis (BDB) scenarios. However, some of these assumptions may not be valid for certain BDB scenarios. In addition, the probability of dependent failures also increases in BDB scenarios due to common cause failures (CCF) which usually results from design modifications, human errors, etc. In this manuscript, a simple and a relatively more complex illustrative examples are used to show the limitation of these assumptions in the numerical quantification of risk for the case of BDB conditions. Case studies with CCF events across multiple fault trees are also presented to illustrate the effect of these assumptions when traditional approach is used in BDB risk assessment. It is shown that the assumptions are valid for the case of DB conditions but may lead to excessively conservative risk estimates in the case of BDB conditions. Finally, a Bayesian network based top-down algorithm is proposed as an alternative tool for accurate numerical quantification of total risk in systems analysis.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2022

An Integrated Risk Assessment Process of Safety-Related Digital I&C Systems in Nuclear Power Plants

Upgrading the existing analog instrumentation and control (I&C) systems to state-of-the-art digital I&C (DI&C) systems will greatly benefit existing light water reactors. However, the issue of software common cause failure (CCF) remains an obstacle in terms of qualification for digital technologies. Existing analyses of CCFs in I&C systems mainly focus on hardware failures. With the application and upgrading of new DI&C systems, design flaws could cause software CCFs to become a potential threat to plant safety, considering that most redundancy designs use similar digital platforms or software in their operating and application systems. With complex multilayer redundancy designs to meet the single failure criterion, these I&C safety systems are of particular concern in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission licensing procedures. In Fiscal Year 2019, the Risk-Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway of the U.S. Department of Energy’s Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades and designs. An integrated risk assessment for the DI&C process was proposed for this strategy to identify potential key digital-induced failures, implement reliability analyses of related digital safety I&C systems, and evaluate the unanalyzed sequences introduced by these failures (particularly software CCFs) at the plant level. Here this paper summarizes these RISA efforts in the risk analysis of safety-related DI&C systems at Idaho National Laboratory.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2021

Quantitative Risk Analysis of High Safety Significant Safety-related Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems in Nuclear Power Plants using IRADIC Technology

This report documents the activities performed by Idaho National Laboratory (INL) during fiscal year (FY) 2021 for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) Program, Risk Informed Systems Analysis (RISA) Pathway, digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) Risk Assessment project. In FY-2019, the RISA Pathway initiated a project to develop a risk assessment strategy for delivering a strong technical basis to support effective, licensable, and secure DI&C technologies for digital upgrades/designs. An integrated risk assessment technology for the DI&C systems (IRADIC technology) was proposed for this strategy, which aims to (1) provide a best-estimate risk-informed capability to quantitatively and accurately estimate the safety margin obtained from plant modernization, especially for the High Safety Significant Safety-related (HSSSR) DI&C systems, (2) develop an advanced risk assessment technology to support transition from analog to DI&C technologies for nuclear industry, (3) assure the long-term safety and reliability of vital HSSSR DI&C systems, (4) reduce uncertainty in costs and support integration of DI&C systems in the plant. To achieve these technical goals and deal with the expensive licensing justifications from regulatory insights, the IRADIC technology is instructive for nuclear vendors and utilities to effectively lower the costs associated with digital compliance and speed industry advances by: (1) defining an integrated risk-informed analysis process for DI&C upgrade, including hazard analysis, reliability analysis, and consequence analysis, (2) applying systematic and risk-informed tools to address common cause failures (CCFs) and quantify responding failure probabilities for DI&C technologies, particularly software CCFs, (3) evaluating the impact of digital failures at the individual level, system level, and plant level, (4) providing insights and suggestions on designs to manage the risks; thus, to support the development, licensing, and deployment of advanced DI&C technologies on nuclear power plant (NPPs). In this report, an approach for performing software CCF analysis, given limited data, is developed and demonstrated using a case study of a highly redundant digital reactor trip system. Consequence analysis is also performed based on different accident scenarios. Results indicate that plant modernization including the improvement of HSSSR DI&C systems will make great benefits to plant safety by providing more safety margins to accident management. In addition, a novel approach is proposed in this report for the quantification of software hazards when sufficient operational and testing data available. The method incorporates software development quality as well as strong analysis techniques to identify and link software defects to potential failure modes. The approach includes both semantic and test-based analysis to detect failures that can exist in different stages of the software development life cycle. This method is applied to an advanced human system interface relevant to reactor trip safety developed from the APR 1400 design.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗