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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records

Grid Communications: Cybersecurity and Supply Chain Challenges and Emerging Regulation Session Three

The TADA Grid Communications Workshops are designed to strengthen cybersecurity and digital assurance across the energy sector by focusing on secure deployment and management of grid communications technologies. These workshops bring together state energy offices, utilities, and technology suppliers to explore the intersection of communications infrastructure, supply chain risks, and emerging regulatory requirements. Participants will apply Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles to reduce risks in communications systems, engage with INL’s procurement guidance, and explore future tools. Through scenario-based exercises and peer exchange, attendees will develop risk-based security strategies and actionable compliance roadmaps tailored to their grid communications projects. The workshops also help participants navigate evolving regulatory frameworks such as FEOC rules in the OBBB, NERC CIP-013, and NDAA 2024, while identifying compliance gaps in mixed-technology environments. A key outcome is the formation of a practitioner network with ongoing access to INL expertise and resources, fostering long-term resilience in the digital energy ecosystem. This is Session 3 of 3 (Full Version).

29 - ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY↗

Communications for the Future Electric Grid: Systems and Implications

As the operation of the electric grid continues to become more automated, the associated increase in sensors and systems places increasing demands for fast response, cybersecure communications. This paper presents a review of advances underway in communications and networking technologies that may be implemented to meet these future electric grid requirements.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

AOI-2, A Novel Access Control Blockchain Paradigm for Cybersecure Sensor Infrastructure in Fossil Power Generation Systems

Fossil power generation systems are increasingly vulnerable to attack from both cybercriminals as well as internal threats. These vulnerabilities demand that emerging technologies such as blockchains be utilized to secure the data involved in the information flows within the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems of the fossil power generation plants. The publicly accessible blockchain protocols, although secure, are visible to everyone. Even private blockchains currently are unable to support different levels of access to different participants, which is a critical requirement for the existing SCADA systems running the power plants. In light of the above, novel blockchain protocols that are specifically adapted to fossil power generation environments need to be developed in order to achieve the goal of cybersecure sensor networks. In this work, we address this question by creating a novel blockchain technology, namely smart private ledger, for cybersecure communication within the fossil power generation systems. A lab-scale sensor network consisting of strain and temperature sensors is constructed to develop the ledger. The technology has hierarchical access control which is compatible with the existing SCADA systems in fossil power plants. The sensor data is used with cryptographic digital signatures and secret sharing protocols within the nodes of the blockchain technology. The research results will lead to cybersecurity for machine-to-machine interactions, infrastructure for secure data logging for sensors, decentralized data storage, and second-layer technologies for high volume machine-to-machine interactions in the power plants. The work aims to largely address the concerns for the security of distributed sensor networks in such systems that can be compromised by insider threats and by cybercriminals. The research has led to the training of the next generation of engineers and scientists in the important areas of sensor engineering and blockchain technology.

01 COAL, LIGNITE, AND PEAT↗

Cyberguardians and STEM Warriors (Final Technical Report (FTR))

In the past decade, solar power, with and without energy storage has become the fastest growing source of energy generation in the world. In the U.S., solar employment more than doubled from 105,145 jobs in 2011 to 255,037 jobs in 2021, four times faster than the U.S. job growth rate overall. These factors, combined with technology advancements, creates a skills gap that puts tremendous stress on society to deliver the workers to fill the open job requisitions. The Cyberguardians and STEM Warriors project (Cyberguardians) was designed to address the trained-worker shortage in the energy industry in three ways: 1) by developing educational curriculum that addresses DER technology changes; 2) by delivering curriculum to prospective workers, including military veterans and their families, via universities, community colleges, and vocational training outlets; and 3) introducing individuals who have completed training to employers that can hire them. Cyberguardians exceeded its curriculum goals by producing 27 academic units of university-accredited material (12 total courses) covering energy fundamentals, smart inverters, Distributed Energy Resource (DER) data communication, cybersecurity, standardization, certification, data analytics, and IEEE 1547 standard topics. The North American Board of Certified Energy Practitioners (NABCEP) also accredited the material for use in their credential program. Seven instructors were recruited and trained, and six academic institutions (University of California San Diego, State University of New York, North Carolina State University, Harper Community College, Green Village Academy, and the SunSpec Alliance) were enlisted, meeting program goals. All course material was published under the Creative Commons license and made available royalty free, thus providing a long-lasting public benefit. The program’s outreach program vastly exceeded program goals and incorporated the efforts of 13 outreach partners (11 of which are veteran focused), an advisory board representing 15 companies, webinars and 10’s of thousands of email messages sent to prospective students and hiring managers. Despite these efforts, the global pandemic depressed anticipated program participation by about a third. Still, a total of 396 students enrolled and 289 completed the courses and were accredited. The job applicant task achieved similar results (111 realized vs a 174 goal) but reported job placement was weaker at (9 realized vs. a 51 goal). The Cyberguardians program fills a critical void for cost-effective, royalty-free curriculum and training pertaining to DER technologies and cybersecurity that prospective energy workers must possess to be effective in the 21 st century. On this basis alone, the investment of taxpayer funds will pay dividends for years to come.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Large Load Integration - Task List and Overview

Large Load Integration Tasks: Task 1 – Workshops Support stakeholder engagement across industry to promote collaboration and identify solutions to challenges that will guide other work Task 2 – Ancillary Services Characterize different types of large loads to assess under what conditions they may be utilized to provide grid stability services Task 3 – Communications Explore the cybersecurity and communications infrastructure required to enable large loads to interface with grid operations to provide ancillary services Task 4 – Nuclear Integration Explore risks and methods for supporting large load energy needs with SMRs and incorporating them into the wider power system Task 5 – Decision Support and TA Provide support to stakeholders through the creation of planning tools and direct technical assistance.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Tabletop Testing for EV Charging Ecosystem PKI (Project T34PKI Final Report)

To test the communications and cybersecurity functionality, Electric Vehicle and charging station vendors have had to ship their products to in-person testing events. This is cumbersome, expensive, inefficient, and an impediment to rapid time-to-deployment. In this project Sandia used COTS hardware and Open-Source Software to develop and demonstrate a more agile, productive approach: testing low-voltage controllers independently from high-voltage power delivery sub-systems. This approach allows communications controllers to be transported easily (e.g. shipped at low cost, checked as airline baggage); set up on a table-top (“bench testing”); and use ordinary 120 VAC outlets to conduct agile testing. Table-top platforms become end nodes that can connect to laboratory and cloud-based servers to test communications and cybersecurity, specifically Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) functionality and interoperability, separately from EV battery charging (power/energy transfer) functionality.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

Deep Reinforcement Learning for Resilient Power and Energy Systems: Progress, Prospects, and Future Avenues

In recent years, deep reinforcement learning (DRL) has garnered substantial attention in the context of enhancing resilience in power and energy systems. Resilience, characterized by the ability to withstand, absorb, and quickly recover from natural disasters and human-induced disruptions, has become paramount in ensuring the stability and dependability of critical infrastructure. This comprehensive review delves into the latest advancements and applications of DRL in enhancing the resilience of power and energy systems, highlighting significant contributions and key insights. The exploration commences with a concise elucidation of the fundamental principles of DRL, highlighting the intricate interplay among reinforcement learning (RL), deep learning, and the emergence of DRL. Furthermore, it categorizes and describes various DRL algorithms, laying a robust foundation for comprehending the applicability of DRL. The linkage between DRL and power system resilience is forged through a systematic classification of DRL applications into five pivotal dimensions: dynamic response, recovery and restoration, energy management and control, communications and cybersecurity, and resilience planning and metrics development. This structured categorization facilitates a methodical exploration of how DRL methodologies can effectively tackle critical challenges within the domain of power and energy system resilience. The review meticulously examines the inherent challenges and limitations entailed in integrating DRL into power and energy system resilience, shedding light on practical challenges and potential pitfalls. Additionally, it offers insights into promising avenues for future research, with the aim of inspiring innovative solutions and further progress in this vital domain.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Demonstration of the Cybersecurity Framework through Real-world Cyber Attack

The Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity, provides five concurrent and continuous functions to Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover from cyber threats and vulnerabilities to buildings. Based on the core architecture and security best practices defined in the CSF guidelines, we developed the CSF webtools. The CSF webtools provide actionable functions that can be easily adopted by a facility operator to enhance their critical infrastructure security. The essence is captured in a set of “how-to” instructions for the facility operators to adopt, adapt, and apply to their critical infrastructure facilities. When considered together, these functions provide a high-level, strategic view of the lifecycle of an organization’s cybersecurity risk management. The CSF webtools provide an easy to follow set of cybersecurity best practices, policies, and procedures to improve the cybersecurity posture of our nation’s buildings and other critical infrastructures. The CSF webtools are also designed to facilitate communication of cybersecurity activities and outcomes across the organization from the executive to operations levels. Finally, the CSF webtools allow the critical infrastructure operators to assess the overall cybersecurity maturity and posture. The goal of this paper is to demonstrate the capabilities of the CSF webtools through an illustrative cyber-attack based on a real-world scenario.

cybersecurity framework, maturity model, critical ↗

Distributed Energy Resource Cybersecurity Standards Development [Final Report]

Currently, the solar industry is operating with little application-specific guidance on how to protect and defend their systems from cyberattacks. This 3-year Department of Energy (DOE) Solar Energy Technologies Office-funded project helped advance the distributed energy resource (DER) cybersecurity state-of-the-art by (a) bolstering industry awareness of cybersecurity concepts, risks, and solutions through a webinar series and (b) developing recommendations for DER cybersecurity standards to improve the security performance of DER products and networks. Drafting DER standards is a lengthy, consensus-based process requiring effective leadership and stakeholder participation. This project was designed to reduce standard and guide writing times by creating well-researched recommendations that could act as a starting place for national and international standards development organizations. Working within the SunSpec/Sandia DER Cybersecurity Workgroup, the team produced guidance for DER cybersecurity certification, communication protocol standards, network architecture s, access control, and patching. The team also led subgroups within the IEEE P 1547.3 Guide for Cybersecurity of Distributed Energy Resources Interconnected with Electric Power Systems committee and pushed a draft to ballot in October 2021.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Cybersecurity Framework Profile for Electric Vehicle Extreme Fast Charging Infrastructure

This document is the Cybersecurity Framework Profile (Profile) developed for the Electric Vehicle Extreme Fast Charging (EV/XFC) ecosystem, including the four domains that relies on the ecosystem (i) Electric Vehicles (EV); (ii) Extreme Fast Charging (XFC); (iii) XFC Cloud or Third-Party Operations; and (iv) Utility and Building Networks. This Profile utilizes the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Version 1.1 and provides voluntary guidance to help relevant parties develop Profiles specific to their organization to understand, assess, and communicate their cybersecurity posture as a part of their risk management process. The Profile is intended to supplement, not replace, an existing risk management program or cybersecurity standards, regulations, and industry guidelines that are in current use by the EV/XFC industry.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

Optimized V1G and V2G Electric Vehicle Fleet Management and Grid Transaction at Marine Corps Air Station Miramar in San Diego, CA

The overall technical goal of the project was to demonstrate an all-electric bi-directional non-tactical fleet at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Miramar that was integrated and controlled with other distributed energy resources (DERs) (i.e., PV, stationary battery, and building loads) to provide resilience to critical electric loads in the event of grid outages, to minimize charging costs, and to provide economic energy resources to electricity markets. In this project, the specific, technical objectives were: 1. Demonstrate that bi-directional electric vehicles can provide critical complementary services to fixed storage batteries in microgrid applications while performing function as non-tactical vehicles. 2. Demonstrate participation of bi-directional (V2G) and unidirectional (V1G) PEVs for demand management and minimization of charging costs. 3. Demonstrate integration of multiple DERs for grid service participation. US Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Miramar in San Diego was the site of this electric vehicle-to-microgrid-utility grid test and demonstration project. Existing microgrid assets in this study included (1) a public works building; (2) a 30-kW rooftop photovoltaic (PV) system and (3) a separate 250 kW carport PV system. In this project, six bi-directional V2G vans were located at the MCAS Miramar’s showcase building-scale microgrid to develop and test technical capabilities that V2G can provide in microgrid applications (e.g., cost reduction and resiliency). These resources provided aggregated demand management and simulated participation in current retail DR programs. The vehicles used in this demonstration were selected because they provided functionality that MCAS Miramar needed, 15 passenger transport and facilities work cargo carrying capacity, and bi-directional charging capability that the research project required. All vehicles in this study were manufactured and distributed by VIA Motors, Inc. There were six vehicles total and each was VIA’s VTRUX eREV V2G model, a modified General Motors Chevrolet 2500 2WD van. Three of the vans were configured as passenger vans and the other three were configured as cargo vans. Each van had an on-board bi-direcrtional inverter/charger, Bel Power Solutions model 350INVCHGT150-120-240-8G nominally rated at +/-15 kW. The VIA van’s charging connector follows the J1772 charging protocol. The bi-directional EVSEs demonstrated in this study were manufactured by Coritech, Inc. Each VGI-80-AC charging station enabled enhanced V2G charging capability to a Clipper Creek CS-100 charging module. The enhanced capabilities included ethernet communication following the SEP2.0 protocol with a distributed energy resource function set and an operator screen displaying real-time SOC, voltage, and current. The VGI-80-AC charging stations are classified as level 2 with a maximum current output of 80 A or effectively 19 kW. The VIA van’s onboard charger limited the charging and discharging power to 15 kW in each direction. A control computer was installed in the EWOC and connected to an existing monitor. The V2G control communication network was a completely stand-alone closed system that did not have any connection to any other networks on the base. A cybersecure remote communication connection was created with a cellular modem, firewall hardware, and a virtual private network configuration.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

SDN-Based Dynamic Cybersecurity Framework of IEC-61850 Communications in Smart Grid

In recent years, critical infrastructure and power grids have experienced a series of cyber-attacks, leading to temporary, widespread blackouts of considerable magnitude. Since most substations are unmanned and have limited physical security protection, cyber breaches into power grid substations present a risk. Nowadays, the susceptibility of SDN architecture to cyber-attacks has exhibited a notable increase in recent years, as indicated by research findings. This suggests a growing concern regarding the potential for cybersecurity breaches within the SDN framework. In this paper, we propose a hybrid intrusion detection system (IDS)-integrated SDN architecture for detecting and preventing the injection of malicious IEC 61850-based generic object-oriented system event (GOOSE) messages in a digital substation. Additionally, this program locates the fault’s location and, as a form of mitigation, disables a certain port. Furthermore, implementation examples are demonstrated and verified using a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed that mimics the functioning of a digital substation.

Liu, Chen-Ching [Virginia Tech] (ORCID:00000002894↗

Universal Utility Data Exchange (UUDEX) – Security and Administration: Cybersecurity of Energy Delivery Systems (CEDS) Research and Development

A critical component of the Universal Utility Data Exchange (UUDEX) approach is the integrated security contained within its processing. This document describes how that security is designed and expected to be implemented by UUDEX Implementations (U-Implementations), including the UUDEX Server (U-Server) and UUDEX Clients (U-Clients). The UUDEX security hierarchy consists of three levels: 1. The UUDEX Instance (U-Instance) itself, which sits at the top of the hierarchy and contains the U-Server, the UUDEX Identity Authority (U-Identity Authority), and the UUDEX Administrator (U-Administrator) functions; 2. A group of one or more UUDEX Participants (U-Participants) that present “organizations” that participate in the U-Instance and contains the UUDEX Administrator Participant (U-U-Administrator Participant) function; 3. A group of one or more UUDEX Endpoints (U-Endpoints) that represent the individual UUDEX Publish Clients (U-Publish Client) responsible for supplying data to the U-Instance that is consumed by UUDEX Subscriber Clients (U-Subscriber Clients). U-Endpoints can be either autonomous devices that publish and subscribe data such as data exchange servers found in supervisory control and data acquisition and energy management systems, or they can be tied to users of applications that, for example, submit DOE OE-417 disturbance reports. U-Participants and U-Endpoints can be organized into UUDEX Groups (U-Groups). Any number of U-Participants or U-Endpoints can be members of a U-Group. A given U-Participant or U-Endpoint can be a member of multiple U-Groups, but a U-Group cannot contain other U-Groups. For example, a U-Group could be created to contain all U-Participant Transmission Operators within the purview of a Reliability Coordinator, and another U-Group could be created to contain all U-Participant Generator Operators within the purview of a Reliability Coordinator. U-Participants that are both Transmission Operators and Generator Operators would be members of both U-Groups. U-Participants, U-Endpoints, and U-Groups are used in the access control structures to provide access to individual UUDEX Subjects (U-Subjects). U-Groups are created by the U-Administrator and are managed by the U-Administrator or the designated U-Group Managers. U-Endpoints can be assigned UUDEX Roles (U-Roles) that can be used to further restrict access. U-Roles are assigned to individual U-Endpoints. For example, a U-Role of “Security Analyst” could be used to restrict which U-Endpoints can publish or subscribe security incident reports and vulnerability notifications, while a U-Role of “Transmission Planner” can be used to restrict which U-Endpoints can publish power system model updates. U-Role definitions are created by the U-Administrator, but the U-Roles are assigned to U-Endpoints by their respective UUDEX Participant Administrators (U-Participant Administrator). Because all information required to make security decisions is either included within the U-Endpoint’s X.509 digital certificate or stored in a datastore on the U-Server, all security decisions are performed and enforced within the U-Server. This reduces the complexity of the U-Client code and minimizes the chance for compromise of the integrity of the UUDEX security features.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

User-Focused Tools to Enhance IT/OT Cyber Resilience within the Power Grid

The power grid is undergoing several changes that are increasing its complexity as nexuses between electric-gas, transmission-distribution, and energy-communications continue to become increasingly critical. This system is heavily dependent on communication infrastructure and controls, and it relies on humans in operational technology (OT) and information technology (IT) roles to manage the increasing breadth, depth, and speed of data. Many technical challenges have presented themselves and will need to be addressed to provide reliable grid operations. With increased reliance on distributed controls and communication infrastructure, cybersecurity becomes an inherent requirement. When considering current cyber-physical security solutions for the power grid, one can notice a clear divide between information technology and operation technology networks. However, in real-life applications, these networks are interdependent. This work presents results of interviews with key utility cybersecurity personnel, analyzes the results, and makes recommendations towards solution of existing technical and operational challenges realized. Existing workflows are presented, wireframe interviews are discussed, and tool requirements are described. The existence of easy-to-implement solutions, based on existing energy management systems, highlight the potential for real-life applications.

cybersecurity, resilience, user-centered design, p↗

Securing Vehicle Charging Infrastructure

As the US electrifies the transportation sector, cyber attacks targeting vehicle charging could bring consequences to electrical system infrastructure. This is a growing area of concern as charging stations increase power delivery and must communicate to a range of entities to authorize charging, sequence the charging process, and manage load (grid operators, vehicles, OEM vendors, charging network operators, etc.). The research challenges are numerous and are complicated because there are many end users, stakeholders, and software and equipment vendors interests involved. Poorly implemented electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSE), electric vehicle (EV), or grid communication system cybersecurity could be a significant risk to EV adoption because the political, social, and financial impact of cyberattacks - or public perception of such - ripples across the industry and has lasting and devastating effects. Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive EVSE cybersecurity approach and limited best practices have been adopted by the EV/EVSE industry. There is an incomplete industry understanding of the attack surface, interconnected assets, and unsecured interfaces. Thus, comprehensive cybersecurity recommendations founded on sound research are necessary to secure EV charging infrastructure. This project is providing the power, security, and automotive industry with a strong technical basis for securing this infrastructure by developing threat models, determining technology gaps, and identifying or developing effective countermeasures. Specifically, the team is creating a cybersecurity threat model and performing a technical risk assessment of EVSE assets, so that automotive, charging, and utility stakeholders can better protect customers, vehicles, and power systems in the face of new cyber threats.

33 ADVANCED PROPULSION SYSTEMS↗

Universal Utility Data Exchange (UUDEX) Functional Design Requirements - Rev 1

This document provides a set of high-level functional design requirements for Universal Utility Data Exchange (UUDEX). These requirements include a set of use cases, data exchanges supported by UUDEX, both for grid operations and for cyber security data, functional requirements for data exchange, data models used by UUDEX, data exchange architectures, and security considerations. These functional design requirements are intended to be used in more detailed design documents.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗