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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2004

An Exploratory Study of Cost Engineering in Axiomatic Design: Creation of the Cost Model Based on an FR-DP Map

Large complex projects cost large sums of money throughout their life cycle for a variety of reasons and causes. For such large programs, the credible estimation of the project cost, a quick assessment of the cost of making changes, and the management of the project budget with effective cost reduction determine the viability of the project. Cost engineering that deals with these issues requires a rigorous method and systematic processes. This paper introduces a logical framework to a&e effective cost engineering. The framework is built upon Axiomatic Design process. The structure in the Axiomatic Design process provides a good foundation to closely tie engineering design and cost information together. The cost framework presented in this paper is a systematic link between the functional domain (FRs), physical domain (DPs), cost domain (CUs), and a task/process-based model. The FR-DP map relates a system s functional requirements to design solutions across all levels and branches of the decomposition hierarchy. DPs are mapped into CUs, which provides a means to estimate the cost of design solutions - DPs - from the cost of the physical entities in the system - CUs. The task/process model describes the iterative process ot-developing each of the CUs, and is used to estimate the cost of CUs. By linking the four domains, this framework provides a superior traceability from requirements to cost information.

Lee, Taesik↗
NASA NTRS2007

A Project Management Approach to Using Simulation for Cost Estimation on Large, Complex Software Development Projects

It is very difficult for project managers to develop accurate cost and schedule estimates for large, complex software development projects. None of the approaches or tools available today can estimate the true cost of software with any high degree of accuracy early in a project. This paper provides an approach that utilizes a software development process simulation model that considers and conveys the level of uncertainty that exists when developing an initial estimate. A NASA project will be analyzed using simulation and data from the Software Engineering Laboratory to show the benefits of such an approach.

Mizell, Carolyn↗
NASA NTRS2016

Schedule Matters: Understanding the Relationship between Schedule Delays and Costs on Overruns

This paper examines the relationship between schedule delays and cost overruns on complex projects. It is generally accepted by many project practitioners that cost overruns are directly related to schedule delays. But what does "directly related to" actually mean? Some reasons or root causes for schedule delays and associated cost overruns are obvious, if only in hindsight. For example, unrealistic estimates, supply chain difficulties, insufficient schedule margin, technical problems, scope changes, or the occurrence of risk events can negatively impact schedule performance. Other factors driving schedule delays and cost overruns may be less obvious and more difficult to quantify. Examples of these less obvious factors include project complexity, flawed estimating assumptions, over-optimism, political factors, "black swan" events, or even poor leadership and communication. Indeed, is it even possible the schedule itself could be a source of delay and subsequent cost overrun? Through literature review, surveys of project practitioners, and the authors' own experience on NASA programs and projects, the authors will categorize and examine the various factors affecting the relationship between project schedule delays and cost growth. The authors will also propose some ideas for organizations to consider to help create an awareness of the factors which could cause or influence schedule delays and associated cost growth on complex projects.

Overruns↗
NASA NTRS1992

Mars Environmental Survey (MESUR): Science objectives and mission description

In-situ observations and measurements of Mars are objectives of a feasibility study beginning at the Ames Research Center for a mission called the Mars Environmental SURvey (MESUR). The purpose of the MESUR mission is to emplace a pole-to-pole global distribution of landers on the Martian surface to make both short- and long-term observations of the atmosphere and surface. The basic concept is to deploy probes which would directly enter the Mars atmosphere, provide measurements of the upper atmospheric structure, image the local terrain before landing, and survive landing to perform meteorology, seismology, surface imaging, and soil chemistry measurements. MESUR is intended to be a relatively low-cost mission to advance both Mars science and human presence objectives. Mission philosophy is to: (1) 'grow' a network over a period of years using a series of launch opportunities, thereby minimizing the peak annual costs; (2) develop a level-of-effort which is flexible and responsive to a broad set of objectives; (3) focus on science while providing a solid basis for human exploration; and (4) minimize project cost and complexity wherever possible. In order to meet the diverse scientific objectives, each MESUR lander will carry the following strawman instrument payload consisting of: (1) Atmospheric structure experiment, (2) Descent and surface imagers, (3) Meteorology package, (4) Elemental composition instrument, (5) 3-axis seismometer, and (6) Thermal analyzer/evolved gas analyzer. The feasibility study is primarily to show a practical way to design an early capability for characterizing Mars' surface and atmospheric environment on a global scale. The goals are to answer some of the most urgent questions to advance significantly our scientific knowledge about Mars, and for planning eventual exploration of the planet by robots and humans.

Hubbard, G. Scott↗
NASA NTRS1991

A Mars environmental survey (MESUR) - Feasibility of a low cost global approach

In situ measurements of Mars' surface and atmosphere are the objectives of a novel network mission concept called the Mars Environmental SURvey (MESUR). As envisioned, the MESUR mission will emplace a pole-to-pole global distribution of 16 landers on the Martian surface over three launch opportunites using medium-lift (Delta-class) launch vehicles. The basic concept is to deploy small free-flying probes which would directly enter the Martian atmosphere, measure the upper atmospheric structure, image the local terrain before landing, and survive landing to perform meteorology, seismology, surface imaging, and soil chemistry measurements. Data will be returned via dedicated relay orbiter or direct-to-earth transmission. The mission philosophy is to: (1) 'grow' a network over a period of years using a series of launch opportunities; (2) develop a level-of-effort which is flexible and responsive to a broad set of objectives; (3) focus on Mars science while providing a solid basis for future human presence; and (4) minimize overall project cost and complexity wherever possible.

Hubbard, G. S.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Mars: On the Path Or In The Way?

Explore Mars may not be the highest and best use of government-? funded human space flight. However, Explore Mars is pervasively accepted as the ultimate goal for human space flight. This meme has become refractory within the human space flight community despite dramatic contextual changes since Apollo: human space flight is no longer central to commonly-?held national priorities, NASA's fraction of the federal budget has diminished 8 fold, over 60 enabling technology challenges have been identified, and the stunning achievements of robotic Mars exploration have accelerated. The Explore Mars vision has not kept pace with these changes.An unprecedented budgetary commitment would have to be sustained for an unprecedented number of decades to achieve the Explore Mars goal. Further, the goal's justification as uniquely able to definitively determine Mars habitability is brittle, and not driving current planning in any case; yet NASA owns the choice of this goal and has authority to change it. Three alternative goals for government investment in human space flight meet NASA's own expressed rationale at least as well as Explore Mars, some with far greater capacity to regain the cultural centrality of human space flight and to grow by attracting private capital. At a minimum the human space flight advocacy community should address the pragmatics of choosing such a vulnerable goal.

complex project costs↗
NASA NTRS2012

JPL Innovation Foundry

Space science missions are increasingly challenged today: in ambition, by increasingly sophisticated hypotheses tested; in development, by the increasing complexity of advanced technologies; in budgeting, by the decline of flagship-class mission opportunities; in management, by expectations for breakthrough science despite a risk-averse programmatic climate; and in planning, by increasing competition for scarce resources. How are the space-science missions of tomorrow being formulated? The paper describes the JPL Innovation Foundry, created in 2011, to respond to this evolving context. The Foundry integrates methods, tools, and experts that span the mission concept lifecycle. Grounded in JPL's heritage of missions, flight instruments, mission proposals, and concept innovation, the Foundry seeks to provide continuity of support and cost-effective, on-call access to the right domain experts at the right time, as science definition teams and Principal Investigators mature mission ideas from "cocktail napkin" to PDR. The Foundry blends JPL capabilities in proposal development and concurrent engineering, including Team X, with new approaches for open-ended concept exploration in earlier, cost-constrained phases, and with ongoing research and technology projects. It applies complexity and cost models, projectformulation lessons learned, and strategy analyses appropriate to each level of concept maturity. The Foundry is organizationally integrated with JPL formulation program offices; staffed by JPL's line organizations for engineering, science, and costing; and overseen by senior Laboratory leaders to assure experienced coordination and review. Incubation of each concept is tailored depending on its maturity and proposal history, and its highest leverage modeling and analysis needs.

mission development↗
NASA NTRS1993

Strategies in transition

A new vision has emerged within the Office of Space Science and Applications (OSSA), and within the agency as a whole, for how to design missions to be responsive to the changing budget environment of the 1990s. The overall space science and applications program had to be looked at, restructuring the most expensive and complex projects to bring down costs and ensure their place in the mission queue of the future. The recent restructuring of some of OSSA's largest programs in development and the work to improve efficiency for those in operation is part of OSSA's effort to free funds for more frequent space science missions in the future. Instead of more great observatories, we are looking toward a new vision encompassing a level of great activity through small, frequent missions. The strategy developed for attaining this vision was to lower costs by reducing size and complexity through new technology, while at the same time making progress in space science. The strategy comprises two interwoven parts: the flight program strategy of each of the science disciplines and OSSA's new-technology strategy. The overall purpose of all OSSA's efforts to date has been to free resources for maximizing the space science program in a tough fiscal environment.

Diaz, Alphonso V.↗
NASA NTRS1994

(abstract) Science-Project Interaction in the Low-Cost Mission

Large, complex, and highly optimized missions have performed most of the preliminary reconnaisance of the solar system. As a result we have now mapped significant fractions of its total surface (or surface-equivalent) area. Now, however, scientific exploration of the solar system is undergoing a major change in scale, and existing missions find it necessary to limit costs while fulfilling existing goals. In the future, NASA's Discovery program will continue the reconnaisance, exploration, and diagnostic phases of planetary research using lower cost missions, which will include lower cost mission operations systems (MOS). Historically, one of the more expensive functions of MOS has been its interaction with the science community. Traditional MOS elements that this interaction have embraced include mission planning, science (and engineering) event conflict resolution, sequence optimization and integration, data production (e.g., assembly, enhancement, quality assurance, documentation, archive), and other science support services. In the past, the payoff from these efforts has been that use of mission resources has been highly optimized, constraining resources have been generally completely consumed, and data products have been accurate and well documented. But because these functions are expensive we are now challenged to reduce their cost while preserving the benefits. In this paper, we will consider ways of revising the traditional MOS approach that might save project resources while retaining a high degree of service to the Projects' customers. Pre-launch, science interaction can be made simplier by limiting numbers of instruments and by providing greater redundancy in mission plans. Post launch, possibilities include prioritizing data collection into a few categories, easing requirements on real-time of quick-look data delivery, and closer integration of scientists into the mission operation.

mission operation science community interaction co↗
NASA NTRS2012

Integrating Efficiency of Industry Processes and Practices Alongside Technology Effectiveness in Space Transportation Cost Modeling and Analysis

This paper presents past and current work in dealing with indirect industry and NASA costs when providing cost estimation or analysis for NASA projects and programs. Indirect costs, when defined as those costs in a project removed from the actual hardware or software hands-on labor; makes up most of the costs of today's complex large scale NASA space/industry projects. This appears to be the case across phases from research into development into production and into the operation of the system. Space transportation is the case of interest here. Modeling and cost estimation as a process rather than a product will be emphasized. Analysis as a series of belief systems in play among decision makers and decision factors will also be emphasized to provide context.

Zapata, Edgar↗
NASA NTRS1973

Application of composites to helicopter airframe and landing gear structures

A preliminary design study has indicated that advanced composite helicopter airframe structures can provide significant system cost advantages in the 1980's. A seven percent increase in productivity and a five percent reduction in life cycle cost are projected. Due to their complexity, landing gear structures do not substantially benefit from the use of advanced composites. The most successful concept was found to be all-molded composite modular panels, which provide integral skin/stringer and frame subassemblies. These subassemblies significantly reduce the number of parts relative to present construction. The subassemblies are mechanically jointed together for economical, rapid final assembly and permit field replacement in the event of major damage.

Rich, M. J.↗
NASA NTRS2015

Why Don't They Just Give Us Money? Project Cost Estimating and Cost Reporting

Successful projects require an integrated approach to managing cost, schedule, and risk. This is especially true for complex, multi-year projects involving multiple organizations. To explore solutions and leverage valuable lessons learned, NASA's Virtual Project Management Challenge will kick off a three-part series examining some of the challenges faced by project and program managers when it comes to managing these important elements. In this first session of the series, we will look at cost management, with an emphasis on the critical roles of cost estimating and cost reporting. By taking a proactive approach to both of these activities, project managers can better control life cycle costs, maintain stakeholder confidence, and protect other current and future projects in the organization's portfolio. Speakers will be Doug Comstock, Director of NASA's Cost Analysis Division, Kristin Van Wychen, Senior Analyst in the GAO Acquisition and Sourcing Management Team, and Mary Beth Zimmerman, Branch Chief for NASA's Portfolio Analysis Branch, Strategic Investments Division. Moderator Ramien Pierre is from NASA's Academy for Program/Project and Engineering Leadership (APPEL).

Comstock, Douglas A.↗
NASA NTRS2007

A Decision Tool that Combines Discrete Event Software Process Models with System Dynamics Pieces for Software Development Cost Estimation and Analysis

The development process for a large software development project is very complex and dependent on many variables that are dynamic and interrelated. Factors such as size, productivity and defect injection rates will have substantial impact on the project in terms of cost and schedule. These factors can be affected by the intricacies of the process itself as well as human behavior because the process is very labor intensive. The complex nature of the development process can be investigated with software development process models that utilize discrete event simulation to analyze the effects of process changes. The organizational environment and its effects on the workforce can be analyzed with system dynamics that utilizes continuous simulation. Each has unique strengths and the benefits of both types can be exploited by combining a system dynamics model and a discrete event process model. This paper will demonstrate how the two types of models can be combined to investigate the impacts of human resource interactions on productivity and ultimately on cost and schedule.

Mizell, Carolyn Barrett↗
NASA NTRS1993

Space Station Facility government estimating

This new, unique Cost Engineering Report introduces the 800-page, C-100 government estimate for the Space Station Processing Facility (SSPF) and Volume IV Aerospace Construction Price Book. At the January 23, 1991, bid opening for the SSPF, the government cost estimate was right on target. Metric, Inc., Prime Contractor, low bid was 1.2 percent below the government estimate. This project contains many different and complex systems. Volume IV is a summary of the cost associated with construction, activation and Ground Support Equipment (GSE) design, estimating, fabrication, installation, testing, termination, and verification of this project. Included are 13 reasons the government estimate was so accurate; abstract of bids, for 8 bidders and government estimate with additive alternates, special labor and materials, budget comparison and system summaries; and comments on the energy credit from local electrical utility. This report adds another project to our continuing study of 'How Does the Low Bidder Get Low and Make Money?' which was started in 1967, and first published in the 1973 AACE Transaction with 18 ways the low bidders get low. The accuracy of this estimate proves the benefits of our Kennedy Space Center (KSC) teamwork efforts and KSC Cost Engineer Tools which are contributing toward our goals of the Space Station.

Brown, Joseph A.↗
NASA NTRS1993

Estimating and bidding for the Space Station Processing Facility

This new, unique Cost Engineering Report introduces the 800-page, C-100 government estimate for the Space Station Processing Facility (SSPF) and Volume IV Aerospace Construction Price Book. At the January 23, 1991, bid opening for the SSPF, the government cost estimate was right on target. Metric, Inc., Prime Contractor, low bid was 1.2 percent below the government estimate. This project contains many different and complex systems. Volume IV is a summary of the cost associated with construction, activation and Ground Support Equipment (GSE) design, estimating, fabrication, installation, testing, termination, and verification of this project. Included are 13 reasons the government estimate was so accurate; abstract of bids, for 8 bidders and government estimate with additive alternates, special labor and materials, budget comparison and system summaries; and comments on the energy credit from local electrical utility. This report adds another project to our continuing study of 'How Does the Low Bidder Get Low and Make Money?' which was started in 1967, and first published in the 1973 AACE Transaction with 10 more ways the low bidder got low. The accuracy of this estimate proves the benefits of our Kennedy Space Center (KSC) teamwork efforts and KSC Cost Engineer Tools which are contributing toward our goals of the Space Station.

Brown, Joseph A.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Autonomous Cryogenic Leak Detector for Improving Launch Site Operations

NASA, military, and commercial satellite users need launch services that are highly reliable, less complex, easier to test, and cost effective. This project has developed a tapered optical fiber sensor for detecting hydrogen. The invention involves incorporating chemical indicators on the tapered end of an optical fiber using organically modified silicate nanomaterials. The Hazardous Gas Detection Lab (HGDL) at Kennedy Space Center is involved in the design and development of instrumentation that can detect and qualify various mission-critical chemicals. Historically, hydrogen, helium, nitrogen, oxygen, and argon are the first five gases of HGDL focus. The use of these cryogenic fluids in the area of propulsion offers challenges. Due to their extreme low temperatures, these fluids induce contraction of the materials they contact, a potential cause of leakage. Among them, hydrogen is of particular concern. Small sensors are needed in multiple locations without adding to the structural weight. The most vulnerable parts of the engine are the connection flanges on the transfer lines, which have to support cycles of large thermal amplitude. The thermal protection of the engine provides a closed area, increasing the likelihood of an explosive atmosphere. Thus, even a small leak represents an unacceptable hazardous condition during loading operations, in flight, or after an aborted launch. Tapered fibers were first fabricated from 1/1.3-mm core/cladding (silica/ plastic) optical fibers. Typically a 1-ft (approx. 30- cm) section of the 1-mm fiber is cut from the bundle and marked with a pen into five 2-.-in. (.5.7-cm) sections. A propane torch is applied at every alternate mark to burn the jacket and soften the glass core. While the core is softening, the two ends of the fiber are pulled apart slowly to create fine tapers of .- to .-in. (.6- to 12-mm) long on the 1-mm optical fiber. Following this, the non-tapered ends of the fibers are polished to a 0.3-micron finish. Then these fibers were coated with indicators sensitive to hydrogen. The tapered hydrogen detection system with its unique flexibility is the only system that can be placed in many locations inside the vehicles and detect the exact location of leaks, saving millions of dollars for launch vehicle industries.

Goswami, Kisholoy↗
NASA NTRS2008

Organizational Considerations for Implementing Systems Engineering and Integration in the Ares Projects Office

Systems Engineering and Integration (SE&I) is a critical discipline in developing new space systems. In 2005, NASA performed an internal study of 24 agency and Department of Defense (DoD) programs to evaluate methods of integrating SE&I practices and determine their effectiveness. The goal of the study was to determine the best SE&I implementation strategy for the Ares Projects Office. The study identified six SE&I organizational structures: 1. Lead systems integrator (LSI) with SE&I responsibility and government technical insight. 2a. Integration contractor with government SE&I responsibility (government insight). 2b. Integration contractor with government SE&I responsibility (government oversight). 3a. Prime contractor with SE&I responsibility (government insight). 3b. Prime contractor with SE&I responsibility (government oversight). 3c. Prime contractor with SE&I responsibility (government/industry partnership). 4a.Prime contractor with government SE&I responsibility (government insight). 4b. Prime contractor with government SE&I responsibility (government oversight). 4d.Prime contractors with total system performance responsibility (TSPR). 5. Prime contractor with government SE&I responsibility and integration products through a Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC). 6. Government/FFRDC in-house development with SE&I responsibility and function. The organizational structure used most often was number 4, using a prime contractor with government SE&I responsibility and government technical insight. However, data analyses did not establish a positive relationship between program development costs and specific SE&I organizational types, nor did it positively determine the relationship between successful programs or projects and their SE&I structure. The SE&I study reached the following conclusions: (1) Large, long-duration, technically complex programs or projects reach their technical goals, but rarely meet schedule or cost goals. NASA's recent successes have been smaller, short-duration development projects using heritage hardware/software, focused technology development, technical oversight and stable external factors. (2) Programs and projects have failed or been terminated due to lack of technical insight, relaxing of SE&I processes, and unstable external factors. (3) The study did not find a single, clear optimum SE&I organization type to fit all projects. However, while any organizational structure can be made to work, the fewer complexities in the program, the better the likelihood of success. (4) The most common successful SE&I organization structure type in the study was type 4b, where the government maintained integration responsibility, with the prime contractor providing SE&I products and the government providing technical oversight. This study was instrumental in helping the APO select organization structure 4, following the same SE&I and oversight process used during humanlund7s last voyages to the Moon.

Thomas, LeAnn↗
NASA NTRS2014

Project Assessment Framework through Design (PAFTD) - A Project Assessment Framework in Support of Strategic Decision Making

Research and development organizations that push the innovation edge of technology frequently encounter challenges when attempting to identify an investment strategy and to accurately forecast the cost and schedule performance of selected projects. Fast moving and complex environments require managers to quickly analyze and diagnose the value of returns on investment versus allocated resources. Our Project Assessment Framework through Design (PAFTD) tool facilitates decision making for NASA senior leadership to enable more strategic and consistent technology development investment analysis, beginning at implementation and continuing through the project life cycle. The framework takes an integrated approach by leveraging design principles of useability, feasibility, and viability and aligns them with methods employed by NASA's Independent Program Assessment Office for project performance assessment. The need exists to periodically revisit the justification and prioritization of technology development investments as changes occur over project life cycles. The framework informs management rapidly and comprehensively about diagnosed internal and external root causes of project performance.

Depenbrock, Brett T.↗