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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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Evaluation of the Los Alamos Nuclear Material Packaging Risk Ranking Method

Repackaging nuclear material into robust containers to protect workers and the public has been ongoing at LANL and around the DOE complex for nearly two decades. The number of containers at LANL is around 5,000; limited resources for repackaging material has led to extended repackaging campaigns and the need to prioritize repackaging. Various methodologies have been used to prioritize the repackaging efforts and to demonstrate progress in risk reduction over time (e.g., Boerigter, 1997). The 2000-1 DNFSB recommendation recognized the limited DOE resources for repackaging, and acknowledged the need to “prioritize and schedule tasks to be undertaken with available funds according to consideration of risks.” Later, in DNFSB recommendation 2005-1, in addition to recommending that DOE develop a packaging standard, the Board recommended that “Characterization information should also be used to develop a surveillance program prioritized according to expected material and container risk (including, for example, material type, material form, and the age and type of container).” In response to requests and recommendations from the DOE and DNSFB to prioritize according to worker risk, a risk ranking method based on the potential consequence of dropping a container from 3 meters was developed in 2007 (Smith, 2007) and updated in 2014 (Hoffman, 2014). Various LANL implementation plans for repackaging were developed over the years using this methodology (Stone, 2014). Currently, this method is utilized in conjunction with an algorithm to mitigate programmatic risk to prioritize container repackaging and material processing (Prochnow, 2015). The purpose of this study is to document how the current risk ranking method works, how it is used and potential limitations.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Current Best Practices on Wildfire Risk Reduction for Electric Transmission and Distribution Systems

This report provides a set of best practices in response to Section 4(d) of Executive Order 14308, Empowering Commonsense Wildfire Prevention and Response. The information contained herein is expected to be used in conjunction with other materials at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Wildfire Risk Mitigation Technical Conference (Docket No. AD25-16-000), with possible direction to the North American Electric Reliability Corporation to take action. The objective of this report is to provide an overview of existing and emerging best practices currently employed or planned by utilities for wildfire mitigation, demonstrating how these efforts align with the executive order’s emphasis on reducing electric utility–caused wildfires while also balancing cost-effectiveness. Additionally, while most practices in utility-developed wildfire mitigation plans focus on risk reduction through robustness and operational reliability, this report also discusses best practices for resilience. The best practices are adopted from publicly available utility wildfire mitigation plans from the United States and Canada, recent findings from wildfire risk reduction research, and industry engagement.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Advancing Geophysical Techniques to Image a Stratigraphic Hydrothermal Resource

Sedimentary-hosted geothermal energy systems are permeable structural, structural-stratigraphic, and/or stratigraphic horizons with sufficient temperature for direct use and/or electricity generation. Sedimentary-hosted (i.e., stratigraphic) geothermal reservoirs may be present in multiple locations across the central and eastern Great Basin of the USA, thereby constituting a potentially large base of untapped, economically accessible energy resources. Sandia National Laboratories has partnered with a multi disciplinary group of collaborators to evaluate a stratigraphic system in Steptoe Valley, Nevada using both established and novel geophysical imaging techniques. The goal of this study is to inform an optimized strategy for subsequent exploration and development of this resource and analogous ones. Building from prior Nevada Play Fairway Analysis (PFA), this team is primarily 1) collecting additional geophysical data, 2) employing novel joint geophysical inversion/modeling techniques to update existing 3D geologic models, and 3) integrating the geophysical results to produce a working, geologically constrained thermo-hydrological reservoir model. Prior PFA work highlights Steptoe Valley as a favorable resource basin that likely has both sedimentary and hydrothermal characteristics. However, there remains significant uncertainty on the nature and architecture of the resource(s) at depth, which increases the risk in exploratory drilling. Newly acquired gravity, magnetic, magnetotelluric, and controlled-source electromagnetic data products, in conjunction with new and preexisting geoscientific measurements and observations, are being integrated and evaluated for efficacy in understanding stratigraphic geothermal resources and mitigating exploration risk. Furthermore, the influence of hydrothermal activity on sedimentary-hosted reservoirs in favorable structural settings, and whether fault-controlled systems may locally enhance temperature and permeability in some deep stratigraphic reservoirs, will also be evaluated.

Geothermal, Sedimentary Heat, Geophysics, Seismic,↗

Fragility Functions Resource Report: Documented Sources for Electricity and Water Resilience Valuation

Fragility curves provide the vulnerability between hazard intensity and an asset. Federal installations may include many different electricity and water infrastructure types (or assets) such as generators, wind turbines, solar PV, switch yards, substations and power lines as well as water distribution systems that could be affected by different hazards. The vulnerability of each asset is a function of its age, type of materials and maintenance. In addition, the vulnerability changes with the hazards intensity and has a probability distribution function associated with it. The fragility functions are used in conjunction with hazard probability and consequence valuations to determine the values at risk for examination of investment grade analyses of alternative mitigation strategies. This document provides examples of fragility functions and links to their sources for different electricity and water infrastructure assets by hazard type.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Data Driven Analysis for Modernization Program Management

NNSA is responsible for managing national nuclear security missions: ensuring a safe, secure, and reliable nuclear deterrent; supplying nuclear fuel to the Navy; and supporting the nation’s nuclear nonproliferation efforts. However, over half of NNSA’s facilities are more than 40 years old, and roughly one-third date back to the Manhattan Project. To execute its critical nuclear security missions, NNSA is making large investments to modernize its nuclear production capabilities. This ramp up represents NNSA’s largest modernization effort since the Cold War. Given the scale of these efforts, NNSA’s Office of Secondary Stage Production Modernization has implemented data driven techniques to prioritize investments and inform strategic decision making. NNSA, with support from its site managing contractors, has developed and implemented an integrated schedule and risk management system to address the issues and limitations with the traditional approach. The multi-year integrated schedules are key to identifying program linkages and managing large portfolios comprised of many different projects and efforts. In conjunction with the integrated schedule, a new program risk management system has also been developed and implemented, which manages program risks and opportunities, along with specific mitigation strategies to reduce or eliminate the risks per timelines that are tracked in the integrated schedule. This paper is supplemented with a follow-on presentation on effective management of program material and throughput modeling.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Degradation and Upcycling of Poly(acrylic) Acid (PAA)

Poly(acrylic acid) (PAA) is a superabsorbent polymer (SAP) widely used in food, paint, textiles, and household products, such as absorbent hygiene products. Specifically, disposable diaper waste comprises a large majority of hygiene waste, in which 80% is landfilled and 20% is incinerated. This proposal describes new methods to valorize PAA to mitigate pollution and risk of large-scale release, dispersion, and accumulation of PAA into aquatic and terrestrial environments. The first strategy builds upon photoredox catalysis to oxidize PAA, which will allow for subsequent cleavage to PAA into valuable chemical feedstocks with intriguing functional groups that can readily undergo further transformations. Moreover, in conjunction with RAFT polymerization, photoredox catalysis would also lead to preparation of new graft block polymers to serve as pH-sensitive drug delivery vehicles. The second strategy invokes electrocatalysis, which can access different intermediates compared to photoredox catalysis. This method would lead to refunctionalization and repurpose of PAA into hydrogels and zwitterionic polymers that can find utilities in ion exchange, water treatment, soil conditioning, paper reinforcement, pigment retention, shampoo formulation, and drug delivery.

37 INORGANIC, ORGANIC, PHYSICAL, AND ANALYTICAL CH↗

Field Programmable Gate Array-Based Reactor Protection Systems and Potential for Inclusion of Secure Elements to Improve Cybersecurity

For acceptable implementations of technologies like wireless communications, remote monitoring, etc., strong mitigations must be developed and evaluated to ensure that new attack pathways do not increase risk for Advanced Reactors. Secure Elements can be adopted and adapted for this purpose based on tamper resistance and cryptographic abilities, but research must be done to properly integrate into critical components such as FPGA-based Important to Safety systems in conjunction with current and future regulations on cyber security features in Advanced Reactors. Typically, the integration of a Secure Element happens during the POST and UEFI boot of a computing platform, performed by the Operating System, which is not possible with FPGAs because they do not include these firmware components. Work must be done to identify a reliable and secure method for integration in FPGA-based systems which lack Operating Systems and therefore complex boot procedures, system calls, etc.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Field Programmable Gate Array-Based Reactor Protection Systems and Potential for Inclusion of Secure Elements to Improve Cybersecurity

For acceptable implementations of technologies like wireless communications, remote monitoring, etc., strong mitigations must be developed and evaluated to ensure that new attack pathways do not increase risk for Advanced Reactors. Secure Elements can be adopted and adapted for this purpose based on tamper resistance and cryptographic abilities, but research must be done to properly integrate into critical components such as FPGA-based Important to Safety systems in conjunction with current and future regulations on cyber security features in Advanced Reactors. Typically, the integration of a Secure Element happens during the POST and UEFI boot of a computing platform, performed by the Operating System, which is not possible with FPGAs because they do not include these firmware components. Work must be done to identify a reliable and secure method for integration in FPGA-based systems which lack Operating Systems and therefore complex boot procedures, system calls, etc.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Investigation of Polyurethane and Fire-Retardant Foams as a Radiological Contamination Fixatives - 20202

Fixation of radiological contamination in decommissioning and deactivation can reduce worker risk, and mitigate potentially hazardous conditions; however, nearly every marketed contamination fixative has been found to be flammable, a significant concern in radiological facilities. Coupled with this, industry fixatives are normally used as a thin coating which can present problems when attempting to stabilize irregular void spaces or areas that are difficult to access and ensure full coverage. To this end, Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), in conjunction with Florida International University (FIU), have begun investigating the applicability of polyurethane based foaming materials, which will expand to fill a given asymmetric volume and provide fire retardancy to ensure no release of contamination in the event of a facility fire. Commercial foams undergo exothermic reactions resulting in gaseous release that subsequently causes the curing foam material to expand. Heat generation during curing can potentially compromise rubber parts of an enclosure, a significant concern in nuclear facilities. To mitigate large body heat generation, SRNL has also examined multiple layering of the material to ensure compatibility of the curing material with a previously cured body of the same material. Environmental studies were also completed in order to determine the influence on polyurethane based foams curing process. These studies showed that nearly half of the materials tested delaminated from a cured body of the same material, a property not discussed in commercially available documentation on the products. Of note was the compatibility of the foaming material with the substrate, depending on the type material that the foam was cured in/on, significant delamination could occur. Mechanical testing via tensile pull tester, dynamic mechanical analysis (DMA), and thermogravimetric analysis (TGA) was also performed. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

1. Physical Security Engineering by Design for Nuclear Facilities; 2. Nuclear Power Plant Site Security Management – A Security Strategy; 3. The UAE Women in Nuclear Energy Security

1. Security by design, or SeBD, is a comprehensive approach that integrates the physical protection system of a nuclear plant into every stage of its existence. This includes planning, designing, constructing, commissioning, and operating the facility, using a combination of analytical, physical, technological, and procedural measures. Essentially, SeBD involves intentionally applying and incorporating security into all aspects of design and operation throughout the entire lifecycle of a facility. By implementing this methodology throughout various phases such as program development, process implementation, staff training and procedures management in conjunction with plant equipment, facilities can be optimized to minimize security risks without compromising functional design requirements. This ultimately improves the overall security posture of the site and reduces the need for costly modifications or additional security resources post-design. 2. A site security strategy is a living document that is revised on a periodic or event-driven basis, ensuring that site security operations and corresponding procedures provide long-term, effective protection for the entire nuclear power plant (NPP) site. A site security strategy aims to mitigate threats across the entire NPP site via in-depth defense approaches and mutual support; therefore, if a layer is omitted or altered, then the effect across all layers must be re-evaluated. Therefore, the aim of the site security strategy is to provide an appropriate, scalable security regime that deters, denies, delays, and detects incidents and, equally importantly, reassures legitimate users and the regulator that due diligence and regulatory compliance have been achieved, ensuring that the site is safe and secure. Robust access control for vehicles and pedestrians is at the heart of the strategy. Vehicle and pedestrian searching and screening are seen as the strongest mitigation methods against vehicle- and pedestrian-borne attacks. The security strategy must also be supported through comprehensive staff training and the development of robust processes, procedures, and planning. If all these measures are to be effective, then training must be implemented during each phase of construction, partial operation/commissioning, and full operation. No single element of site security is completely isolated from the influence of other elements. Ideally, consideration of all key elements will result in a security strategy that is integrated and proportional to the threat and that does not over specify individual security solutions through the application of isolated measures but rather applies a holistic, all-encompassing approach. 3. When women enter the labor force, numerous positive outcomes emerge, including increased GDP, educational gains, and decreased maternal mortality. Despite these benefits, women's employment rates and equality vary significantly worldwide as does support for women in the workforce. This paper will explore the multifaceted benefits of women's employment, the factors influencing labor force participation rates, and the urgency to achieve gender equality as outlined in the 2015 United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). It will then examine the emerging presence of women in the traditionally male-dominated nuclear field, specifically within the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a testament to their resilience and determination to break social norms and advance gender equality.

Zineddin, Dr. Z.↗

Bioenergy for climate change mitigation: Scale and sustainability

Many global climate change mitigation pathways presented in IPCC assessment reports rely heavily on the deployment of biomass for bioenergy, often used in conjunction with carbon capture and storage (BECCS). We review the literature on bioenergy, including the modelling of bioenergy in integrated assessment models (IAMs) and bottom-up modelling and non-modelling studies on the implications of bioenergy use. We summarise the limitations of existing modelling studies and what is known about the potential co-benefits and adverse side-effects of bioenergy systems. We find that the implications of bioenergy supply on mitigation and other sustainability criteria are context dependent and influenced by feedstock, management regime, climatic region, scale of deployment and the counterfactual land use and energy system. However, due to limitations of the existing models, and uncertainty over the future context with respect to the many variables that influence availability of biomass and land resources, it is not possible to precisely quantify the sustainability implications for different scales of bioenergy implementation. Given these uncertainties, the dependence on large-scale deployment of bioenergy in mitigation scenarios carries risks. The deployment of bioenergy technologies and the evolution of biomass supply chains at a scale that achieves significant mitigation and carbon sequestration requires integrative policies, coordinated institutions and improved governance mechanisms. As a result, bioenergy, and the use of land to produce biomass, is an essential part of many climate mitigation strategies but there are limits to its use due to trade-offs with sustainability.

09 BIOMASS FUELS↗

CPAP Ventilators Needed for Rapid Response to COVID-19 by Modification of CPAP Equipment

Early on in the COVID-19 pandemic, potential ventilator shortages were a critical issue identified by national health care providers. Capacity modeling at the time suggested patient demand may exceed ventilator supply. Thus, the challenge became finding an urgent interim solution to meet health care needs. Our initial hypothesis was that CPAP technology could be modified to provide similar functionality to a ventilator, relieving demand and allowing physicians to decide which patients need high end machines, ultimately saving lives. In conjunction with medical experts and pulmonologists, we were able to identify three key thrusts associated with this research problem: (1) modification of CPAP technology to allow for 02 input that would be capable of providing ventilation; (2) development of an alarming function that would provide real-time audible alarms to alert medical personnel to critical conditions, which would be used inline with CPAP technology; and (3) a method of sterilizing expiratory air from such a system in order to protect medical personnel from biohazard, since CPAPs vent to the atmosphere. We were unable to realize results for thrust 1 (CPAP modification for 02); we identified potential safety issues associated with utilizing medical grade oxygen with a common CPAP device. In order to characterize and mitigate these issues, we would need to partner closely with a device manufacturer; such a partnership could not be achieved in the timeframe needed for this rapid response work. However, we determined that some medical grade BiPAP devices do not need this modification and that the significant progress on thrusts 2 and 3 would be sufficient to buy down risk of a massive ventilator shortage. Our team built a prototype alarm system that can be utilized with any assistive respiratory device to alert on all key conditions identified by medical personnel (high pressure, low pressure, apnea, loss of power, low battery). Finally, our team made significant progress in the rapid prototyping and demonstration of an inline UV air purifier device. The device is cost efficient and can be manufactured at scale with both commercially available and additively manufactured parts. Initial tests with SARS-CoV-2 analog bacteriophage MS2 show 99% efficacy at reducing bioburden. Following a successful demonstration of the prototype device with medical personnel, we were able to obtain follow-on (non-LDRD) funding to provide additional device characterization, validation, and production in order to respond to an immediate regional need.

42 ENGINEERING↗

The hazard components of representative key risks. The physical climate perspective

The framework of Representative Key Risks (RKRs) has been adopted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Working Group II in order to categorize, assess and communicate a wide range of regional and sectoral key risks, expected to become severe as a consequence of the potentially detrimental convergence of changing climate conditions, exposure and vulnerability of human and natural systems, and responses through (mal)adaptation measures. Other papers in this special issue treat each of eight RKRs by holistically assessing their current status and future evolution as a result of this convergence. However, their treatment cannot always organize such assessment according to a systematic gradation of climatic changes, often times having to extrapolate the big-picture evolution of risk from either qualitative effects of “low” medium” and “high” warming, or limited/focused analysis of the consequences of particular mitigation choices (e.g., benefits of limiting warming to 1.5 or 2C). In this study we offer as systematic a representation as possible – given current literature and assessments – of the future evolution of the hazard components of RKRs. We draw on the assessment of changes in climatic impact-drivers relevant to RKRs described in the 6th Assessment Report by Working Group 1 (WGI) supplemented when needed by more recent literature. We identify the relevant hazards for each RKR, based upon the WGII authors’ assessment, and we report on their current state and expected future changes in magnitude, intensity and/or frequency, linking these changes to Global Warming Levels to the extent possible. For some of these quantities - like regional trends in oceanic and atmospheric temperature and precipitation, some heat and precipitation extremes, permafrost thaw and Northern Hemisphere snow cover - a strong and quantitative relationship with global average temperature change has been assessed. For others - like frequency and intensity of tropical cyclones and extra-tropical storms, and fire weather - the link to increasing global temperatures can only be described qualitatively. For some processes - like the behavior of ice-sheets, or changes in circulation dynamics - large uncertainties about the effects of different levels of warming remain, and for a few others - like ocean pH and air pollution - the composition of the scenario of anthropogenic emissions is most relevant, rather than the warming reached. In almost all cases, however, the basic message remains that every small increment in CO2 concentration in the atmosphere and associated warming will bring changes in climate phenomena that will contribute to increasing risk of impacts on human and natural systems when these changes happen in conjunction with these systems’ conditions of exposure and vulnerability, and in lack of effective adaptation. Our picture of the evolution of RKR-relevant climatic impact-drivers complements and enriches the treatment of RKRs in the other papers in at least two ways: by filling in an often only cursory or limited representation of the physical climate aspects driving impacts, and by providing a fuller representation of their future possible evolution which represents an important component – if never the only one – of the potential future evolution of risk severity.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

WISP: Watching grid Infrastructure Stealthily through Proxies (Final Technical Report)

The complex interdependencies of cyber systems (sensors and communications), physical grids and associated electricity market operations make protecting electric power grids a significant challenge. The energy sector is constantly under new, targeted, advanced and dangerous cyber-attacks that have the potential to result in the loss of human life. These threats are further exacerbated by our need to modernize the grid. One focus of cyber security research in smart grids is the securing of the SCADA system through advanced intrusion detection systems (IDS) and bad data detection algorithms in state estimation. These methods either require full knowledge of the system topology and parameters or fail to understand the physical behaviors under attack. WISP (Watching grid Infrastructure Stealthily through Proxies) is designed to provide additional protection to the power grid using only publicly available data. In particular, WISP exploits the spatio-temporal nature of the real time locational marginal prices (LMPs), in conjunction with other information such as bids, weather, outages and load data to analyze anomalous power pricing behaviors and then correlate those observations to localize regions of interest and identify potential cyber events. WISP is non-intrusive as the tool is deployed as a service in the Cloud or on premise and provides reliable information to system operators for enhanced situational awareness, without impeding energy delivery functions. The WISP technology comprises three modules: the data-driven anomaly detection core, the vulnerability and risk analysis and the root cause analysis. The data-driven anomaly detection core performs the tasks of feature selection, anomaly detection and attack region localization. The vulnerability and risk analysis module provides system level information of the vulnerable variables and times, assisting the operators in selecting monitoring and protection nodes. The root cause analysis module takes the detection results and identifies potential operational conditions that contribute to the detected anomalies. In Phase I, we have demonstrated the feasibility and effectiveness of WISP. We developed a realistic electricity market simulator capable of generating normal and attack market data under various operational conditions. We developed a series of cyber-attack detection and analysis algorithms and evaluated them under multiple data sources. Finally, we integrated all modules into an end-to-end software, providing functions for data management, data analytics and visualization. Specifically, we have achieved: (i) real-time data acceptance from external utility interfaces with >99% acceptance rate; (ii) high performance anomaly detection algorithms with >98% detection accuracy and <0.1% false alarm rate; and (iii) ultra-low computing delay <50 milliseconds. Additionally, our team developed algorithms to identify the vulnerable variables in electricity market operations and root cause analysis functions to identify major contributors to the price spikes. These ancillary modules are necessary when deploying WISP in real world industry environment. In Phase II, we have demonstrated the effectiveness of WISP software on realistic largescale power systems. We performed red team testing for the Phase I WISP software and identified software vulnerabilities and implemented corresponding mitigation solutions. We adapted the electricity market simulator for the Texas synthetic 2000-bus system and generated datasets for the false data injection attacks. We created database and visualization interfaces for the Texas system and the ISO New England system. We performed software optimization in terms of operation efficiency, computing speed and detection accuracy. Finally, we tested the software on the Texas system and the ISO New England system and evaluated the detection performance. Overall, we achieved above 89% detection rate, below 3% false alarm rate and below 37 seconds of end-to-end detection delay.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗