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At least 19 records

Technical Bases for Consequence Analyses Using MACCS (MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System)

The use of MELCOR Accident Consequence Code System (MACCS) in regulatory applications requires that input parameters used in MACCS models have a defensible and transparent technical basis. The existing technical basis for MACCS parameters was identified and updates were developed based on current data and information. The transparent way these updates are documented provides a technical basis for updating MACCS parameters with consistent application among the MACCS user community.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Cognitive consequences of clumsy automation on high workload, high consequence human performance

The growth of computational power has fueled attempts to automate more of the human role in complex problem solving domains, especially those where system faults have high consequences and where periods of high workload may saturate the performance capacity of human operators. Examples of these domains include flightdecks, space stations, air traffic control, nuclear power operation, ground satellite control rooms, and surgical operating rooms. Automation efforts may have unanticipated effects on human performance, particularly if they increase the workload at peak workload times or change the practitioners' strategies for coping with workload. Smooth and effective changes in automation requires detailed understanding of the congnitive tasks confronting the user: it has been called user centered automation. The introduction of a new computerized technology in a group of hospital operating rooms used for heart surgery was observed. The study revealed how automation, especially 'clumsy automation', effects practitioner work patterns and suggest that clumsy automation constrains users in specific and significant ways. Users tailor both the new system and their tasks in order to accommodate the needs of process and production. The study of this tailoring may prove a powerful tool for exposing previously hidden patterns of user data processing, integration, and decision making which may, in turn, be useful in the design of more effective human-machine systems.

Cook, Richard I.↗

Consequences of contamination of the spacecraft environment: immunologic consequences

Long-term space voyages pose numerous known and unknown health hazards, to the human immune system. Well-studied clinical examples of secondary immunodeficiencies created on Earth, lead one to predict that the conditions of prolonged space flight would weaken the human immune responses that normally hold infection and cancer in check. From evidence gathered from humans flown for prolonged periods in space and from human models of space flight studied on Earth it is reasonable to suspect that space travelers to the planet Mars would experience a weakening of immunity. Subtle defects of immune cell structure and function have been observed in astronauts, such as weakening of specific T-lymphocyte recall of specific antigens. Ground-based models also have demonstrated alterations of immune function, such as the elevation of neuroendocrine immune system messengers, interleukin-6, and soluble tumor necrosis factor-alpha receptor in sleep deprivation. Since severe immune compromise the clinical consequences of reactivation of latent virus infections and the development of cancer, has yet to be seen in space flight or in the Earth models, it is extremely important to begin to quantify early changes in immunity to predict the development of immune system collapse with poor clinical outcomes. This approach is designed to validate a number of surrogate markers that will predict trouble ahead. Inherent in this research is the development of countermeasures to reduce the risks of infection and cancer in the first humans going to Mars.

Non-NASA Center↗

Detecting And Characterizing Archetypes of Unintended Consequences in Engineered Systems

When designing engineered systems, the potential for unintended consequences of design policies or design decisions exists despite best intentions. Conditions that might cause the formation of unintended consequences are often known only in hindsight. However, since these conditions are associated with a single event, it is difficult to uncover the general patterns of conditions leading to unintended consequences. In this research, patterns of conditions associated with unintended consequences are learned from historical data and represented in the form of archetypes. While previous work using systems theoretic modeling has identified high-level archetypes, this work leverages a self-organizing map to learn archetypes of unintended consequences from human-tagged risk factors in a large data set of lessons learned from adverse events at NASA. The sixty-six identified archetypes contain patterns of conditions such as complexity and human-machine interaction associated with the formation of unintended consequences. To validate the archetypes, a sample of the archetypes is represented using system dynamics in order to illustrate that the identified archetypes are specialized versions of known high-level archetypes of unintended consequences. While the research is based upon a specific dataset, the archetypes apply to any engineered system and the pattern of leading indicators open a new path to manage unintended consequences and mitigate the magnitude of potentially adverse outcomes.

Hannah S Walsh↗

Consequence analyses of sabotage-induced radiological releases in high-temperature helium-cooled prismatic microreactors

Here, this study analyzes the radiological dose consequences of sabotage-induced accidents at three high-temperature helium-cooled prismatic microreactors (HTPMs) with thermal power ratings of 1, 10, and 50 MWt. Each HTPM employs uranium oxycarbide tristructural isotropic fuel enriched to 19.75 wt% high-assay low-enriched uranium. Simulations were conducted to estimate reactor core inventory at the point of fuel discharge––when the effective multiplication factor reduced to less than 1––representing peak radionuclide inventory. Postulated sabotage scenarios leading to reactor shutdown were analyzed at two intervals: immediately post-shutdown (0 h) and 3 days after shutdown using the SCALE code for radionuclide inventories and the RASCAL tool for dose consequences. Results show that although HTPMs benefit from inherent safety features and robust fuel design, radiological consequences scale with reactor power because of increased source term inventories. Smaller microreactors exhibited proportionally lower dose consequences. To support the economic and regulatory feasibility of microreactor deployment, this study emphasizes the value of a risk-informed, performance-based approach, as supported by regulations like 10 CFR Parts 100 and 53 in the United States. Microreactor developers should perform site-specific assessments of potential sabotage or low-probability, high-consequence events, especially when considering minimal on-site or full off-site emergency response.

Consequence↗

Extravehicular Activity on the Lunar Surface: Mapping Mitigation Risk Consequence for Crew Needing Assistance or Rescue

Extravehicular activity (EVA) on the lunar surface presents unique risks to crew with possibility for injury. Without appropriate assistance or rescue capability, inability to nominally ambulate and return to a lander, especially during early Artemis missions, could have catastrophic consequences. Mapping likelihood and consequence safety risk associated with identified injury scenarios establishes a baseline from which to assess potential mitigation solutions to ensure crew health and safety. Causes leading to the need for incapacitated crew rescue (ICR) during EVA on the lunar surface were previously identified and classified using an ICR/Acute Injury scenario spectrum. Severe scenarios are those when the affected astronaut requires either partial or full continuous assistance from the rescuer. Evaluation of these continual reliance conditions included calculating event probabilities (likelihoods) associated with an early Artemis mission and mapping them to established Exploration System Directorate (ESD) probability thresholds; safety consequences were analyzed and correlated to defined ESD personnel safety categories. These resulting likelihood and consequence values served as a baseline for assessing risk reduction of three mitigation capabilities: crew assistance (rescuer crew) only, walking assist devices, and a wheeled transport device. Of the twenty-five continual reliance conditions, ten were evaluated as “catastrophic” (Level 5, loss of life) during EVA on the lunar surface with probabilities ranging from moderate to very low during an early Artemis mission. Crew assistance only and walking assist devices showed similar potential for risk reduction, with four of the ten causes decreasing to Level 4. A wheeled transport device further increased risk reduction with six of the ten conditions decreasing to Level 4. Given the catastrophic consequence of several identified conditions, assessments should be performed to determine the feasibility of mitigation capabilities. It is currently unknown whether a rescuer astronaut could effectively provide continuous assistance to enable both crew to return safely to the lander from the standpoint of both suit geometry and human performance. Although resulting in an increase in resources, providing a wheeled transport provides the highest risk reduction potential, and walking assist devices may have prevention as well as mitigation benefits.

lunar surface↗

Addressing Consequence within Operational Risk (O.T. Gagnon III) 9-18-2024

Addressing Consequence within Operational Risk: Why threats and security are just not that important! When dealing with cyber or physical risk within any critical infrastructure (CI) environment, don’t concern yourself with vulnerabilities and threats, at least not at first! Also, don’t be overly fixated on “securing the systems” within the organization. The endeavor of tackling operational risk focused on consequences in any critical infrastructure environment to include the complex Aviation ecosystem is challenging even for the most resourced entity but can be advanced though a simplified approach: identifying, binning, and prioritizing the infrastructure environment. While no two entities within a single element of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors are exactly alike when it comes to risk, there is a basic process to move toward a greater understanding of operational risk through becoming more informed about the infrastructure environment in which the entity exists. The process starts with bringing internal and external stakeholders and subject matter experts together to analyze key areas such as Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technology (OT) components and points of convergence, analyzing internal and external cyber and physical dependencies, accounting for explosive growth in devices and wireless technology, and leveraging the contributions of people inside and outside the operational environment. Attaining a common understanding of the infrastructure environment as part of addressing consequences within operational risk is not easy to do or resource light, but the process outlined provides the framework to further any entity’s efforts in this space. When it comes to cyber risks, before an organization can consider vulnerabilities within and threats to its operations, it must first have a solid understanding of the consequences existing inside its infrastructure environment. Idaho National Lab’s Consequence-Driven, Cyber-Informed Engineering is offered as an example of this approach to effective and efficient cyber risk mitigation.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Comparative Assessment of Radiological Consequences from Sabotage-Induced Releases in Diverse Microreactor Designs

Many microreactor design developers are planning to reduce on-site physical protection measures and emergency planning zones by relying on robust fuel and reactor designs and leveraging passive safety systems. These reductions raise the risk of sabotage at these microreactors. To evaluate these requirements, this study assessed the radiological consequences of sabotage-induced accidents at microreactors. For the assessment, five diverse designs, each producing 30 MWt, were considered. These designs included pressurized water microreactors (PWMs), sodium-cooled fast microreactors (SFMs), high-temperature helium-cooled prismatic microreactors (HTPMs), heat pipe–cooled microreactors (HPMs), and molten salt–cooled microreactors (MSMs). For each design, two postulated sabotage-induced accidents were defined along with the associated release percentages of fission products. Additionally, consequences from the release of activation products were assessed. With regard to evaluating physical protection and emergency planning requirements, the consequences of sabotage-induced accidents for each design type were found to be comparable. The differences were primarily because of the distinct fuel forms (and associated release mechanisms), burnup, and neutron spectra of the different microreactor types. Future effort will further investigate the release percentages of fission products to perform accurate dose consequence assessment.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Consequence and Resilience Modeling for Chemical Supply Chains

The U.S. chemical sector produces more than 70,000 chemicals that are essential material inputs to critical infrastructure systems, such as the energy, public health, and food and agriculture sectors. Disruptions to the chemical sector can potentially cascade to other dependent sectors, resulting in serious national consequences. To address this concern, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) tasked Sandia National Laboratories to develop a predictive consequence modeling and simulation capability for global chemical supply chains. This paper describes that capability , which includes a dynamic supply chain simulation platform called N_ABLE(tm). The paper also presents results from a case study that simulates the consequences of a Gulf Coast hurricane on selected segments of the U.S. chemical sector. The case study identified consequences that include impacted chemical facilities, cascading impacts to other parts of the chemical sector. and estimates of the lengths of chemical shortages and recovery . Overall. these simulation results can DHS prepare for and respond to actual disruptions.

Stamber, Kevin L.↗

Consequence-driven cyber-informed engineering and related systems and methods

Embodiments of the disclosure relate to a computer-implemented consequence-driven cyber-informed engineering tool for performing and reporting consequence-based prioritization, system-of-systems breakdown, consequence-based targeting, and mitigations and protections. Embodiments of a CCE tool may perform one or more steps of defining a target industrial control system (ICS), wherein the target ICS includes operational goals, critical functions, and critical services; determining one or more scored high consequence events (HCE) associated with the defined target ICS; prioritizing the scored HCEs according to an HCE severity index; and updating a dashboard with one or more representations of the prioritized HCEs, wherein the updated dashboard is associated with the CCE tool and presented at a display.

Assante, Michael↗

Consequence analyses of sabotage-induced radiological releases in sodium-cooled fast microreactors

Analysis of three sodium-cooled fast microreactors (SFMs) with thermal powers of 10, 30, and 50 MWt showed that smaller reactors result in lower radiological consequences during a postulated sabotage-induced event because of their reduced core inventory. All SFMs used U-10Zr metal fuel enriched to 15 wt% high-assay low-enriched uranium and operated until their respective effective multiplication factor (k eff ) reduced to less than 1 or until the end of their operational lifespan. Sabotage scenarios were simulated at this point, when the fuel inventory within the core contains the highest-level of radioactivity. Radionuclide core inventories were calculated using the SCALE code at shutdown and 3 days post-shutdown. Dose consequence analyses were performed for three sabotage scenarios using the RASCAL tool. As microreactor developers plan for minimal on-site or complete off-site emergency response, it remains essential to evaluate their physical protection needs and potential hazards, including assessing postulated sabotage-induced events that could become more relevant. SFM licensees should identify a credible worst-case, major accident, estimate release source terms, and perform dose consequence analyses to evaluate site-specific physical protection measures. In conclusion, this recommendation supports a risk-informed, performance-based approach, aligning with applicable regulatory requirements, i.e., 10 CFR Parts 100 and 53 rulemaking in the United States.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Assessment and Validation of Collision "Consequence" Method of Assessing Orbital Regime Risk Posed by Potential Satellite Conjunctions

Collision risk management theory requires a thorough assessment of both the likelihood and consequence of potential collision events. Satellite conjunction risk assessment has produced a highly-developed theory for assessing the likelihood of collision but neglects to account for the consequences of a given collision. While any collision may compromise the operational survival of a spacecraft, the amount of debris produced by the potential collision, and therefore the degree to which the orbital corridor may be compromised, can vary greatly among satellite conjunctions. Previous studies leveraged work on satellite collision modeling to develop a method to estimate whether a particular collision is likely to produce a relatively large or relatively small amount of resultant debris. The approximation of the number of debris pieces is dependent on a mass estimation process for the secondary objects utilizing the radar cross section of said object. This study examines the validity of the mass estimation process and establishes uncertainty bounds on the secondary object mass, which will be used to best approximate the possible consequences of a potential collision. This process is then applied to a large set of historical conjunctions to assess the frequency at which possible collisions may significantly augment the orbital debris environment in operational spacecraft.

Collision Consequence↗

Extravehicular Activity on the Lunar Surface: Mapping Mitigation Risk Consequence for Crew Needing Assistance or Rescue

The lunar environment offers unique challenges for human health and safety over the course of performing Extravehicular Activities (EVAs) during early Artemis missions. Driver medical conditions leading to an injured EVA crewmember needing assistance or rescue were analyzed and correlated to established, defined consequence categories. Catastrophic Drivers were identified, and three mitigation strategies were analyzed to determine if there was a potential change in consequence with their application. Risk consequence across the mitigations were compared with each other and the original risk without mitigations. Mitigations were further evaluated in a broader context with prospective preventions to understand the design and risk trade space associated with an early Artemis EVA.

Risk↗

Extravehicular Activity on the Lunar Surface: Mapping Mitigation Risk Consequence for Crew Needing Assistance or Rescue

The lunar environment offers unique challenges for human health and safety over the course of performing Extravehicular Activities (EVAs) during early Artemis missions. Driver medical conditions leading to an injured EVA crewmember needing assistance or rescue were analyzed and correlated to established, defined consequence categories. Catastrophic Drivers were identified, and three mitigation strategies were analyzed to determine if there was a potential change in consequence with their application. Risk consequence across the mitigations were compared with each other and the original risk without mitigations. Mitigations were further evaluated in a broader context with prospective preventions to understand the design and risk trade space associated with an early Artemis EVA.

Risk↗

Animal displacement from marine energy development: Mechanisms and consequences

For marine wave and tidal energy to successfully contribute to global renewable energy goals and climate change mitigation, marine energy projects need to expand beyond small deployments to large-scale arrays. However, with large-scale projects come potential environmental effects not observed at the scales of single devices and small arrays. One of these effects is the risk of displacing marine animals from their preferred habitats or their migration routes, which may increase with the size of arrays and location. Many marine animals may be susceptible to some level of displacement once large marine energy arrays are increasingly integrated into the seascape, including large migratory animals, non-migratory pelagic animals with large home ranges, and benthic and demersal mobile organisms with more limited ranges, among many others. Yet, research around the mechanisms and effects of displacement have been hindered by the lack of clarity within the international marine energy community regarding the definition of displacement, how it occurs, its consequences, species of concern, and methods to investigate the outcomes. This review paper leveraged lessons learned from other industries, such as offshore development, to establish a definition of displacement in the marine energy context, explore which functional groups of marine animals may be affected and in what way, and identify pathways for investigating displacement through modeling and monitoring. In the marine energy context, we defined displacement as the outcome of one of three mechanisms (i.e., attraction, avoidance, and exclusion) triggered by an animal's response to one or more stressors acting as a disturbance, with various consequences at the individual through population levels. The knowledge gaps highlighted in this study will help the regulatory and scientific communities prepare for mitigating, observing, measuring, and characterizing displacement of various animals around marine energy arrays in order to prevent irreversible consequences.

16 TIDAL AND WAVE POWER↗

Updated Economic Model for Estimation of GDP Losses in the MACCS Offsite Consequence Analysis Code RDEIM Model Report for MACCS v4.2

This report updates the Regional Disruption Economic Impact Model (RDEIM) GDP-based model described in Bixler et al. (2020) used in the MACCS accident consequence analysis code. MACCS is the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) used to perform probabilistic health and economic consequence assessments for atmospheric releases of radionuclides. It is also used by international organizations, both reactor owners and regulators. It is intended and most commonly used for hypothetical accidents that could potentially occur in the future rather than to evaluate past accidents or to provide emergency response during an ongoing accident. It is designed to support probabilistic risk and consequence analyses and is used by the NRC, U.S. nuclear licensees, the Department of Energy, and international vendors, licensees, and regulators. The update of the RDEIM model in version 4.2 expresses the national recovery calculation explicitly, rather than implicitly as in the previous version. The calculation of the total national GDP losses remains unchanged. However, anticipated gains from recovery are now allocated across all the GDP loss types – direct, indirect, and induced – whereas in version 4.1, all recovery gains were accounted for in the indirect loss type. To achieve this, we’ve introduced new methodology to streamline and simplify the calculation of all types of losses and recovery. In addition, RDEIM includes other kinds of losses, including tangible wealth. This includes loss of tangible assets (e.g., depreciation) and accident expenditures (e.g., decontamination). This document describes the updated RDEIM economic model and provides examples of loss and recovery calculation, results analysis, and presentation. Changes to the tangible cost calculation and accident expenditures are described in section 2.2. The updates to the RDEIM input-output (I-O) model are not expected to affect the final benchmark results Bixler et al. (2020), as the RDEIM calculation for the total national GDP losses remains unchanged. The reader is referred to the MACCS revision history for other cost modelling changes since version 4.0 that may affect the benchmark. RDEIM has its roots in a code developed by Sandia National Laboratories for the Department of Homeland Security to estimate short-term losses from natural and manmade accidents, called the Regional Economic Accounting analysis tool (REAcct). This model was adapted and modified for MACCS. It is based on I-O theory, which is widely used in economic modeling. It accounts for direct losses to a disrupted region affected by an accident, indirect losses to the national economy due to disruption of the supply chain, and induced losses from reduced spending by displaced workers. RDEIM differs from REAcct in in its treatment and estimation of indirect loss multipliers, elimination of double-counting associated with inter-industry trade in the affected area, and that it is intended to be used for extended periods that can occur from a major nuclear reactor accident, such as the one that occurred at the Fukushima Daiichi site in Japan. Most input-output models do not account for economic adaptation and recovery, and in this regard RDEIM differs from its parent, REAcct, because it allows for a user-definable national recovery period. Implementation of a recovery period was one of several recommendations made by an independent peer review panel to ensure that RDEIM is state-of-practice. For this and several other reasons, RDEIM differs from REAcct.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗