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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2026

Water-Resistant Container Testing: A426-7, A426-25, and A426-50 Container Designs

The purpose of this report is to detail the results of water ingress testing conducted on the A426-7, A426-25, and A426-50 Mini-Pot container designs and discuss these results against the water-resistant container requirements of TA55-AP-522 and PA-RD-01009. The A426 design series is a proposed commercially off the shelf inner container option for material storage inside of a glovebox and/or as an approved nonhermetically sealed inner of an approved packaging configuration inside of an approved outer container as listed in PA-RD-01022. The A426-25 and A426-50 are shaped similar to an ointment jar, made of 316L stainless steel, and utilize a threaded lid for closure and containment. The A426-7 container is shaped similar to a vial, made of 316L stainless steel, and utilizes a threaded lid for closure and containment. See Figure 1 and Table 1-3 for a summary of the container specifications. For more details on the container design, see Section 1.4.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2024

ILAW Container Cost Reduction and Optimization Study

This study, performed on behalf of Washington River Protection Solutions (WRPS), examines the potential for making cost savings for the Immobilized Low Active Waste (ILAW) containers over the mission life of the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP). it builds on earlier study assessments 24590-LAW-RPT-M-01-001 Rev 0 ILAW Product Container Specifications Optimization Study and DOE/ORP-2013-02 Rev 0 Decision Analysis of Low-Active Waste Container Finishing Handling System Alternatives. The WTP design and installed equipment has evolved over an extended period ~20 years. Consequently, some of the existing requirements relating the ILAW containers may no longer be applicable under current mission plans where the glass filled containers are placed into the Integrated Disposal Facility (IDF) rather than stacked in an engineered purpose-built ventilated store as originally envisioned. The study team reviewed available WTP project reference documents to establish the functions the container must perform and assign requirements against each of these functions. With the assumptions that some of the existing WTP contract restrictions would not necessarily apply to the subsequent facility operations contract the container requirements were reviewed to identify those which were ‘hard constraints‘, imposed by regulatory requirements. Initially each of these hard constraints were reviewed, evaluated and documented to see if they precluded the use of an alternate less expensive material of construction, carbon steel, to the existing 304 L stainless steel in the current container specification. That review did not generate any fatal flaws for a change in material of construction to carbon steel allowing the study team to examine the impacts of material cost savings, potential changes to the design and requirements and impacts on interfaces of the containers with the existing WTP process equipment from container receipt, transfers, glass filling, cooling and export. In addition, a change in container target fill level was evaluated and qualitative, and quantitative where feasible, impacts to the container fabrication process assessed. Lastly, additional follow on development or testing activities to support the use of carbon steel were assessed and a recommended path forward with a ROM cost and timescale developed.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

Measuring 3D Profilometry of SAVY-4000 Nuclear Material Storage Containers: Novacam TubeInspect Capabilities Report

The SAVY-4000 container series is a general-purpose interim storage container for nuclear materials, developed and maintained by Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). It is the first vented, general-use nuclear material container to be demonstrated as meeting the requirements outlined in DOE M 441.1-1, the Nuclear Material Packaging Manual. Due to the challenging radiation, thermal, and corrosive storage conditions that the SAVY containers must endure, continuous surveillance techniques are employed to ensure the containers meet all safety standards and specifications. These inspections are typically performed by human operators, who check for issues such as corrosion, O-ring deterioration, corrosion, filter integrity, and potential manufacturing defects. However, human inspections alone are not sufficient, and automated inspection technologies, such as the ATIS system, as well as other automated systems are also utilized. The MicroCam TubeInspect, developed by Novacam Technologies Inc., is designed to address the challenges of understanding how manufacturing variations in the SAVY-4000 container series may affect performance. It is a 3D profilometry measurement system that enables detailed analysis of surface features, including defects, surface roughness, and manufacturing variations. This advanced tool significantly enhances rapid surveillance techniques for both pristine and used containers. In this study, container properties such as surface roughness, thickness, and geometric attributes like circularity are measured for SAVY-4000 containers. Artificially corroded or dented containers are examined to demonstrate the MicroCam's ability to quantify defects. A sensitivity analysis is also conducted, comparing the MicroCam results to those obtained using more precise instruments such as confocal microscopy. This comparison aims to provide valuable insights into container quality, durability, and potential improvements in manufacturing processes.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Lifetime extension drop-test of real-world corroded 5 Quart Hagan nuclear material storage container

A 5Qt Hagan container with a 20-year history of nuclear material storage was challenged with three successive drop tests at a height of 3.7 meters. The total mass of the test package was 12.1 kg. The 1st and 2nd drop tests (center of gravity over the container bottom corner but 180 degrees apart on the container bottom face) passed the pre- and post- impact helium leak criterion at less than 1.00E-6 atm-cc/sec (ambient cubic centimeters per second). The 3rd and final test (center of gravity over top corner) failed with a post-impact gross leak of 1.1E-1 atmcc/sec. The RRFMC (Respirable Release Fraction Measurement Chamber) is a drop tower test system that is critical for the sustainability of the SAVY-4000™ series and Hagan-type (NFT Inc. Golden CO) nuclear material storage containers. These are the primary in-use nuclear material storage container types at the Los Alamos National Laboratory TA-55 facility. Results are presented to expand the technical knowledge basis for container lifetime, regarding actual exposure to corrosive gas species on the container inner surfaces. The primary source of general corrosion throughout the container is gaseous hydrogen chloride (HCl). This gas is generated by the degradation of the polyvinylchloride (PVC) bag-out bag. Additionally, in most cases, the nuclear material itself also releases HCl gas (due to residual chemical components associated with the material formation). The RRFMC drop tower gives the end-user the ability record and analyze high-speed video and photography and if needed aerosol mass release measurements. In this report the principal issue is the physical deformation of the 5Qt Hagan container. There were no mass release experiments of test aerosol mass in the present study.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

Examination of 3013 Containers Baseline Surface Features

The Surveillance and Monitoring Program at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) was tasked with evaluating the baseline features of 3013 containers. This baseline is to be used as a basis for comparison for 3013 containers that had been packaged with corrosive plutonium materials. The LANL team evaluated an unwelded container, an unused welded container, and a welded container that had held plutonium metal without any corrosive impurities. These three containers had features with depths no larger than 6 µm and had similar depth distributions. The features observed in the baseline containers were all shallower than those seen in containers packaged with corrosive plutonium materials. This work establishes workflows for feature identification and measurement, as well as establishment of baseline data for future comparison with corroded containers.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗
DOE OSTI2025

COMPUTATION FLUID DYNAMICS ANALYSIS FOR GENERIC SMALL MODULAR REACTOR CONTAINMENT SEPARATE EFFECTS TEST

It is desirable for fourth-generation Small Modular Reactors to be passively cooled in standard and accident operations. Passive Containment Cooling Systems can reject heat from the containment structure, without using pumps or blowers. The targeted design containment structure is a large, domed, stainless steel, cylindrical vessel. In a postulated Design Basis Accident, steam will flash inside containment. Steam condensation occurs on the inner containment wall and transfers heat through the steel containment into a large body of water known as the annular reservoir (AR) surrounding the vessel serving as the ultimate heat sink. Natural circulation drives the flow in the AR and heat will be released to the environment by evaporation of water. Unique containment geometry requires a separate effects test (SET) facility for the verification and validation of the computer code and evaluation model development and assessment for reactor licensing efforts. In this study, STAR-CCM+, a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) code was used to inform the decision-making process on the design of the SET. The CFD simulation modeled, a two-phase turbulent flow with fluid film development and heat transfer for different containment geometries. The Reactor Excursion and Leak Analysis Program will also be used in a code-to-code verification against the CFD results.

21 - SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLAN↗
DOE OSTI2025

SMR Containment Cable and Electrical Penetration Assembly System

GAIN Project CRADA Number NFE-21-08839, entitled “SMR Containment Cable and EPA System” was initiated by the partnership of Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and Engineered Solutions Group (ESG) to test an ESG-designed Electrical Penetration Assembly and Containment Cabling System Qualified for not only SMR technologies, but also Advanced Reactors design. An Electrical Penetration Assembly (EPA) is a component used to allow electrical power and signal conductors as well as optical fiber through the nuclear reactor’s containment structure while maintaining a pressure barrier. The EPA ensures the containment's integrity both during the normal operation and also accident conditions by providing a sealed passage for power and signals. This project was undertaken to fill the equipment gap of EPA and Cabling Systems that require much more severe environmental requirements than legacy plant applications present due to their smaller containment volumes that result in high energy densities compared to legacy designs. This high energy density results in severe accident environments and also more severe normal operating conditions.This document describes cost effective approaches to qualify a unique EPA for Small Modular Reactor (SMR) technologies as legacy LWR EPA technologies will likely have inherent material performance insufficiencies. The DBA profiles for SMRs (and some Advanced Reactor Technologies) are more severe than the legacy qualification requirements making the design of the qualification testing system challenging as the temperatures and pressures can approach the limits permitted by ASME Pressure Vessel Code, as well as accident temperatures exceeding the capability of polymeric gaskets and dielectrics. Small Modular Reactors are designed to have, as the name suggests, modularity which implies sized for factory fabrication and subsequent assembly at the power plant site. SMR containment is much smaller than a legacy Light Water Reactor containment. The containment walls are likely to be comprised of stainless steel. Qualifying Electrical Penetration Assemblies (EPAs) through these steel vessels are of interest in this work. Methods are presented here that discuss critical safety and cost effectiveness for these SMR EPA’s test systems.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

An approach for spent nuclear fuel containment integrity verification using gas tagging

Verification of containment integrity is required for spent nuclear fuel (SNF) managed by the commercial nuclear industry and U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), especially after extended storage. Certain SNF storage systems, such as the DOE road-ready dry storage system, hold several packaged containments within a welded over-canister. These packaged containments are called Department of Energy Standard Canisters (DOESCs). DOESC leakage identification is challenging because their containment boundary cannot be accessed for testing and their contents (i.e., SNF and fill gas) are often similar. There are concerns that this could result in costly characterization and repackaging operations of DOE road-ready dry storage systems if compromised DOESCs are suspected. Here, to address these concerns, this paper presents an approach for applying a gas tagging process using xenon to uniquely identify compromised inaccessible containments following extended storage. The containments considered for this application are seven DOESCs, each packaged within a single over-canister. Two different SNF loading configurations from the Advanced Test Reactor and Fort Saint Vrain nuclear power plant are considered. These configurations are used to represent research reactor aluminum-clad spent nuclear fuel (ASNF) and TRi-structural ISOtropic (TRISO) SNF types. Results for this application show that for ASNF and TRISO type fuels for which the selected fuels are representative, the volume of taggant required at loading is determined primarily by the lower detection limit and leak rate of taggant from a compromised DOESC, rather than the amount of fission-generated xenon in the loaded fuel. While the application presented is suited for larger leaks, smaller leaks could be detected by modifying certain design parameters. This gas tagging approach can also be applied to other DOE containments and advanced reactor SNF storage systems.

07 - ISOTOPES AND RADIATION SOURCES↗
DOE OSTI2024

Using containers to speed up development, to run integration tests and to teach about distributed systems

GlideinWMS is a workload manager provisioning resources for many experiments including CMS and DUNE. The software is distributed both as native packages and specialized production containers. Following an approach used in other communities like web development we built our workspaces, system-like containers to ease development and testing. Developers can change the source tree or check out a different branch and quickly reconfigure the services to see the effect of their changes. In this paper, we’ll talk about what differentiates workspaces from other containers. We’ll describe our base system composed of three containers. A one-node cluster including a compute element and a batch system. A GlideinWMS Factory controlling pilot jobs. And a scheduler and Frontend, to submit jobs and provision resources. Additional containers can be used for optional components. This system can easily run on a laptop and we’ll share our evaluation of different container runtimes, with an eye for ease of use and performance. Finally, we’ll talk about our experience as developers and with students. The GlideinWMS workspaces are easily integrated with IDEs like VS Code, simplifying debugging and allowing development and testing of the system also when offline. They simplified the training and onboarding of new team members and Summer interns. And they were useful in workshops where students could have first-hand experience with the mechanisms and components that, in production, run millions of jobs.

Mambelli, Marco↗
DOE OSTI2025

Full Submersion Water Testing of SAVY-4000 Nuclear Material Storage Containers

SAVY-4000 (SAVY) containers are the primary container used at Technical Area (TA) TA-55 plutonium facility for the prevention of water ingress to mitigate against a criticality event. The basis for water resistance of these containers has long been attributed to the Polytetrafluoroethylene (PTFE) membrane that is assembled on the outermost surface of the filter assembly. On August 22nd a test of a container used inside of a glovebox was performed that brought into question this long-standing-basis. This test was performed by inverting a SAVY-lid onto a specialized piece of equipment for evaluating the integrity of the PTFE membrane. During the test water was observed passing through the filter indicating that the filter membrane was no longer preventing the ingress of water through the filter. The assumption after making this observation was that alpha-particles were rapidly degrading the membrane creating a leak path through the underlying aluminosilicate media (Fiberfrax®). The apparatus used was designed to only test the lid rather than the entire SAVY assembly. A test plan, PA-PLAN-01921, was developed to investigate whether a fully assembled container with a fully degraded PTFE membrane would be capable of meeting the criteria defined in PA-RD-1009 of not allowing more than 200 ml of water to enter the container with a water column of 6-inches applied over a 2-hour period. This report provides the results of the testing performed against PA-PLAN-01921.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2025

ALARA Review for Venting of Flanged Tritium Waste Containers (FTWCs) at TA-54

This project will vent headspace hydrogen and oxygen from specialized high-pressure storage vessels called flanged tritium waste containers (FTWCs). There are four of these containers located in Los Alamos National Laboratory’s (LANL’s) Technical Area 54 (TA-54), Building 1028. This building is in the southwest corner of LANL’s Material Disposal Area G. The vented headspace gas is expected to contain tritium in the form of water vapor, elemental hydrogen or a combination of both. The venting operation is expected to take place in 2025. There will be a series of operational readiness reviews prior to venting activities commencing. The FTWCs at TA-54 contain tritium-contaminated metal parts and molecular sieve media, which is a pebble-like material used to absorb water vapor from the air. This molecular sieve media inside the FTWCs is contained in metal canisters, along with some loose media material in bags. Over time, tritiated water vapor that had been adsorbed onto the media can become liberated into the FTWC headspace gas. Radiolysis can cause separation of the water vapor into its hydrogen and oxygen components, resulting in the potentially hazardous gas mixture within the FTWC. LANL has determined that continued tritium storage in these containers can pose an unsafe condition due to possible hydrogen and oxygen gas buildup within the FTWCs with a potential for explosion if sparks are generated within the FTWCs. To mitigate this hazard, the FTWCs will be stabilized by venting them in-place to remove hazardous gases.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

3013 Baseline Inner Container Report: Description, Imaging, and Analysis

This report presents consolidated findings from three microscopy studies of baseline Bagless Transfer Containers (BTCs), which are the inner containers used in DOE Standard 3013-compliant plutonium storage packages. The studies were conducted by Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Savannah River National Laboratory (SRNL), and DNV, a subcontractor specializing in corrosion science. The baseline BTCs examined had not been exposed to corrosive environments, serving as control samples for comparison with destructively examined (DE) containers. Additionally, the Background section provides an overview of the BTC design, including manufacturing methods, material properties, and container configurations that may influence corrosion behavior. The primary objective of the LANL and SRNL studies was to establish reference characteristics of BTCs to distinguish manufacturing artifacts from corrosion-induced features observed in DE containers. Both laboratories used advanced microscopy techniques, including Wide Area Microscopy (WAMS), Laser Confocal Microscopy (LCM), Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM), and Focused Ion Beam (FIB), to reveal that most surface anomalies were shallow and attributable to flow-forming processes, not corrosion. Subsurface impurities, identified as non-metallic inclusions, were also observed. DNV’s investigation focused on characterizing the mechanical and chemical properties of the BTC material to support crack growth modeling. Their findings indicate higher hardness and strength but reduced ductility—consistent with flow-formed 304L stainless steel and a higher-than-expected martensite content, in contrast to manufacturer claims. Ongoing and future studies, including Electron Backscatter Diffraction (EBSD), aim to further understand the microstructural factors influencing crack initiation and propagation. The combined studies provide a crucial baseline for distinguishing corrosion effects in DE containers, contributing to the safe and reliable long-term storage of plutonium-bearing materials.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2025

Evaluation of Technologies to Mitigate the Presence of Gaseous Elemental Mercury in Waste Disposal Containers

A study was conducted to evaluate sorbent technologies that can mitigate the presence of elemental mercury (Hg⁰) in waste containers for mercury-contaminated debris (MCD). Decontamination and demolition (D&D) activities at the Y-12 National Security Complex (Y-12) and other U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR) facilities generate MCD requiring offsite disposal. The debris is packaged in appropriate waste containers and may be temporarily stored onsite prior to transport for treatment and/or disposal. During transportation of loads that had no visible liquid Hg at the point of origin, temperature changes can cause Hg⁰ to evaporate, condense, and form droplets on container walls. Furthermore, vibration during transportation could cause beads of Hg to be released from the debris, container walls, and ceiling, resulting in pools of liquid Hg⁰ on the container floor. Waste acceptance criteria (WAC) limitations for commercial disposal facilities, the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), and ORR mixed low-level waste landfills prohibit the presence of any free liquids in containers identified as a solid waste form. Potential solutions to mitigate the presence of residual liquids that could be formed through vapor condensation include the use of sorbents or similar materials to capture and stabilize volatile Hg⁰ vapors and thus ensure compliance with landfill WAC requirements. This report summarizes data from small-scale laboratory experiments conducted to evaluate sorbent materials for Hg⁰ vapor suppression and sorption of liquid Hg⁰ that could form under relevant transportation and disposal conditions. A series of experiments was conducted to evaluate commercial sorbent materials and their effectiveness for Hg⁰ sorption across a temperature range from 19.4°C to 60°C. The impact of residual moisture on sorption was investigated under relevant conditions, and leaching tests were performed to assess the stability of Hg⁰ captured sorbent materials. The results provide estimates for sorbent quantities needed for a given Hg⁰ mass loading based on experimental results exposing sorbents to gaseous and liquid Hg⁰ at various mass ratios. Overall, sorbents that were most effective for Hg⁰ vapor suppression were brominated activated carbons, mackinawite-based sorbents coated on vermiculite, and sulfur-modified granular activated carbon. Elevated temperatures and moisture conditions did not result in significant increases of Hg⁰ headspace concentrations, and the materials also demonstrated high sorption capacities for the sorption of liquid Hg⁰.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2026

Technical Basis SAVY-4000® Series, 5.5G Container (Rev. 1)

The 5.5 Gallon (5.5G) SAVY-4000® nuclear material storage container is the latest in the SAVY-4000® series. The 5.5G is similar to that of a 1or 2Qt container in functionality with the exception of a larger volume deep drawn and spun form body achieved through increases in the depth and diameter of the container. Here, a technical basis using engineering equivalency analysis, calculation, and test data is presented to establish that the 5.5G SAVY-4000® Container is a DOE Manual 441.1-1 compliant container at a drop height of 9 feet (rather than the typical 12 ft of the other SAVY-4000® containers) and that a twenty-five year design life (as with the currently approved SAVY-4000® series) is justified.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Using Containers to Speed Up Development, to Run Integration Tests and to Teach About Distributed Systems

GlideinWMS is a workload manager provisioning resources for many experiments, including CMS and DUNE. The software is distributed both as native packages and specialized production containers. Following an approach used in other communities like web development, we built our workspaces, system-like containers to ease development and testing. Developers can change the source tree or check out a different branch and quickly reconfigure the services to see the effect of their changes. In this paper, we will talk about what differentiates workspaces from other containers. We will describe our base system, composed of three containers: a one-node cluster including a compute element and a batch system, a GlideinWMS Factory controlling pilot jobs, and a scheduler and Frontend to submit jobs and provision resources. Additional containers can be used for optional components. This system can easily run on a laptop, and we will share our evaluation of different container runtimes, with an eye for ease of use and performance. Finally, we will talk about our experience as developers and with students. The GlideinWMS workspaces are easily integrated with IDEs like VS Code, simplifying debugging and allowing development and testing of the system even when offline. They simplified the training and onboarding of new team members and summer interns. And they were useful in workshops where students could have first-hand experience with the mechanisms and components that, in production, run millions of jobs.

Mambelli, Marco [Fermilab] (ORCID:0000000294892681↗
DOE OSTI2025

Reducing the Risk of Airborne Contamination through Intelligent Container Surveillance

DOE Manual 441.1-1 provides a set of performance criteria that nuclear material storage containers must achieve to provide protection to the worker, public, and environment. At Los Alamos National Laboratory, the SAVY-4000 is the container of choice for nuclear material storage, meeting all Manual requirements. At the outset, polymer components of the SAVY 4000 were considered to be life-limiting components due to their performance degradation resulting from radiation exposure. However, recent annual surveillance results revealed another life-limiting phenomenon for the container: a deterioration of the package integrity through corrosion of the stainless steel components, primarily the body. Container surveillance remains the choice method of observing, measuring, and tracking container health in service.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2025

An initial effort to study the influence of pitting in SAVY containers

As part of a broader effort to investigate a critical pit depth, below which SAVY containers fail a leak test after a drop test, surrogate testing using pristine SAVY container material was investigated. The original study involved producing pits in a SAVY wall to depths 35% to 55% of the wall thickness and subjecting the pitted container to a drop test under prototypic conditions. Subsequent leak testing after drop testing showed the container passed and that the pit size distribution and drop conditions were not sufficient to cause a leak test failure in this specific container.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2026

Redesign of Nuclear Material Storage Container with Additive Manufacturing

The goal of this project is to reduce worker dose and improve criticality safety by improving nuclear material storage containers. The current method of medium to long term (up to 15 years) storage of small amounts of nuclear material is to store it in a stainless-steel flat tube with a copper crush gasket. These containers use 10 bolts to fasten the lid, and the crush gasket must be replaced after every use. Stainless-steel acts as a gamma shield, but there is not any material to account for neutron dose. A redesign of this container should prioritize reducing radiation doses to handlers of the container by reducing the amount of time handlers are exposed to the container and introducing material with effective neutron and gamma shielding mechanics.

42 ENGINEERING↗