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At least 19 records

Transitioning GlideinWMS, a multi domain distributed workload manager, from GSI proxies to tokens and other granular credentials

GlideinWMS is a distributed workload manager that has been used in production for many years to provision resources for experiments like CERN’s CMS, many Neutrino experiments, and the OSG. Its security model was based mainly on GSI (Grid Security Infrastructure), using X.509 certificate proxies and VOMS (Virtual Organization Membership Service) extensions. Even when other credentials, like SSH keys, were used to authenticate with resources, proxies were also added all the time, to establish the identity of the requestor and the associated memberships or privileges. This single credential was used for everything and was, often implicitly, forwarded wherever needed. The addition of identity and access tokens and the phase-out of GSI forced us to reconsider the security model of GlideinWMS, to handle multiple credentials which can differ in type, technology, and functionality. Both identity tokens and access tokens are supported. GSI proxies even if no more mandatory, are still used, together with various JWT (JSON Web Token) based tokens and other certificates. The functionality of the credentials, defined by issuer, audience, and scope, also differ: a credential can allow access to a computing resource, or can protect the GlideinWMS framework from tampering, or can grant read or write access to storage, can provide an identity for accounting or auditing, or can provide a combination of any the formers. Furthermore, the tools in use do not include automatic forwarding and renewal of the new credentials so credential lifetime and renewal requirements became part of the discussion as well. In this paper, we will present how GlideinWMS was able to change its design and code to respond to all these changes.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

The New GlideinWMS Credentials Model and the New Challenges It Presents

The new credentials implementation of GlideinWMS and the recent migration from Grid Proxies to SciTokens presents new challenges in how we handle credentials and authenticate with grid resources. This presentation summarizes the features of the new model and explains the challenges we will have to address moving forward.

72 PHYSICS OF ELEMENTARY PARTICLES AND FIELDS↗

Insights and Impacts of Credentials: Energy Auditor, Quality Control Inspector, and Certification Updates

Join this session to learn about recent and upcoming Home Energy Professional credential and resource updates from the National Renewable Laboratory (NREL) in support of the U.S. Department of Energy's Weatherization Assistance Program (WAP). NREL staff will provide an in-depth overview of improvements to the EA and QCI certification schemes. Be prepared to provide feedback and share new ideas in pursuit of continuous improvement within WAP. These certifications are critical to ensuring the highest standards of quality, safety, and efficiency within the Weatherization Assistance Program, helping to elevate the skills of professionals and drive the program's overall success.

32 ENERGY CONSERVATION, CONSUMPTION, AND UTILIZATI↗

A Managed Tokens Service for Securely Keeping and Distributing Grid Tokens

Fermilab is transitioning authentication and authorization for grid operations to using bearer tokens based on the WLCG Common JWT (JSON Web Token) Profile. One of the functionalities that Fermilab experimenters rely on is the ability to automate batch job submission, which in turn depends on the ability to securely refresh and distribute the necessary credentials to experiment job submit points. Thus, with the transition to using tokens for grid operations, we needed to create a service that would obtain, refresh, and distribute tokens for experimenters’ use. This service would avoid the need for experimenters to be experts in obtaining their own tokens and would better protect the most sensitive long-lived credentials. Further, the service needed to be widely scalable, as we are currently keeping credentials active for approximately 15 experiments, each with 1-3 different credentials, and distributing those credentials to 2-20 submit points per experiment, with those numbers steadily increasing. To address these issues, we created and deployed a Managed Tokens service. The service is written in Go, taking advantage of that language’s native concurrency primitives to easily be able to scale operations as we onboard experiments. The service uses as its first credentials a set of kerberos keytabs, stored on the same secure machine that the Managed Tokens service runs on. These kerberos credentials allow the service to use htgettoken via condor_vault_storer to store vault tokens in the HTCondor credential managers (credds) that run on the batch system scheduler machines (HTCondor schedds); as well as downloading a local, shorter-lived copy of the vault token. The kerberos credentials are then also used to distribute copies of the locally-stored vault tokens to experiment submit points. When experimenters schedule jobs to be submitted, these distributed vault tokens are used to access a Hashicorp Vault instance (run separately from the Managed Tokens service), and previously-stored refresh tokens there are used to obtain the bearer token that is submitted with the job. We will discuss here the design of the Managed Tokens service, including elaborating on certain choices we made with regards to concurrent operations, configuration, monitoring, and deployment.

Bhat, Shreyas↗

A Managed Tokens Service for Securely Keeping and Distributing Grid Tokens

Fermilab is transitioning authentication and authorization for grid operations to using bearer tokens based on the WLCG Common JWT (JSON Web Token) Profile. One of the functionalities that Fermilab experimenters rely on is the ability to automate batch job submission, which in turn depends on the ability to securely refresh and distribute the necessary credentials to experiment job submit points. Thus, with the transition to using tokens for grid operations, we needed to create a service that would obtain, refresh, and distribute tokens for experimenters' use. This service would avoid the need for experimenters to be experts in obtaining their own tokens and would better protect the most sensitive long-lived credentials. Further, the service needed to be widely scalable, as Fermilab hosts many experiments, each of which would need their own credentials. To address these issues, we created and deployed a Managed Tokens Service. The service is written in Go, taking advantage of that language's native concurrency primitives to easily be able to scale operations as we onboard experiments. The service uses as its first credentials a set of kerberos keytabs, stored on the same secure machine that the Managed Tokens service runs on. These kerberos credentials allow the service to use htgettoken via condor_vault_storer to store vault tokens in the HTCondor credential managers (credds) that run on the batch system scheduler machines (HTCondor schedds); as well as downloading a local, shorter-lived copy of the vault token. The kerberos credentials are then also used to distribute copies of the locally-stored vault tokens to experiment submit points.

46 INSTRUMENTATION RELATED TO NUCLEAR SCIENCE AND ↗

Addressing tokens dynamic generation, propagation, storage and renewal to secure the GlideinWMS pilot based jobs and system

GlideinWMS has been one of the first middleware in the WLCG community to transition from X.509 to support also tokens. The first step was to get from the prototype in 2019 to using tokens in production in 2022. This paper will present the challenges introduced by the wider adoption of tokens and the evolution plans for securing the pilot infrastructure of GlideinWMS and supporting the new requirements. In the last couple of years, the GlideinWMS team supported the migration to tokens of experiments and resources. Inadequate support in the current infrastructure, more stringent requirements, and the higher spatial and temporal granularity forced GlideinWMS to revisit once more how credentials are generated, used, and propagated. The new credential modules have been designed to be used in multiple systems (GWMS, HC) and use a model where credentials have type, purpose, and different flows. Credentials are dynamically generated in order to customize the duration and limit the scope to the targeted resource. This allows to enforce the least privilege principle. Finally, we also considered adding credential storage, renewal, and invalidation mechanisms within the GlideinWMS infrastructure to serve better the experiments’ needs.

Mambelli, Marco↗

Addressing tokens dynamic generation, propagation, storage and renewal to secure the GlideinWMS pilot based jobs and system

GlideinWMS has been one of the first middleware in the WLCG community to transition from X.509 to support also tokens. The first step was to get from the prototype in 2019 to using tokens in production in 2022. This paper will present the challenges introduced by the wider adoption of tokens and the evolution plans for securing the pilot infrastructure of GlideinWMS and supporting the new requirements. In the last couple of years, the GlideinWMS team supported the migration of experiments and resources to tokens. Inadequate support in the current infrastructure, more stringent requirements, and the higher spatial and temporal granularity forced GlideinWMS to revisit once more how credentials are generated, used, and propagated. The new credential modules have been designed to be used in multiple systems (GlideinWMS, HEPCloud) and use a model where credentials have type, purpose, and different flows. Credentials are dynamically generated in order to customize the duration and limit the scope to the targeted resource. This allows to enforce the least privilege principle. Finally, we also considered adding credential storage, renewal, and invalidation mechanisms within the GlideinWMS infrastructure to better serve the experiments' needs.

Coimbra, Bruno Moreira [Fermilab] (ORCID:000900022↗

CMS Token Transition

Within the LHC community, a momentous transition has been occurring in authorization. For nearly 20 years, services within the Worldwide LHC Computing Grid (WLCG) have authorized based on mapping an identity, derived from an X.509 credential, or a group/role, derived from a VOMS extension issued by the experiment. A fundamental shift is occurring to capabilities: the credential, a bearer token, asserts the authorizations of the bearer, not the identity. By the HL-LHC era, the CMS experiment plans for the transition to tokens, based on the WLCG Common JSON Web Token profile, to be complete. Services in the technology architecture include the INDIGO Identity and Access Management server to issue tokens; a HashiCorp Vault server to store and refresh access tokens for users and jobs; a managed token bastion server to push credentials to the HTCondor CredMon service; and HTCondor to maintain valid tokens in long-running batch jobs. We will describe the transition plans of the experiment, current status, configuration of the central authorization server, lessons learned in commissioning token-based access with sites, and operational experience using tokens for both job submissions and file transfers.

43 PARTICLE ACCELERATORS↗

Precursor Analysis Report: Industroyer Targeting Ukraine Electric Power Transport Utility (Ukrenergo) 2016

The Industroyer Targeting Ukraine Electric Power Transport Utility (Ukrenergo) 2016 Precursor Analysis Report leverages publicly available information about the December 2016 cyber attack against the Ukrainian Ukrenergo electric transmission utility and catalogs anomalous observables for each technique employed in the attack. This analysis is based upon the methodology of the Cybersecurity for the Operational Technology Environment (CyOTE) program. Industroyer is a modular malware framework designed to deploy several Industrial Control System (ICS) protocol-specific attack payloads to disrupt electricity distribution. Adversaries deployed Industroyer within the target network on a Microsoft Windows endpoint capable of directly manipulating or communicating with ICS. Industroyer abuses the functionality of a targeted ICS’s legitimate control system to achieve its intended impact. Adversaries likely first gained access to Ukrenergo enterprise networks in early 2016 after a successful spearphishing campaign against organizations in the electric power sector. Adversaries then began capturing credentials beginning on 1 December 2016. This allowed access to the ICS environment at the Pivnichna electric transmission substation outside Kyiv through a device dual-homed on the Information Technology (IT) and ICS networks. Adversaries conducted discovery, targeting, and access to this device using information and previously captured credentials from compromised enterprise IT machines. Finally, the adversaries deployed and launched the Industroyer malware just before midnight on 17 December. By midnight, Ukrenergo had lost control of a targeted substation, resulting in electric power outages for over an hour in the city of Kyiv and the Kyiv region. Researchers and analysts identified 31 unique techniques (used in a sequence of 33 steps) utilized during the attack with a total of 846 observables using MITRE ATT&CK® for Industrial Control Systems. The CyOTE program assesses observables accompanying techniques used prior to the triggering event to identify opportunities to detect malicious activity. If observables accompanying the attack techniques are perceived and investigated prior to the triggering event, earlier comprehension of malicious activity can take place. Twenty-nine of the identified techniques used during the Industroyer cyber attack were precursors to the triggering event. Analysis identified 548 observables associated with these precursor techniques, 353 of which were assessed to have an increased likelihood of being perceived in the 300 days preceding the triggering event. The response and comprehension time could have been reduced if the observables had been identified earlier. The information gathered in this report contributes to a library of observables tied to a repository of artifacts, data sources, and technique detection references for practitioners and developers to support the comprehension of indicators of attack. Asset owners and operators can use these products if they experience similar observables or to prepare for comparable scenarios.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Digital Assurance Checklist for Homeowners and Installers

This document provides a comprehensive Digital Assurance Checklist for securing behind-the-meter energy assets, focusing on both installers and homeowners. As distributed energy resources (DERs) such as solar PV and battery storage become integral to residential energy systems, cybersecurity emerges as a critical component of reliability and safety. The guide outlines actionable steps for installers during pre-installation, commissioning, and post-installation phases, emphasizing practices like network segmentation, credential management, firmware validation, and homeowner education. For homeowners, the document introduces a tiered approach to cyber hygiene—from essential measures like strong Wi-Fi credentials and automatic updates to advanced strategies such as network segmentation, DNS filtering, and intrusion detection. By adopting these practices, stakeholders can mitigate cyber risks, safeguard energy infrastructure, and ensure resilient, secure operation of DER systems. Additional resources and references to industry standards are included to support implementation.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Digital Assurance Checklist for Homeowners and Installers

This document provides a comprehensive Digital Assurance Checklist for securing behind-the-meter energy assets, focusing on both installers and homeowners. As distributed energy resources (DERs) such as solar PV and battery storage become integral to residential energy systems, cybersecurity emerges as a critical component of reliability and safety. The guide outlines actionable steps for installers during pre-installation, commissioning, and post-installation phases, emphasizing practices like network segmentation, credential management, firmware validation, and homeowner education. For homeowners, the document introduces a tiered approach to cyber hygiene—from essential measures like strong Wi-Fi credentials and automatic updates to advanced strategies such as network segmentation, DNS filtering, and intrusion detection. By adopting these practices, stakeholders can mitigate cyber risks, safeguard energy infrastructure, and ensure resilient, secure operation of DER systems. Additional resources and references to industry standards are included to support implementation.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Energy Auditor and Quality Control Inspector Certification Updates

This presentation discusses recent and future Home Energy Professional credential and resource updates at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory in support to the U.S Department of Energy's Weatherization Assistance Program (WAP). It will provide an in-depth overview of planned improvements to the EA and QCI certification schemes.

certification↗

Leveraging 13C-Labeling to Assign Molecular Formulas to Unknown Yeast Metabolites

Mass spectrometry analyses have identified tens of thousands of unknown small molecule-associated peaks in different biological specimens. Notably, even the simplest and best studied organisms like Escherichia coli and Saccharomyces cerevisiae yield thousands of unknown peaks. A key question is how many of these reflect actual novel endogenous metabolites. To explore this, Mahieu and Patti used complete 13 C -labeling in E. coli to credential peaks as biological. This reduced the number of unknowns by more than 90%. Here, we carry out similar uniform 13 C-labeling in the Baker’s yeast S. cerevisiae and two less-studied bioenergy-relevant yeasts Rhodotorula toruloides (lipid producer) and Issatchenkia orientalis (organic acid producer). Identification of unknown metabolite peaks and their molecular formulas is facilitated through software tailored for 13 C labeling data and resulting knowledge of carbon atom count. A classification model evaluates the plausibility of each candidate formula, with peaks lacking plausible candidate formulas unlikely to reflect metabolite molecular ions. This approach prioritizes about one hundred candidate abundant unknown metabolites with logical molecular formulas. Most of these are species-specific rather than conserved across yeasts, and more are found in the nonmodel yeasts than S. cerevisiae. Thus, 13 C-labeling data on unknown metabolites highlights the potential for discovering new metabolites and pathways in nonmodel yeasts.

Carbon↗

WLCG transition from X.509 to Tokens: Progress and Outlook

Since 2017, the Worldwide LHC Computing Grid (WLCG) has been working towards enabling token-based authentication and authorization throughout its entire middleware stack.Taking guidance from the WLCG Token Transition Timeline, published in 2022, substantial progress has been achieved not only in making middleware compatible with the use of tokens, but also in understanding the limitations of the WLCG Common JWT Profiles, first published in 2019. Significant scalability experience has been gained from Data Challenge 2024, during which millions of files were transferred with tokens used as credentials - a significant percentage of the total transfers completed.Besides describing the state of affairs in the transition to tokens, revisions to the WLCG token profile, and the evolving road maps, this contribution also covers the corresponding transition from VOMS-Admin to INDIGO-IAM services, with continuing improvements in terms of functionality as well as deployment.

Dack, Thomas [Rutherford Appleton Laboratory]↗

General-Purpose Unsupervised Cyber Anomaly Detection via Non-Negative Tensor Factorization

Distinguishing malicious anomalous activities from unusual but benign activities is a fundamental challenge for cyber defenders. Prior studies have shown that statistical user behavior analysis yields accurate detections by learning behavior profiles from observed user activity. These unsupervised models are able to generalize to unseen types of attacks by detecting deviations from normal behavior, without knowledge of specific attack signatures. However, approaches proposed to date based on probabilistic matrix factorization are limited by the information conveyed in a two-dimensional space. Non-negative tensor factorization, on the other hand, is a powerful unsupervised machine learning method that naturally models multi-dimensional data, capturing complex and multi-faceted details of behavior profiles. Herein, our new unsupervised statistical anomaly detection methodology matches or surpasses state-of-the-art supervised learning baselines across several challenging and diverse cyber application areas, including detection of compromised user credentials, botnets, spam e-mails, and fraudulent credit card transactions.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗