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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2005

Passive Stability on an Entry Vehicle to Enhance Crew Survival

The most desirable crew survival feature for an entry vehicle is probably a full coverage escape system. With full coverage escape, crew survival is maintained for a wide range of failures by the allowing the crew to escape from the failed vehicle and performing the entry to touchdown flight phase in an alternative system. However, there are considerable challenges in providing a separate entry capability, and for some programs, requiring full coverage escape could result in program cancellation. An alternative means of providing for crew survival if the flight control system fails is to design a return vehicle that can enter without active attitude control. A study was performed to assess the feasibility of performing a totally passive entry. Lift over drag has a major impact on performing a passive entry, so a parametric of three typical lift over drag concepts was performed. First an assessment of historical entry vehicles was completed. Second an assessment of end of mission entry trajectories and entry trajectories initiated from ascent abort profiles were made. Trajectories for a wide array of pitch, yaw, and roll rates were made. Third, six-degree-of freedom analyses of the entry were performed. FOP a truly passive return, the entry vehicle must trim in only the heat shield forward orientation. An assessment of the effect of center of gravity placement to achieve this orientation was made.

Deger, Daniel J.↗
NASA NTRS2009

Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report

NASA commissioned the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) to conduct a thorough review of both the technical and the organizational causes of the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and her crew on February 1, 2003. The accident investigation that followed determined that a large piece of insulating foam from Columbia s external tank (ET) had come off during ascent and struck the leading edge of the left wing, causing critical damage. The damage was undetected during the mission. The CAIB's findings and recommendations were published in 2003 and are available on the web at http://caib.nasa.gov/. NASA responded to the CAIB findings and recommendations with the Space Shuttle Return to Flight Implementation Plan. Significant enhancements were made to NASA's organizational structure, technical rigor, and understanding of the flight environment. The ET was redesigned to reduce foam shedding and eliminate critical debris. In 2005, NASA succeeded in returning the space shuttle to flight. In 2010, the space shuttle will complete its mission of assembling the International Space Station and will be retired to make way for the next generation of human space flight vehicles: the Constellation Program. The Space Shuttle Program recognized the importance of capturing the lessons learned from the loss of Columbia and her crew to benefit future human exploration, particularly future vehicle design. The program commissioned the Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team (SCSIIT). The SCSIIT was asked to perform a comprehensive analysis of the accident, focusing on factors and events affecting crew survival, and to develop recommendations for improving crew survival for all future human space flight vehicles. To do this, the SCSIIT investigated all elements of crew survival, including the design features, equipment, training, and procedures intended to protect the crew. This report documents the SCSIIT findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

Source record↗
NASA NTRS2010

Introduction of the Space Shuttle Columbia Accident, Investigation Details, Findings and Crew Survival Investigation Report

As the Space Shuttle Program comes to an end, it is important that the lessons learned from the Columbia accident be captured and understood by those who will be developing future aerospace programs and supporting current programs. Aeromedical lessons learned from the Accident were presented at AsMA in 2005. This Panel will update that information, closeout the lessons learned, provide additional information on the accident and provide suggestions for the future. To set the stage, an overview of the accident is required. The Space Shuttle Columbia was returning to Earth with a crew of seven astronauts on 1Feb, 2003. It disintegrated along a track extending from California to Louisiana and observers along part of the track filmed the breakup of Columbia. Debris was recovered from Littlefield, Texas to Fort Polk, Louisiana, along a 567 statute mile track; the largest ever recorded debris field. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) concluded its investigation in August 2003, and released their findings in a report published in February 2004. NASA recognized the importance of capturing the lessons learned from the loss of Columbia and her crew and the Space Shuttle Program managers commissioned the Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team (SCSIIT) to accomplish this. Their task was to perform a comprehensive analysis of the accident, focusing on factors and events affecting crew survival, and to develop recommendations for improving crew survival, including the design features, equipment, training and procedures intended to protect the crew. NASA released the Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report in December 2008. Key personnel have been assembled to give you an overview of the Space Shuttle Columbia accident, the medical response, the medico-legal issues, the SCSIIT findings and recommendations and future NASA flight surgeon spacecraft accident response training. Educational Objectives: Set the stage for the Panel to address the investigation, medico-legal issues, the Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team report and training for accident response.

Chandler, Michael↗
NASA NTRS2012

Space Suits and Crew Survival Systems Branch Education and Public Outreach Support of NASA's Strategic Goals in Fiscal Year 2012

As NASA plans to send people beyond low Earth orbit, it is important to educate and inspire the next generation of astronauts, engineers, scientist, and general public. This is so important to NASA future that it is one of the agencies strategic goals. The Space Suits and Crew Survival Systems Branch at Johnson Space Center (JSC) is actively involved in helping to achieve this goal by sharing our hardware and technical experts with students, educators, and the general public and educating them about the challenges of human space flight, with Education and Public Outreach (EPO). This paper summarizes the Space Suit and Crew Survival Systems Branch EPO efforts throughout fiscal year 2012.

Jennings, Mallory A.↗
NASA NTRS2013

Space Suits and Crew Survival Systems Branch Education and Public Outreach Support of NASA's Strategic Goals in Fiscal Year 2012

As NASA plans to send people beyond low Earth orbit, it is important to educate and inspire the next generation of astronauts, engineers, scientists, and the general public. This is so important to NASA s future that it is one of the agency s strategic goals. The Space Suits and Crew Survival Systems Branch at Johnson Space Center (JSC) is actively involved in achieving this goal by sharing our hardware and technical experts with students, educators, and the general public and educating them about the challenges of human space flight, with Education and Public Outreach (EPO). This paper summarizes the Space Suit and Crew Survival Systems Branch EPO efforts throughout fiscal year 2012.

Jennings, Mallory A.↗
NASA NTRS2008

Post-Landing Orion Crew Survival in Warm Ocean Areas: A Case Study in Iterative Environmental Design

The Orion crew module (CM) is being designed to perform survivable land and water landings. There are many issues associated with post-landing crew survival. In general, the most challenging of the realistic Orion landing scenarios from an environmental control standpoint is the off-nominal water landing. Available power and other consumables will be very limited after landing, and it may not be possible to provide full environmental control within the crew cabin for very long after splashdown. Given the bulk and thermal insulation characteristics of the crew-worn pressure suits, landing in a warm tropical ocean area would pose a risk to crew survival from elevated core body temperatures, if for some reason the crewmembers were not able to remove their suits and/or exit the vehicle. This paper summarizes the analyses performed and conclusions reached regarding post-landing crew survival following a water landing, from the standpoint of the crew s core body temperatures.

Rains, George E.↗
NASA NTRS2024

Overview of Integrated Random Vibration Testing of the NASA Orion Crew Survival Suit

The launch ascent and abort random vibration environments from NASA’s Orion spacecraft drove the need to test the NASA Orion Crew Survival Suit as an integrated system with exposure to the design levels. In order to properly characterize component responses, a series of integrated tests were designed to incorporate the interaction between a crew member, suit, seat, and the attenuation system. The first Development Test (2017) included human subjects, and was performed with early development seat and suit components, and low level inputs. It provided a baseline for frequency response and behavior of the integrated system. The next two tests, Development Test (2019) and Qualification Test (2020), used manikin surrogates to represent the crew member and increasing levels of component hardware fidelity in order to test to higher input levels. Testing was performed at NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) and Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Vibration Labs and provided the input levels required to represent the ascent and abort vehicle profiles as well as recorded component response behavior from accelerometer instrumentation and high speed cameras. Inspection of the suit and related components showed that for all seat orientations, and input environments, no damage occurred. Additional pre and post-test checks confirmed the functionality of all suited hardware. Response data of the suited components generally showed heavy attenuation across most of the tested frequency range. Transmissibility plots showed some amplification of components at lower frequency ranges. Overall this series of integrated tests showed that 1) the use of surrogate manikins in the tests were adequate for representing crew in a vibration environment, 2) full vibration levels for ascent and abort were heavily attenuated in the suit components and were non-damaging, and 3) the suit and related components are qualified for the Orion random vibration environments.

Jeffrey D Suhey↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Overview of Integrated Random Vibration Testing of the NASA Orion Crew Survival Suit

The launch ascent and abort random vibration environments from NASA’s Orion spacecraft drove the need to test the NASA Orion Crew Survival Suit as an integrated system with exposure to the design levels. In order to properly characterize component responses, a series of integrated tests were designed to incorporate the interaction between a crew member, suit, seat, and the attenuation system. The first Development Test (2017) included human subjects, and was performed with early development seat and suit components, and low level inputs. It provided a baseline for frequency response and behavior of the integrated system. The next two tests, Development Test (2019) and Qualification Test (2020), used manikin surrogates to represent the crew member and increasing levels of component hardware fidelity in order to test to higher input levels. Testing was performed at NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC) and Kennedy Space Center (KSC) Vibration Labs and provided the input levels required to represent the ascent and abort vehicle profiles as well as recorded component response behavior from accelerometer instrumentation and high speed cameras. Inspection of the suit and related components showed that for all seat orientations, and input environments, no damage occurred. Additional pre and post-test checks confirmed the functionality of all suited hardware. Response data of the suited components generally showed heavy attenuation across most of the tested frequency range. Transmissibility plots showed some amplification of components at lower frequency ranges. Overall this series of integrated tests showed that 1) the use of surrogate manikins in the tests were adequate for representing crew in a vibration environment, 2) full vibration levels for ascent and abort were heavily attenuated in the suit components and were non-damaging, and 3) the suit and related components are qualified for the Orion random vibration environments.

Jeffrey Suhey↗
NASA NTRS2019

Development of a Novel Helmet Support Assembly for NASA Orion Crew Survival Suit

Orion Spacecraft water landing environments have necessitated the design and testing of a novel Helmet Support Assembly (HSA) as part of the NASA Orion Crew Survival Systems (OCSS) launch and re-entry spacesuit. A series of development sled tests using 5 th female, 50th male, and 95th male Hybrid III Anthropometric Test Devices (ATDs) simulated worst case water landings and identified the need for an integrated suit countermeasure to control the helmet during dynamic loading. Initial prototype countermeasures rigidly restrained the helmet keeping the helmet in place as desired, but led to large force and moment transmission to the upper neck. Further development led to a flexible HSA which used high-strength steel wire contoured to the size-matched ATD thorax and attached to both the front and rear of the neck ring. The selected wire diameter and contoured shape provided some ability to flex under the expected worst-case dynamic loads. The existing shoulder harness was used to restrain the helmet motion during “eyeballs out/down” loading while also attempting to prevent head-to-helmet contact in “eyeballs down” spinal-axis loading. A new small prototype helmet was also developed and tested for the 5th and 50th ATDs with both HSA devices. Dynamic impact tests were conducted on the HIA (Horizontal Impulse Accelerator) at Wright Patterson Air Force Base (WPAFB) under simulated off-nominal landing conditions using a representative Orion seat and 5-point harness. For each ATD size, peak Neck Injury Criteria (Nij) were compared to equivalent sled tests with an unsuited ATD configuration. Adding a helmet without attempting to control motion increased peak Nij values for all ATD sizes. The use of the rigid countermeasure showed decreased peak Nij results for the 5th female, but increased peak Nij values for both 50th configurations and the 95th male ATDs. By comparison, the flexible HSA showed reduced peak Nij values for all ATD sizes. Overall, this series of dynamic impact tests identified a risk of increased crew neck loading when under- or over-restraining the helmet during simulated Orion water landings and also demonstrated an effective strategy to mitigate those loads with a compliant HSA design.

Safety↗
NASA NTRS2011

Crew Survivability After a Rapid Cabin Depressurization Event

Anecdotal evidence acquired through historic failure investigations involving rapid cabin decompression (e.g. Challenger, Columbia and Soyuz 11) show that full evacuation of the cabin atmosphere may occur within seconds. During such an event, the delta-pressure between the sealed suit ventilation system and the cabin will rise at the rate of the cabin depressurization; potentially at a rate exceeding the capability of the suit relief valve. It is possible that permanent damage to the suit pressure enclosure and ventilation loop components may occur as the integrated system may be subjected to delta pressures in excess of the design to pressures. Additionally, as the total pressure of the suit ventilation system decreases, so does the oxygen available to the crew. The crew may be subjected to a temporary incapacitating, but non-lethal, hypoxic environment. It is expected that the suit will maintain a survivable atmosphere on the crew until the vehicle pressure control system recovers or the cabin has otherwise attained a habitable environment. A common finding from the aforementioned reports indicates that the crew would have had a better chance at surviving the event had they been in a protective configuration, that is, in a survival suit. Making use of these lessons learned, the Constellation Program implemented a suit loop in the spacecraft design and required that the crew be in a protective configuration, that is suited with gloves on and visors down, during dynamic phases of flight that pose the greatest risk for a rapid and uncontrolled cabin depressurization event: ascent, entry, and docking. This paper details the evaluation performed to derive suit pressure garment and ventilation system performance parameters that would lead to the highest probability of crew survivability after an uncontrolled crew cabin depressurization event while remaining in the realm of practicality for suit design. This evaluation involved: (1) assessment of stakeholder expectations to validate the functionality being imposed; (2) review/refinement of concept of operations to establish the potential triggers for such an event and define the response of the spacecraft and suit ventilation loop pressure control systems; and (3) assessment of system capabilities with respect to structural capability and pressure control. 1 Crew and Thermal Systems Division, NASA Johnson Space Center, Mail Code: AES29, 2101 NASA Parkway, Houston,

Sargusingh, Miriam J.↗
NASA NTRS2012

Crew Survivability After a Rapid Cabin Depressurization Event

Anecdotal evidence acquired through historic failure investigations involving rapid cabin decompression (e.g. Challenger, Columbia and Soyuz 11) show that full evacuation of the cabin atmosphere may occur within seconds. During such an event, the delta-pressure between the sealed suit ventilation system and the cabin will rise at the rate of the cabin depressurization; potentially at a rate exceeding the capability of the suit relief valve. It is possible that permanent damage to the suit pressure enclosure and ventilation loop components may occur as the integrated system may be subjected to delta pressures in excess of the design-to pressures. Additionally, as the total pressure of the suit ventilation system decreases, so does the oxygen available to the crew. The crew may be subjected to a temporarily incapacitating, but non-lethal, hypoxic environment. It is expected that the suit will maintain a survivable atmosphere on the crew until the vehicle pressure control system recovers or the cabin has otherwise attained a habitable environment. A common finding from the aforementioned reports indicates that the crew would have had a better chance at surviving the event had they been in a protective configuration, that is, in a survival suit. Making use of these lessons learned, the Constellation Program implemented a suit loop in the spacecraft design and required that the crew be in a protective configuration, that is suited with gloves on and visors down, during dynamic phases of flight that pose the greatest risk for a rapid and uncontrolled cabin depressurization event: ascent, entry, and docking. This paper details the evaluation performed to derive suit pressure garment and ventilation system performance parameters that would lead to the highest probability of crew survivability after an uncontrolled crew cabin depressurization event while remaining in the realm of practicality for suit design. This evaluation involved: (1) assessment of stakeholder expectations to validate the functionality being imposed; (2) review/refinement of concept of operations to establish the potential triggers for such an event and define the response of the spacecraft and suit ventilation loop pressure control systems; and (3) assessment of system capabilities with respect to structural capability and pressure control.

Sargusingh, Miriam J.↗
NASA NTRS2006

Launch Architecture Impact on Ascent Abort and Crew Survival

A study was performed to assess the effect of booster configuration on the ascent abort process. A generic abort event sequence was created and booster related risk drivers were identified. Three model boosters were considered in light of the risk drivers: a solid rocket motor configuration, a side mount combination solid and liquid configuration, and a stacked liquid configuration. The primary risk drivers included explosive fireball, overpressure, and fragment effects and booster-crew module re-contact. Risk drivers that were not specifically booster dependent were not addressed. The solid rocket configuration had the most benign influence on an abort while the side mount architecture provided the most challenging abort environment.

Mathias, Donovan L.↗
NASA NTRS2002

Historic and Current Launcher Success Rates

This presentation reviews historic and current space launcher success rates from all nations with a mature launcher industry. Data from the 1950's through present day is reviewed for possible trends such as when in the launch timeline a failure occurred, which stages had the highest failure rate, overall launcher reliability, a decade by decade look at launcher reliability, when in a launchers history did failures occur, and the reliability of United States human-rated launchers. This information is useful in determining where launcher reliability can be improved and where additional measures for crew survival (i.e., Crew Escape systems) will have the greatest emphasis

Rust, Randy↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Gateway Integrated Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) Overview and Status

The Gateway comprised of modules provided by commercial and international partners will be a lunar orbiting platform that is a critical element in the Moon to Mars architecture. Of the 4 modules that comprise the Gateway, the core Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) is provided by the Habitation and Logistics Outpost (HALO) module provided by NASA, and the International Habitat (I-Hab) provided by the European Space Agency (ESA) with the ECLSS provided by the Japanese Space Agency (JAXA). These modules work together to provide pressure control, air revitalization, and air conditioning capabilities for the Gateway integrated habitable volumes and attached visiting vehicles during open hatch crewed operations. Individually, they maintain the internal atmosphere during the long periods of dormancy between crewed operations to support payload operations and ensure a safe environment when the crew returns. Additionally, NASA bolsters crew survivability by providing government furnished equipment (GFE) to support crew survival in the face of catastrophic hazards (such as fire or a cabin air leak) until the Gateway stack reaches a point in the orbit where crew can safely abort on Orion. This paper explains the key driving requirements, architecture, and development status of the Gateway ECLSS.

Gateway↗