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At least 19 records

An Approach for Validating Actinide and Fission Product Burnup Credit Criticality Safety Analyses: Criticality (k eff ) Predictions

One of the most important remaining challenges associated with expanded implementation of burnup credit in the United States is the validation of depletion and criticality calculations used in the safety evaluation—in particular, the availability and use of applicable measured data to support validation, especially for fission products (FPs). Applicants and regulatory reviewers have been constrained by both a scarcity of data and a lack of clear technical basis or approach for use of the data. In this study, this paper describes a validation approach for commercial spent nuclear fuel (SNF) criticality safety (k eff ) evaluations based on best-available data and methods and applies the approach for representative SNF storage and transport configurations/conditions to demonstrate its usage and applicability, as well as to provide reference bias results. The criticality validation approach utilizes not only available laboratory critical experiment (LCE) data from the International Handbook of Evaluated Criticality Safety Benchmark Experiments and the French Haut Taux de Combustion program to support validation of the principal actinides but also calculated sensitivities, nuclear data uncertainties, and limited available FP LCE data to predict and verify individual biases for relevant minor actinides and FPs. The results demonstrate that (a) sufficient critical experiment data exist to adequately validate k eff calculations via conventional validation approaches for the primary actinides, (b) sensitivity-based critical experiment selection is more appropriate for generating accurate application model bias and uncertainty, and (c) calculated sensitivities and nuclear data uncertainties can be used for generating conservative estimates of bias for minor actinides and FPs. Results based on the SCALE 6.1 and the ENDF/B-VII.0 cross-section libraries indicate that a conservative estimate of the bias for the minor actinides and FPs is 1.5% of their worth within the application model. Finally, this paper provides a detailed description of the approach and its technical bases, describes the application of the approach for representative pressurized water reactor and boiling water reactor safety analysis models, and provides reference bias results based on the prerelease SCALE 6.1 code package and ENDF/B-VII nuclear cross-section data.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

The Development, Content, Design, and Conduct of the 2011 Piloted US DOE Nuclear Criticality Safety Program Criticality Safety Engineering Training and Education Project

In May 1973 the University of New Mexico conducted the first nationwide criticality safety training and education week-long short course for nuclear criticality safety engineers. Subsequent to that course, the Los Alamos Critical Experiments Facility (LACEF) developed very successful 'hands-on' subcritical and critical training programs for operators, supervisors, and engineering staff. Since the inception of the US Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear Criticality Technology and Safety Project (NCT&SP) in 1983, the DOE has stimulated contractor facilities and laboratories to collaborate in the furthering of nuclear criticality as a discipline. That effort included the education and training of nuclear criticality safety engineers (NCSEs). In 1985 a textbook was written that established a path toward formalizing education and training for NCSEs. Though the NCT&SP went through a brief hiatus from 1990 to 1992, other DOE-supported programs were evolving to the benefit of NCSE training and education. In 1993 the DOE established a Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) and undertook a comprehensive development effort to expand the extant LACEF 'hands-on' course specifically for the education and training of NCSEs. That successful education and training was interrupted in 2006 for the closing of the LACEF and the accompanying movement of materials and critical experiment machines to the Nevada Test Site. Prior to that closing, the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) was commissioned by the US DOE NCSP to establish an independent hands-on NCSE subcritical education and training course. The course provided an interim transition for the establishment of a reinvigorated and expanded two-week NCSE education and training program in 2011. The 2011 piloted two-week course was coordinated by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and jointly conducted by the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) classroom education and facility training, the Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) hands-on criticality experiments training, and the US DOE National Criticality Experiment Research Center (NCERC) hands-on criticality experiments training that is jointly supported by LLNL and LANL and located at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) This paper provides the description of the bases, content, and conduct of the piloted, and future US DOE NCSP Criticality Safety Engineer Training and Education Project.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Current Status of the DOE/NNSA Nuclear Criticality Safety Program Hands-on Criticality Safety Training Courses

In 2011, the US Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) developed and piloted a 2-week nuclear criticality safety (NCS) practitioner course to support training and qualification of new NCS staff. The course was developed in accordance with the American National Standard Institute/American Nuclear Society (ANSI/ANS) standard for NCS training and qualifications (ANSI/ANS-8.26-2007). In 2013, an NCS manager’s course was developed for process supervisors, managers, regulators, and other professionals with NCS-related responsibilities. These courses consist of classroom education, facility training, and hands-on subcritical and critical experiments training. Each course is currently offered twice per year. The 2-week practitioner course offers a week of classroom training, with practical workshops and exercises focused on teaching students how to perform an NCS evaluation. The second week of training involves hands-on critical and subcritical experiments and measurements. The first week is offered in Las Vegas, Nevada, at the DOE Nevada Field Office or the National Atomic Testing Museum. Depending on the student’s clearance level, the second week is offered at Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) (uncleared and L-cleared students) or at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) (Q-cleared students). The 1-week manager’s course is offered at SNL or NCERC, depending on clearance or interest, and includes classroom and hands-on critical and subcritical experiments and measurements. This paper provides an overview and status report for the DOE/NNSA NCSP training courses in NCS and provides information about future course offerings.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

A primer on criticality safety

Criticality is the state of a nuclear chain reacting medium when the chain reaction is just self-sustaining (or critical). Criticality is dependent on nine interrelated parameters. Moreover, we design criticality safety controls in order to constrain these parameters to minimize fissions and maximize neutron leakage and absorption in other materials, which makes criticality more difficult or impossible to achieve. We present the consequences of criticality accidents are discussed, the nine interrelated parameters that combine to affect criticality are described, and criticality safety controls used to minimize the likelihood of a criticality accident are presented.

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Current Status of the DOE/NNSA Nuclear Criticality Safety Program Hands-On Criticality Safety Training

The U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) has conducted two-week Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Practitioner courses since 2011 to support the training and qualification of new NCS staff. The course was developed in accordance with the American National Standard Institute/American Nuclear Society (ANSI/ANS) standard for NCS training and qualifications (ANSI/ANS-8.26-2007). In 2013, an NCS Manager’s course was developed for process supervisors, managers, regulators, and other professionals with NCS-related responsibilities. This course was revised in 2019 for Criticality Safety Officers (CSOs) based on an NCSP Criticality Safety Support Group tasking (2018-01). This course was piloted at the Nevada Field Office and the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) in June 2021. These courses consist of the following training components: classroom education, facility training, and hands-on subcritical and critical experiments training. The two-week Practitioner course offers a week of classroom training, with practical workshops and exercises focused on teaching students how to perform an NCS evaluation. The second week of training involves hands-on critical and subcritical experiments and measurements. The first week is offered in Las Vegas, Nevada, at the DOE Nevada Field Office or the National Atomic Testing Museum. Depending on the student’s clearance level, the second week is offered at Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) (uncleared and L-cleared students) or at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (Q-cleared students). The one-week Manager’s course is offered at SNL or NCERC, depending on clearance or interest, and includes classroom and hands- on critical and subcritical experiments and measurements. This paper provides an overview and status report for the DOE/NNSA NCSP training courses in NCS and to provide information about future course offerings. This paper discusses the challenges associated with executing the training courses during the COVID-19 pandemic. The 2-week Practitioner and 1-week manager courses are currently offered twice per year and adjustments are made based upon demand.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Current Status of the DOE/NNSA Nuclear Criticality Safety Program Hands-On Criticality Safety Training [Abstract]

The U.S. Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) has conducted two-week Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS) Practitioner courses since 2011 to support the training and qualification of new NCS staff. The course was developed in accordance with the American National Standard Institute/American Nuclear Society (ANSI/ANS) standard for NCS training and qualifications (ANSI/ANS-8.26-2007). In 2013, an NCS Manager’s course was developed for process supervisors, managers, regulators, and other professionals with NCS-related responsibilities. This course was revised in 2019 for Criticality Safety Officers (CSOs) based on an NCSP Criticality Safety Support Group tasking (2018-01). This course was piloted at the Nevada Field Office and the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) in June 2021. These courses consist of the following training components: classroom education, facility training, and hands-on subcritical and critical experiments training. The two-week Practitioner course offers a week of classroom training, with practical workshops and exercises focused on teaching students how to perform an NCS evaluation. The second week of training involves hands-on critical and subcritical experiments and measurements. The first week is offered in Las Vegas, Nevada, at the DOE Nevada Field Office or the National Atomic Testing Museum. Depending on the student’s clearance level, the second week is offered at Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) (uncleared and L-cleared students) or at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (Q-cleared students). The one-week Manager’s course is offered at SNL or NCERC, depending on clearance or interest, and includes classroom and hands-on critical and subcritical experiments and measurements. This paper provides an overview and status report for the DOE/NNSA NCSP training courses in NCS and to provide information about future course offerings. This paper will also discuss the challenges associated with executing the training courses during the COVID-19 pandemic. The 2-week Practitioner and 1-week manager courses are currently offered twice per year and adjustments are made based upon demand.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗

Current Status of the DOE Nuclear Criticality Safety Program Hands-on Criticality Safety Training Course at Sandia

A hands-on critical-experiment training class has been developed by the US DOE Nuclear Criticality Safety Program using the water-moderated pin-fueled critical experiments at Sandia National Laboratories. The class is offered as part of the NCSP training program for Nuclear Criticality Safety Engineers in a facility that allows attendance by both cleared and uncleared personnel. Laboratory exercises have been developed that demonstrate the effects of varying a number of the parameters that are considered important to criticality safety. Accompanying the experiments is a series of classroom presentations that emphasize the concepts that are demonstrated in the experiments.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Criticality Safety Evaluation of Standard Criticality Safety Requirements #1-520 g Operations in PF-4

Guidance has been requested from the Nuclear Criticality Safety Division (NCSD) regarding processes that involve 520 grams of fissionable material or less. This Level-3 evaluation was conducted and documented in accordance with NCS-AP-004 (Ref. 1), formerly NCS-GUIDE-01. This evaluation is being written as a generic evaluation for all operations that will be able to operate using a 520-gram mass limit. Implementation for specific operations will be performed using a Level 1 CSED, which will confirm and document that this CSED can be used for the specific operation as discussed in NCS-MEMO-17-007 (Ref. 2). This Level 3 CSED updates and supersedes the analysis performed in NCS-TECH-14-014 (Ref. 3).

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Current status of the DOE/NNSA nuclear criticality safety program hands-on criticality safety training courses

In 2011 the US Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) developed and piloted a 2-week nuclear criticality safety (NCS) practitioner course to support training and qualification of new NCS staff. The course was developed in accordance with the American National Standard Institute/American Nuclear Society (ANSI/ANS) standard for NCS training and qualifications (ANSI/ANS-8.26-2007). In 2013, an NCS manager's course was developed for process supervisors, managers, regulators, and other professionals with NCS-related responsibilities. These courses consist of classroom education, facility training, and hands-on subcritical and critical experiments training. Each course is currently offered twice per year. The 2-week practitioner course offers a week of classroom training, with practical workshops and exercises focused on teaching students how to perform an NCS evaluation. The second week of training involves hands-on critical and subcritical experiments and measurements. The first week is offered in Las Vegas, Nevada, at the DOE Nevada Field Office or the National Atomic Testing Museum. Depending on the student's clearance level, the second week is offered at Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) (uncleared and L-cleared students) or at the National Criticality Experiments Research Center (NCERC) (Q-cleared students). The 1-week manager's course is offered at SNL or NCERC, depending on clearance or interest, and includes classroom and hands-on critical and subcritical experiments and measurements. This paper provides an overview and status report for the DOE/NNSA NCSP training courses in NCS and provides information about future course offerings. (author)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗

Criticality Safety Evaluation Project Development for University of California Berkely Nuclear Criticality Safety Pipeline Course

The Nuclear Criticality Safety Division at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has taken a unique approach to developing criticality safety evaluation topics in support of the University of California Berkeley criticality safety pipeline course. The evaluation topics are designed to go beyond the typical evaluation examples used for many training courses including vault storage and variations on storage arrays. These types of evaluations provide in-depth analysis into the fundamentals of criticality safety and are complex but may be far off from what a new criticality safety engineer may actually be evaluating. To provide more practical examples of criticality safety evaluation topics that are better fit for the knowledge level of a criticality safety engineer in-training, variations of current and future operations and research operations performed at LLNL are used as evaluation topics. Additionally, an emphasis on research is included in all evaluation topics as it allows students to take advantage of the concepts learned in class to apply them for process improvement, engineering equipment that is favorable for criticality safety, and negotiation tactics to work with operations personnel. The process used by LLNL to develop project topics for the pipeline course is provided in this paper. The intent is to provide an alternative technique for training students and potentially younger staff members in criticality safety on developing criticality safety evaluations.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Current Status of the DOE/NNSA Nuclear Criticality Safety Program Hands-on Criticality Safety Training Courses [Slides]

The NCSP training and education program has been conducted since 2011 and has trained over 591 students. 388 students have been trained in the 2-week hands-on course for practitioners and 203 students have been trained in the 1-week manager courses. The course is continuously improved using lessons-learned from the prior year, and new course content is added as necessary. Special courses are developed and offered periodically at the discretion of the NCSP manager. The updated manager course for CSOs was successfully piloted at NCERC in June 2020 and was successfully piloted at Sandia in April 2022. Students interested in taking the courses should visit the DOE NCSP website for additional information about all course offerings and for information about course registration.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

OVERVIEW AND STATUS OF DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS FOR NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY

For many years, the United States (US) and international consensus standards for nuclear criticality safety (NCS) have provided guidance for those with hands-on operations involving fissionable materials. These consensus standards have been crucial to reducing the number of criticality accidents in process facilities. The last known criticality accident inside the United States was in 1978 (nearly 41 years ago) at the Idaho Chemical Processing Plant, and outside the United States, an accident occurred at Tokai-mura, Japan, in 1999 (20 years ago). The domestic consensus standards for NCS include the American Nuclear Society (ANS) standards. The ANS Standards Board, the NCS Consensus Committee, and the ANS-8 Subcommittee oversee the development and maintenance of these standards. Currently there are 18 standards in the ANS-8 series: 6 are in revision mode and 12 are in maintenance mode. The international consensus standards for NCS calculations, procedures, and practices are maintained and developed within the International Organization for Standardization, Technical Committee 85 on Nuclear Energy, Subcommittee 5 on Nuclear Fuel Technology, and Working Group 8, “Nuclear Criticality Safety.” Eight standards are currently available, three standards are in revision mode, and four proposed standards are at various stages of development. This paper provides the NCS community with an overview and status report on domestic and international NCS consensus standards to stimulate interest and to support their continued development.

Bowen, Douglas G.↗

Importance of Plutonium Turnings in Criticality Safety

In criticality safety, turnings are a concern due to the fact that they leave interstitial space in which a moderator can ingress and reduce the critical mass for a fissile material. As turnings are produced when a Plutonium (Pu) items are machined, they are commonly encountered in facilities that process Pu. The intent of this paper is to establish minimum subcritical mass data points for Pu turnings based on the minimum density achievable as measured in a turnings experiment performed at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). Further discussion will cover the implications of these results with concern to criticality safety during normal operations and during a glovebox fire scenario.

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Comparative Analysis of Confidence Metrics for Nuclear Criticality Safety

Nuclear criticality safety standards provide guidance on the requirements and recommendations to establish confidence in computerized model results used to support operation with fissionable materials. By design, the guidance is not prescriptive, leaving the analysts free to determine how various sources of uncertainties are to be statistically aggregated. This report compares the analyses and key assumptions behind four notable methodologies documented in the nuclear criticality safety literature: the parametric, nonparametric, Whisper, and TSURFER methodologies. Because of the involved use of statistics entangled with heuristic recipes, the results of these methodologies are often difficult to interpret. Also, they are augmented by additional large administrative margins, eliminating the incentive to understand their differences. With the new resurgent wave of advanced nuclear systems focused on economizing operation—including advanced reactors, fuel cycles, and fuel concepts—there is a strong need to develop a clear understanding of uncertainties and their fusion methodologies to reduce uncertainties in a scientifically defensible manner. This report offers a deep dive into the various assumptions of the four noted methodologies, their adequacy, and their limitations, to provide guidance on developing confidence for the emergent nuclear systems. These systems are expected to be challenged by the scarcity of experimental data.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗

Importance of Plutonium Turnings in Criticality Safety

In criticality safety, turnings are a concern due to the fact that they leave interstitial space in which a moderator can ingress and reduce the critical mass for a fissile material. As turnings are produced when a Plutonium (Pu) items are machined, they are commonly encountered in facilities that process Pu. The intent of this paper is to establish minimum subcritical mass data points for Pu turnings based on the minimum density achievable as measured in a turnings experiment performed at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). Further discussion will cover the implications of these results with concern to criticality safety during normal operations and during a glovebox fire scenario. The results of the study show that a bare homogeneous Pu turnings (at 0.252 kg/L) and water mixture has a spherical critical mass of 3.80 kg, while the fully water reflected spherical critical mass of the same Pu turnings and water mixture has a critical mass of 1.65 kg. When mixed with an idealized hydrocarbon oil rather than water, the spherical critical mass is reduced. In this case, the bare critical mass of the homogeneous Pu turnings and oil mixture is 2.57 kg while the fully water reflected spherical critical mass of the Pu turnings and oil mixture is 1.17 kg. The results of this study show that up to approximately 1000 g of Pu turnings even if mixed with an ideal hydrocarbon and flooded would not be a criticality concern during fire fighting activities. (authors)

11 NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE AND FUEL MATERIALS↗

Nuclear Criticality Safety Assessment of Criticality Control Containers without Moderation Control at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) provides for safe, permanent disposal of government-owned transuranic (TRU) and TRU mixed wastes. Receipt and disposal of waste at the WIPP site began in March 1999. The Sandia report, Consideration of Nuclear Criticality When Disposing of Transuranic Waste at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, addressed potential nuclear criticality safety issues based on the projected inventory characteristics known at the time [1]. As designs for inventory, waste forms, and disposal packages have changed, new analyses have been performed, and updates have been made to address any potential effects to the WIPP safety basis. New analyses performed include Saylor 2017 [2] and Brickner 2019 [3], which address certain waste containers with specified loadings under post-closure conditions. Both examined several hypothetical scenarios and included analyses to bound (from a criticality potential standpoint) credible configurations that could occur at WIPP during the repository regulatory post-closure disposal time period for feature, event, and process (FEP) considerations—10,000 years. During this post-closure period at WIPP, the screening of FEPs is governed by the risk-based standards and implementing regulations of the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (i.e., 40 CFR 191 and 40 CFR 194, respectively) [4,5]. An FEP screening can be based on either a low-consequence or low-probability rationale. A low-probability rationale includes either (a) a qualitative rationale that the FEP is not credible or (b) a quantitative demonstration that the probability is less than 10-4 in 104 years. In this evaluation, a qualitative lowprobability rationale of not credible is used by demonstrating that bounding configurations of the waste are not critical. The demonstration of subcriticality is through quantitative calculations, but a probability of criticality is not evaluated. Rather, the rationale for this evaluation is that bounding configurations with an effective neutron multiplication factor (keff) well below the upper subcriticality limit (USL) make criticality incredible. Reference [2] documented a nuclear criticality assessment of the WIPP repository for disposal of dilute surplus plutonium materials using the Dilute and Dispose Approach and packaging in criticality control overpacks (CCOs). The CCO is the waste disposal container recently designed to allow for up to 380 fissile gram equivalent (FGE) 239 Pu per drum, which is a higher fissile loading than typical waste containers. The CCO consists of a criticality control container (CCC) positioned by upper and lower plywood spacers within a standard 55 gal drum. The CCC is used to establish a geometry control for fissile materials during transportation and WIPP emplacement operations. The current WIPP waste acceptance criteria for CCO payloads limit beryllium to less than or equal to 1% by weight of the waste contents and require the waste form to be non-machine compacted. Reference [2] considered two scenario progressions—room closure from salt creep, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured dry scenario, and flooding with brine, hereafter referred to as the reconfigured wet scenario. The subsequent drying out of the reconfigured wet scenarios was also considered. For all scenarios, subcriticality was maintained when 50 g of B 4 C (acting as a neutron absorber) per CCC was intermixed within the plutonium disposition waste form. The analysis used a waste form description that limits the amount of moderation that could be present within the waste form (i.e., it limits the amount of water and polyethylene that could be present based on planned processing conditions). This analysis to evaluate increased limits on the amount of moderation that could be present was performed as a companion to Reference [2] to address concerns associated with verifying moisture and/or plastic contents of waste materials following packaging of dilute surplus plutonium in the CCO. To that end, this analysis used the models and methods from Reference [2] to evaluate a more generic base waste form consisting of water and polyethylene that is more similar (and nearly identical) to the generic waste forms utilized in other models/analyses supporting the TRU Package Transporter Model II (TRUPACTII) safety analysis [6] (all are without moderation controls). The waste form in this analysis uses a base mixture of 75% water and 25% polyethylene, the total amount of which is varied to determine the optimum moderation to fissile material (H/Pu) ratio. The fissile loading is maintained at up to 380 FGE 239 Pu (modeled as PuO 2 ) per CCO with an additional 545 g of beryllium (to bound the 1% by weight contents restriction) and 50 g of B 4 C intermixed per CCO. The beryllium content (1% by weight) is based on the total allowed waste weight (this does not include packaging and container weights). Figures ES-1 and ES-2 display summary results, showing that with this model including 50 g of B 4 C per CCO, the system keff remains under 0.85 for all moderator amounts and provides a significant margin against post-closure criticality under postulated bounding conditions for compaction. Figure ES-1 compares an infinite model with a room model at the initial emplacement spacing and under full radial compaction. Full radial compaction places each CCC in direct contact and does not credit any anticipated spacing associated with current post-closure geomechanical modeling of the repository [7]. The effects of variations in the H/Pu ratio were evaluated by varying the amount of the water/polyethylene component of the waste model, with fissile loading maintained at 380 239 Pu FGE. Similarly, Figure ES-2 illustrates how various amounts of B 4 C per CCO influence k eff at different radial compactions, all at the H/Pu ratio of 200 (in the room array model). Therefore, while the results from Saylor 2017 [2] modeled more realistic process limits associated with packaging of dilute surplus plutonium, this analysis demonstrates that limits on moderation (plastic and water content) are not necessary to ensure subcriticality in the WIPP repository, provided the requisite B 4 C absorber is present.

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗

Water Resistant Container Technical Basis Document for the TA-55 Criticality Safety Program

Criticality safety at TA-55 relies on nuclear material containers that are water resistant to prevent significant amounts of water from coming into contact with fissile material in the event of a fire that causes a breach of glovevbox confinement and subsequent fire water ingress. A “water tight container” is a container that will not allow more than 50ml of water ingress when fully submerged, except when under sufficient pressure to produce structural discontinuity. There are many types of containers, welded containers, hermetically sealed containers, filtered containers, etc.

61 RADIATION PROTECTION AND DOSIMETRY↗