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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2015

Apparatus, system and method for providing cryptographic key information with physically unclonable function circuitry

Techniques and mechanisms for providing a value from physically unclonable function (PUF) circuitry for a cryptographic operation of a security module. In an embodiment, a cryptographic engine receives a value from PUF circuitry and based on the value, outputs a result of a cryptographic operation to a bus of the security module. The bus couples the cryptographic engine to control logic or interface logic of the security module. In another embodiment, the value is provided to the cryptographic engine from the PUF circuitry via a signal line which is distinct from the bus, where any exchange of the value by either of the cryptographic engine and the PUF circuitry is for communication of the first value independent of the bus.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2014

Cryptographic Key Management and Critical Risk Assessment

The Department of Energy Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (DOE-OE) CyberSecurity for Energy Delivery Systems (CSEDS) industry led program (DE-FOA-0000359) entitled "Innovation for Increasing CyberSecurity for Energy Delivery Systems (12CSEDS)," awarded a contract to Sypris Electronics LLC to develop a Cryptographic Key Management System for the smart grid (Scalable Key Management Solutions for Critical Infrastructure Protection). Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and Sypris Electronics, LLC as a result of that award entered into a CRADA (NFE-11-03562) between ORNL and Sypris Electronics, LLC. ORNL provided its Cyber Security Econometrics System (CSES) as a tool to be modified and used as a metric to address risks and vulnerabilities in the management of cryptographic keys within the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) domain of the electric sector. ORNL concentrated our analysis on the AMI domain of which the National Electric Sector Cyber security Organization Resource (NESCOR) Working Group 1 (WG1) has documented 29 failure scenarios. The computational infrastructure of this metric involves system stakeholders, security requirements, system components and security threats. To compute this metric, we estimated the stakes that each stakeholder associates with each security requirement, as well as stochastic matrices that represent the probability of a threat to cause a component failure and the probability of a component failure to cause a security requirement violation. We applied this model to estimate the security of the AMI, by leveraging the recently established National Institute of Standards and Technology Interagency Report (NISTIR) 7628 guidelines for smart grid security and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 63351, Part 9 to identify the life cycle for cryptographic key management, resulting in a vector that assigned to each stakeholder an estimate of their average loss in terms of dollars per day of system operation. To further address probabilities of threats, information security analysis can be performed using game theory implemented in dynamic Agent Based Game Theoretic (ABGT) simulations. Such simulations can be verified with the results from game theory analysis and further used to explore larger scale, real world scenarios involving multiple attackers, defenders, and information assets. The strategy for the game was developed by analyzing five electric sector representative failure scenarios contained in the AMI functional domain from NESCOR WG1. From these five selected scenarios, we characterized them into three specific threat categories affecting confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA). The analysis using our ABGT simulation demonstrated how to model the AMI functional domain using a set of rationalized game theoretic rules decomposed from the failure scenarios in terms of how those scenarios might impact the AMI network with respect to CIA.

Advanced Metering Infrastructure↗
DOE OSTI2014

Centralized Cryptographic Key Management and Critical Risk Assessment - (CRADA Final Report)

The Department of Energy Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability (DOE-OE) Cyber Security for Energy Delivery Systems (CSEDS) industry led program (DE-FOA-0000359) entitled "Innovation for Increasing Cyber Security for Energy Delivery Systems (12CSEDS)," awarded a contract to Sypris Electronics LLC to develop a Cryptographic Key Management System for the smart grid (Scalable Key Management Solutions for Critical Infrastructure Protection). Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and Sypris Electronics, LLC as a result of that award entered into a CRADA (NFE-11-03562) between ORNL and Sypris Electronics, LLC. ORNL provided its Cyber Security Econometrics System (CSES) as a tool to be modified and used as a metric to address risks and vulnerabilities in the management of cryptographic keys within the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) domain of the electric sector. ORNL concentrated our analysis on the AMI domain of which the National Electric Sector Cyber security Organization Resource (NESCOR) Working Group 1 (WG1) has documented 29 failure scenarios. The computational infrastructure of this metric involves system stakeholders, security requirements, system components and security threats. To compute this metric, we estimated the stakes that each stakeholder associates with each security requirement, as well as stochastic matrices that represent the probability of a threat to cause a component failure and the probability of a component failure to cause a security requirement violation. We applied this model to estimate the security of the AMI, by leveraging the recently established National Institute of Standards and Technology Interagency Report (NISTIR) 7628 guidelines for smart grid security and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 63351, Part 9 to identify the life cycle for cryptographic key management, resulting in a vector that assigned to each stakeholder an estimate of their average loss in terms of dollars per day of system operation. To further address probabilities of threats, information security analysis can be performed using game theory implemented in dynamic Agent Based Game Theoretic (ABGT) simulations. Such simulations can be verified with the results from game theory analysis and further used to explore larger scale, real world scenarios involving multiple attackers, defenders, and information assets. The strategy for the game was developed by analyzing five electric sector representative failure scenarios contained in the AMI functional domain from NESCOR WG1. From these five selected scenarios, we characterized them into three specific threat categories affecting confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA). The analysis using our ABGT simulation demonstrated how to model the AMI functional domain using a set of rationalized game theoretic rules decomposed from the failure scenarios in terms of how those scenarios might impact the AMI network with respect to CIA.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Interactive cryptographic proofs of quantumness using mid-circuit measurements

The ability to perform measurements in the middle of a quantum circuit is a powerful resource. It underlies a wide range of applications, from remote state preparation to quantum error correction. Here we apply mid-circuit measurements for a particular task: demonstrating quantum computational advantage. The goal of such a demonstration is for a quantum device to perform a computational task that is infeasible for a classical device with comparable resources. In contrast to existing demonstrations, the distinguishing feature of our approach is that the classical verification process is efficient, both in asymptotic complexity and in practice. Furthermore, the classical hardness of performing the task is based upon well-established cryptographic assumptions. Protocols with these features are known as cryptographic proofs of quantumness. Using a trapped-ion quantum computer, we perform mid-circuit measurements by spatially isolating portions of the ion chain via shuttling. This enables us to implement two interactive cryptographic proofs of quantumness, which when suitably scaled to larger systems, promise the efficient verification of quantum computational advantage. In conclusion, our methods can be applied to a range of interactive quantum protocols.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2018

Efficient Public-key Revocation Management for Secure Smart Meter Communications using One-way Cryptographic Accumulators

Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) forms a communication network for the collection of power data from smart meters in Smart Grid. As the communication within an AMI needs to be secure, public-key cryptography can be used to reduce the overhead of key management. However, it still has certain challenges in terms of certificate revocation and management. In particular, distribution and storage of the Certificate Revocation List (CRL), which holds the revoked certificates, is a major challenge due to its overhead. To address this challenge, in this paper, we propose a novel revocation management scheme by utilizing cryptographic accumulators which not only reduces the space requirements for revocation information but also enables convenient distribution of revocation information to all smart meters. We implemented this oneway cryptographic accumulator-based revocation scheme on ns-3 using IEEE 802.11s mesh standard as a model for AMI and demonstrated its superior performance with respect to traditional methods of CRL management through extensive simulations.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2022

A Cryptographic Method for Defense Against MiTM Cyber Attack in the Electricity Grid Supply Chain

Critical infrastructures such as the electricity grid can be severely impacted by cyber-attacks on its supply chain. Hence, having a robust cybersecurity infrastructure and management system for the electricity grid is a high priority. This paper proposes a cyber-security protocol for defense against man-in-the-middle (MiTM) attacks to the supply chain, which uses encryption and cryptographic multi-party authentication. A cyber-physical simulator is utilized to simulate the power system, control system, and security layers. The correctness of the attack modeling and the cryptographic security protocol against this MiTM attack is demonstrated in four different attack scenarios.

Paul, Shuva↗
DOE OSTI2010

The generation of shared cryptographic keys through channel impulse response estimation at 60 GHz.

Methods to generate private keys based on wireless channel characteristics have been proposed as an alternative to standard key-management schemes. In this work, we discuss past work in the field and offer a generalized scheme for the generation of private keys using uncorrelated channels in multiple domains. Proposed cognitive enhancements measure channel characteristics, to dynamically change transmission and reception parameters as well as estimate private key randomness and expiration times. Finally, results are presented on the implementation of a system for the generation of private keys for cryptographic communications using channel impulse-response estimation at 60 GHz. The testbed is composed of commercial millimeter-wave VubIQ transceivers, laboratory equipment, and software implemented in MATLAB. Novel cognitive enhancements are demonstrated, using channel estimation to dynamically change system parameters and estimate cryptographic key strength. We show for a complex channel that secret key generation can be accomplished on the order of 100 kb/s.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2014

Cryptographic Key Management System (CKMS)

This report summarizes the outcome of U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) contract DE-OE0000543, requesting the design of a Cryptographic Key Management System (CKMS) for the secure management of cryptographic keys for the energy sector infrastructure. Prime contractor Sypris Electronics, in collaboration with Oak Ridge National Laboratories (ORNL), Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), Valicore Technologies, and Purdue University's Center for Education and Research in Information Assurance and Security (CERIAS) and Smart Meter Integration Laboratory (SMIL), has designed, developed and evaluated the CKMS solution. We provide an overview of the project in Section 3, review the core contributions of all contractors in Section 4, and discuss benefits to the DOE in Section 5. In Section 6 we describe the technical construction of the CKMS solution, and review its key contributions in Section 6.9. Section 7 describes the evaluation and demonstration of the CKMS solution in different environments. We summarize the key project objectives in Section 8, list publications resulting from the project in Section 9, and conclude with a discussion on commercialization in Section 10 and future work in Section 11.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2018

Assessment of Post-Quantum Cryptographic Algorithms

Recent research and development in exploiting quantum phenomenon have solidified the creation of large-scale quantum computers as a reality. These machines will have the ability to solve intractable problems defined on conventional computers. This has a significant impact on current cryptographic systems. A viable quantum computer will require an increase in symmetric key sizes and the replacement of asymmetric cryptographic schemes. Specifically, new constructs for public key cryptosystems must be established in order to continue to ensure the security that digital signatures and key exchange protocols provide. Understanding the post-quantum landscape is critical to applying Sandia-developed capabilities to post-quantum cyber areas. Developing a cohort of experts in this challenging and volatile space has enabled our ability to adapt to the new challenges in various customer mission areas.

71 CLASSICAL AND QUANTUM MECHANICS, GENERAL PHYSIC↗
NASA NTRS1980

On the security of the Merkle-Hellman cryptographic scheme

Cryptanalysis applied to a simple Merkle-Hellman (1978) public key cryptographic system (described within a standard-parameter knapsack problem) reveals the high vulnerability of the system. However, a cryptanalytic attack becomes ineffective when the knapsack problem with two or more iterations is used in order to obscure the structure of the superincreasing sequence. To enhance the security of a cryptographic system structured numbers can be used, while the multiple iterations of the modular multiplications technique can produce a safer Merkle-Hellman knapsack system.

Shamir, A.↗
DOE OSTI2019

A Cryptographic Escrow for Treaty Declarations and Step-by-Step Verification

The verification of arms-control and disarmament agreements requires states to provide declarations, including information on sensitive military sites and assets. There are important cases, however, where negotiations of these agreements are impeded because states are reluctant to provide any such data, because of concerns about prematurely handing over militarily significant information. To address this challenge, we present a cryptographic escrow that allows a state to make a complete declaration of sites and assets at the outset and commit to its content, but only reveal the sensitive information therein sequentially. Combined with an inspection regime, our escrow allows for step-by-step verification of the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration so that the information release and inspections keep pace with parallel diplomatic and political processes. We apply this approach to the possible denuclearization of North Korea. Such approaches can be applied, however, to any agreement requiring the sharing of sensitive information.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗
DOE OSTI2018

Analysis of Design Constraints and System Impact of DER Cryptographic Module

In designing a security module for inverter communications in a DER environment, it is critical to consider the impact of the additional security on the environment as well as what types of security is required for the various messages that must pass from the inverter to and from a utility. Also, since cyber security is more than just preventing an unauthorized user from viewing data, mechanisms for proving identity and ensuring that data cannot be altered without such a modification being discovered are needed. This is where the security principles of confidentiality, integrity, and availability come into play. For different types of communications, these different security principles may be important or not needed at all. Furthermore, the cost and constraints for applying cryptography for securing DER communications must be considered to help determine what is feasible within this environment and what will be the impact and cost of applying common cryptographic protections to inverter communications.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2018

Analysis of Design Constraints and System Impact of DER Cryptographic Module

In designing a security module for inverter communications in a DER environment, it is critical to consider the impact of the additional security on the environment as well as what types of security is required for the various messages that must pass from the inverter to and from a utility. Also, since cyber security is more than just preventing an unauthorized user from viewing data, mechanisms for proving identity and ensuring that data cannot be altered without such a modification being discovered are needed. This is where the security principles of confidentiality, integrity, and availability come into play. For different types of communications, these different security principles may be important or not needed at all. Furthermore, the cost and constraints for applying cryptography for securing DER communications must be considered to help determine what is feasible within this environment and what will be the impact and cost of applying common cryptographic protections to inverter communications.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
NASA NTRS2009

Deductive Verification of Cryptographic Software

We report on the application of an off-the-shelf verification platform to the RC4 stream cipher cryptographic software implementation (as available in the openSSL library), and introduce a deductive verification technique based on self-composition for proving the absence of error propagation.

Almeida, Jose Barcelar↗
DOE OSTI2011

Secure Cryptographic Key Management System (CKMS) Considerations for Smart Grid Devices

In this paper, we examine some unique challenges associated with key management in the Smart Grid and concomitant research initiatives: 1) effectively model security requirements and their implementations, and 2) manage keys and key distribution for very large scale deployments such as Smart Meters over a long period of performance. This will set the stage to: 3) develop innovative, low cost methods to protect keying material, and 4) provide high assurance authentication services. We will present our perspective on key management and will discuss some key issues within the life cycle of a cryptographic key designed to achieve the following: 1) control systems designed, installed, operated, and maintained to survive an intentional cyber assault with no loss of critical function, and 2) widespread implementation of methods for secure communication between remote access devices and control centers that are scalable and cost-effective to deploy.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2014

Novel Authentication of Monitoring Data Through the use of Secret and Public Cryptographic Keys

The Office of Nuclear Verification (ONV) is supporting the development of a piece of equipment to provide data authentication and protection for a suite of monitoring sensors as part of a larger effort to create an arms control technology toolkit. This device, currently called the Red Box, leverages the strengths of both secret and public cryptographic keys to authenticate, digitally sign, and pass along monitoring data to allow for host review, and redaction if necessary, without the loss of confidence in the authenticity of the data by the monitoring party. The design of the Red Box will allow for the addition and removal of monitoring equipment and can also verify that the data was collected by authentic monitoring equipment prior to signing the data and sending it to the host and for review. The host will then forward the data to the monitor for review and inspection. This paper will highlight the progress to date of the Red Box development, and will explain the novel method of leveraging both symmetric and asymmetric (secret and public key) cryptography to authenticate data within a warhead monitoring regime.

Benz, Jacob M.↗