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At least 19 records

International Cyber Incident Repository System: Information Sharing on a Global Scale

According to the 2016 Internet Security Threat Report, the largest number of cyber attacks were recorded last year (2015), reaching a total of 430 million incidents throughout the world. As the number of cyber incidents increases, the need for information and intelligence sharing increases, as well. This fairly large increase in cyber incidents is driving the need for an international cyber incident data reporting system. The goal of the cyber incident reporting system is to make available shared and collected information about cyber events among participating international parties. In its 2014 report, Insurance Industry Working Session Readout Report-Insurance for CyberRelated Critical Infrastructure Loss: Key Issues, on the outcomes of a working session on cyber insurance, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security observed that “many participants cited the need for a secure method through which organizations could pool and share cyber incident information” and noted that one underwriter emphasized the importance of internationally harmonized data taxonomies. This cyber incident data reporting system could benefit all nations that take part in reporting incidents to provide a more common operating picture. In addition, this reporting system could allow for trending and anticipated attacks and could potentially benefit participating members by enabling them to get in front of potential attacks. The purpose of this paper is to identify options for consideration for such a system in fostering cooperative cyber defense.

Joyce, Amanda L.↗

History of Industrial Control System Cyber Incidents

For many years malicious cyber actors have been targeting the industrial control systems (ICS) that manage our critical infrastructures. Most of these events are not reported to the public, and the threats and incidents to ICS are not as well-known as enterprise cyber threats and incidents. This paper is a brief study of publically reported cyber threats to critical infrastructure that sheds light on the growing cyber threats to ICS devices. It is important to note that this list is not all inclusive. The events selected in this study highlight the significant threats and incidents to industrial control systems and demonstrate that significant cyber incidents to ICS devices are growing and becoming more complex.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Washington State Cyber Incident Response Summit Event Report

On September 7 and 8, 2022, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory and Washington State Adjutant General Major General Bret Daugherty, with support from the Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, hosted the Washington State Cyber Incident Response Summit at Camp Murray in Washington State. The invite-only summit convened 40 key decision makers and stakeholders from across the state to discuss strategies and pilot a collaborative approach to improve cyber incident response readiness within Washington. In small working groups, participants shared incident response lessons learned, best practices, and opportunities for improvement within the water and transportation sectors. This report highlights the details of the workshop presentations and discussions.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Evolution and Trends of Industrial Control System Cyber Incidents since 2017

The industrial control systems (ICSs) that manage our critical infrastructure are increasingly converging with corporate networks and the Internet as technology and businesses prioritize digital connectivity. These connections make them more vulnerable and available to malicious cyber actors who traditionally targeted the companies’ more public-facing information technology (IT) networks. This paper will review select publicly reported cyber incidents to highlight the continued and growing threat to ICS devices and operational technology (OT) environments. It will summarize the incident and when available, will provide information on the cyber actors, the vulnerabilities they exploited, and any publications the U.S. Government (USG) provided in response. Data belonging to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) will be used to highlight quantitative trends concerning ICS incidents. This paper builds on “History of Industrial Control System Cyber Incidents” (Hemsley & Fisher 2018), a paper that highlighted select noteworthy threats and incidents to ICS systems up to 2017. This paper will similarly review select incidents occurring after the last previously reviewed incident, Triton/HatMan, December 2017, and will note ICS incident trends including IT/OT convergence and advances in cyber-threat actors’ capabilities in observed in the examined incidents.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Compendium of Cyber Incident Notification Requirements for Critical Infrastructure Utilities by State

Cyber attacks targeting critical infrastructure in the United States are on the rise and pose serious risks to the economy and health and safety of its citizens. Experts suggest a sound cyber risk mitigation strategy includes constant monitoring for signs of cyber intrusions and rapid reporting of incidents so that other critical infrastructure operators may benefit from early warnings. Reporting incidents to Public Utility Commissions (PUCs) and other state agencies who have roles in energy emergency planning and incident response and recovery is essential for them to maintain situational awareness and provide necessary support to ensure rapid restoration of utility services, should disruptions occur.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Akatosh: Automated Cyber Incident Verification and Impact Analysis

Akatosh, a U.S. Department of Homeland Security Transition to Practice Program (TTP) project developed by Oak Ridge National Laboratory with industry and academic partnership, enables automated, real-time forensic analysis of endpoints after malware-attacks and other cyber security incidents by automatically maintaining detailed snapshots of host-level activity on endpoints over time. It achieves this by integrating intrusion detection systems (IDS) with forensic tools. The combination allows Akatosh to collect vast amounts of endpoint data and assists in verifying, tracking, and analyzing endpoints in real time. This provides operations personnel and analysts as well as managers and executives with continuous feedback on the impact of malicious software and other security incidents on endpoints in their network.

Smith, Jared M.↗

Akatosh: Automated Cyber Incident Verification and Impact Analysis

Akatosh is a highly configurable system based on the integration of the capabilities of one or more Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and automated forensic analysis. Akatosh reduces the false positive rates of IDSs and alleviates costs of incident response by pointing forensic personnel to the root cause of an incident on affected endpoint devices. Akatosh is able to analyze a computer system in near real-time and provide operations and forensic analyst personnel with continuous feedback on the impact of malware and software on deployed systems. Additionally, Akatosh provides the ability to look back into any prior state in the history of the computer system along with the ability to compare one or more prior system states with any other prior state.

Smith, Jared M↗

Incentivizing Cyber Security Investment in the Power Sector Using An Extended Cyber Insurance Framework

Collaboration between the DHS Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and public- sector partners has revealed that a dearth of cyber- incident data combined with the unpredictability of cyber attacks have contributed to a shortfall in first-party cyber insurance protection in the critical infrastructure community. This research explores the foundations of insurance theory and adopts behavioral manipulation methods to incentivize cyber-security investment. We validate the model by applying power industry performance data from 2013-2015 to assess risk facing the industry. Results show that the model can successfully discriminate between individual power companies as well as geographic regions on the basis of risk and can recommend cyber risk- management strategies tailored to individual risk profiles. Here, the adoption of this framework could invite more market participation, which will create a more robust cyber- incident reporting environment, contributing directly to the DHS goal of creating a national cyber- incident data repository.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Development and Demonstration of a Security Core Component

In recent years, the convergence of a number of trends has resulted in Cyber Security becoming a much greater concern for electric utilities. A short list of these trends includes: · Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) have evolved from depending on proprietary hardware and operating software toward using standard off-the-shelf hardware and operating software. This has meant that these ICSs can no longer depend on “security through obscurity. · Similarly, these same systems have evolved toward using standard communications protocols, further reducing their ability to rely upon obscurity. · The rise of the Internet and the accompanying demand for more data about virtually everything has resulted in formerly isolated ICSs becoming at least partially accessible via Internet-connected networks. · “Cyber crime” has become commonplace, whether it be for industrial espionage, reconnaissance for a possible cyber attack, theft, or because some individual or group “has something to prove.” Electric utility system operators are experts at running the power grid. The reality is, especially at small and mid-sized utilities, these SCADA operators will by default be “on the front line” if and when a cyber attack occurs against their systems. These people are not computer software, networking, or cyber security experts, so they are ill-equipped to deal with a cyber security incident. Cyber Security Manager (CSM) was conceived, designed, and built so that it can be configured to know what a utility’s SCADA/EMS/DMS system looks like under normal conditions. To do this, CSM monitors log messages from any device that uses the syslog standard. It can also monitor a variety of statistics from the computers that make up the SCADA/EMS/DMS: outputs from host-based security tools, intrusion detection systems, SCADA alarms, and real-time SCADA values – even results from a SIEM (Security Information and Event Management) system. When the system deviates from “normal,” CSM can alert the operator in language that they understand that an incident may be occurring, provide actionable intelligence, and informing them what actions to take. These alarms may be viewed on CSM’s built-in user interface, sent to a SCADA alarm list, or communicated via email, phone, pager, or SMS message. In recognition of the fact that “real world” training for cyber security events is impractical, CSM has a built-in Operator Training Simulator capability. This can be used stand alone to create simulated event scenarios for training purposes. It may also be used in conjunction with the recipient’s SCADA/EMS/DMS Operator Training Simulator. In addition to providing cyber security situational awareness for electric utility operators, CSM also provides tools for analysts and support personnel; in fact, the majority of user interface displays are designed for use in analyzing current and past security events. CSM keeps security-related information in long-term storage, as well as writing any decisions it makes to a (syslog) log for use forensic or other post-event analysis.

Turke, Andy↗

Cyber Friendly Fire: Research Challenges for Security Informatics

This paper addresses cognitive implications and research needs surrounding the problem of cyber friendly fire (FF). We define cyber FF as intentional offensive or defensive cyber/electronic actions intended to protect cyber systems against enemy forces or to attack enemy cyber systems, which unintention-ally harms the mission effectiveness of friendly or neutral forces. Just as with combat friendly fire, maintaining situation awareness (SA) is paramount to avoiding cyber FF incidents. Cyber SA concerns knowledge of a system’s topology (connectedness and relationships of the nodes in a system), and critical knowledge elements such as the characteristics and vulnerabilities of the components that comprise the system and its nodes, the nature of the activities or work performed, and the available defensive and offensive countermeasures that may be applied to thwart network attacks. Mitigation strategies to combat cyber FF— including both training concepts and suggestions for decision aids and visualization approaches—are discussed.

cyber friendly fire↗

Development and assessment of a model predictive controller enabling anticipatory control strategies for a heat-pipe system

To support the reliable and resilient operation of modular reactors and microreactors, anticipatory control strategies have been proposed for achieving faster-than-real-time predictions and decision-making capabilities in anticipation of potential anomalies, including setpoint changes and cyber incidents. Here this work presents how anticipatory control strategies can be implemented via model predictive control (MPC) of a single heat pipe’s temperature. Considering the uncertainty in developing and applying MPC, this work evaluates MPC performance given three different model forms: a linear response surface model, an artificial neural network (ANN), and an autoregressive model with exogenous input (ARX). This work also evaluates the impacts of different input biases and variance on MPC performance in order to account for potential sensor reading variations due to cyber incidents. We observe that nonparametric models such as the ANN and ARX result in more fluctuated control actions compared to the MPC applied to the linear response surface model. However, when the cyber incidents are of a large magnitude, the linear response surface model produces smaller feasible regions than the nonparametric models under identical constraints.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗