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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2016

Severe Accident Modeling for Cyber Scenarios

A generic severe accident model of a PWR is developed to support analyses of cyber-fault scenarios that may lead to extensive core damage. For this purpose, a MELCOR 2.1 model of a generic PWR is created that is capable of simulating primary and secondary thermal-hydraulics, core heatup and fuel degradation, RPV failure, containment response, and radionuclide release and transport to the environment. The size and detail of the severe accident model are intended to facilitate scoping analyses of various cyber-based scenarios in an automated, dynamic framework. A dynamic job scheduler such as ADAPT will be used to evaluate many accident scenarios in an automated fashion utilizing parallel computing. Individual test calculations are first conducted of a basic unmitigated scenario (i.e. no significant operator intervention) with a cyber-based accident initiator. This preliminary assessment is used to gauge modelling capabilities for further, expanded cyber accident scenarios in conjunction with ADAPT. (authors)

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Why does cyber deterrence fail and when might it succeed? A framework for cyber scenario analysis

Through cyberattacks on information technology and digital communications systems, antagonists have increasingly been able to alter the strategic balance in their favor without provoking serious consequences. Conflict within and through the cyber domain is inherently different from conflict in other domains that house our critical systems. These differences result in new challenges for defending and creating resilient systems, and for deterring those who would wish to disrupt or destroy them. The purpose of this paper is to further examine the question of whether or not deterrence can be an effective strategy in cyber conflict, given our broad and varied interests in cyberspace. We define deterrence broadly as the creation of conditions that dissuade antagonists from taking unwanted actions because they believe that they will incur unacceptably high costs and/or receive insufficient benefits from taking that action. Deterrence may or may not be the most credible or effective strategy for achieving our desired end states in cybersecurity. Regardless of the answer here, however, it is important to consider why deterrence strategies might succeed under certain conditions, and to understand why deterrence is not effective within the myriad contexts that it appears fail. Deterrence remains a key component of U.S. cyber strategy, but there is little detail on how to operationalize or implement this policy, how to bring a whole-of-government and whole-of- private-sector approach to cyber deterrence, which types of antagonists can or should be deterred, and in which contexts. Moreover, discussion about how nations can and should respond to significant cyber incidents largely centers around whether or not the incident constitutes a "use of force," which would justify certain types of responses according to international law. However, we believe the "use of force" threshold is inadequate to describe the myriad interests and objectives of actors in cyberspace, both attackers and defenders. In this paper, we propose an approach to further examine if deterrence is an effective strategy and under which conditions. Our approach includes systematic analysis of cyber incident scenarios using a framework to evaluate the effectiveness of various activities in influencing antagonist behavior. While we only examine a single scenario for this paper, we propose that additional work is needed to more fully understand how various alternative thresholds constrain or unleash options for actors to influence one another's behavior in the cyber domain.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2025

Zero Trust Strategies for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Detection Systems: D.1 Cyber Scenarios

The evolving landscape of cybersecurity necessitates a paradigm shift to a Zero Trust (ZT) model, which assumes breaches and continuously verifies trust. This approach reshapes how trust boundaries are established, focusing on identities, devices, networks, applications, and data, rather than solely relying on perimeter defenses such as firewalls. Central to this transformation is the National Institute of Standards and Technology's (NIST) Special Publication 800-207, outlining the Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA), along with Executive Order 14028, which mandates federal agencies to adopt ZT principles. Complementary to these efforts, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) developed the Zero Trust Maturity Model (ZTMM), providing a framework with five pillars and three cross-cutting capabilities to guide agencies toward enhanced cybersecurity maturity. In support of these initiatives, the DHS Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) is applying ZT principles to secure Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) detection systems. Recognizing the diverse deployment models and network connectivity of these systems—from stationary, non-networked units to mobile, cloud-connected devices—the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing cybersecurity scenarios specifically for CBRN environments. These scenarios examine various configurations and technological capabilities, offering insights into the application of ZTMM pillars in enhancing the security postures of CBRN devices. The cybersecurity scenarios presented by PNNL are hypothetical, crafted to explore theoretical situations and stimulate discussion on the potential use or compromise of CBRN detection systems in varied contexts. These narratives are illustrative and do not reference any real events or actual networks. Instead, they employ generalized reference models to highlight concepts and potential issues within CBRN security, focusing on how Zero Trust strategies can be adapted to address these challenges effectively.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

Reactor System Demonstration with Cyber-Attack Scenarios Using CrowPis and Arduino Microcontrollers

This study covers developing and simulating nuclear reactor system using CrowPis and Arduino microcontrollers for demonstrating cyber-attack scenarios. The team was tasked with implementing more sensors and cybersecurity aspects to the reactor program that was created by last year’s high school interns. The team received the opportunity to collaborate and obtain advice from multiple university interns that helped us gain a better perspective of our project. Our mentor’s background in nuclear science was pivotal to our understanding what we could add to the reactor program to make it as realistic as possible. The first week of our internship was spent reading as much material as possible to gain an understanding of and the background for cyber-attacks and nuclear science. Nuclear science was a new horizon for each of the high school interns on the team, so spending this time in the beginning of our internship was crucial to our success. For the remaining portion of our internship, the team collectively did our best to implement as many sensors and use as much hardware as we could to make an accurate representation of a nuclear reactor in the program that was created. This internship was a big learning experience for everyone on the team. We all gained so many insights into the nuclear world and how it can benefit our lives, as well as how so many moving pieces are needed for it to work properly.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2016

Identification of Significant NPP Cyber-Attack Scenarios based on Risk Information

For the last decades, analog instrumentation and control (I and C) systems have been replaced with digital systems in nuclear power plants (NPPs). While there are various advantages of the digital technology for the plant safety, new threats have been introduced such as cyber security. In fact, there have been cyber-attacks on nuclear facilities adopting digital systems. The cyber-attack on the Iran nuclear facility is a typical example which shows the possibility of a cyber-attack on safety critical infrastructures with intra-network. Cyber security has been introduced as one of the significant issues for NPP safety and recently its importance has been more highlighted, but the research in this field is not mature yet. Moreover, there is not much information about cyber security of NPPs. In this work, as a fundamental research for risk evaluation of cyber-attacks, a method to identify significant cyber-attack scenarios on NPPs was proposed based on the probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) method which is widely used for evaluating the safety of NPPs. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2019

Requirements for Robust DERMS Control and Cyber Attack Scenarios

A Distribution Management System (DMS) is responsible for monitoring and maintaining the health of a distribution grid. Common DMS applications include fault location isolation and service restoration, on-line power flow (OLPF), volt/VAR optimization (VVO), and switch order management. These systems were developed primarily in the area of top-down, unidirectional power flow, with large centralized generating plants moving electricity through the transmission grid and into the distribution grid from and thence to consumers. The recent and ongoing addition of distributed energy resources (DER) to the grid, including rooftop and community solar and wind, means that power is now flowing into the distribution grid from the edge, which complicates the functioning of the DMS. To ameliorate this problem, DMS use distributed energy resource management systems (DERMS) to control DER such as solar inverters. DERMS comprise software management tools that allow management and near real-time control of an array of DER. DERMS control devices and grid services including smart inverters, capacitor banks, on-load tap changes, voltage regulators, and customer loads.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗
DOE OSTI2025

DRE: Designing for Resilience through Emulation

Threats to cyber- and cyber-physical systems have continued to increase over the past decade. Now more than ever, it is vital that cyber-physical system stakeholders have the tools to deeply understand their systems and the threats they face. High-fidelity modeling capabilities are powerful tools to support system understanding and decision-making, but they currently lack scientifically rigorous experimentation practices and infrastructures. The purpose of the project Designing for Resilience through Emulation (DRE) was to bring together past research and existing tools into a new pipeline to improve our ability to quantitatively evaluate future cyber scenarios. DRE offers new integrated capabilities for large dataset collection, noise studies, sensitivity analysis, uncertainty quantification, and surrogate modeling using a cyber-physical system emulation environment. These new capabilities significantly improve our ability to establish the credibility of the answers derived from emulation environments, ultimately leading to better critical decision support.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2026

Performing Numerical Analysis of Cybersecurity Options Using Dynamic Risk Analysis Tool EMRALD

Cyberattacks can have many different attack paths, durations, and goals. There are also many different mitigation options involving hardware, software, and/or humans. Considering a cyber threat should involve defense-in-depth methods and a quantitative or numerical evaluation of overall effectiveness against dynamic, time-dependent attacks to make cost and risk-informed decisions. Typical cyberattack modeling methods only provide a qualitative evaluation. The main areas of cybersecurity are confidentiality, integrity, and availability. For companies with cyber-physical systems such as advanced nuclear reactors, cyber-related safety is a requirement set by North American Electric Reliability and the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. They are also concerned about availability or reliability as a business case. As cyber threats are evolving to a business-for-hire structure, more attacks may focus on disrupting business success and reliability, causing financial and economic stability risk. Companies want to know business reliability and recovery from those threats, and that requires modeling physical behavior of the targets. Dynamic-state-based and Markov-based modeling provides a method for better cyber scenario modeling with different tools having issues such as state-base explosion. Dynamic modeling enables time and conditional features not found in other numerical evaluation methods. EMRALD (Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Lined Diagrams) is a dynamic risk analysis modeling and simulation tool and has features that reduce modeling issues. It has been used to model different time-dependent events including plant behavior and operator procedures. As a general modeling tool, EMRALD can also be used to model cyberattack scenarios with varying mitigation options and quantify effectiveness, producing numerical data for risk-informed decisions. This paper uses EMRALD to demonstrate that dynamic numerical risk analysis can be used for cyber threat modeling to provide insights for design decision-making and optimize defense strategies. Keywords: cyber modeling; cyber-physical systems; numerical cyber modeling

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Securing Distributed Energy Resource Integration

The penetration of distributed energy resources (DER) is growing at much higher rates than predicted 20 years ago. Far from being used only in residential settings, DER are now installed on distribution and transmission circuits. In this position, they do not have the same properties as traditional generators and are more flexible in many cases. The growing penetration and range of uses for DER motivate the need to reliably and safely integrate them into the grid. Operators must be able to rely on them not only for normal operation, but also during abnormal conditions like black starts or adverse cyber scenarios. To that end, we study the communications, device interfaces, and potential consequences of DER operation under abnormal and adversarial conditions. The weaknesses of communications networks are studied based on the industrial protocols used, and the benefits of security features are examined. The device interfaces are found to be vulnerable to attack based on the requirements in the IEEE-1547 standard for DER interconnection and interoperability, which is expected to be adopted in the next ten years. In addition to exploring the requirements of the standard, we show that these vulnerabilities and others do exist and can be used maliciously in a modern storage system DER. Consequences of these vulnerabilities range from exacerbated grid instability, to simultaneous loss of large portions of DER penetration, to physical damage to inverters or DER themselves and other sensitive equipment. We tie these outcomes to specific attacker actions in an effort to give operators a better threat intelligence view that allows them to prioritize mitigations. Finally, we discuss mitigations that could prevent many of the adversarial scenarios described. Some solutions can be added to existing infrastructure, while others may require longer term planning for grid modernization with consideration for security.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2021

Development of Integrated Safety and Security Models for Comprehensive Reliability and Resiliency Evaluation

The security of the electric grid and supporting energy systems is crucial to national security. One of the complexities in analyzing the security of energy systems is the safety consequences that may result from accidents. For energy systems, the goal is to ensure that they operate as intended and that any consequences are mitigated or prevented. The integration of safety and security is paramount to protecting these systems from attacks and ensuring that large consequences are prevented. This report describes an integrated safety and security methodology to evaluate cybersecurity events that can lead to large consequences. This novel approach first describes how Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) provides a digital causal analysis for Bayesian Networks (BNs). The use of STPA causal analysis provides a systematic approach to constructing BNs that adequately model cyber scenarios that result in consequences. When combined with the technical principles described in Risk-Informed Management of Enterprise Systems (RIMES), a comprehensive risk-informed cybersecurity analysis results that allows decision-makers to prioritize systems that most impact risk.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2017

Development of cyber security test scenario for non-safety display system - 226

In order to test the cyber security of NPP related to safety, the results of probabilistic safety assessment were used. The fault tree (FT) is used to reflect the impact of the cyber-attack on the operator. The cyber security test should be performed focusing on the scenario derived from the FT. The concept of a security case has been introduced. (authors)

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2018

Enhancing Power Plant Safety through Coupling Plant Simulators to Cyber Digital Architecture

There are differences in how cyber-attack, sabotage, or discrete component failure mechanisms manifest within power plants and what these events would look like within the control room from an operator's perspective. This research focuses on understanding how a cyber event would affect the operation of the plant, how an operator would perceive the event, and if the operator's actions based on those perceptions will allow him/her to maintain plant safety. This research is funded as part of Sandia's Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) program to develop scenarios with cyber induced failure of plant systems coupled with a generic pressurized water reactor plant training simulator. The cyber scenario s w ere developed separately and injected into the simulator operational state to simulate an attack. These scenarios will determine if Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) operators can 1) recognize that the control room indicators were presenting incorrect or erroneous information and 2) take appropriate actions to keep the plant safe. This will also provide the opportunity to assess the operator cognitive workload during such events and identify where improvements might be made. This paper will review results of a pilot study run with NPP operators to investigate performance under various cyber scenarios. The discussion will provide an overview of the approach, scenario selection, metrics captured, resulting insights into operator actions and plant response to multiple scenarios of the NPP system.

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Analyzing the Effects of Cyberattacks on Distribution System State Estimation: Preprint

Key components of power systems—such as energy management systems, automatic generation control, and state estimation—are under serious vulnerability from cyber attacks. Cyber threats in electric grids have increased significantly because of the increased interconnectivity of supervisory control and data acquisition systems and public network infrastructure. As the penetration level of distributed energy resources increases, it is imperative to employ system-monitoring techniques such as state estimation for the reliable operation of distribution systems. Recently, multiple methods have been developed that exploit the low rank property of distribution system state matrix and are robust to bad data, such as matrix completion. This paper analyzes the impact of various realistic cyber attack scenarios on matrix completion. Realistic cyber attack scenarios are converted into data corruption models that are used in an extensive simulation of a custom IEEE 123-bus system.

41 EE - Solar Energy Technologies Office (EE-4S)↗
DOE OSTI2025

Advanced Reactor Safeguards & Security Program: Cybersecurity Scenarios

The use of digital control systems and automation in advanced nuclear power systems introduces different types of vulnerabilities compared to legacy (i.e. analog) control systems that cyber adversaries can exploit. These vulnerabilities pose a challenge to reactor operators and cyber operations staff due to the dynamic nature of the event in which a human response or a lack of response can potentially evolve into a worsening plant condition. Using the Department of Homeland Security Cyber and Infrastructure Security Agency’s (CISA) critical infrastructure exercise framework, this document presents several cyber security scenarios typical of digital control systems that could be used in advanced reactor designs. These scenarios can be used in tabletop exercises to evaluate cyber security posture or conduct training on different aspects of cyber security, including detection, threat hunting using indicators of compromise, evaluating incident response, risk mitigation, incident reporting, information sharing and recovery.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2015

Emulytics for Cyber-Enabled Physical Attack Scenarios: Interim LDRD Report of Year One Results.

Sandia National Laboratories has funded the research and development of a new capability to interactively explore the effects of cyber exploits on the performance of physical protection systems. This informal, interim report of progress summarizes the project’s basis and year one (of two) accomplishments. It includes descriptions of confirmed cyber exploits against a representative testbed protection system and details the development of an emulytics capability to support live, virtual, and constructive experiments. This work will support stakeholders to better engineer, operate, and maintain reliable protection systems.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗