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At least 19 records

A Privacy-Preserving Cyber Threat Intelligence Sharing System

Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) is a key resource for developing defensive strategies against potential cyber adversaries. Entities typically access CTI through open-source platforms, national agencies, or specialized commercial services. However, the bi-directional exchange of CTI is hindered by organizational trust boundaries, which complicate the sharing processes between entities and CTI providers. Centralized CTI services benefit from receiving suspicious cyber observables such as IP addresses, domain names, and email addresses from various entities. The aggregation allows for the correlation of widespread adversarial activities to enhance the alert and response mechanisms across the network of involved parties. Despite these benefits, openly sharing such observables incurs potential legal, regulatory, and reputational risks for the disclosing entities.This paper introduces a system designed to facilitate the secure exchange of cyber observables across trust boundaries without compromising the anonymity of the sharing entities. Here, we propose an architecture that leverages common web protocols alongside zero-knowledge proofs to authenticate members while maintaining anonymity. Additionally, we outline a privacy model tailored for STIX (Structured Threat Information eXpression) cyber observables to minimize the risk of inadvertently disclosing private information. Through our threat models, we assess the privacy implications of our proposed system and demonstrate its potential to enhance collaborative cyber defense efforts without exposing entities to undue risk.

BBS+ Signatures↗

SeqMask: Behavior Extraction Over Cyber Threat Intelligence Via Multi-Instance Learning

Abstract Identification and extraction of Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) for Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI) restore the full picture of cyber attacks and guide the analysts to assess the system risk. Existing frameworks can hardly provide uniform and complete processing mechanisms for TTPs information extraction without adequate knowledge background. A multi-instance learning approach named SeqMask is proposed in this paper as a solution. SeqMask extracts behavior keywords from CTI evaluated by the semantic impact, and predicts TTPs labels by conditional probabilities. Still, the framework has two mechanisms to determine the validity of keywords. One using expert experience verification. The other verifies the distortion of the classification effect by blocking existing keywords. In the experiments, SeqMask reached 86.07% and 73.99% in F1 scores for TTPs classifications. For the top 20% of keywords, the expert approval rating is 92.20%, where the average repetition of keywords whose scores between 100% and 90% is 60.02%. Particularly, when the top 65% of the keywords were blocked, the F1 decreased to about 50%; when removing the top 50%, the F1 was under 31%. Further, we also validate the possibility of extracting TTPs from full-size CTI and malware whose F1 are improved by 2.16% and 0.81%.

Ge, Wenhan↗

Intern Poster: STIG Shouldn't Drop ACID

STIG (Structured Threat Intelligence Graph) is an open-source graph database tool from INL. It’s used to create and process cyber intelligence graphs, which are shared in the cyber threat intelligence community and used to train INL machine learning products like @DisCo. For quality machine learning and critical infrastructure defense, STIG’s database must be ACID: Atomic, Consistent, Isolated, Durable. Various ACID tests were designed and applied to STIG to ensure its behavior follows these properties.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Critical Roles of Information, Analysis, Research, and Operations in the Cyber Realm

PNNL has developed an adaptive cyber integration framework (ACIF) to facilitate the timely sharing of cyber threat information along with the advancement of situational awareness tools to enhance protection against and respond to critical infrastructure cybersecurity threats. The ACIF comprises components implemented iteratively to achieve research and mission goals. The ACIF components include data generation technologies, analytic tools development and maturation, data enrichment and fusion, trust building with stakeholders, investigative research, analytic rigor, production, and dissemination. Each component, its importance to the ACIF, and how they can be adopted and applied across other information-sharing sectors and domains are discussed in this paper.

Cyber Threat Intelligence, Cyber Security, Data En↗

Improving Cyber Situational Understanding

Effective cybersecurity operations require the ability to analyze large amounts of information to assess security risks and formulate defensive strategies against adversaries. This has become more complex in recent years as the sprawl and interconnectivity of devices grows through implementation of virtualization, cloud computing, and Internet of Things (IoT). The amount of data and analysis required for effective cybersecurity command and control decisions far exceeds humans’ capacity to perform manually. We characterize the analysis problem as cyber situational understanding. The research presented to improve cyber situational understanding focuses on vulnerability analysis and threat intelligence. Regarding vulnerabilities, entities must analyze and plan work for between thousands and tens of thousands of software vulnerabilities annually. Entities heavily use network firewalls to limit vulnerability exposure. As a result, some of these vulnerabilities permit exposure to adversarial exploitation, whereas others are inaccessible and therefore present negligible risk of exploitation. Distinguishing between high and low risk software vulnerabilities requires a deep understanding of the vulnerability, network firewall protection, and characteristics of the targeted device. This problem is solved by extracting network service features from vulnerability data features using both machine-learning and natural language processing. Then, the network firewall topology is parsed to determine which vulnerabilities are reachable by adversaries. Ultimately, a state-based safety analysis ascertains which vulnerabilities are unsafe. A related vulnerability analysis problem occurs in cybersecurity operations when associating an entity’s hardware and software assets to public vulnerability databases. Assets often reveal hardware and software through installation artifacts and network service identification, and entities store these artifacts in inventory databases. However, software and hardware vendors apply a standard Common Platform Enumeration (CPE) naming convention when publicly reporting vulnerabilities. Associating these two datasets often requires many hours to days of manual inspection. The proposed solution automates the mapping approach of human analysts using fuzzy matching techniques, natural language processing, and, ultimately, machine learning to present a small set of recommendations for mapping the two datasets. The result significantly reduces human analysis time and reduces the occurrence of false positives in vulnerability notifications. Finally, cyber threat intelligence (CTI) requires associating cyber observable artifacts, such as IP addresses, URIs, and file hashes, with cyber threat tactics, techniques, and procedures. Unfortunately, most CTI data is compartmentalized across multiple organizations and cannot be shared due to the legal and reputational risk with cyber threat being associated with the entity. The approach to solving this problem inovlves using a distributed ledger with anonymous token spending and authentication. This allows a consortium of semi-trusted entities to share the workload of curating CTI for a threat sharing community’s cooperative benefit.

Huff, Philip↗

Linking Threat Agents to Targeted Organizations: A Pipeline for Enhanced Cybersecurity Risk Metrics

In this study, we present a methodology leveraging Large Language Models (LLMs) to transform Cybersecurity Threat Intelligence (CTI) narratives into actionable insights for individual organizations. Our approach automates the extraction of machine-readable adversary SKRAM (Skills, Knowledge, Resources, Authorities, and Motivation) attributes from open-source reports, extending LLM utility beyond typical interactions. This innovation enables precise, automated assessments of cybersecurity risks posed by various adversaries. Using a chain-of-thought and multi-shot prompting strategy, our methodology advances the automation of cybersecurity feature extraction for new machine-learning models that predict the risk of adversary targeting. This approach is refined using a substantial dataset of over 150 analyst-validated threat reports and synthetic organizational data from 900 companies. Here, by bootstrapping the training data with a rule-based heuristic over synthetic data, we have developed a high-accuracy machine-learning model that allows entities to dynamically prioritize threats and defensive actions.

Cyber Threat Intelligence↗

Scout: An AI-Driven Tool for Cyber Threat Report Creation

This talk will introduce Scout, an AI-driven tool designed to enhance the efficiency of cyber threat report creation. Attendees will learn how Scout leverages advanced AI technologies to streamline the reporting process, thereby enabling faster and more reliable threat assessments.

99 - GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Neighborhood Keeper

Neighborhood Keeper is a collective defense and community-wide visibility solution that provides a more effective industrial cyber defense by sharing threat intelligence at machine-speed across industries and geographic regions.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

"Russians in the Grid" Enrichment Process

Threat intelligence sources are numerous, and the quality of their intelligence is equally variable. The need for quality, actionable, and shareable intelligence is becoming increasingly important as cyber-threats continue to increase. In this paper, we describe the process we used to enrich U.S. CERT’s Technical Alert entitled “Russian Government Cyber-Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors,” affectionately referred to as “Russians In the Grid,” from a series of separate but related reports to a final, actionable, unified Structured Threat Information Expression (STIX) v2 representation of the report. In the process, we detail the tools and procedures we used, some of which are automated and others highly manual. We identify some of the limitations of current STIX enrichment tools and techniques, and propose enhancements to allow for more effective enrichment and better overall threat intelligence to be used for more effective threat data-sharing, as well as machine learning-based predictive threat work being conducted at Idaho National Laboratory.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗

Using Structured Intelligence Graph (STIG) to protect our critical infrastructure against cyber attacks [Poster]

STIG is a revolutionary cybersecurity tool developed by researchers at the U. S. Department of Energy's Idaho National Laboratory and it is a software that allows utility owners and operators to easily visualize, create, and edit cyberthreat intelligence information. STIG uses Structured Threat Information eXpression (STIX) and converts complex data on cybersecurity vulnerabilities into a visualization that is easy to understand and act on. With STIG, utility owners and operators have a common system for sharing threat intelligence information, thus increasing the chances of detecting and mitigating cyber exploits before they lead to a cyberattack.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Mapping SIEM Vulnerabilities in STIG

SIEM (Security Information and Event Management) tools monitor network traffic and allow users to quickly detect problems in their networks. Because of the valuable information processed by SIEM tools, it is important to understand their vulnerabilities. STIG (Structured Threat Intelligence Graph) is an application created at INL used to visualize data related to cyber threats. Using STIG can allow users to understand vulnerabilities related to their SIEM products and how to protect their systems.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗

Cybersecurity Enhancement in Digital Substations: Hidden Markov Model-Based Smart Cyber Switching and Threat Response

The rising incidence of cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure and power grids poses significant threats to the stability and reliability of electrical substations, with potentially devastating consequences such as extended blackouts. This paper introduces an advanced cybersecurity framework aimed at safeguarding IEC 61850-based substations through the integration of software-defined networking (SDN) and digital twin (DT) technologies. The proposed DT-based framework employs smart cyber switching (SCS) for proactive threat mitigation and concurrent intelligent electronic device (CIED) for swift system restoration, thereby maintaining continuous operational integrity and robust cybersecurity defenses. Central to this framework is the adaptive port controller (APC), which enables dynamic port management to adapt to evolving threats, and an intrusion detection system (IDS) designed to detect and neutralize malicious attacks on IEC 61850-based sampled value (SV) and generic object-oriented substation event (GOOSE) messages within the substation’s communication network. Further, novel predictive intrusion detection and response (PIDR) algorithm is implemented on a digital substation (DS) to predict the best route to be taken by the attacker. The efficacy of these comprehensive cybersecurity frameworks is validated through rigorous simulations and a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testbed, showcasing the system’s ability to sustain substation operations amidst cyber-attacks.

Digital substation↗

Resilience of Urban Transport Network-of-Networks under Intense Flood Hazards Exacerbated by Targeted Attacks

Natural hazards including floods can trigger catastrophic failures in interdependent urban transport network-of-networks (NoNs). Population growth has enhanced transportation demand while urbanization and climate change have intensified urban floods. However, despite the clear need to develop actionable insights for improving the resilience of critical urban lifelines, the theory and methods remain underdeveloped. Furthermore, as infrastructure systems become more intelligent, security experts point to the growing threat of targeted cyber-physical attacks during natural hazards. Here we develop a hypothesis-driven resilience framework for urban transport NoNs, which we demonstrate on the London Rail Network (LRN). We find that topological attributes designed for maximizing efficiency rather than robustness render the network more vulnerable to compound natural-targeted disruptions including cascading failures. Our results suggest that an organizing principle for post-disruption recovery may be developed with network science principles. Our findings and frameworks can generalize to urban lifelines and more generally to real-world spatial networks.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗

Dragonstone Strategy Kickoff Report [Slides]

The oil & natural gas (ONG) system like any other heavy industrial process, relies on a complex system of information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) devices. Cyber-preparedness varies across the ONG industry from organization to organization. Common challenges include remote locations, long-lived field assets, and insufficient capabilities to find and track malware. ONG companies tend to be concerned with lack of cyber-awareness from employees, risk stemming from remote access for operations & maintenance, and software vulnerabilities within third-party equipment. For a variety of reasons, the general consensus from stakeholders interviewed by LLNL is that the state of cybersecurity within the electric grid is currently outpacing its ONG cousin. Existing strategies for the resilience and cybersecurity of the electric grid can and should be leveraged to provide immediate benefits to the ONG system. In LLNL’s view, there are two key factors currently limiting the development of necessary cyber-practices within the ONG industry: regulatory overlap and inefficiencies, and lack of industry awareness of potentially useful technologies for solving known issues. In the months following this report, LLNL will develop a cyber-resilience roadmap for the oil & gas pipeline sector, coupling threat intelligence, industry knowledge base, and ongoing outreach

02 PETROLEUM↗

Dragonstone Strategy – State of Cybersecurity in the Oil & Natural Gas Sector

The oil & natural gas (ONG) system touches every corner of the nation and increased communications & control capabilities have not only allowed for greater efficiency of system operation, but have also created a massive target for adversaries to launch cyber-attacks. Like any other heavy industrial process, the ONG system relies on a complex system of information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) devices. The current state of cyber-preparedness across the ONG industry varies from organization to organization. Among the most common challenges that ONG companies face are remote locations, longlived field assets, and lacking capabilities to find and track malware on their systems. ONG companies tend to be concerned with lack of cyber-awareness from employees, risk stemming from remote access for operations & maintenance, and software vulnerabilities within third-party equipment. Various industry and government organizations are performing research and development activities to address some of these challenges, but in many cases industry stakeholders are not aware of solutions that already exist. It is clear that a need exists for a coherent, comprehensive, multi-layered strategy for assuring the security and resilience of the nation's pipeline infrastructure against cyber threats. For a variety of reasons, the general consensus from stakeholders interviewed by LLNL is that the state of cyber-security within the electric grid is currently outpacing its ONG cousin. Existing strategies for the resilience and cyber-security of the electric grid can and should be leveraged to provide immediate benefits to the ONG system. In LLNL’s view, there are two key factors currently limiting the development of necessary cyber-practices within the ONG industry: The sheer number of differing regulatory bodies and trade groups offering both standards and best-practice recommendations for ONG cyber-security makes it difficult to create a comprehensive, directed, and coherent strategy that is applicable to all players within the ONG industry. The ONG industry is unaware of potentially useful technologies that have been developed for ensuring cyber-security of other infrastructure systems, such as the electric grid. Leveraging these technologies—and the science and engineering behind them—can provide some low-hanging fruit that can greatly improve cyber-security in the ONG industry without significant investments in terms of time and money. In the months following this report, LLNL will continue to perform outreach to key oil & gas industry stakeholders in a continual effort to identify the most pressing cyber-resilience issues in the industry. This outreach will be supplemented with LLNL’s threat intelligence capabilities to begin painting a clearer picture of the overall threat landscape faced by this sector. This assessment will be threat-informed and while the strategy itself will not be classified we will leverage intelligence analysis and adversary capabilities to identify gaps in current cybersecurity practices for oil & gas pipeline systems. Recommended efforts will be compiled into a cyber-resilience roadmap for the oil & gas pipeline sector, in which LLNL will highlight priority activities to immediately improve the state of cyber-resilience in the industry.

02 PETROLEUM↗

Design Considerations for Distributed Energy Resource Honeypots and Canaries

There are now over 2.5 million Distributed Energy Resource (DER) installations connected to the U.S. power system. These installations represent a major portion of American electricity critical infrastructure and a cyberattack on these assets in aggregate would significantly affect grid operations. Virtualized Operational Technology (OT) equipment has been shown to provide practitioners with situational awareness and better understanding of adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Deploying synthetic DER devices as honeypots and canaries would open new avenues of operational defense, threat intelligence gathering, and empower DER owners and operators with new cyber-defense mechanisms against the growing intensity and sophistication of cyberattacks on OT systems. Well-designed DER canary field deployments would deceive adversaries and provide early-warning notifications of adversary presence and malicious activities on OT networks. In this report, we present progress to design a high-fidelity DER honeypot/canary prototype in a late-start Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) project.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Evaluating China's Road to Cyber Super Power

This report examines open source, non-classified qualitative analysis to evaluate China’s current cyber maturity. Evidence for this document draws on materials from academia, private cybersecurity companies, and national security research institutions. Private sector threat intelligence firms produce high quality analysis on Chinese APTs tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and investigation from companies such as FireEye illuminate China’s ability to wield cyber means for its security ends. None of the materials cited in this assessment originate from classified United States or foreign government sources. Any references to United States government sources are sourced entirely to unclassified information.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗