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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

User Guide to the Facility Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (F-C2M2) Assessment

The Facility Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (F-C2M2) assessment was designed to help facilities address their unique cybersecurity challenges. Building upon the foundational principles of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2), the F-C2M2 was explicitly tailored for federal facilities to help evaluate, benchmark, and enhance the cybersecurity capabilities of both their information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) environments. This user guide was developed to facilitate a thorough understanding of the tool. Whether users are familiar with the original C2M2 or are new to the maturity model concept, this guide was designed to offer clarity, direction, and support.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Cybersecurity Vulnerability Mitigation Framework through Empirical Paradigm: Enhanced Prioritized Gap Analysis

Existing cybersecurity vulnerability assessment tools were designed based on the policies and standards defined by organizations such as the U.S. Department of Energy and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). Frameworks such as the cybersecurity capability maturity model (C2M2) and the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) are often used by the critical infrastructure owners and operators to determine the cybersecurity maturity of their facility. Although these frameworks are exceptional at performing qualitative cybersecurity analysis and identifying vulnerabilities, they do not provide a means to perform prioritized mitigation of those vulnerabilities in order to achieve a desired cybersecurity maturity. To address that challenge, we developed a framework and software application called the cybersecurity vulnerability mitigation framework through empirical paradigm (CyFEr). This paper presents the detailed architecture of CyFEr’s enhanced prioritized gap analysis (EPGA) methodology and its application to CSF. The efficacy of the presented framework is demonstrated by comparing against existing similar models and testing against the cyber injects from a real-world cyber-attack that targeted industrial control systems (ICS) in critical infrastructures.

Gourisetti, Sri Nikhil G.↗
DOE OSTI2020

APPLICATION OF MATURITY MODELS FOR EVALUATING CYBERSECURITY PROGRAMS AT NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL FACILITIES

Maturity models can be used to provide government agencies, industry associations, and organizations operating nuclear facilities with the ability to quickly evaluate the maturity of their cybersecurity programs and identify areas to prioritize for improvement. The Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2) was developed by the U.S. Department of Energy to allow organizations in the energy sector to evaluate the programmatic capabilities of their cybersecurity programs in a consistent manner, communicate programmatic maturity information, prioritize cybersecurity investments in targeted areas of concern, and track how the maturity of their cybersecurity program evolves over time. The C2M2 is designed for use by any critical infrastructure organization regardless of ownership, structure, or size. The C2M2 can be easily fine-tuned to access the maturity of nuclear cybersecurity programs and their application at individual facilities. Built on a foundation of existing cybersecurity standards, frameworks, programs, and initiatives, the model features 10 security domains. Performance in each security domain is characterized using a structured set of cybersecurity practices that represent activities an organization can perform to improve cybersecurity in their domain. Each practice can be quickly evaluated as being either fully, largely, partially, or not implemented. Once practices are evaluated for each security domain, the model defines four maturity indicator levels that apply independently to each domain in the model. To earn a maturity level in a given domain, an organization must adequately perform all the practices for that maturity level and its predecessor level(s). A small assessment team can conduct a C2M2 assessment in a single day. A screening version of the C2M2 allows an initial look at the maturity of nuclear cybersecurity programs that could be completed in under an hour.

Cyber security, Nuclear security, maturity model↗
DOE OSTI2023

DER Cybersecurity R&D

The National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) conducted more than 30 assessments for utilities across the United States with a cybersecurity assessment tool based on the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2) and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) and focused on business process. With funding from the DOE Office of Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Federal Energy Management Program, NREL modified the current cyber governance assessment tool to include an assessment process specifically for distributed energy resources (DERs). The Distributed Energy Resources Cybersecurity Framework (DER-CF) was developed to help federal agencies mitigate gaps in their cybersecurity posture for distributed energy systems.

cybersecurity valuation↗
DOE OSTI2020

Facility Cybersecurity Framework Best Practices

Federal facilities are increasingly adopting automation and connecting to the Internet creating an energy-internet-of-things environment that converges operational technology (OT) and information technology (IT). Today's buildings increasingly weave together networked sensors and cyber and physical systems that enable data to be collected, aggregated, exchanged, stored and monetized in new ways. Building technological advances have created new energy technology, services, markets and value creation opportunities (e.g. transactive energy, two-way grid communications, machine learning, and increased use of renewable and distributed energy resources). But as larger data sets are being exchanged at faster speeds between an increasing number of OT systems, it becomes more difficult to protect the security of the data lifecycle and the physical equipment it interacts with. These challenges are especially difficult to overcome because the economic and environmental gain (interoperability, big data, social networks and ubiquitous information sharing) are driving these prominent trends in the digital age. Often cybersecurity is an afterthought. The U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) funded the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) to develop various cybersecurity tools, trainings, and reports to aid federal facility managers – and other building owners and operators – in better applying frameworks and lessons learned from the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF), risk management framework (RMF), DOE’s cybersecurity capability maturity model (C2M2), and a wide variety of industry best practices and guidance documents (i.e., NIST 800 series, Department of Defense United Facilities Criteria). This set of tools, collectively known as the FEMP Facility-Related Control System Cyber Toolkit (FRCS Cyber Toolkit)2, is focused on cybersecurity concerns from facility-related control systems and other operational technology (OT), such as industrial control systems (ICS). The FRCS Cyber Toolkit can be applied across six of the sixteen critical infrastructure sectors designated by the Department of Homeland Security, including government facilities, healthcare and public health, commercial facilities (e.g., public assembly, offices, lodging), financial services (e.g., banking and insurance), emergency services (e.g., fire and police stations), and information technology. With increasingly converged IT and OT systems, it is crucial to address OT cybersecurity considerations and assess how the seam of these two systems could impact the overall cybersecurity posture of a facility. The objective of this report is to provide an overview of the best possible method to use FRCS Cyber Toolkit (section 2.0) and distilled cybersecurity best practices for the federal facilities to address growing non-linear cyber threats (section 3.0). Recommendations in this document are aggregated from several NIST and other documents (see Appendix A for additional details).

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Electricity Subsector Transmission Resilience Maturity Model (TRMM) User Guide

The electric transmission sector is facing a range of threats to its functionality that are either new, more severe than experienced in earlier years, or more well understood. Such threats include more frequent and more severe extreme weather events, wildfires, droughts, and human-caused physical and cyberattacks. They also include geological, electromagnetic, and biological events. The novelty or increasing severity of these threats creates a significant need for transmission owners to implement programs to prevent, prepare for, respond to, and recover from such incidents. The national and economic security of the United States depends on the reliable functioning of the Nation’s critical infrastructure in the face of such threats, and the transmission networks are essential components of that infrastructure. The Electricity Subsector Transmission Resilience Maturity Model (TRMM) is a tool that a transmission organization can use to objectively evaluate and benchmark its currently established transmission resilience strategies, programs, policies, and investments, in order to target and prioritize enhancements where needed. The TRMM was developed to address the unique characteristics of the transmission system. The model can enable users to: • evaluate and benchmark their organization’s resilience capabilities, effectively and consistently • prioritize actions and investments to improve the resilience of their systems • share transmission-related knowledge, best practices, and relevant references within their organization and with business partners as a means to improve resilience capabilities • contribute to increasing the overall resilience of the Nation’s transmission systems. The TRMM provides descriptive rather than prescriptive industry-focused guidance. The model content is presented at a high level of abstraction so that it can be interpreted by transmission organizations of various types, structures, and sizes. The model is designed to an be easy-to-use, self-assessment tool.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2025

Zero Trust Strategies for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Detection Systems: D.1 Cyber Scenarios

The evolving landscape of cybersecurity necessitates a paradigm shift to a Zero Trust (ZT) model, which assumes breaches and continuously verifies trust. This approach reshapes how trust boundaries are established, focusing on identities, devices, networks, applications, and data, rather than solely relying on perimeter defenses such as firewalls. Central to this transformation is the National Institute of Standards and Technology's (NIST) Special Publication 800-207, outlining the Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA), along with Executive Order 14028, which mandates federal agencies to adopt ZT principles. Complementary to these efforts, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) developed the Zero Trust Maturity Model (ZTMM), providing a framework with five pillars and three cross-cutting capabilities to guide agencies toward enhanced cybersecurity maturity. In support of these initiatives, the DHS Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD) is applying ZT principles to secure Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) detection systems. Recognizing the diverse deployment models and network connectivity of these systems—from stationary, non-networked units to mobile, cloud-connected devices—the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing cybersecurity scenarios specifically for CBRN environments. These scenarios examine various configurations and technological capabilities, offering insights into the application of ZTMM pillars in enhancing the security postures of CBRN devices. The cybersecurity scenarios presented by PNNL are hypothetical, crafted to explore theoretical situations and stimulate discussion on the potential use or compromise of CBRN detection systems in varied contexts. These narratives are illustrative and do not reference any real events or actual networks. Instead, they employ generalized reference models to highlight concepts and potential issues within CBRN security, focusing on how Zero Trust strategies can be adapted to address these challenges effectively.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2023

Smart manufacturing maturity models and their applicability: a review

The purpose of this paper is to review existing smart manufacturing (SM) maturity models' dimensions and maturity levels to assess their applicability and drawbacks. There are many maturity models available but many of them have not been validated or do not provide a useful guide or tool for applications. This gap creates the need for a review of the existing maturity model's applicability. Nineteen peer-reviewed maturity models related to “Digital Transformation,” “Industry 4.0” or “Smart Manufacturing” were selected based on a systematic literature review and five consulting firm models were selected based on the author's industry knowledge. The chosen models were analyzed to determine 10 categories of dimensions. Then they are assessed on a 1–5 scale for how applicable they are in the 10 categories of dimensions. The five “consulting firm” models have a first-mover advantage, are more widely used in industry and are more applicable, but some require payment, and they lack published details and validation. The 19 “peer reviewed” models are not as widely used, lack awareness in the industry and are not as easy to apply because of no web tool for self-assessment, but they are improving. The categories defined to characterize the models and facilitate comparisons for users include “Information Technology (IT) and Cyber-Physical System (CPS) and Data,” “Strategy and Organization,” “Supply Chain and Logistics,” “Products and Services,” “Culture and Employees,” “Technology and Capabilities,” “Customer and Market,” “Cybersecurity and Risk,” “Leadership and Management” and “Governance and Compliance.” The analyzed maturity models were particularly weak in the areas of cybersecurity, leadership and governance. Researchers and practitioners can use this review with consideration of their specific needs to determine if a maturity model is applicable or if a new model needs to be developed. The review can also aid in the development of maturity models through the discussion of each of the dimension categories. Finally, compared to existing reviews of SM maturity models, this research determines comprehensive dimension categories and focuses on applicability and drawbacks.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Secure Design and Development Cyber Security Capability Maturity Model” (SD2-CM2)

The "Secure Design and Development Cyber Security Capability Maturity Model" (SD2-CM2) allows electrical system managers to assess the maturity of their cybersecurity systems, including designs reflecting internet of things devices (IOT). The content provides best practices in the field and users can assess the level of their designs. Modules are "Content" and "Infrastructure"

Gourisetti, Sri Nikhil Gupta↗
DOE OSTI2020

The CYBER security – Competency Health and Maturity Progression (CYBER-CHAMP) model: Extending the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) Framework Across Organizational Security

Problem Statement: There is a pervasive talent deficit in the cybersecurity industry that prevents employers from being able to fill their open positions efficiently. A holistic approach to security is required to ensure organizations have adequate prevention and response capabilities in case of a cyberattack. Specifically, industrial control systems (ICS’s) and their operational technology (OT) components have become a constant target for cyberattacks. Research Questions: It is proposed that the NICE Framework should be extended in the following areas: 1) Include guidance regarding the job roles and competencies for both IT and OT professionals. 2) Offer step-by-step solutions, based on the work role mappings from the NICE Framework, to increase cybersecurity through employee training and education. 3) Provide a streamlined, lifecycle approach to building a cybersecurity program. Contribution: The CYBER security – Competency Health and Maturity Progression (CYBER-CHAMP©) model provides a customized solution for businesses to understand their education gaps in organizational security and target areas for improvement. Rationale: The Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity v1.1 addresses ICS but does not offer a measurement of cybersecurity maturity or clear methods to ascertain an organization’s current risk profile. In Phases 1 and 5 of the model, measurements are provided to help an organization build their current and target risk profiles. The NICE framework provides a structure for planning an IT cybersecurity workforce, but the OT aspects of cybersecurity are only briefly discussed. The model uses Phases 2-3 to examine the competencies of an organization’s workforce, which includes both IT and OT roles. Current frameworks do not offer next steps to increase an organization’s cybersecurity. During Phase 4, employees’ roles are mapped to training, education, and/or certifications from common vendors. Investigative Approach: The model provides measurements and metrics for both an organization’s status and continual improvement. This improvement methodology includes guidance for creating an overall strategic plan for security improvement via products designed to increase an organization’s operational readiness through workforce competency health. Lessons Learned: Depending on who was participating, there were contradicting answers given in Phase 1 due to different security cultures in the organization. This revelation has influenced the steps listed in the User’s Guide, where Phase 1’s first recommended step is to assemble a team that champions the facilitation and implementation of the model in the organization. During Phase 2, the discovery was made that organizations may be missing roles that are necessary to perform critical cybersecurity functions. By understanding the functional roles and competencies needed, they can contract or hire cybersecurity help to fill these gaps. Implications: Using the model, organizations can discuss quantitative measures for improvement as a business case for advancing their security program. Future research can validate and extend the present theory and model to a variety of environments. It is of interest to investigate additional security roles and knowledge domains that are used to build standardized cybersecurity curriculum.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2019

Demonstration of the Cybersecurity Framework through Real-world Cyber Attack

The Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) developed by the National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity, provides five concurrent and continuous functions to Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover from cyber threats and vulnerabilities to buildings. Based on the core architecture and security best practices defined in the CSF guidelines, we developed the CSF webtools. The CSF webtools provide actionable functions that can be easily adopted by a facility operator to enhance their critical infrastructure security. The essence is captured in a set of “how-to” instructions for the facility operators to adopt, adapt, and apply to their critical infrastructure facilities. When considered together, these functions provide a high-level, strategic view of the lifecycle of an organization’s cybersecurity risk management. The CSF webtools provide an easy to follow set of cybersecurity best practices, policies, and procedures to improve the cybersecurity posture of our nation’s buildings and other critical infrastructures. The CSF webtools are also designed to facilitate communication of cybersecurity activities and outcomes across the organization from the executive to operations levels. Finally, the CSF webtools allow the critical infrastructure operators to assess the overall cybersecurity maturity and posture. The goal of this paper is to demonstrate the capabilities of the CSF webtools through an illustrative cyber-attack based on a real-world scenario.

cybersecurity framework, maturity model, critical ↗