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NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Unlocking the Mysteries of the Moon’s Shadowed Regions

The Moon poles host large quantities of water-ice deposits in the permanently shadowed regions (PSRs), which are vital for enabling sustainable human space exploration, making these regions high-priority targets for upcoming Artemis missions [1]. Unfortunately, today, the best available orbital lunar imagery [2, 3] lacks the meter-scale resolution and signal needed to understand the geomorphology and trafficability of PSRs, complicating the planning and execution of future missions seeking to explore PSRs. We have developed an image enhancement tool called HORUS (Hyper-effective nOise Removal Unet Software) [4, 5], designed to enhance LRO Narrow-Angle Camera (NAC) optical low-light imagery of permanently shadowed regions by effectively removing the CCD-related, photon, and other residual noises that corrupt the images. The tool is composed of two deep learning neural networks trained on environmental metadata and real and synthetic imagery, the latter generated by a physical noise model (LROC). We demonstrated that HORUS effectively produces low-noise, high-resolution images (~1.5m/px), achieving a 5 to 10x improvement over existing long-exposure images of PSRs. HORUS allows scientists and engineers to identify geomorphic features (e.g., craters and boulders) in shadowed regions as small as 3 meters across as well as to peek inside of small shadowed regions, for the first time. The tool was deployed and thoroughly validated for NASA's VIPER mission [6], where it was applied to 20 candidate target regions across the lunar South Pole. Additionally, we conducted different approaches to validate the resulting HORUS-processed images. With HORUS denoised images, VIPER scientists can increase their confidence on what surface features (previously unseen) exist in the shadowed regions, helping them plan rover traverses more safely and efficiently (e.g., Fig. 1) In this manuscript, we will describe how VIPER scientists are utilizing HORUS denoised images to extract new information from the terrain and increase their confidence in what surface features exist in the shadowed regions. In combination with other high-resolution images and digital elevation maps, HORUS images are helping the team analyze potential lading and science sites, as well as planning traverses more safely and efficiently (e.g., Fig. 1). Additionally, we will describe how HORUS tool unlocks a broad range of scientific and exploration applications to other Artemis and CPLS missions to the lunar poles, including (but not limited to) geomorphic analysis, change detection, surface hazard detection, and terrain relative navigation.

artificial intelligence↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

A Framework for the Analysis of Deep Neural Networks in Autonomous Aerospace Applications using Bayesian Statistics

Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are considered to be key components in many autonomous systems. Applications range from vision-based obstacle avoidance to intelligent/learning control and planning. Safety-critical applications as found in the aerospace domain require that the behavior of the DNN is validated and tested rigorously for safety of the autonomous system (AUS). In this paper, we present a framework to support testing of DNNs and the analysis of the network structure. Our framework employs techniques from statistical modeling and active learning to effectively generate test cases for DNN safety testing and performance analysis. We will present results of a case study on a physics-based Deep recurrent residual neural network (DR-RNN), which has been trained to emulate the aerodynamics behavior of a fixed-wing aircraft.

Deep Neural networks↗

NASA NTRS2023

Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance Integration - The Future of Safe Deep Space Human Exploration

Helen Vaccaro↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance Integration - the Future of Safe Deep Space Human Exploration

As a foundational element of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Artemis Campaign, the Gateway is an incrementally built cislunar spacecraft that will serve as a platform for deep space human exploration, science, and technology demonstration. The Gateway will be a unifying catalyst for international partners around the world to establish sustained deep space scientific investigations, lunar surface access, and missions to Mars. As human exploration moves farther away from Earth, spacecraft designs must prioritize and optimize mass and volume allocations, while minimizing human and spacecraft risk. To accomplish this objective, the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance functions develop, implement, and ensure compliance with requirements, in concert with the accurate characterization and transparent communication of residual hazard risks, for integrated safety, reliability and maintainability and quality assurance. Safety and Mission Assurance was a key contributor during Gateway program pre-formulation and formulation activities where safety and reliability analysis was embedded in the Gateway Systems Engineering and Integration team. During these early program stages, a preliminary Gateway Integrated Hazard Analysis and Preliminary Gateway Probabilistic Risk Assessment assisted in Gateway architectural and operational definition as part of a risk-informed design process. As the deep space architecture has matured, the integrated Safety and Mission Assurance analyses have matured, new safety review processes have been developed, and requirements have been refined to ensure compliance with integrated safety and mission assurance objectives. The Gateway Program is currently concluding the preliminary design review informed milestone, where the primary objectives included: - Ensured completeness and consistency of the preliminary design, including the meeting of all requirements within appropriate margins and acceptable risk posture. - Identification of any major issues moving forward to the Critical Design phase. At this milestone, Safety and Mission Assurance provided numerous products, including Gateway Top Risks and Risk Mitigation Plans, updated integrated hazard analyses, updated probabilistic risk assessment, Crew Survival Analysis Report, and updated Safety and Mission Assurance Requirements and Plans. These products provide a many-faceted perspective on the inherent risk and available mitigations involved in flying the current proposed vehicle design and anticipated stack configurations. In addition, Safety and Mission Assurance identified top technical, process and workforce concerns to be addressed as the program progresses toward the critical design phase. This paper will detail the evolution of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance integration functions, provide its current status and lessons learned for future human spaceflight programs. Throughout this paper the key tenets of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance will be discussed: - Application of a risk-informed approach to identify and mitigate areas of highest risk. - Leverage of valuable processes and lessons learned from earlier spaceflight programs. - Development of Safety and Mission Assurance products to inform design risk trades. - Utilization of common Safety and Mission Assurance practices to identify safety risks for multiple perspectives: top-down, bottom-up, and across lines of integration. - Approval of safety hazards at the appropriate level of authority, keeping most deliberation closest to design expertise and elevating risks of greatest concern for program-level consideration. - Championing of Safety and Mission Assurance processes and forums to foster a pervasive safety culture that is transparent, inclusive, and collaborative between all partners. These tenets have allowed the Gateway Safety and Mission Assurance function to play a key role in optimized vehicle design evolution, and early identification and mitigation of Gateway program and Artemis mission risk.

Helen Vaccaro↗

NASA NTRS2014

Current Ground Test Options for Nuclear Thermal Propulsion (NTP)

About 20 different NTP engines/ reactors were tested from 1959 to 1972 as part of the Rover and Nuclear Engine for Rocket Vehicle Application (NERVA) program. Most were tested in open air at test cell A or test cell C, at the Nevada Test Site (NTS). Even after serious engine breakdowns of the reactor (e.g., Phoebus 1A), the test cells were cleaned up for other engine tests. The engine test stand (ETS) was made for high altitude (approximately 1 psia) testing of an NTP engine with a flight configuration, but still had the exhaust released to open air. The Rover/NERVA program became aware of new environmental regulations which would prohibit the release of any significant quantity of radioactive particulates and noble gases into the open air. The nuclear furnace (NF-1) was the last reactor tested before the program was cancelled in 1973, but successfully demonstrated a scrubber concept on how to filter the NTP exhaust. The NF-1 was demonstrated in the summer of 1972. The NF-1 used a 44MW reactor and operated each run for approximately 90 minutes. The system cooled the hot hydrogen exhaust from the engine with a water spray before entering a particle filter. The exhaust then passed through a series of heat exchangers and water separators to help remove water from the exhaust and further reduce the exhaust temperatures. The exhaust was next prepared for the charcoal trap by passing through a dryer and effluent cooler to bring exhaust temperatures close to liquid nitrogen. At those low temperatures, most of the noble gases (e.g., Xe and Kr made from fission products) get captured in the charcoal trap. The filtered hydrogen is finally passed through a flare stack and released to the air. The concept was overall successful but did show a La plating on some surfaces and had multiple recommendations for improvement. The most recent detailed study on the NTP scrubber concept was performed by the ARES Corporation in 2006. The concept is based on a 50,000 lbf thrust engine (approximately 1 GW) with a maximum burn time of 1 hour. The concept utilized lessons learned from NF-1. The strategy breaks down the exhaust into parallel paths to allow flexibility with engine size and mass flow of exhaust. Similar to NF-1, the exhaust is slowed down, cooled, filtered of particulates, filtered of noble gases, and then the clean hydrogen is flared to open air. Another concept proposed by Steve Howe (currently Director of the Center for Space Nuclear Research) to simplify the NTP exhaust filtering is to run the hydrogen exhaust into boreholes underground to filter the exhaust. The two borehole site locations proposed are at the NTS and at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). At NTS, the boreholes are 8' diameter and 1200' deep. The permeability of hydrogen through the soil and its buoyancy will allow it to rise up through the soil and allow the filtering of noble gases and radioactive particulates. The exhaust needs to be cooled to 600C before entering the borehole to avoid soil glazing. Preliminary analysis shows a small buildup of back pressure with time which depends on permeability. Noble gases entering the borehole walls deep can take a long time before reaching the surface. Other factors affecting permeability include borehole pressure, water saturation, and turbulence. Also, a possible need to pump out contaminated water collected at the bottom of the borehole. At INL, the borehole concept is slightly different. The underground borehole has openings to the soil at special depths which have impermeable interbeds above the water table and below the surface to allow the exhaust to travel horizontal between the impermeable layers. Preliminary results indicate better permeability than at NTS. The last option is total containment of the exhaust during the test run. The concept involves slowing down the flow to subsonic in a water cooled diffuser. The hydrogen is burned off in an oxygen rich afterburner with the only products being steam, oxygen, and some noble gases. A heat exchanger and water spray pulls heat from the steam and lowers the temperature for condensation. The optimum ratio between the two is being investigated, with a goal to minimize the total volume of the water hold tanks. A water tank farm collects the contaminated water. The amount of water produced from burning the hydrogen is approximately 100,000 gallons (not including cooling water) for a 25k lbf engine operating for 50 minutes. Residual gases (e.g., oxygen and some noble gases) can be captured at cryogenic levels with a liquid nitrogen cooled dewar. After a few weeks post-test, the radiation levels can drop to more favorable levels before slowly draining each capture tank and using existing filters. With today's environmental regulations, the NTP exhaust is filtered to meet 10 mrem/year exposure to the general public (at a DOE site) or 100 mrem/year (via NRC when tested elsewhere), when natural background radiation exposure to the general public is 300- 600 mrem per year. The current society feels more comfortable with filtering even lower to as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA).

Gerrish, Harold P., Jr.↗

NASA NTRS2012

Next Generation Microbiology Requirements

As humans continue to explore deep into space, microorganisms will travel with them. The primary means to mitigate the risk of infectious disease are a combination of prudent spacecraft design and rigorous operational controls. The effectiveness of these methods are evaluated by microbiological monitoring of spacecraft, food, water, and the crew that is performed preflight, in-flight, and post-flight. Current NASA requirements associated with microbiological monitoring are based on culture-based methodology where microorganisms are grown on a semi-solid growth medium and enumerated. Subsequent identification of the organisms requires specialized labor and large equipment, which historically has been performed on Earth. Requirements that rely strictly on culture-based units limit the use of non-culture based monitoring technology. Specifically, the culture-based "measurement criteria" are Colony Forming Units (CFU, representing the growth of one microorganism at a single location on the agar medium) per a given volume, area, or sample size. As the CFU unit by definition is culture-based, these requirements limit alternative technologies for spaceflight applications. As spaceflight missions such as those to Mars extend further into space, culture-based technology will become difficult to implement due to the (a) limited shelf life of the culture media, (b) mass/volume necessary to carry these consumables, and (c) problems associated with the production of biohazardous material in the habitable volume of the spacecraft. In addition, an extensive amount of new knowledge has been obtained during the Space Shuttle, NASA-Mir, and International Space Station Programs, which gave direction for new or modified microbial control requirements for vehicle design and mission operations. The goal of this task is to develop and recommend a new set of requirements for vehicle design and mission operations, including microbiological monitoring, based upon "lessons learned" and new technology. During 2011, this study focused on evaluating potable water requirements by assembling a forum of internal and external experts from NASA, other federal agencies, and academia. Key findings from this forum included: (1) Preventive design and operational strategies should be stringent and the primary focus of NASA's mitigation efforts, as they are cost effective and can be attained with conventional technology. (2) Microbial monitoring hardware should be simple and must be able to measure the viability of microorganisms in a sample. Multiple monitoring technologies can be utilized as long as at the microorganisms being identified can also be confirmed as viable. (3) Evidence showing alterations in the crew immune function and microbial virulence complicates risk assessments and creates the need for very conservative requirements. (4) One key source of infectious agents will always be the crew, and appropriate preventative measures should be taken preflight. (5) Water systems should be thoroughly disinfected (sterilized if possible) preflight and retain a residual biocide throughout the mission. Future forums will cover requirements for other types of samples, specifically spaceflight food and environmental samples, such as vehicle air and vehicle and cargo surfaces. An interim report on the potable water forum has been delivered to the Human Research Program with a final report on the recommendations for all sample types being delivered in September 2013.

Ott, C. M.↗