Results for “design assurance levels”

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Runway Sign Classifier: A DAL C Certifiable Machine Learning System

In recent years, the remarkable progress of Machine Learning (ML) technologies within the domain of Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems has presented unprecedented opportunities for the aviation industry, paving the way for further advancements in automation, including the potential for single pilot or fully autonomous operation of large commercial airplanes. However, ML technology faces major incompatibilities with existing airborne certification standards, such as ML model traceability and explainability issues or the inadequacy of traditional coverage metrics. Certification of ML-based airborne systems using current standards is problematic due to these challenges. This paper presents a case study of an airborne system utilizing a Deep Neural Network (DNN) for airport sign detection and classification. Building upon our previous work, which demonstrates compliance with Design Assurance Level (DAL) ”D”, we upgrade the system to meet the more stringent requirements of Design Assurance Level ”C”. To achieve DAL C, we employ an established architectural mitigation technique involving two redundant and dissimilar Deep Neural Networks. The application of novel ML-specific data management techniques further enhances this approach. This work is intended to illustrate how the certification challenges of ML-based systems can be addressed for medium criticality airborne applications.

Flight Software↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Toward Design Assurance of Machine-Learning Airborne Systems

In recent years, Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems, enabled by Machine Learning (ML)technology, have demonstrated impressive progress and provides historic opportunities for the aviation industry. However, several key aspects of ML technology are not compatible with existing design assurance standards and make certification problematic. In this paper, we present a case study of a visual system with a Deep Neural Network (DNN) intended to detect and identify airport runway signs. Different use cases and variants of this system exhibit different levels of criticality ranging from design assurance level (DAL) D to B. We use the case study to illustrate the challenges of certification according to the current standards, such asDO-178C. We present the system design, data generation, training, and verification in detail and describe how the design assurance objectives can be met for a DAL D variant of the system. We also discuss gaps and potential approaches for the higher design assurance levels.

Avionics↗

NASA NTRS2012

Safety Assurance in NextGen

The generation of minimum operational, safety, performance, and interoperability requirements is an important aspect of safely integrating new NextGen components into the Communication Navigation Surveillance and Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) system. These requirements are used as part of the implementation and approval processes. In addition, they provide guidance to determine the levels of design assurance and performance that are needed for each element of the new NextGen procedures, including aircraft, operator, and Air Navigation and Service Provider. Using the enhanced Airborne Traffic Situational Awareness for InTrail Procedure (ATSA-ITP) as an example, this report describes some limitations of the current process used for generating safety requirements and levels of required design assurance. An alternative process is described, as well as the argument for why the alternative can generate more comprehensive requirements and greater safety assurance than the current approach.

HarrisonFleming, Cody↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Leveling Arguments: Easier Said Than Done

The aerospace industry’s current desire to rapidly adopt new technologies is inconsistent with the traditional approach to creating new aerospace certification standards. To address this, an FAA-sponsored international Overarching Properties Working Group comprising industry representatives and certifying agencies has introduced the concept of Overarching Properties (OPs). OPs provide a foundation for proposing alternative Means of Compliance (MoC) by demonstrating a product's possession of the Intent, Correctness, and Innocuity properties. Handling criticality levels with the OPs is in its infancy but still required to integrate alternative MoC into the existing aerospace certification infrastructure. This paper examines the impact of criticality levels on the creation and evaluation of OP-related arguments (OPRAs), specifically focusing on the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) system. The study highlights the need for tailored OPRA creation based on assigned criticality levels and proposes self-assessment techniques to strengthen arguments. This research serves as a stepping stone in exploring criticality levels for OPs and bridging the gap in aerospace certification practices.

argument↗

NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance Integration - the Future of Safe Deep Space Human Exploration

As a foundational element of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Artemis Campaign, the Gateway is an incrementally built cislunar spacecraft that will serve as a platform for deep space human exploration, science, and technology demonstration. The Gateway will be a unifying catalyst for international partners around the world to establish sustained deep space scientific investigations, lunar surface access, and missions to Mars. As human exploration moves farther away from Earth, spacecraft designs must prioritize and optimize mass and volume allocations, while minimizing human and spacecraft risk. To accomplish this objective, the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance functions develop, implement, and ensure compliance with requirements, in concert with the accurate characterization and transparent communication of residual hazard risks, for integrated safety, reliability and maintainability and quality assurance. Safety and Mission Assurance was a key contributor during Gateway program pre-formulation and formulation activities where safety and reliability analysis was embedded in the Gateway Systems Engineering and Integration team. During these early program stages, a preliminary Gateway Integrated Hazard Analysis and Preliminary Gateway Probabilistic Risk Assessment assisted in Gateway architectural and operational definition as part of a risk-informed design process. As the deep space architecture has matured, the integrated Safety and Mission Assurance analyses have matured, new safety review processes have been developed, and requirements have been refined to ensure compliance with integrated safety and mission assurance objectives. The Gateway Program is currently concluding the preliminary design review informed milestone, where the primary objectives included: - Ensured completeness and consistency of the preliminary design, including the meeting of all requirements within appropriate margins and acceptable risk posture. - Identification of any major issues moving forward to the Critical Design phase. At this milestone, Safety and Mission Assurance provided numerous products, including Gateway Top Risks and Risk Mitigation Plans, updated integrated hazard analyses, updated probabilistic risk assessment, Crew Survival Analysis Report, and updated Safety and Mission Assurance Requirements and Plans. These products provide a many-faceted perspective on the inherent risk and available mitigations involved in flying the current proposed vehicle design and anticipated stack configurations. In addition, Safety and Mission Assurance identified top technical, process and workforce concerns to be addressed as the program progresses toward the critical design phase. This paper will detail the evolution of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance integration functions, provide its current status and lessons learned for future human spaceflight programs. Throughout this paper the key tenets of the Gateway Program Safety and Mission Assurance will be discussed: - Application of a risk-informed approach to identify and mitigate areas of highest risk. - Leverage of valuable processes and lessons learned from earlier spaceflight programs. - Development of Safety and Mission Assurance products to inform design risk trades. - Utilization of common Safety and Mission Assurance practices to identify safety risks for multiple perspectives: top-down, bottom-up, and across lines of integration. - Approval of safety hazards at the appropriate level of authority, keeping most deliberation closest to design expertise and elevating risks of greatest concern for program-level consideration. - Championing of Safety and Mission Assurance processes and forums to foster a pervasive safety culture that is transparent, inclusive, and collaborative between all partners. These tenets have allowed the Gateway Safety and Mission Assurance function to play a key role in optimized vehicle design evolution, and early identification and mitigation of Gateway program and Artemis mission risk.

Helen Vaccaro↗

NASA NTRS2013

Final Report - Regulatory Considerations for Adaptive Systems

This report documents the findings of a preliminary research study into new approaches to the software design assurance of adaptive systems. We suggest a methodology to overcome the software validation and verification difficulties posed by the underlying assumption of non-adaptive software in the requirementsbased- testing verification methods in RTCA/DO-178B and C. An analysis of the relevant RTCA/DO-178B and C objectives is presented showing the reasons for the difficulties that arise in showing satisfaction of the objectives and suggested additional means by which they could be satisfied. We suggest that the software design assurance problem for adaptive systems is principally one of developing correct and complete high level requirements and system level constraints that define the necessary system functional and safety properties to assure the safe use of adaptive systems. We show how analytical techniques such as model based design, mathematical modeling and formal or formal-like methods can be used to both validate the high level functional and safety requirements, establish necessary constraints and provide the verification evidence for the satisfaction of requirements and constraints that supplements conventional testing. Finally the report identifies the follow-on research topics needed to implement this methodology.

Wilkinson, Chris↗

NASA NTRS2007

Revitalization of Space-Related Human Factors, Environmental and Habitability Data

The NASA Chief Health and Medical Officer (CHMO) recently directed that the agency establish crew health standards to aid in the development of requirements for future vehicles and habitats. Response to this direction includes development of a new NASA habitability and human factors standard and an accompanying design handbook. The new standard contains high-level, over-arching principles to assure its applicability and usability across all NASA development programs. The handbook will provide detailed design requirements and suggestions that will meet the standards. The information contained in NASA-STD-3000 will be updated and included in the new design handbook. In this approach, each new program will derive detailed program-specific requirements from the new standard using the handbook as a design guide and resource. With the completion of the standard, the focus of this year s effort is the development of the new handbook: Human Integration Design Handbook (HIDH). This is an opportunity for the space flight human factors and habitability community to consolidate up-to-date data for use by NASA programs and designers as well as outside researchers and policy makers looking for the next research focus. The goal of the handbook is to help NASA design and build human space flight systems which accommodate the capabilities and limitations of the crew so as to provide an environment where the crew can live and work effectively, safely, and comfortably. Handbook contents will address that primary goal, addressing unique aspects of space flight and habitation, including reduced gravity conditions, time lags, EVA systems and day/night cycles, not addressed in other standards or handbooks. The handbook will be divided into topics similar to NASA-STD-3000 (anthropometrics, architecture, workstations, etc.) and each topic area will contain elements for designers, human factors practitioners, program managers, operators, and researchers. The handbook will include the following elements: (1) Design considerations include a clear and concise summary of what is important to designers in space vehicle / habitat design, design information to translate Earth-base knowledge to the space environment, space issues and the data necessary to address those issues, and a consistent set of terminology. (2) Updates to Lessons Learned and example solutions from Shuttle and Station program experience will provide historical examples to help prevent repeating mistakes or reinvention of the wheel. (3) Requirements will aid in the translation of standards into program specific requirements. The scope of included requirements will define the pool that each program needs to consider and tailor for their specific program. (4) Requirements rationale will help understanding of the importance of these considerations. The HIDH development team at JSC is finalizing the format of the new handbook, prioritizing topic areas for expansion and update, and contacting subject matter experts within the scientific community to assist with this effort. Plans are also being made to continue handbook expansion and maintenance to assure it remains a valuable resource for human factors and human space flight programs.

Russo, Dane↗

NASA NTRS2023

Adaptive Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Reduces Risk of Software Impacting Safety in Artemis Missions

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is asking more of its human spaceflight programs than ever before through the collective Artemis Missions. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program contributes to NASA’s human spaceflight goals by providing IV&V services for NASA’s critical spacecraft and ground software. The IV&V Program is tasked with providing assurance from both individual and integrated mission software perspectives. The Artemis IV&V organization is actively supporting six distinct development efforts: Orion, the Space Launch System (SLS), Exploration Ground Systems (EGS), Mission Control Center (MCC), the Lunar Gateway, and the Human Landing System (HLS), representing a wide diversity of developer organizations, management structures, and development approaches. With much of this extremely complex flight and ground software being essential to human safety both on the ground and in space, Artemis IV&V is likewise challenged to provide more value-added assurance to future Artemis missions within a constrained budget. To meet this challenge, Artemis IV&V employs a variety of novel and evolving “Adaptive IV&V” approaches for planning and executing IV&V analysis to increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of the IV&V Program’s assurance activities, and to address the difficulties imposed by assuring software for a large, highly integrated, multi-mission enterprise managed and executed by physically and organizationally distinct programs. Instilling agile principles like iterative planning cycles, self-organizing teams, and regular retrospectives, into IV&V planning and execution has led to a more rapid turnaround of a minimum viable assurance product and allowed for increased alignment of assurance activities with development progress. Adopting an assurance case methodology has led to greater consistency and clearer communication of assurance design and provided a foundation for long-term maintenance of assurance plans, products, and results across missions. The IV&V-developed Assurance / Safety Case Analytical Network (A-SCAN) framework and tool has enabled the quantification and tracking of system/software risk and confidence. These confidence measures provide a means to repeatedly express the impact of planned and completed assurance work and the remaining residual risk. Applied as part of a “Follow-the-Risk” organizational ethos, this allows consistent rightsizing of analysis rigor and intensity commensurate with the perceived risk of defects, as well as appropriate targeting of the highest risk areas of the software to find safety issues before they can manifest. Finally, the development of the IV&V Advanced Risk Reduction Integrated Software Test and Operations Tri-program Lightweight Environment (ARRISTOTLE), an integrated software-only simulation of Orion, SLS, and EGS systems, has made it possible to independently test integrated pad and flight scenarios and inject faults to observe how the Artemis multi-program, mission software behaves in degraded modes and in response to hazards. These adaptive IV&V investments have enabled Artemis IV&V to become more efficient and effective in IV&V planning and execution and respond more readily to changes in the risk landscape, increasing the breadth and depth of risk reduction possible within the available resources. Residual risk tracking allows IV&V to communicate more effectively with stakeholders, both internal and external at all levels, and inform key decision-making personnel. This evolving assurance design approach provides IV&V surety that work is performed in the highest risk, most value-added areas of the software, to keep our astronauts and ground crews safe and ensure mission success.

Gerek A Whitman↗

NASA NTRS2023

Adaptive Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Reduces Risk of Software Impacting Safety in Artemis Missions

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is asking more of its human spaceflight programs than ever before through the collective Artemis Missions. The NASA Independent Verification and Validation (IV&V) Program contributes to NASA’s human spaceflight goals by providing IV&V services for NASA’s critical spacecraft and ground software. The IV&V Program is tasked with providing assurance from both individual and integrated mission software perspectives. The Artemis IV&V organization is actively supporting six distinct development efforts: Orion, the Space Launch System (SLS), Exploration Ground Systems (EGS), Mission Control Center (MCC), the Lunar Gateway, and the Human Landing System (HLS), representing a wide diversity of developer organizations, management structures, and development approaches. With much of this extremely complex flight and ground software being essential to human safety both on the ground and in space, Artemis IV&V is likewise challenged to provide more value-added assurance to future Artemis missions within a constrained budget. To meet this challenge, Artemis IV&V employs a variety of novel and evolving “Adaptive IV&V” approaches for planning and executing IV&V analysis to increase both the efficiency and effectiveness of the IV&V Program’s assurance activities, and to address the difficulties imposed by assuring software for a large, highly integrated, multi-mission enterprise managed and executed by physically and organizationally distinct programs. Instilling agile principles like iterative planning cycles, self-organizing teams, and regular retrospectives, into IV&V planning and execution has led to a more rapid turnaround of a minimum viable assurance product and allowed for increased alignment of assurance activities with development progress. Adopting an assurance case methodology has led to greater consistency and clearer communication of assurance design and provided a foundation for long-term maintenance of assurance plans, products, and results across missions. The IV&V-developed Assurance / Safety Case Analytical Network (A-SCAN) framework and tool has enabled the quantification and tracking of system/software risk and confidence. These confidence measures provide a means to repeatedly express the impact of planned and completed assurance work and the remaining residual risk. Applied as part of a “Follow-the-Risk” organizational ethos, this allows consistent rightsizing of analysis rigor and intensity commensurate with the perceived risk of defects, as well as appropriate targeting of the highest risk areas of the software to find safety issues before they can manifest. Finally, the development of the IV&V Advanced Risk Reduction Integrated Software Test and Operations Tri-program Lightweight Environment (ARRISTOTLE), an integrated software-only simulation of Orion, SLS, and EGS systems, has made it possible to independently test integrated pad and flight scenarios and inject faults to observe how the Artemis multi-program, mission software behaves in degraded modes and in response to hazards. These adaptive IV&V investments have enabled Artemis IV&V to become more efficient and effective in IV&V planning and execution and respond more readily to changes in the risk landscape, increasing the breadth and depth of risk reduction possible within the available resources. Residual risk tracking allows IV&V to communicate more effectively with stakeholders, both internal and external at all levels, and inform key decision-making personnel. This evolving assurance design approach provides IV&V surety that work is performed in the highest risk, most value-added areas of the software, to keep our astronauts and ground crews safe and ensure mission success.

Gerek Whitman↗

NASA NTRS1987

Broadband imaging system with three fields of view

Payload space limitations, high optical fidelity and the desirability of fast slew rates imply that certain broadband active pointing systems should be lightweight, compact and high performance with small moments of inertia. This paper describes a 12 inch diameter, F/5 reflective hybrid with two fields of view in the visible SWIR, and one field of view in the LWIR region. By incorporating two classic optical designs, these stringent requirements are met at a level as to assure reasonably attainable weight, size and performance estimates.

Manhart, Paul K.↗

NASA NTRS1996

The Role of Independent V&V in Upstream Software Development Processes

This paper describes the role of Verification and Validation (V&V) during the requirements and high level design processes, and in particular the role of Independent V&V (IV&V). The job of IV&V during these phases is to ensure that the requirements are complete, consistent and valid, and to ensure that the high level design meets the requirements. This contrasts with the role of Quality Assurance (QA), which ensures that appropriate standards and process models are defined and applied. This paper describes the current state of practice for IV&V, concentrating on the process model used in NASA projects. We describe a case study, showing the processes by which problem reporting and tracking takes place, and how IV&V feeds into decision making by the development team. We then describe the problems faced in implementing IV&V. We conclude that despite a well defined process model, and tools to support it, IV&V is still beset by communication and coordination problems.

Easterbrook, Steve↗

NASA NTRS2010

Automated Conflict Resolution, Arrival Management and Weather Avoidance for ATM

The paper describes a unified solution to three types of separation assurance problems that occur in en-route airspace: separation conflicts, arrival sequencing, and weather-cell avoidance. Algorithms for solving these problems play a key role in the design of future air traffic management systems such as NextGen. Because these problems can arise simultaneously in any combination, it is necessary to develop integrated algorithms for solving them. A unified and comprehensive solution to these problems provides the foundation for a future air traffic management system that requires a high level of automation in separation assurance. The paper describes the three algorithms developed for solving each problem and then shows how they are used sequentially to solve any combination of these problems. The first algorithm resolves loss-of-separation conflicts and is an evolution of an algorithm described in an earlier paper. The new version generates multiple resolutions for each conflict and then selects the one giving the least delay. Two new algorithms, one for sequencing and merging of arrival traffic, referred to as the Arrival Manager, and the other for weather-cell avoidance are the major focus of the paper. Because these three problems constitute a substantial fraction of the workload of en-route controllers, integrated algorithms to solve them is a basic requirement for automated separation assurance. The paper also reviews the Advanced Airspace Concept, a proposed design for a ground-based system that postulates redundant systems for separation assurance in order to achieve both high levels of safety and airspace capacity. It is proposed that automated separation assurance be introduced operationally in several steps, each step reducing controller workload further while increasing airspace capacity. A fast time simulation was used to determine performance statistics of the algorithm at up to 3 times current traffic levels.

Erzberger, H.↗

NASA NTRS1986

CID-720 aircraft high-environment flight instrumentation system

The high-environment flight instrumentation system was designed to acquire Langley's structural response data during the full scale transport-controlled impact demonstration test. There was only one opportunity for data acquisition. Thus, a high reliability and crashworthy design approach was implemented. The approach featured multi-level redundancy and a vigorous quality assurance testing program. Complying with an accelerated schedule, the instrumentation system was developed, tested and shipped within 18 months to Dryden Flight Research Facility. The flight instrumentation system consists of two autonomous data systems, DAS #1 and #2, and an excellent checkout subsystem. Each data system is partitioned into four pallets. The system was designed to operate on manned and unmanned flights. There are 176 data channels per data system. These channels are sequentially sampled and encoded into 1 megabit/sec pulse code modulation (PCM) data signal. To increase the probability of success, a special PCM distribution subsystem was developed. This subsystem distributes the PCM signal to two transmitters, one delay memory, and eight recorder tracks. The data on four of these trackes was digitally delayed approximately 300 msec to maximize data acquisition during impact. Therefore each data system's data is redundantly recorded onboard and on the ground. There are two time code generators. Parallel time from each is encoded into both data systems. Serial time from each is redundantly recorded on both onboard recorders. Instrumentation power is independent of aircraft power and self-contained.

Calloway, R. S.↗

NASA NTRS2011

Shooting the Moon

This story is about an unlikely NASA mission to the Moon. It was unlikely because it was started with far too little time and too-little money to complete. It was unlikely because it was able to take chances to accept risk of failure. It was unlikely because it was searching for the unthinkable: water-ice on the moon... Figure 1-1: LCROSS Mission. The mission of the Lunar CRater Observation and Sensing Satellite (LCROSS) was to investigate the possibility of water ice in craters on the Moon s poles. This is certainly an interesting scientific topic in itself, but I intend to focus on the compelling experience of managing the LCROSS Project in the context of this storied Agency. Perhaps most interesting are the implications this story has for managing any development effort, lunar or not, and working a balance to achieve success. NASA is by design a risk-taking agency within the US Government. It could be argued that NASA s purpose in the aerospace community is to take on the really big challenges that either the corporate world can t afford, are not yet profitable endeavors, or are just too risky for private corporations to entertain. However, expectations of the Agency have evolved. A combination of grim human tragedies and some very public cost and schedule overruns have challenged the public s and Congress s tolerance for risk-taking within the Agency. NASA, which is supposed to be in the business of taking risks to do bold, difficult things, has become less and less able to do so within its cost framework. Yet effectively replacing prudent risk management with attempts to "risk-eliminate" is completely unaffordable. So where does risk-taking fit within the Agency, or within private/corporate organizations for that matter? Where astronauts play there is clearly concern about risk. When an organization puts humans in harm s way, it is understandably going to take extra effort to assure nobody gets hurt. Doing so, of course, costs money - a lot of money to pay for labor and hardware which is attempting to assure nothing will go wrong. Sophisticated designs, with doubly- or triply-redundant systems, extensive testing to verify those systems, and numerous engineering test units built to learn and evolve a hardware design, all drive the cost and time required to implement. Human spaceflight is an expensive business because of the exceptional system complexity and levels of assurance required for human space travel. What about missions that do not involve human spaceflight? What about missions whose potential failure will not take a human life, whose costs are small and whose urgency and importance are limited by design? A portfolio consisting of this type of mission can be designed to be risk tolerant, not requiring large expenditures to guarantee against failure. With the money saved, the number of missions that can be executed within the portfolio grows, or the total cost of the portfolio can be reduced. The NASA LCROSS mission is a pathfinder example of a low-cost, quick turn-around mission which struck a balance on mission risk, while accomplishing big objectives, like defining how we understand the Moon.

Andrews, Daniel R.↗

NASA NTRS2007

Exploration Challenges: Transferring Ground Repair Techniques to Space Flight Application

Fulfilling NASA's Vision for Space Exploration will demand an extended presence in space at distances from our home planet that exceed our current experience in space logistics and maintenance. The ability to perform repairs in lieu of the customary Orbital Replacement Unit (ORU) process where a faulty part is replaced will be elevated from contingency to routine to sustain operations. The use and cost effectiveness of field repairs for ground based operations in industry and the military have advanced with the development of technology in new materials, new repair techniques and new equipment. The unique environments, accessibility constraints and Extra Vehicular Activity (EVA) issues of space operations will require extensive assessment and evolution of these technologies to provide an equivalent and expected level of assurance to mission success. Challenges include the necessity of changes in design philosophy and policy, extremes in thermal cycling, disruptive forces (such as static charge and wind entrainment) on developed methods for control of materials, dramatically increased volatility of chemicals for cleaning and other compounds due to extremely low pressures, the limits imposed on dexterity and maneuverability by current EVA equipment and practices, and the necessity of unique verification methodology. This paper describes these challenges in and discusses the effects on the established ground techniques for repair. The paper also describes the leading repair methodology candidates and their beneficial attributes for resolving these issues with the evolution of technology.

McLemore, Carole A.↗

NASA NTRS2022

Impact of Future Low-Emissions Combustor Technology on Acoustic Scaling Laws

A first-of-its-kind examination of broadband noise associated with a far-term advanced low-emission aero-combustor concept is presented. Due to design trends and expected cycle changes for future aircraft propulsion systems, noise generated by sources in the combustor are expected to become of increasing significance for airport-community noise. The paper assesses the impact on legacy semi-empirical noise-prediction methods from the expected radical departures from current combustor operating conditions and designs, such as fuel-air distribution and flame anchoring techniques. Such methods are essential in system-level noise assessments at the preliminary design stage for advanced air transports to assure that overall environmental goals are met. Detailed unsteady pressure measurements, obtained in a fundamental combustion noise experiment utilizing a combustor rig at relevant pressures and temperatures, are analyzed. In addition to an advanced far-term low-emissions concept, a reference configuration with the test section arranged to model a modern combustor sector was also studied. For the test rig in the current-generation configuration, the measured broadband acoustic data are reasonably well described by the acoustic-power scaling laws used in legacy semi-empirical noise-prediction methods. For the future-advanced configuration, the legacy scaling laws, with some notable exceptions, provide correct trends, but with much less accuracy

aeroacoustics↗

NASA NTRS1999

Generation of Level 3 SMMR and SSM/I Brightness Temperatures for the Period 1978-1999

The NOAA/NASA Pathfinder Program was initially designed to assure that certain key remote sensing data sets of particular significance to global change research were scientifically validated, consistently processed and made readily available to the research community at minimal cost. Through this Program the National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC), University of Colorado has successfully processed, archived and distributed the Scanning Multichannel Microwave Radiometer (SMMR) and Special Sensor Microwave/Imager (SSM/I) Level 3 (EASE-Grid format) Pathfinder data sets for the period 1978 to 1999. These data are routinely distributed to approximately 150 researchers through various media including CD-ROM, 8 mm tape, ftp and the EOS Information Management System (IMS). At NSIDC these data are currently being applied in the development and validation of algorithms to derive snow water equivalent (NASA NAG5-6636), the mapping of frozen ground and the detection of the onset of melt over ice sheets, sea ice and snow cover. The EASE-Grid format, developed at NSIDC in conjunction with the SMMR-SSM/I Pathfinder project has also been applied to Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer (AVHRR) and TOVS Pathfinder data, as well as ancillary data such as digital elevation, land cover classification and several in situ data sets. EASE-Grid will also be used for all land products derived from the NASA EOS AMSR-E instrument.

Partington, Kim↗

NASA NTRS1990

Flight payloads environmental approach

The Earth Observing System (EOS) and Space Station (SS) attached payload instruments to be developed by JPL will have a consistent implied level of reliability confidence based on the application of product assurance requirements. An important subset of these requirements is a set of detailed environmental design and test requirements. These requirements have a sound technical defense, are unambiguous in their level of detail, provide rational risk management as a function of payload classification, and are rigorously enforced with a comprehensive waiver process imposed on planned deviations.

Schlue, John W.↗