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At least 19 records

DER Digital Supply Chain Gap Analysis

Solar photovoltaic (PV) cybersecurity is a growing field of research. As deployments of solar PV have increased, cyber risk has also increased. Utility solar PV installations, however, are not required to comply with the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) plan unless they meet a minimum generation threshold of 75 MW. Individual residential-scale solar PV deployments will not meet that generation threshold and are therefore excluded from the NERC CIP requirements. With most solar installations less than 75 MW, solar PV has been deployed with minimal oversight and highly variable cybersecurity maturity. The resources that comprise the digital supply chain can include software, code, data, and other digital components. But as clean energy technologies advance, cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities continue to evolve and grow in sophistication. Supply chain cybersecurity represents a critical area for ensuring safe operations as the U.S. moves toward a clean energy future.

cybersecurity↗

IBR Digital Supply Chain Gap Analysis and Recommendations

The adoption of clean energy technologies, including solar photovoltaics, continues to introduce non-traditional stakeholders to the operations and planning of the electric system. Stakeholders such as manufacturers, vendors, owners, aggregators, and others are enabling the adoption, integration, and optimum operations of solar technologies at accelerated rates. Inverters form the foundation of many digitally controlled energy sources for clean energy technologies, including Solar, Battery Energy Storage Systems, Hybrid Systems, and Hydrogen Fuel Cells. Their supply chain is complex, a series of microchips, electronic switches and other components making up its primary functions. The complexity of this space and the growing digitization associated with these components can create supply chain cyber risks. One measure to mitigate cybersecurity attacks is proper digital supply chain security. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Solar Energy Technologies Office (SETO), in partnership with the Cybersecurity, Energy, Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) office, is hosting a workshop to bring together solar vendors and services providers to discuss digital supply chain security for solar systems and challenges and opportunities in the transitioning to a fully domestic supply chain for solar energy in the U.S. This workshop will support the Securing Solar for the Grid (S2G) and Energy Cyber Sense program activities. During the workshop, industry experts and researchers from DOE National Laboratories will discuss the current solar supply chain landscape and the transition to domestic manufacturing of solar components in the U.S. Tools and techniques to better manage and secure the digital supply chain of solar devices and systems will be discussed.

cybersecurity↗

Obstacles to Practical Digital Supply Chain Risk Management in the Energy Sector

Cyber supply chain risk management (C-SCRM) programs must consider operations that depend on the lifecycles of digital components such as hardware, firmware, software, and services. We integrate academic literature, historical incidents, and existing standards to identify obstacles faced by C-SCRM programs.

Business Process Management & Integration↗

LANL’s Digital Supply Chain Transformation with Ariba Part 2 [Slides]

LANL’s budget continues to increase. Our annual procurement spend has increased from approximately 750 million two years ago to 1.4 Billion in FY21. Procurement for LANL is a mix of indirect and direct but had limited managed spend – more standalone orders vs master contracts. The level of transformation we were looking to achieve required a comprehensive approach, encompassing people, processes and software solutions.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Cybersecurity and Digital Components: Supply Chain Deep Dive Assessment

The report “America’s Strategy to Secure the Supply Chain for a Robust Clean Energy Transition” lays out the challenges and opportunities faced by the United States in the energy supply chain as well as the federal government plans to address these challenges and opportunities. It is accompanied by several issue-specific deep dive assessments, including this one, in response to Executive Order 14017 “America’s Supply Chains,” which directs the Secretary of Energy to submit a report on supply chains for the energy sector industrial base. The Executive Order is helping the federal government to build more secure and diverse U.S. supply chains, including energy supply chains. As the energy sector has become more globalized and increasingly complex, digitized, and even virtualized, its supply chain risk for digital components – the software, virtual platforms and services, and data – in energy systems has evolved and expanded. All digital components in U.S. energy sector systems are vulnerable and may be subject to cyber supply cha in risks stemming from a variety of threats, vulnerabilities, and impacts. This includes digital components in all systems within the ESIB, namely those systems operated by asset owners across different energy subsectors (e.g., electricity, oil and natural gas, and renewables) and the systems operated by a worldwide industrial complex with capabilities to perform research and development and design, produce, operate, and maintain energy sector systems, subsystems, components, or parts to meet U.S. energy requirements. Supply chain risks for digital components including software, virtual platforms and services, and data have grown in recent years as increasingly sophisticated cyber adversaries have targeted exploiting vulnerabilities in these digital assets. Supply chain risks for digital components in energy sector systems will continue to evolve and likely increase as these systems are increasingly interconnected, digitized, and remotely operated.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Organizational Influence on Supply Chain for Digital Energy Infrastructure: Business Models, and Policy Landscape

Significant investment is driving the essential modernization and digitization of U.S. energy infrastructure, but the United States faces a key challenge in this grid transformation: our renewable and clean energy supply chains have limited capacity to source necessary digital assets through U.S. or allied sources. Batteries and their associated power electronic interfaces are key components to delivering clean and more resilient energy delivery, providing much-needed fast ramping, emergency discharge, generation, and operations support to the electric grid. These services have grown to be invaluable over the past 10 years and will soon be an irreplaceable component of energy delivery. While there have been significant strides to move supply chains for raw and critical materials to U.S. and allied nations, the control and power electronic industry has lagged, in part because of lower cost margins. For example, the United States now has growing capacity to manufacture solar photovoltaic (PV) panels, but 90% of the inverters—which are essential to the conversion of DC to AC for grid connection and controls—are made in or source parts from the People’s Republic of China (PRC). While a global supply chain is beneficial for many economic and supply diversification reasons, presence of foreign entities of concern (FEOC) in a dominant role in this supply chain brings additional concerns for national security of infrastructure. The BESS relationship and new clean energy have features that warrant discussions and additional focus on impact for technology security, given their critical role. This review considers the impact and solutions for complex business and policy landscapes in clean energy supply chain, and the benefit trade-offs, focusing on the Battery Energy Storage System case study, and its complex organizational relationships across both the US, Allied countries and Foreign Entities of Concern. While many examples in this paper are presented on PRC focused manufacture, this could apply to any potentially adversarial relationship

25 - ENERGY STORAGE↗

Securing the Modern Grid: Federal Investments, Digitization, and Supply Chain Strategy

Across the United States (U.S.) grid expansion and modernization is underway, paving the way for accelerated load growth and intelligent resource management. Digitization of the grid is supported by several state and federal programs, providing support for utilities installing advanced metering infrastructure (AMI), AI-powered analytics systems, battery energy storage systems (BESS), and distributed energy resource management systems (DERMS) to transform the grid from a one-way power delivery system into an intelligent, responsive network that will enable faster load growth and power expansion of data centers for advanced artificial intelligence (AI) applications. The digital transformation of America's grid presents opportunity for increased efficiency and resiliency but also introduces new digital risks that require careful management. Digital equipment often contains several vulnerabilities such as unencrypted communication protocols, and persistent remote access capabilities that could be exploited to manipulate device settings, coordinate service disruptions, or inject false data into grid operations. These digital risks become particularly important as the grid must rapidly scale to support AI-driven data centers, which the administration has identified as essential for maintaining U.S. technological leadership and economic competitiveness. These vulnerabilities are compounded by supply chain realities: Chinese manufacturers currently produce 70-90% of essential grid components including inverters, batteries, and control systems, with the U.S. lacking domestic manufacturing capacity for critical assets like extra-high voltage transformers. Recent federal legislation has established Foreign Entity of Concern (FEOC) restrictions to address these risks, requiring projects to achieve escalating thresholds of non-FEOC content to receive tax credits while utilities work to expand sourcing channels for their supply chains and strengthen security measures. These restrictions arrive precisely when utilities face unprecedented electricity demand growth driven by the rapid growth in data centers, creating a considerable challenge: rapidly expanding infrastructure while navigating complex compliance requirements while lacking viable alternatives for many critical components. Idaho National Laboratory (INL) and its partners have developed practical approaches to help utilities navigate these intersecting challenges as they leverage federal investment to strengthen and grow the grid. These solutions include Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles that build resilience directly into systems, the Cirrus tool for secure cloud migration, and enhanced procurement guidance that embeds security requirements throughout equipment lifecycles. Federal initiatives, such as the Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance (TADA) project, provide direct support to utilities implementing these approaches while facilitating knowledge sharing across the industry. While these tools and frameworks cannot eliminate all risks inherent in foreign supply chain dependencies, they offer pragmatic pathways for strengthening security posture without sacrificing the deployment momentum essential to meeting surging electricity demand. Ultimately, securing America's digital energy infrastructure demands dedicated coordination across multiple fronts: building domestic supply chains, implementing robust digital assurance practices, and maintaining the aggressive modernization timeline necessary for reliability, resilience, and energy independence.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

BESS Digital Assurance, Supply Chain Risk Management, and Emerging Regulation Session Two

The TADA BESS Supply Chain Workshops are designed to equip participants with the knowledge and tools necessary to address the evolving challenges at the intersection of battery energy storage systems (BESS), cybersecurity, and supply chain vulnerabilities. The workshops emphasize the application of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles using INL’s procurement guide and the CIE-BAT tool. Attendees will develop risk-based security strategies and actionable compliance roadmaps tailored to their BESS projects. Additionally, the program fosters a collaborative network of practitioners and provides guidance on navigating emerging regulatory requirements, including FEOC rules under the OBBB framework, to assess and enhance organizational readiness. A comprehensive exploration of BESS cybersecurity supply chain risks, systematic vendor risk assessment through the BESS Procurement Guide, and practical application of the INL SCRM Chatbot for enhanced supply chain resilience. This is Session 2 of 3. (Full Version)

25 - ENERGY STORAGE↗

BESS Digital Assurance, Supply Chain Risk Management, and Emerging Regulation Session One - Abridged

The TADA BESS Supply Chain Workshops are designed to equip participants with the knowledge and tools necessary to address the evolving challenges at the intersection of battery energy storage systems (BESS), cybersecurity, and supply chain vulnerabilities. The workshops emphasize the application of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles using INL’s procurement guide and the CIE-BAT tool. Attendees will develop risk-based security strategies and actionable compliance roadmaps tailored to their BESS projects. Additionally, the program fosters a collaborative network of practitioners and provides guidance on navigating emerging regulatory requirements, including FEOC rules under the OBBB framework, to assess and enhance organizational readiness. This is Session 1 of 3.

25 - ENERGY STORAGE↗

BESS Digital Assurance, Supply Chain Risk Management, and Emerging Regulation Session One

The TADA BESS Supply Chain Workshops are designed to equip participants with the knowledge and tools necessary to address the evolving challenges at the intersection of battery energy storage systems (BESS), cybersecurity, and supply chain vulnerabilities. The workshops emphasize the application of Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles using INL’s procurement guide and the CIE-BAT tool. Attendees will develop risk-based security strategies and actionable compliance roadmaps tailored to their BESS projects. Additionally, the program fosters a collaborative network of practitioners and provides guidance on navigating emerging regulatory requirements, including FEOC rules under the OBBB framework, to assess and enhance organizational readiness. This is Session 1 of 3. (Full Version)

25 - ENERGY STORAGE↗

Supply Chain Cybersecurity Recommendations for Solar Photovoltaics

Solar photovoltaic (PV) cybersecurity is a growing field of research. As deployments of solar PV has increased, cyber risk has also increased. However, utility solar PV installations are not required to comply with North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) unless they meet a minimum generation threshold of 75 Megawatts (MW). Individual residential scale solar PV deployments will not meet that generation threshold and are therefore excluded from NERC CIP requirements. With most solar installations below 75MW, solar PV has been deployed with minimal oversight and highly variable cybersecurity maturity. The resources that make up the digital supply chain can include software, code, data, as well as other digital components. However as clean energy technology advances, cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities continue to evolve and grow in sophistication. Solar PV faces a unique challenge in which it can be deployed in residential buildings and purchased by a consumer directly. This makes the supply chain of PV a unique challenge, where responsible parties for cybersecurity vary widely depending on the type of solar PV being deployed. Supply chain cybersecurity for solar PV represents a critical area for ensuring safe operations as the U.S. moves towards a clean energy future.

14 SOLAR ENERGY↗

Managing Cyber Supply Chain Risk for Renewable Energy Technologies

On July 1, 2021, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER) hosted a virtual workshop facilitated by the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL). Cybersecurity supply chain experts, researchers, and leaders in government and industry came together to share information on current and future challenges in securing emerging technologies and technical architecture. From a cybersecurity perspective, we need to move from a cybersecurity approach that focuses principally on legacy asset owners to one that incorporates more emphasis on end-point device manufacturers and third-party integrators. Cybersecurity for the global digital supply chain for manufacturers of consumer end-point devices—such as smart solar inverters and smart electric vehicle (EV) chargers—will be critical to the future cyber health of the grid.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗

Modeling Cyber Supply Chain Incidents with Multilayered Graph Motifs

As noted within the literature, supply chain includes people and organizations---manufacturers, integrators, and third-party vendors---that are involved in one or more stages of a product lifecycle. Since supply chains, by definition, include organizations and people, supply chain risk management activities must consider dependencies between an organization's business processes and third-party resources. Just as adversarial tactics can be implemented via techniques implemented via networked computer systems, so can such tactics be expressed via legal business relationships. A cyber incident may have an exponential impact downstream, for example, by leveraging a product's distribution channel (e.g. malicious updates in SolarWinds, buggy updates in CrowdStrike). Similarly, legitimate and legal business relationships also affect the attack surface exposure of systems, enabling long-term persistence and/or unknown impacts to product quality that are hard to detect. This paper catalogs several recent digital supply chain incidents and applies a multilayered network formalism to develop structural indicators (graph motifs) that reflect potentially-adversarial behavior. Finally, we compare and contrast the characteristics of adversarial tactics (e.g. Loss of Availability, Data Collection) that leverage cyber-physical dependencies to those that leverage legal organizational relationships.

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Defense Resilience Technical Assistance Options - Initial Overview

The Defense Resilience Technical Assistance (TA) project, a collaboration between the DOE Grid Deployment Office and the DoD, aims to enhance energy infrastructure at military installations and utilities and the surrounding community. It focuses on improving energy system performance, addressing power infrastructure inadequacies, enhancing power quality, reducing cyber sabotage impacts, and strengthening digital supply chains. Defense Resilience Technical Assistance Options - Initial Overview. Intend to tailor to the pilot installation.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Grid Communications: Digital Assurance and Supply Chain Challenges and Emerging Regulation Session Two

The TADA Grid Communications Workshops are designed to strengthen cybersecurity and digital assurance across the energy sector by focusing on secure deployment and management of grid communications technologies. These workshops bring together state energy offices, utilities, and technology suppliers to explore the intersection of communications infrastructure, supply chain risks, and emerging regulatory requirements. Participants will apply Cyber-Informed Engineering (CIE) principles to reduce risks in communications systems, engage with INL’s procurement guidance, and explore future tools. Through scenario-based exercises and peer exchange, attendees will develop risk-based security strategies and actionable compliance roadmaps tailored to their grid communications projects. The workshops also help participants navigate evolving regulatory frameworks such as FEOC rules in the OBBB, NERC CIP-013, and NDAA 2024, while identifying compliance gaps in mixed-technology environments. A key outcome is the formation of a practitioner network with ongoing access to INL expertise and resources, fostering long-term resilience in the digital energy ecosystem. This is Session 2 of 3 (Full Version).

29 - ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY AND ECONOMY↗

The Nuclear Digital I&C System Supply Chain Cyber-Attack Surface

The nuclear supply chain attack surface is a large, complex network of interconnected stakeholders and activities. The global economy has widened and deepened the supply chain, resulting in larger numbers of geographically dispersed locations and increased difficulty ensuring the authenticity and security of digital assets. Although the nuclear industry has made significant strides in securing facilities from cyber-attacks, the supply chain remains vulnerable. This paper outlines supply chain threats and vulnerabilities and provides a Digital I&C System Supply Chain Cyber-Attack Surface diagram to illustrate the complexity of securing hardware, firmware, software, and system information throughout the entire supply chain lifecycle. The knowledge presented in this paper provides a foundation to use in cybersecurity supply chain risk analysis and to guide future supply chain research and development efforts leading to enhancement of a nuclear facility’s overall security posture.

98 NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT, SAFEGUARDS, AND PHYSICAL P↗

Data Centers and Digital Assurance Introduction to Supply Chain and Cybersecurity for Data Centers, Session 1

The first session of the TADA (Technical Assistance for Digital Assurance) Data Centers Cohort Workshop, held on October 30, 2025, introduced foundational concepts of Digital Assurance in the context of data center and grid integration. Sponsored by the U.S. Department of Energy, the workshop brought together utilities, data center operators, developers, and vendors to address cybersecurity and supply chain vulnerabilities. The session emphasized the growing criticality of data centers within the electric grid and the need for secure, real-time, bidirectional communication. Participants explored the principles of Digital Assurance, including cybersecurity, cyber-informed engineering (CIE), and lifecycle security, and applied a threat-vulnerability-consequence framework to identify and mitigate risks at the data center–grid interface. Discussions covered a range of threats such as spoofed dispatch signals and insider threats, architectural vulnerabilities like SCADA interfaces and insecure protocols, and potential consequences including cascading grid failures. The session also raised strategic questions about business value, vendor assurance, and defining cyber boundaries and responsibilities. This foundational workshop set the stage for deeper technical analysis and the development of actionable frameworks in subsequent sessions. Session 1 of 3.

24 - POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗