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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2023

Organizational System Resilience to Disinformation: A Viable Systems Model Exploration

This paper explores the utility of organizational system modeling frameworks to provide valuable insight into information flows within organizations and subsequently the opportunities for increasing resilience against disinformation campaigns targeting the system's ability to utilize information within its decision making. Disinformation is a growing challenge for many organizations and in recent years has created delay in decision making. Here the paper has utilized the viable systems model (VSM) to characterize organizational systems and used this approach to outline potential subsystem requirements to promote resilience of the system. The results of this paper can support the development of simulations and models considering the human elements within the system as well as support the development of quantitative measures of resilience.

96 KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND PRESERVATION↗
DOE OSTI2022

Identifying Disinformation Using Rhetorical Devices in Natural Language Models

Foreign disinformation campaigns are strategically organized, extended efforts using disinformation – false or misleading information deliberately placed by an adversary – to achieve some goal. Disinformation campaigns pose severe threats to our nation’s security by misinforming decision makers and negatively influencing their actions when they are operating on limited amounts of evidence. Current efforts rely on subject matter experts to manually identify disinformation, or on computers and traditional natural language processing algorithms to identify patterns in data to calculate the probability that something is disinformation or not. While both have their merits and successes, subject matter experts are unable to keep up with the high volumes of global information and traditional natural language algorithms do not do well in identifying “why” something is disinformation or not. Our hypothesis is that we can identify disinformation by looking at the way someone speaks, in the rhetorical devices they use. We have curated and annotated a dataset designed for multiple natural language processing tasks, but specifically useful for disinformation detection algorithms.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Contentious narratives and disinformation about nuclear weapons in strategic deterrence and competition: A SOCOM perspective. Part of Section: United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) in Emerging Strategic & Geopolitical Challenges: Operational Implications for US Combatant Commands

Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine demonstrates the challenge for strategic deterrence and competition of countering contentious narratives and disinformation about weapons of mass destruction (WMD) during conventional regional wars against a nucleararmed adversary. Moscow uses both tailored, contentious narratives and targeted disinformation about WMD in Ukraine to influence and disrupt local and global perceptions in support of its deterrence and competition objectives vis-à-vis the United States and NATO. Since December 2021, Moscow has made a focal point of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons in its efforts to establish a permissive environment for its military buildup on the border with Ukraine and then its military intervention. These information tactics also demonstrate an opportunity for US Special Operations Forces (SOF). They are a case study for considering how SOF can contribute to strategic deterrence and competition objectives, specifically countering adversary gray-zone information efforts to alter regional security orders.1 Such a role is in line with the 2022 Special Operations Forces Vision and Strategy, which provides a framework for the evolution of SOF into “a force capable of creating strategic, asymmetric advantages for the nation as a key contributor of integrated deterrence” (United States Special Operations Command, 2022). This paper briefly examines this strategic challenge and SOF opportunity, focusing narrowly on the distinction between contentious narratives and disinformation about nuclear weapons and the role of SOF in countering these gray-zone information tactics. The nuclear dimension of Moscow’s contentious narratives and disinformation in the “special military operation” is of particular interest because it demonstrates the distinction between strategic efforts to influence and disrupt local and global perceptions in Moscow’s favor. This distinction between influence and disruption is less clear with Russia’s contentious narratives and disinformation about chemical and biological weapons in Ukraine, as disinformation about these two types of WMD appears to overwhelm contentious narratives. We believe this distinction is useful for policymakers and warfighters responsible for countering gray-zone information tactics because it provides a framework for crafting tailored responses to contentious narratives and disinformation about nuclear weapons and other WMD. The chapter concludes with a discussion of efforts that could be undertaken by SOF in cooperation with other relevant stakeholders to address this aspect of adversary gray-zone information tactics.

29 ENERGY PLANNING, POLICY, AND ECONOMY↗
DOE OSTI2021

Defending Weapons Inspections from the Effects of Disinformation

The intentional spread of disinformation is not a new challenge for the scientific world. We have seen it perpetuate the idea of a flat earth, convince communities that vaccines are more dangerous than helpful, and even suggest a connection between the “5G” communication infrastructure and COVID-19. Nor is disinformation a new phenomenon in the weapons inspection arena. Weapons inspectors themselves are often forced to sift through alternative narratives of events and inconsistent reporting, and they regularly see their credibility and conclusions questioned in the face of government politics or public biases. But certain recent disinformation campaigns have become so overwhelmingly comprehensive and effective that they constitute a new kind of threat. By preventing accountability for clear violations of international law, these campaigns have created a challenge to the survival of arms control treaties themselves. If weapons inspectors cannot regain the trust of the international community in the face of this challenge, it will be increasingly difficult to ensure compliance with arms control and disarmament treaties going forward. In this essay, I will briefly discuss one of the most comprehensive disinformation efforts of the past decade: the disinformation campaign used to prevent accountability for Syria's repeated use of chemical weapons. After this discussion, I will propose one possible approach to help protect the credibility of disarmament experts and weapons inspectors in the face of pervasive disinformation. This approach will require a concerted effort to connect and support compliance experts and to understand and explain their expertise across cultural, political, national, economic, and religious divides.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2021

A Projected Network Model of Online Disinformation Cascades

Within the past half-decade, it has become overwhelmingly clear that suppressing the spread of deliberate false and misleading information is of the utmost importance for protecting democratic institutions. Disinformation has been found to come from both foreign and domestic actors, but the effects from either can be disastrous. From the simple encouragement of unwarranted distrust to conspiracy theories promoting violence, the results of disinformation have put the functionality of American democracy under direct threat. Present scientific challenges posed by this problem include detecting disinformation, quantifying its potential impact, and preventing its amplification. We present a model on which we can experiment with possible strategies toward the third challenge: the prevention of amplification. This is a social contagion network model, which is decomposed into layers to represent physical, ''offline'', interactions as well as virtual interactions on a social media platform. Along with the topological modifications to the standard contagion model, we use state-transition rules designed specifically for disinformation, and distinguish between contagious and non-contagious infected nodes. We use this framework to explore the effect of grassroots social movements on the size of disinformation cascades by simulating these cascades in scenarios where a proportion of the agents remove themselves from the social platform. We also test the efficacy of strategies that could be implemented at the administrative level by the online platform to minimize such spread. These top-down strategies include banning agents who disseminate false information, or providing corrective information to individuals exposed to false information to decrease their probability of believing it. We find an abrupt transition to smaller cascades when a critical number of random agents are removed from the platform, as well as steady decreases in the size of cascades with increasingly more convincing corrective information. Finally, we compare simulated cascades on this framework with real cascades of disinformation recorded on Whatsapp surrounding the 2019 Indian election. We find a set of hyperparameter values that produces a distribution of cascades matching the scaling exponent of the distribution of actual cascades recorded in the dataset. We acknowledge the available future directions for improving the performance of the framework and validation methods, as well as ways to extend the model to capture additional features of social contagion.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Methodology to Compare Twitter Reaction Trends between Disinformation Communities, to COVID related Campaign Events at Different Geospatial Granularities

With still ongoing COVID pandemic, there is an immediate need for a deeper understanding of how Twitter discussions (or chatters) in disinformation spreading communities get triggered. More specifically, the value is in monitoring how such trigger events in Twitter discussion do align with the timelines of relevant influencing events in the society (indicated in this work as campaign events). For campaign events in regards to COVID pandemic, we consider both NPI (Nonpharmaceutical Interventions) campaigns and disinformation spreading campaigns together. In this short paper we have presented a novel methodology to quantify, compare and relate two Twitter disinformation communities, in terms of their reaction patterns to the timelines of major campaign events. We have also analyzed these campaigns at their three geospatial granularity contexts: local county, state, and country/ federal. We have conducted a novel dataset collection on campaigns (NPI + Disinformation) at these different geospatial granularities. Then, with collected dataset on Twitter disinformation communities, we have performed a case study to validate our proposed methodology.

De, Debraj↗
DOE OSTI2025

Verifying LLM generative agents reflect human behavior in contested information environments to effectively simulate disinformation campaigns (Proteus)

Disinformation poses a significant and evolving threat to today’s online environment. Individuals encounter challenges in detecting disinformation, subsequently influencing their behavior and decision-making processes. Our research examines the potential use of large language model (LLM) generative agents (LGAs) to replicate human behavior to better understand how disinformation is spread in online environments. Using human subjects research, we first investigate how personality traits, individual differences, and demographic factors relate to decision-making in simulated online disinformation environments. Then, we examine whether LGAs can effectively replicate human responses in the same simulated online environments when assigned personality traits, demographic characteristics and behavioral attributes. Our findings indicate that LGAs can align with human decisions in these scenarios; however, alignment is contingent upon scenario context, persona settings and LLM selection. Results provide valuable insights for methodology refinement in future research and in utilizing LGAs to model complex national security challenges such as disinformation campaigns.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Evolution of Intent and Social Influence Networks and Their Significance in Detecting COVID-19 Disinformation Actors on Social Media

Online disinformation actors are those individuals or bots who disseminate false or misleading information over social media, with the intent to sway public opinion in the information domain towards harmful social outcomes. Quantification of the degree to which users post or respond intentionally versus under social influence, remains a challenge, as individuals or organizations operating the profile are foreshadowed by their online persona. However, social influence has been shown to be measurable in the paradigm of information theory. In this paper, we introduce an information theoretic measure to quantify social media user intent, and then investigate the corroboration of intent with evolution of the social network and detection of disinformation actors related to COVID-19 discussions on Twitter. Our measurement of user intent utilizes an existing time series analysis technique for estimation of social influence using transfer entropy among the considered users. We have analyzed 4.7 million tweets originating from several countries of interest, during a 5 month period when the arrival of the first dose of COVID vaccinations were announced. Our key findings include evidence that: (i) a significant correspondence between intent and social influence; (ii) ranking over users by intent and social influence is unstable over time with evidence of shifts in the hierarchical structure; and (iii) both user intent and social influence are important when distinguishing disinformation actors from non-disinformation actors.

Gunaratne, Chathika↗
DOE OSTI2024

Part 1: Nuclear Mis- and Disinformation and Impacts to the American Public

Russia’s nuclear saber rattling throughout the war in Ukraine, reports of China’s increasing nuclear modernization, and the 2023 release of Oppenheimer has reignited in the public talk of nuclear weapons. With the increasing prevalence of conversation around nuclear weapons comes increasing opportunity for mis- or disinformation to spread about them and the nuclear enterprise (NE). Mis- and disinformation are not new phenomena. However, the speed and reach offered by current digital communications technology is novel. What are the impacts of misinformation or disinformation about nuclear weapons to the American public?

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Reading Between the Lines: Measuring the Effects of Linguistic-Based Indicators of Deception on Experts’ Identification and Categorization of Disinformation

There is currently very limited research into how experts analyze and assess potentially fraudulent content in their expertise areas, and most research within the disinformation space involves very limited text samples (e.g., news headlines). The overarching goal of the present study was to explore how an individual’s psychological profile and the linguistic features in text might influence an expert’s ability to discern disinformation/fraudulent content in academic journal articles. At a high level, the current design tasked experts with reading journal articles from their area of expertise and indicating if they thought an article was deceptive or not. Half the articles they read were journal papers that had been retracted due to academic fraud. Demographic and psychological inventory data collected on the participants was combined with performance data to generate insights about individual expert susceptibility to deception. Our data show that our population of experts were unable to reliably detect deception in formal technical writing. Several psychological dimensions such as comfort with uncertainty and intellectual humility may provide some protection against deception. This work informs our understanding of expert susceptibility to potentially fraudulent content within official, technical information and can be used to inform future mitigative efforts and provide a building block for future disinformation work.

99 GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS↗
DOE OSTI2025

The propagation of seismic waves, misinformation, and disinformation from the 2024-10-05 M 4.5 Iran earthquake

The 2024-10-05 Iran M 4.5 earthquake took place at a time of heightened tensions in the Middle East. We perform a discrimination and moment tensor analysis and identify a shallow-dipping, reverse fault source commensurate with the compressional setting of the Iranian interior. Nonetheless, the event's aftermath saw widespread dissemination of misinformation, and potentially active disinformation, concluding that it was in fact a test of an Iranian nuclear weapon. The 'evidence' for many of these claims was based on inaccurate interpretation of seismic data. In this paper, we analyze how geophysical 'fake news' propagated through social media (mainly Twitter/X) following this event, eventually gaining traction in mainstream, earned media. This event is an illustrative warning of how seismic data can be misinterpreted and/or manipulated in public discourse.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗