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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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14 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2020

Dynamic PRA Methods to Evaluate the Impact on Accident Progression of Accident Tolerant Fuels

Accident tolerant fuels (ATFs) are new nuclear fuels developed in response to the accident at the Fukushima power station in March 2011. The goal of ATFs is to withstand accident scenarios through better performance compared to currently employed fuels (e.g., small-scale hydrogen generation). This paper targets a method for evaluating and comparing ATF performance from a probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) perspective by employing a newly developed combination of event trees and dynamic PRA methods. Compared to classical PRA methods based on event trees and fault trees, dynamic PRA can evaluate with higher resolution the safety impacts of physics dynamics and the timing/sequencing of events on the accident progression without the need to introduce overly conservative modeling assumptions and success criteria. In this paper, we analyze the impact on the accident progression of three different cladding configurations for two initiating events [a large break loss-of-coolant accident (LB-LOCA) and a station blackout (SBO)] by employing dynamic PRA methods. The goal is to compare the safety performance of ATFs (FeCrAl and Cr-coated cladding) and the currently employed Zr-based clad fuel. We employ two different strategies. The first focuses on the identification of success criteria discrepancies between the accident sequences generated by the classical PRA model and the set of simulation runs generated by dynamic PRA using ATF. The second one, on the other hand, directly uses dynamic PRA to evaluate the impact of timing of events (e.g., recovery actions) on accident progression. In conclusion, by applying these methods to the LB-LOCA and SBO initiating events, we show how dynamic PRA methods can provide analysts with detailed and quantitative information on the safety impact of ATFs.

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2020

Linking classical PRA models to a dynamic PRA

Here, this paper presents a series of methods designed to incorporate classical Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) models such as Event Trees (ETs) and Fault Trees (FTs) into dynamic PRA. In contrast to classical PRA, dynamic PRA couples stochastic methods with system simulators to determine the risks associated with complex systems such as nuclear power plants. Compared with classical PRA methods, they can evaluate with higher resolution the safety impact of timing and sequencing of events on the progression of the accident. As part of a dynamic PRA analysis, it is not uncommon that parts of the system to be analyzed might not require a computationally expensive simulation model. These parts could be in fact modeled by employing classical PRA models (e.g., a FT). Here, we present a set of methods and tools that can be used to link the most common classical PRA models (ETs, FTs, reliability block diagrams and Markov models) to simulation codes such as RELAP5-3D: creating a “hybrid PRA.” In order to show the potential of such an hybrid PRA we employ this method to verify ET modeling assumptions (e.g., success criteria) using a large break loss of coolant accident initiating event as a test case. In this respect, we link a set of FTs from the original PRA to the RELAP5-3D code and perform a hybrid PRA. The FTs are employed to model the control logic of several safety systems and to propagate component failures throughout the system. Provided the generated dynamic PRA data, we show how conservative assumptions in the original PRA can be identified and how such original PRA can be modified by updating success criteria captured by the set of RELAP5-3D simulation runs.

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2021

Event-modeled Risk Assessment Using Linked Diagrams

Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) is a software tool developed at INL for researching the capabilities of dynamic PRA (Probabilistic Risk Assessment). In order to promote the effective use of dynamic PRA by the general community, EMRALD focuses on the following key aspects: Simplifying the modeling process by providing a structure that corresponds to traditional PRA modeling methods Providing a user interface (UI) that makes it easy for the user to model and visualize complex interactions Allowing the user to couple with other analysis applications such as physics based simulations. This includes one-way communication for most applications and two-way loose coupling for customizable applications Providing the sequence and timing of events that lead to the specified outcomes when calculating results Traditional aspects of components with basic events, fault trees, and event trees are all captured in a dynamic framework of state diagrams, which are displayed.

Prescott, SteveR↗
DOE OSTI2022

Evaluation of Physical Security Risk for Potential Implementation of FLEX using Dynamic Simulation Methods

The requirements for United States nuclear power plants to maintain a large onsite physical security force contribute to their large operational costs. The cost of maintaining the current physical security posture is approximately 10% of the overall operation and maintenance budget for commercial nuclear power plants. The goal of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability Program Physical Security Pathway is to develop tools, methods, and technologies and provide the technical basis for an optimized physical security posture. This pathway will analyze and minimize the conservatisms built into current security postures in order to reduce security costs while still ensuring adequate security and operational safety. The research performed at Idaho National Laboratory within this pathway has successfully developed a dynamic force-on-force (FOF) modeling framework using various computer simulation tools and integrated them with the dynamic assessment Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) tool. This document provides an overview of lessons learned in applying a dynamic computational framework that links results from a commercially available FOF simulation tool, a commercially available thermal-hydraulic tool, and EMRALD to an operating commercial nuclear power plant. This process of including plant procedures and multiple analysis results is being called Modeling and Analysis for Safety Security using Dynamic EMRALD Framework. Previous reports described how a user could integrate their plant-specific FOF models with the dynamic simulation tool EMRALD, model operator actions, integrate with probabilistic risk assessment tools, such as Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis System or Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations, and with thermal-hydraulic tools, such as RELAP-5. Previous reports applied various combinations of available simulations codes with EMRALD using generic plant models to demonstrate how to perform the analysis. This report documents the results of applying the dynamic computational framework to an actual nuclear facility using their security scenarios and timelines. The purpose of this study was to verify that results achieved using generic models are similar to actual plant results and to refine our guidance of the use of the framework. Such an assessment enables further analysis, such as what-if scenarios and staff-reduction evaluation, thereby optimizing physical security at plants. NOTE: The work performed in this report is based on a generic EMRALD model with actual plant data used for the analysis. However, only the generic model and general results of the analysis are in the report. No plant’s sensitive information is discussed in this report. The discussion shows examples of insights that can be obtained from the MASS-DEF methodology.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2023

Plant-specific Model and Data Analysis using Dynamic Security Modeling and Simulation

The requirements for U.S. nuclear power plants to maintain a large on-site physical security force contribute to their high operational costs. The cost of maintaining the current physical security posture is approximately 10% of the overall operation and maintenance budget for commercial nuclear power plants. The goal of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program’s physical security pathway is to develop tools, methods, and technologies and provide the technical basis for an optimized physical security posture. The conservatisms built into current security postures may be analyzed and minimized in order to reduce security costs while still ensuring adequate security and operational safety. The research performed at Idaho National Laboratory within LWRS program’s physical security pathway has successfully developed a dynamic force-on-force modeling framework using various computer simulation tools and integrating them with the dynamic assessment Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) tool. This document provides an update on the progress in applying a dynamic computational framework that links results from a commercially available force-on-force simulation tool, a commercially available thermal-hydraulic tool, and EMRALD to an operating commercial nuclear power plant. This report is only a summary of the progress and does not contain specific modeling results as those contain sensitive security information. This process of including plant procedures and multiple analysis results is being called Modeling and Analysis for Safety Security using Dynamic EMRALD Framework or MASS-DEF. Previous reports described how a user could integrate their plant-specific force-on-force models with the dynamic simulation tool EMRALD, model operator actions, integrate with probabilistic risk assessment tools, such as CAFTA (Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis System) or SAPHIRE (Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations), and with thermal-hydraulic tools, such as RELAP-5. Previous reports applied various combinations of available simulations codes with EMRALD using generic plant models to demonstrate how to perform the analysis. This report documents the results of applying the dynamic computational framework to an actual nuclear facility using their security scenarios and timelines. This report does not contain any plant's sensitive information and/or Safeguards Information. The purpose of this study was to verify that results achieved using generic models are similar to actual plant results and to refine our guidance on the use of the framework. This assessment enables further analysis, such as what-if scenarios and staff-reduction evaluation, thereby optimizing physical security at plants.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2024

An Evaluation of The Dynamic Physical Security Risk Assessment Methodology for Fleet-Wide Applications

The requirements for U.S. nuclear power plants to maintain a large onsite physical security force contribute to their high operational costs. The cost of maintaining the current physical security posture is approximately 10% of the overall operation and maintenance budget for commercial nuclear power plants. The goal of the Light Water Reactor Sustainability (LWRS) program’s physical security pathway is to develop tools, methods, and technologies and provide the technical basis for an optimized physical security posture. The conservatisms built into current security postures may be analyzed and minimized to reduce security costs while still ensuring adequate security and operational safety. The research performed at Idaho National Laboratory within LWRS program’s physical security pathway has successfully developed a dynamic force-on-force modeling framework using various computer simulation tools and integrating them with the dynamic assessment Event Modeling Risk Assessment using Linked Diagrams (EMRALD) tool. This integrated process for physical security analysis is named Modeling and Analysis for Safety Security using Dynamic EMRALD Framework (MASS-DEF). This document provides an update on the progress in applying the MASS-DEF process to an operating commercial nuclear power plant as well as additional industry feedback regarding use of the tool for other physical security risk-informed topics. This report is only a summary of the progress and does not contain specific modeling results as those contain sensitive security information. Previous reports described how a user could integrate their plant-specific force-on-force models with the dynamic simulation tool EMRALD, model operator actions, and integrate with probabilistic risk assessment tools, such as CAFTA (Computer Aided Fault Tree Analysis System) or SAPHIRE (Systems Analysis Programs for Hands-on Integrated Reliability Evaluations), and with thermal-hydraulic tools, such as RELAP-5 or MAAP. Previous reports applied various combinations of available simulations codes with EMRALD using generic plant models to demonstrate how to perform the analysis. This report is an update the progress of applying the dynamic computational framework to an actual nuclear facility using their security scenarios and timelines. This report also provides an update to the procedural guidance for the MASS-DEF process and an overview of the generic models available for use by utilities. This report does not contain any plant’s sensitive information and/or safeguards information. This study’s purpose was to verify that the results achieved using generic models are similar to actual plant results and refine our guidance on the use of the framework. This assessment enables further analysis, such as what-if scenarios and staff-reduction evaluation, thereby optimizing physical security at plants.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2020

Safety Risk Reliability Model Library

SR2ML is a software package which contains a set of safety and reliability models designed to be interfaced with the INL developed RAVEN code. These models can be employed to perform both static and dynamic system risk analysis and determine risk importance of specific elements of the considered system. Two classes of reliability models have been developed; the first class includes all classical reliability models (Fault-Trees, Event-Trees, Markov models and Reliability Block Diagrams) which have been extended to deal not only with Boolean logic values but also time dependent values. The second class includes several components aging models. Models of these two classes are designed to be included in a RAVEN ensemble model to perform time dependent system reliability analysis (dynamic analysis). Similarly, these models can be interfaced with system analysis codes to determine failure time of systems and evaluate accident progression (static analysis).

Wang, Congjian↗
DOE OSTI2025

AUTOMATIC GENERATION OF EVENT TREES AND FAULT TREES: A MODEL-BASED APPROACH

In the past few decades, increasing complexity in modern engineering systems has been driven by the integration of a large number of components and by the fact that the system operations involve many disciplines (e.g., thermal-hydraulics, plant operations, cyber-security). Current safety/reliability modeling approaches to such systems are labor intensive, difficult to learn, and rely heavily on simplistic Boolean logic to depict failure propagation and accident progression. While these methods serve well for simple systems (i.e., linear causal systems with limited small inter- and intra-system interactions), their results are difficult to verify when modeling complex systems (typically performed through the extensive use of modeling assumptions). The development of new methods is addressed to meet these challenges through a model-based system engineering (MBSE) lens. Under MBSE philosophy, every aspect of the system (form or function) is represented by a model that completely characterizes its architecture or behavior. MBSE approach greatly improves the management of design, analysis and verification of complex systems. An integration of Dynamic Probabilistic Risk Assessment (DPRA) methods with MBSE models is proposed to perform safety/reliability analyses of engineering systems. In particular, MBSE representation of the system (performed using Systems Modeling Language [SysML]) is coupled with DPRA methods to automatically generate event trees and fault trees.

97 - MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2025

Success Path Method: Introduction to the Success Path Method Software Tool©

As part of its commitment to advancing safety and reliability assessment methodologies, Argonne National Laboratory pioneered the use of an evaluation method called the Success Path Method (SPM) to improve risk management for offshore oil and gas operations. The development of the SPM at Argonne has been driven by the need to improve existing risk assessment methodologies by focusing on the steps necessary for success rather than failure modes alone. This is particularly important for industrial environments like offshore facilities that perform multiple functions under a continuously evolving set of operational conditions – such as water depth and temperature, currents, and weather conditions. In these dynamic environments, the traditional Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) approach is far too complex as it focuses on what can go wrong – which comprises an infinite failure space that must be fully explored and understood. By shifting the focus to a finite space of success paths, the SPM enables operators and decision makers to prioritize a manageable number of steps that must go right to ensure success. Building on its five decades of experience in safety assessments for the nuclear industry, Argonne made major adaptations to existing risk assessment methods utilizing features similar to fault trees that are traditionally used in PRA to map all pathways in which the system can malfunction. In contrast, SPM identifies the components and processes that must function correctly to achieve specific outcomes – such as preventing the uncontrolled release of hydrocarbons during drilling operations. The SPM framework integrates equipment, procedures, software, processes, and human actions to ensure that physical barriers meet critical safety functions in dynamic operational conditions. This approach helps identify failure modes and improve operational risk management by narrowing the focus to key success elements, which in turn reduces uncertainty and helps users understand, manage, and respond to failures.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2022

Automatic Generation of Event Trees and Fault Trees: A Model-Based Approach

In the past few decades, the increasing complexity of modern engineering systems has been driven by the integration of a large number of components whose operations may involve many disciplines (e.g., thermal hydraulics, plant operations, cybersecurity). Most computational tools used by industry and regulators for system safety and reliability assessments are still based on the traditional fault tree (FT) and event tree (ET) approach, which may not be able to capture complex interactions among system constituents. The use of simulation tools has widely increased in the past few decades to improve the fidelity of the reliability and safety analyses. However, the direct use of simulation tools as part of dynamic probabilistic risk assessment (DPRA) methods is not getting traction since (1) modeling the whole system under consideration with DPRA methods may be computationally expensive and unnecessary, and (2) the manual integration of DPRA models into existing state-of-practice probabilistic risk assessment models (i.e., based on FTs and ETs) can be time consuming and prone to errors. Here, in this paper we propose a procedure to overcome this limitation by presenting several algorithms designed to automatically construct subsystem ETs and FTs from DPRA methods for integration into an existing ET/FT system model.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2023

Machine Learning Classification of Molten Salt Heat Exchanger Channel Plugging using Synthetic Data

This report addresses the requirements of Milestone M3.4 AI capability to identify and predict maintenance events. Development of digital twins (DT) for molten salt reactor (MSR) components is crucial for reducing operating and maintenance costs (O&M) and ensuring commercial viability of these reactors. Our focus is on development of DT for MSR primary system heat exchanger (HX), a critical component, the fault in which can reduce operating efficiency and force reactor shutdown. We are investigating the feasibility of a conceptual DT of HX consisting of internal distributed temperature sensing with fiber optics and machine learning (ML) algorithms to detect and localize faults. To determine the optimal approach to detection and localization of channel plugging, we benchmark seven different ML models: Logistic Regression, K-Nearest Neighbors (KNN), Gaussian Naïve Bayes, Support Vector Machines (SVM), Decision Tree Classifier, Random Forest Tree Classifier, and Feed-Forward Neural Network. ML algorithms are benchmarked using synthetic HX plugging data generated with computational fluid dynamics COMSOL software, with added brown noise to represent experimental noise. We show that the best performance is obtained with the Decision Tree classifier.

22 GENERAL STUDIES OF NUCLEAR REACTORS↗
DOE OSTI2025

Development and Demonstration of a Prototype Molten Salt Sampling System

Molten salt reactors (MSRs) offer potential operability and safety advantages when compared to commercial light water reactors (LWRs). However, operating experience with MSRs is sparse in comparison to what exists for LWRs. Further, the chemical and isotopic composition of the fuel and/or coolant salt is dynamic and difficult to characterize continuously, posing potential safety, operability, and safeguards unknowns that need to be addressed. A molten salt sampling system (MSSS) is regarded as a necessary subsystem within first generation MSRs used to obtain samples of salt for chemical and isotopic analysis in support of the need to monitor and control salt composition during operation. The MSSS is being developed using the Safety-in-Design (SiD) methodology, which incorporates incremental integration of safety analysis into the design process. The MSSS conceptual design emerging from the application of the early stages of the SiD methodology consists of a sample collection system and its housing, a freeze port, and inert gas control and delivery systems. This article describes the prototypes developed to test the functions of these MSSS subsystems, presents the results of testing in both dry and molten salt environments (including reliability data collection performed in accordance with the principles of SiD and the development of a semiquantitative fault tree model), and summarizes the opportunities for future design and testing enhancements based on the results of prototype testing.

molten salt reactor↗
DOE OSTI2021

AI-Guided Reasoning-Based Operator Support System for the Nuclear Power Plant Management

The Decision-making process in the Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) control room faces some challenges: operator incomplete knowledge, insufficient time for responding to the highly dynamic events, and a large number of indicators to monitor. Because of the complexity of the NPP system, it is hard to pre-plan all the failures/mitigative actions. An intelligent operator support system is vital to mitigate these shortcomings. In this paper, an AI declarative approach (Answer Set Programming (ASP)) is employed to represent our knowledge of the nuclear power plant in the form of logic rules. This represented knowledge is structured to form a reasoning-based operator support system. When an incident occurs, this ASP-based reasoning support system is demonstrated to be capable of fault identification (diagnosis), informing the operator of different scenarios and consequences, and generating the control options (decision making).

21 SPECIFIC NUCLEAR REACTORS AND ASSOCIATED PLANTS↗
DOE OSTI2022

Cyber risk assessment and investment optimization using game theory and ML-based anomaly detection and mitigation for wide-area control in smart grids

The electric power grid is increasingly becoming susceptible to cyber attacks that exploit vulnerabilities in the smart grid control, information, and physical layers. Successful cyber attacks can have catastrophic impacts on the social and economic well-being of any nation all over the globe. It has, thus, become imperative to secure the smart grid against such adversarial actions to ensure stable, secure, and reliable operation of the grid. The existing research and industry practices prove to be inadequate in terms of providing pragmatic and effective defense methodologies and measures for long-term cybersecurity planning and real-time cybersecurity for grid operation. For example, existing works lack models that incorporate uncertain behavior of cyber-attackers and pragmatic defense measures for cyber risk assessment and cybersecurity investment optimization which often provide unreliable and strictly qualitative solutions to these problems. At the same time, with the growing number of cyber incidents in the grid, there still exists a need to develop attack-resilient algorithms for wide-area monitoring, protection, and control (WAMPAC) applications like the wide-area voltage control systems (WAVCS) for Flexible AC Transmissions Systems (FACTS) that lack in scalable and feasible solutions from the cybersecurity perspective. This dissertation proposes novel models and methodologies for: (1) Cybersecurity planning, and (2) Cybersecurity for system operation. The cybersecurity planning is achieved through cyber risk assessment and cybersecurity resource investment optimization for long-term cybersecurity of the grid using game theory and attack-defense trees. Cybersecurity for system operation consists of development of cyber anomaly detection and mitigation algorithms for flexible AC transmission system (FACTS) controller-based wide-area voltage control systems (WAVCS) using machine learning (ML), and software defined networking-based moving target defense network routing for achieving real-time cyber-physical security for grid operations. This is followed by hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) implementation and evaluation of these attack prevention, detection, and mitigation algorithms and methodologies showcasing their feasibility in a close to real-world environment. For cybersecurity planning, a novel approach involving a combination of game theory and attack defense trees (ADT) for optimal cybersecurity resource allocation in the smart grid is proposed. This methodology involves modeling of the cyber-physical smart grid substations as ADTs, defining attacker costs, defense costs, and attack probabilities for attack access points. Using game theoretical formulation, optimal defense strategies for the defender of the system to invest cybersecurity resources in the grid are obtained. Additionally, a game-theoretic framework is developed for quantitative cyber-physical risk assessment of the grid under a dynamically changing cyber threat space and uncertain behavior of cyber attackers which is further used to optimize investments in the smart grid's cybersecurity resources. The attacker, defender, and the smart grid system are modeled while incorporating attacker-stochasticity and federal guidelines for smart grid cybersecurity. This allows quantification of threat, vulnerabilities, and attack impact of the grid for quantitative risk assessment. The defender's budget to invest in the security resources in the grid is optimized based on the strategies leading to minimum system risk. The evaluation of the proposed solutions highlight the feasibility for practical implementation of these methodologies and algorithms in the smart grid, while taking the federal requirements and guidelines for smart grid security into consideration. For achieving cybersecurity for system operation, attack prevention, detection, and mitigation algorithms and methodologies are developed specifically for FACTS-based WAVCS. Anomaly detection and mitigation in the WAVCS are achieved using algorithms based on machine learning which involves offline training and testing of ML models with CPS datasets incorporating physics-based features that allow accurate distinction between system faults and cyber attacks. For attack prevention, a methodology based on software defined network (SDN)-based moving target defense (MTD) network routing is proposed that enables prevention of Denial of Service (DoS) type attacks on the smart grid communication system. Subsequently, these methodologies and algorithms are implemented and evaluated on an HIL testbed that allows for real-time attack prevention, detection, and mitigation of emulated cyber attacks on the WAVCS in a close to real-world environment. The results show highly accurate and efficient performance of the implemented algorithms and methodologies with the smart grid system operating within the NERC's system operation limits even in the presence of DoS and data integrity cyber attacks. This work opens up future research opportunities in other directions such as (1) Expanding cybersecurity planning methodologies to real-time cyber contingency analysis with different game formulations; and (2) Applying the cybersecurity for system operation algorithms to broader categories of wide-area control applications.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗