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We describe dynamic safety cases, a novel operationalization of the concept of through-life safety assurance, whose goal is to enable proactive safety management. Using an example from the aviation systems domain, we motivate our approach, its underlying principles, and a lifecycle. We then identify the key elements required to move towards a formalization of the associated framework.
Safety cases are typically used to certify systems at design time as being approved for operation. However, systems typically undergo changes in operation. We present ongoing work extending the safety case concept to account for operational updates.
Ventilation is a key component to maintaining healthy, safe indoor air quality. Especially important in laboratories, ventilation is the first line of defense against airborne hazards produced during research activities. Though a vital component, laboratory ventilation systems are often victim to ineffective operation, posing a risk to the most important asset - the researchers. Furthermore, system inefficiencies can lead to up to 50% wasted energy. To improve both energy efficiency and safety in laboratories, we present the Smart Labs Toolkit - a resource developed by the U.S. Department of Energy Federal Energy Management Program and the International Institute for Sustainable Laboratories that guides laboratory stakeholders through a straight-forward, holistic approach to achieve dynamic, high-performance laboratories. Smart Labs enable safe and efficient world class science to occur in laboratories through high-performance methods. A Smart Labs program employs a combination of physical, administrative, and management techniques to assess, optimize, and manage high performance laboratories. We will focus on a central component of the Smart Labs approach - the Laboratory Ventilation Risk Assessment, a systematic process for identifying risk due to airborne hazards to inform the operation of dynamic ventilation that optimizes safety and efficiency. Case studies of organizations who have successfully implemented Smart Labs ventilation management programs will also be shared. In learning ventilation strategies successful in critical laboratory environments, learn the tools and resources needed to successfully manage energy in any building through smarter, safer ventilation.
The world-wide aviation system is one of the most complex dynamical systems ever developed and is generating data at an extremely rapid rate. Most modern commercial aircraft record several hundred flight parameters including information from the guidance, navigation, and control systems, the avionics and propulsion systems, and the pilot inputs into the aircraft. These parameters may be continuous measurements or binary or categorical measurements recorded in one second intervals for the duration of the flight. Currently, most approaches to aviation safety are reactive, meaning that they are designed to react to an aviation safety incident or accident. In this paper, we discuss a novel approach based on the theory of multiple kernel learning to detect potential safety anomalies in very large data bases of discrete and continuous data from world-wide operations of commercial fleets. We pose a general anomaly detection problem which includes both discrete and continuous data streams, where we assume that the discrete streams have a causal influence on the continuous streams. We also assume that atypical sequence of events in the discrete streams can lead to off-nominal system performance. We discuss the application domain, novel algorithms, and also discuss results on real-world data sets. Our algorithm uncovers operationally significant events in high dimensional data streams in the aviation industry which are not detectable using state of the art methods
The temporal frequency content of the dynamic pressure predicted by a 360 degree computational fluid dynamics (CFD) analysis of a turbine flow field provides indicators of forcing function excitation frequencies (e.g., multiples of blade pass frequency) for turbine components. For the Pratt and Whitney Rocketdyne J-2X engine turbopumps, Campbell diagrams generated using these forcing function frequencies and the results of NASTRAN modal analyses show a number of components with modes in the engine operating range. As a consequence, forced response and static analyses are required for the prediction of combined stress, high cycle fatigue safety factors (HCFSF). Cyclically symmetric structural models have been used to analyze turbine vane and blade rows, not only in modal analyses, but also in forced response and static analyses. Due to the tortuous flow pattern in the turbine, dynamic pressure loading is not cyclically symmetric. Furthermore, CFD analyses predict dynamic pressure waves caused by adjacent and non-adjacent blade/vane rows upstream and downstream of the row analyzed. A MATLAB script has been written to calculate displacements due to the complex cyclically asymmetric dynamic pressure components predicted by CFD analysis, for all grids in a blade/vane row, at a chosen turbopump running speed. The MATLAB displacements are then read into NASTRAN, and dynamic stresses are calculated, including an adjustment for possible mistuning. In a cyclically symmetric NASTRAN static analysis, static stresses due to centrifugal, thermal, and pressure loading at the mode running speed are calculated. MATLAB is used to generate the HCFSF at each grid in the blade/vane row. When compared to an approach assuming cyclic symmetry in the dynamic flow field, the current approach provides better assurance that the worst case safety factor has been identified. An extended example for a J-2X turbopump component is provided.
Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) is used extensively to evaluate the risks associated with complex engineering systems like Nuclear Power Plants (NPPs). Current PSA models are based on the Event-Tree/Fault-Tree (ET/FT) methodology. ET and FT models are static and are based on Boolean logic approaches. In the past, concerns have been raised in the literature regarding the capability of the traditional static modelling approaches to adequately account for the impact of process, hardware, software, firmware and human interactions on the stochastic system behaviour. To overcome the limitations of the traditional approach to PSA, several dynamic PSA methodologies have been proposed. One of the dynamic PSA methodologies used for dynamic evaluations is Dynamic Event Tree (DET) framework which can be used to assess the impact of the parameter variability and scenario dynamics on the PSA model for the initiating event. The DET framework couples the stochastic model (number of component/trains that start on demand, operator action timing, etc.) with a Thermal-Hydraulic (TH) model of the plant. This paper explores the use of DET along with a case study on advanced reactor. The initiating event selected for the study was Class IV power supply failure event. The TH analysis considering uncertainty in various parameters was performed using RELAP5 and Reactor Analysis and Virtual control ENvironment (RAVEN) tool. Based on the uncertainty analysis, it is concluded that the peak clad temperatures (PCT) are within the limits in all the code runs implying a high-degree of safety margin. However, variation in time to reach the PCT was observed among the code runs and the mean time to reach the PCT was found to be around 8590sec (approximately 2.4 hours). Hence, sufficient time margin is available for human intervention and the operator might have a relatively stress-free state during such an accident scenario. Due to the static nature of the traditional PSA models, the safety margin available was lesser, whereas, with the help of dynamic PSA models, one can demonstrate that the actual available safety margin is more in the present case study and is valuable input from the design point of view.
A unique attribute of the nuclear industry is the extent by which designers, developers, operators, and regulators pay attention to demonstrating the safety case. The safety case for nuclear systems is a written, traceable expression of safety, demonstrating the system’s protective measures against uncontrolled radiological releases. The nuclear installation resiliency or safety takes overriding priority over function and performance. The preparation of the safety case heavily relies on extensive experimental campaigns that challenge the target design under a spectrum of postulated accident scenarios. For safety reasons, these experiments are typically conducted in sub-scale test apparatuses intended to reproduce the postulated accident scenarios and event sequences realistically but subject to proven similarity criteria, often referred to as scaling analyses. Since the dawn of the nuclear industry, significant resources have been committed to the construction and operation of such test facilities and a massive amount of data has been generated. Such test data have been and are still used to validate the fundamental assumptions of nuclear power plant phenomena. As we move into the digital world, capturing this multi-decades worth of information in a transparent, easily accessible, and usable manner for the public and industry stakeholders is of paramount importance. Over the last few years FPoliSolutions has been actively developing an enterprise digital data ontology platform (FPoliDON) intended to do just that. The concept was introduced in a paper at the previous NURETH edition and has been significantly enhanced since. With the vision of helping designers use the data to assess their safety case evaluation models, the platform was designed not only to ontologically organize the experimental data, but also to guide the user in the complex analytics associated with the interpretation and use of such test results. A new feature which has been recently added is the ability for the user to access a library of sophisticated mathematical procedures for performing scaling analyses. For this purpose, the Dynamical System Scaling (DSS) procedure invented by Dr. Jose’ Reyes was formulated as one of the services in the digital platform. These methods have been demonstrated to provide an excelled mathematical apparatus to identify similarity criteria or quantify distortions between measured data and the target prototypical conditions. Moreover, DSS can provide a level of synthesis across SETs and IETs which has the promise to yield efficiency in the evaluation code assessment activities. This is often a daunting and expensive task to set up evaluation models that support the safety case of current and future nuclear power plants.
NASA uses six-degrees-of-freedom (6-DOF) simulations tools to design, test, develop Guidance Navigation and Control (GN&C) software, and certify vehicle performance prior to flight. Therefore, it is critical that the 6-DOF tools used for vehicle design and certification are validated. The focus of this work is the vali-dation of the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center 6-DOF “GeneraLized Aero-space Simulation in Simulink” (GLASS) framework tool. The GLASS tool framework is currently used to support NASA GN&C insight for the Human Landing System (HLS) project, simulating vehicle dynamics during lunar descent and as-cent. The GLASS framework utilizes the off-the-shelf Mathworks ® Simscape Multibody® toolbox to model vehicle multi-body dynamics. NASA’s Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) provides a set of 6-DOF simulation verification “check cases” that are available to any user needing to verify 6-DOF tools. The check cases contain seventeen atmospheric and twenty-six orbital test scenarios are provided to validate equations of motion, environmental models (e.g., atmosphere, gravitation, and geodesy) and tool propagators. This paper compares GLASS 6-DOF simulation results against the NESC check cases’ results via simulation-to-simulation comparisons. The comparisons demonstrate that GLASS simulation results are “in family” with the outputs of the applicable NASA NESC check cases and verifies the GLASS core framework dynamics and the correct implementation of the check case scenario models.
NASA uses six-degrees-of-freedom (6-DOF) simulations tools to design, test, develop Guidance Navigation and Control (GN&C) software, and certify vehicle performance prior to flight. Therefore, it is critical that the 6-DOF tools used for vehicle design and certification are validated. The focus of this work is the validation of the NASA Marshall Space Flight Center 6-DOF “GeneraLized Aerospace Simulation in Simulink” (GLASS) framework tool. The GLASS tool framework is currently used to support NASA GN&C insight for the Human Landing System (HLS) project, simulating vehicle dynamics during lunar descent and ascent. The GLASS framework utilizes the off-the-shelf Mathworks (R) Simscape (TM) Multibody (TM) toolbox to model vehicle multi-body dynamics. NASA’s Engineering and Safety Center (NESC) provides a set of 6-DOF simulation verification “check cases” that are available to any user needing to verify 6-DOF tools. The check cases contain seventeen atmospheric and twenty-six orbital test scenarios are provided to validate equations of motion, environmental models (e.g., atmosphere, gravitation, and geodesy) and tool propagators. This paper compares GLASS 6-DOF simulation results against the NESC check cases’ results via simulation-to-simulation comparisons. The comparison demonstrates that GLASS simulation results are “in family” with the outputs of the applicable NASA NESC check-cases and verify the GLASS core framework dynamics and the implementation of the check case scenario models.
The design and capabilities of two digital controller systems for aeroelastic wind-tunnel models are described. The first allowed control of flutter while performing roll maneuvers with wing load control as well as coordinating the acquisition, storage, and transfer of data for on-line analysis. This system, which employs several digital signal multi-processor (DSP) boards programmed in high-level software languages, is housed in a SUN Workstation environment. A second DCS provides a measure of wind-tunnel safety by functioning as a trip system during testing in the case of high model dynamic response or in case the first DCS fails. The second DCS uses National Instruments LabVIEW Software and Hardware within a Macintosh environment.
Robonaut 2 (R2) has completed its fixed base activities on-board the ISS and is scheduled to receive its climbing legs in early 2014. In its continuing line of firsts, the R2 torso finished up its on-orbit activities on its stanchion with the manipulation of space blanket materials and performed multiple tasks under teleoperation control by IVA astronauts. The successful completion of these two IVA experiments is a key step in Robonaut's progression towards an EVA capability. Integration with the legs and climbing inside the ISS will provide another important part of the experience that R2 will need prior to performing tasks on the outside of ISS. In support of these on-orbit activities, R2 has been traversing across handrails in simulated zero-g environments and working with EVA tools and equipment on the ground to determine manipulation strategies for an EVA Robonaut. R2 made significant advances in robotic manipulation of deformable materials in space while working with its softgoods task panel. This panel features quarter turn latches that secure a space blanket to the task panel structure. The space blanket covers two cloth cubes that are attached with Velcro to the structure. R2 was able to open and close the latches, pull back the blanket, and remove the cube underneath. R2 simulated cleaning up an EVA worksite as well, by replacing the cube and reattaching the blanket. In order to interact with the softgoods panel, R2 has both autonomously and with a human in the loop identified and localized these deformable objects. Using stereo color cameras, R2 identified characteristic elements on the softgoods panel then extracted the location and orientation of the object in its field of view using stereo disparity and kinematic transforms. R2 used both vision processing and supervisory control to successfully accomplish this important task. Teleoperation is a key capability for Robonaut's effectiveness as an EVA system. To build proficiency, crewmembers have attempted increasingly difficult tasks using R2 inside the Station. After donning motion capture equipment and a virtual reality visor, Expedition 34/35 flight engineer Tom Marshburn began operations with simple hand movements. Having gained confidence, Marshburn guided R2's arms in a leader-follower exercise with crewmate Chris Cassidy. He was also able to use the hand to grab a tumbling roll of tape, a task only demonstrable in microgravity. Later efforts saw Cassidy handle softgoods through shared control with ground operators, mimicking an activity previously achieved using only autonomy. Robotic climbing through the ISS on handrails requires both precision motion and compliant grasps in order to both position grippers on handrails/seat track and prevent large internal forces. R2 climbs using actively controlled compliance and torque limiting to meet both the precision and softness requirements. During a step, the attached leg is controlled to be strong and stiff in order to maintain precision trajectory tracking. The swing leg is controlled to be stiff but weak to minimize unintentional impact forces while maintaining precision. During a simulated dual limb grasp (as shown in Figure 1), the R2 controller maintains one limb rigid and one limb soft to prevent large internal forces from building up. R2's grippers also use a form of force control to limit grip force while not fully closed on either a handrail or seat track thus limiting unintentional forces on cables/objects that may be present in R2's translational path. The on-board torso R2 safety system relies on a single end-effector velocity limit to prevent potential impact forces from exceeding Station maximum load requirements. R2's mobile configuration required modifications to the velocity limiting safety function due to its large, dynamic inertia. R2's legs maneuver the robot's mass creating configuration dependent, joint-relative inertias. A single all-encompassing velocity limit to cover worst case inertia is prohibitively low. The upgraded R2 control and safety systems solve this problem using momentum limiting, momentum control, and kinetic energy minimization. Momentum and kinetic energy take the robot mass into account relieving low velocity restrictions on low inertia end-effectors while ensuring that the overall mass of R2 is limited from hazardous velocities. The momentum of R2's five safety nodes (each of the four end-effectors and the body) is monitored and compared to a single momentum limit. If any of the five nodes exceeds the safety limit, the motor power is removed and the robot comes to a stop. Momentum control/limiting also provides a simple, reliable method to integrate hand held tools into the safety system by providing the tool mass to the control system thus automatically reducing the allowable velocity of the end-effector with the tool. Work on the ground continues to build the skill set for an EVA Robonaut. Recent experiments (Figure 2) demonstrate how a teleoperator can use R2 to manipulate a tether hook, an important safety precaution on spacewalks. Another task displayed Robonaut's ability to pull back a protective jacket over a hose and search for damage, as well as inspect a quick-disconnect fitting for debris. Demonstrations such as these are indicative of EVA work done on ISS, specifically seen during a series of spacewalks over 2012 and 2013 where astronauts searched for an ammonia leak in one of the external cooling loops. Through experiments both on ISS and on the ground, R2 is evolving and providing the information needed to plan out the upgrades that will make an EVA Robonaut an effective tool. With the addition of legs, R2 will start climbing inside the space station and supply invaluable information on how the climbing strategies and task stabilization techniques must be refined. Ground R2 systems will continue to work with additional EVA tools and equipment in preparation for onboard IVA testing and future EVA applications.
Uncertainty quantification of computational fluid dynamics (CFD) simulations is a complicated procedure which still relies in many cases on engineering judgment and factors of safety. This is in part because the computational cost of measuring the simulation's sensitivity to all meaningful parameters (e.g., body surface roughness) and hyperparameters (e.g., subiteration convergence criterion) is intractable for even a single simulation. Reduced-order modeling dramatically lowers this computational cost of simulating fluid flows, but usually only where similar data is already available. In this work, fluid reduced-order models are utilized to quantify a flow's sensitivity to certain physical parameters for the purposes of improved uncertainty quantification. Characteristic observability and sensitivity are both explored. The resulting sensitivity quantifications enable more informed CFD frameworks and more rigorous uncertainty bounds on the resulting data.
Uncertainty quantification of computational fluid dynamics (CFD) simulations is a complicated procedure which still relies in many cases on engineering judgment and factors of safety. This is in part because the computational cost of measuring the simulation's sensitivity to all meaningful parameters (e.g., body surface roughness) and hyperparameters (e.g., subiteration convergence criterion) is intractable for even a single simulation. Reduced-order modeling dramatically lowers this computational cost of simulating fluid flows, but usually only where similar data is already available. In this work, fluid reduced-order models are utilized to quantify a flow's sensitivity to certain physical parameters for the purposes of improved uncertainty quantification. Characteristic observability and sensitivity are both explored. The resulting sensitivity quantifications enable more informed CFD frameworks and more rigorous uncertainty bounds on the resulting data.
The paper is concerned with the selection of a specific spacecraft power technology and the identification of technology development to meet system requirements. Requirements which influence the selection of a given technology include the power level required, whether the load is constant or transient in nature, and in the case of transient loads, the time required to recover the power, and overall system safety. Various power technologies, such as solar voltaic power, solar dynamic power, nuclear power systems, and electrochemical energy storage, are briefly described.
Telerobotic operations, whether under autonomous or teleoperated control, require a much more sophisticated safety system than that needed for most industrial applications. Industrial robots generally perform very repetitive tasks in a controlled, static environment. The safety system in that case can be as simple as shutting down the robot if a human enters the work area, or even simply building a cage around the work space. Telerobotic operations, however, will take place in a dynamic, sometimes unpredictable environment, and will involve complicated and perhaps unrehearsed manipulations. This creates a much greater potential for damage to the robot or objects in its vicinity. The Procedural Safety System (PSS) collects data from external sensors and the robot, then processes it through an expert system shell to determine whether an unsafe condition or potential unsafe condition exists. Unsafe conditions could include exceeding velocity, acceleration, torque, or joint limits, imminent collision, exceeding temperature limits, and robot or sensor component failure. If a threat to safety exists, the operator is warned. If the threat is serious enough, the robot is halted. The PSS, therefore, uses expert system technology to enhance safety thus reducing operator work load, allowing him/her to focus on performing the task at hand without the distraction of worrying about violating safety criteria.
Aircraft and spacecraft comprise the class of aerospace structures that require efficiency and wisdom in design, sophistication and accuracy in analysis and numerous and careful experimental evaluations of components and prototype, in order to achieve the necessary system reliability, performance and safety. Preliminary and/or concept design entails the assemblage of system mission requirements, system expected performance and identification of components and their connections as well as of manufacturing and system assembly techniques. This is accomplished through experience based on previous similar designs, and through the possible use of models to simulate the entire system characteristics. Detail design is heavily dependent on information and concepts derived from the previous steps. This information identifies critical design areas which need sophisticated analyses, and design and redesign procedures to achieve the expected component performance. This step may require several independent analysis models, which, in many instances, require component testing. The last step in the design process, before going to production, is the verification of the design. This step necessitates the production of large components and prototypes in order to test component and system analytical predictions and verify strength and performance requirements under the worst loading conditions that the system is expected to encounter in service. Clearly then, full-scale testing is in many cases necessary and always very expensive. In the aircraft industry, in addition to full-scale tests, certification and safety necessitate large component static and dynamic testing. Such tests are extremely difficult, time consuming and definitely absolutely necessary. Clearly, one should not expect that prototype testing will be totally eliminated in the aircraft industry. It is hoped, though, that we can reduce full-scale testing to a minimum. Full-scale large component testing is necessary in other industries as well, Ship building, automobile and railway car construction all rely heavily on testing. Regardless of the application, a scaled-down (by a large factor) model (scale model) which closely represents the structural behavior of the full-scale system (prototype) can prove to be an extremely beneficial tool. This possible development must be based on the existence of certain structural parameters that control the behavior of a structural system when acted upon by static and/or dynamic loads. If such structural parameters exist, a scaled-down replica can be built, which will duplicate the response of the full-scale system. The two systems are then said to be structurally similar. The term, then, that best describes this similarity is structural similitude. Similarity of systems requires that the relevant system parameters be identical and these systems be governed by a unique set of characteristic equations. Thus, if a relation or equation of variables is written for a system, it is valid for all systems which are similar to it. Each variable in a model is proportional to the corresponding variable of the prototype. This ratio, which plays an essential role in predicting the relationship between the model and its prototype, is called the scale factor.
Explosion is the most extreme case of thermal runaway of lithium-ion (Li-ion) batteries. In this study, explosion dynamics of large-format Li-ion cells are investigated experimentally and numerically. Overcharge-to-explosion tests are conducted on 40 Ah Li-ion cells with Li[Ni 0.8 Co 0.1 Mn 0.1 ]O 2 cathode. Based on the explosion physics, shockwave and detonation models are used to characterize the shock effect of the cell explosion and evaluate the explosion equivalent. Von Neumann peak is observed on the pressure curves, and the shockwave velocity is supersonic at this time; the unwrinkled spherical flame phenomenon observed in the experiment indicates that it is detonation. Additionally, a geometric model is established based on the real testing scenario, and the explosion behavior is numerically studied. The characteristics of the explosion dynamics process are interpreted and the propagation mechanism of the shockwave are revealed; the deflagration to detonation transition (DDT) phenomenon in this process is caused by the formation of “hot spots”, and the explosion of the cells eventually turns into stable combustion. Here this study fills the gap in the research on thermal runaway of Li-ion cells, especially in the extreme cases of fire and explosion, and provide useful guidance for battery safety.
This paper describes the software design patterns and vehicle interfaces that were employed to transition vehicle controllers from simulation environments to open-road field experiments. The approach relies on a life cycle that utilizes model-based design and code generation, along with agile software development, and both software and hardware-in-the-loop testing, with additional safety margins. Autonomous designs should consider the dynamics of mixed autonomy in traffic to safely operate among humans. The software that provides a vehicle’s behavior intelligence is often developed through simulation, which may have a mismatch between dynamics, or as a result of a reinforcement learning workflow, which may be a black box with challenges to analyze. In each of these cases, it is important to have research interfaces that provide strongly typed data streams accessible to researchers who are not software experts while continuing to satisfy safety and liveness constraints. This paper describes how we design the hardware platform interfaces and software design process for a mixed autonomy traffic experiment with a leader-follower scenario. Controller synthesis for these vehicles requires clearly articulated vehicle interfaces and software design patterns for successful onboard deployment. Testing strategies for such controllers are also described before algorithms are transitioned to full-scale field experiments with safety operators for the vehicles. Testing strategies include software-in-the-loop simulation testing, hardware-in-the-loop simulation, ghost-car testing, and read-only testing in live traffic. With our approach, we were not only able to validate our controller synthesized in scripts and simulation, but also able to scale deployment to multiple vehicles.