Effects of aquatic environmental stress on enteric bacterial pathogens
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The International Space Station (ISS) is a semi-closed habitat in low Earth orbit with environmental conditions provided by an advanced life support system that controls temperature and recycles air and most of the potable water. The crew's activities, such as eating, sleeping, hygiene, and laboratory research, are performed in relatively close proximity. Research in the laboratory includes a myriad of experiments, including those with rodents, plants, and pathogenic microorganisms. Despite these conditions, in-flight monitoring of ISS indicates that the microbial diversity is similar to homes on earth. Accordingly, the crew is generally very healthy, however infectious disease does occur and potential routes of infection by obligate and opportunistic pathogens cannot be completely prevented. Determining the extent of this risk is further complicated, as microorganisms can alter their characteristics in response to spaceflight culture, as exemplified by the increase in virulence of the enteric pathogen Salmonella enterica Typhimurium during spaceflight compared to otherwise identical cultures grown on Earth. Taken together, these factors suggest a need for continued microbiological monitoring and research to understand and mitigate the risk of infectious disease during long duration missions.
While preventive measures limit the presence of many medically significant microorganisms during spaceflight missions, microbial infection of crewmembers cannot be completely prevented. Spaceflight experiments over the past 50 years have demonstrated a unique microbial response to spaceflight culture, although the mechanisms behind those responses and their operational relevance were unclear. In 2007, the operational importance of these microbial responses was emphasized as the results of an experiment aboard STS-115 demonstrated that the enteric pathogen Salmonella enterica serovar Typhimurium (S. Typhimurium) increased in virulence in a murine model of infection. The experiment was reproduced in 2008 aboard STS-123 confirming this finding. In response to these findings, the Institute of Medicine of the National Academies recommended that NASA investigate this risk and its potential impact on the health of the crew during spaceflight. NASA assigned this risk to the Human Research Program. To better understand this risk, evidence has been collected and reported from both spaceflight analog systems and actual spaceflight. Although the performance of virulence studies during spaceflight are challenging and often impractical, additional information has been and continues to be collected to better understand the risk to crew health. Still, the uncertainty concerning the extent and severity of these alterations in host-microorganism interactions is very large and requires more investigation.
While preventive measures limit the presence of many medically significant microorganisms during spaceflight missions, microbial infection of crewmembers cannot be completely prevented. Spaceflight experiments over the past 50 years have demonstrated a unique microbial response to spaceflight culture, although the mechanisms behind those responses and their operational relevance were unclear. In 2007, the operational importance of these microbial responses was emphasized as the results of an experiment aboard STS-115 demonstrated that the enteric pathogen Salmonella enterica serovar Typhimurium (S. Typhimurium) increased in virulence in a murine model of infection. The experiment was reproduced in 2008 aboard STS-123 confirming this finding. In response to these findings, the Institute of Medicine of the National Academies recommended that NASA investigate this risk and its potential impact on the health of the crew during spaceflight. NASA assigned this risk to the Human Research Program. To better understand this risk, evidence has been collected and reported from both spaceflight analog systems and actual spaceflight including Mir, Space Shuttle, and ISS missions. Although the performance of virulence studies during spaceflight are challenging and often impractical, additional information has been and continues to be collected to better understand the risk to crew health. Still, the uncertainty concerning the extent and severity of these alterations in host-microorganism interactions is very large and requires more investigation as the focus of human spaceflight shifts to longer-duration exploration class missions.
The discovery that biomechanical forces regulate microbial virulence was established with the finding that physiological low fluid shear (LFS) forces altered gene expression, stress responses, and virulence of the enteric pathogen Salmonella enterica serovar Typhimurium during log phase. These log phase LFS-induced phenotypes were independent of the master stress response regulator, RpoS (S). Given the central importance of RpoS in regulating stationary phase stress responses of S. Typhimurium cultured under conventional shake flask and static conditions, we examined its role in stationary phase cultures grown under physiological LFS. We constructed an isogenic rpoS mutant derivative of wild type S. Typhimurium and compared the ability of these strains to survive in vitro pathogenesis-related stresses that mimic those encountered in the infected host and environment. We also compared the ability of these strains to colonize (adhere, invade, and survive within) human intestinal epithelial cell cultures. Unexpectedly, LFS-induced resistance of stationary phase S. Typhimurium cultures to acid and bile salts stresses did not rely on RpoS. Likewise, RpoS was dispensable for stationary phase LFS cultures to adhere to and survive within intestinal epithelial cells. In contrast, the resistance of these cultures to challenge with oxidative and thermal stresses, and their invasion into intestinal epithelial cells was influenced by RpoS. These findings expand our mechanistic understanding of how physiological fluid shear forces modulate stationary phase S. Typhimurium physiology in unexpected ways and provide clues into microbial mechanobiology and nuances of Salmonella responses to microenvironmental niches in the infected host.
The normal scope of an adequate public health response to released biological material is framed by working with biological vectors with known pathogenicity and virulence. Defining the scope of a response to the release of biological material with unknown pathogenicity and virulence enters into a novel and yet to be framed domain. A current case, the case of returning samples from a location other than Earth, extraterrestrial samples from a location such as Mars, which may harbor life as we know it, requires framing a public health response. An unintentional release of biological material with unknown pathogenicity and virulence may occur when biological containment mechanisms in the Earth-returning transport method are lost. This paper raises initial public health and healthcare response questions during a return of extraterrestrial samples to Earth, in the event of its release from biological containment mechanisms: How does the public health community prepare for a response when there is release of samples that may contain potential extraterrestrial organisms from a planetary body or hardy terrestrial organisms surviving a round trip? If a mishap occurs during the return of these samples, what considerations need to be made to confine, decontaminate, and collect material in regions around the mishap? How will the public health community work with relevant government organizations to prepare the general public? The unknowns of exposure, potential extraterrestrial pathogenicity, and decontamination approaches, underscore gaps in biopreparedness for this novel case from the federal to local levels.
Until now, NASA's space water reuse research program has not considered the transport of water-borne infectious enteric viruses; however, viral diseases probably are a signifficant concern in long-duration space missions. To simplify monitoring and prediction of pathogen distribution, model indicator strains historically have been used. In this research, the male specific RNA coliphage MS-2 is used as a model of enteric viruses due to their similar size and biochemical composition. Inactivation of some water-borne enteric viruses by iodine has previously been characterized. In this paper, iodine inactivation of the model coliphage MS-2 in buffered water is compared with earlier bench-scale disinfection survival data and with survival in iodinated simulated shower water used in a test water recycling system.
Exploration Class missions to Mars will require precautions against potential contamination by any native microorganisms that may be incidentally pathogenic to humans. While the results of NASA's Viking biology experiments of 1976 have been generally interpreted as inconclusive for surface organisms, the possibility of native surface life has never been ruled out and more recent studies suggest that the case for biological interpretation of the Viking Labeled Release data may now be stronger than it was when the experiments were originally conducted. It is possible that, prior to the first human landing on Mars, robotic craft and sample return missions will provide enough data to know with certainty whether or not future human landing sites harbor extant life forms. However, if native life is confirmed, it will be problematic to determine whether any of its species may present a medical risk to astronauts. Therefore, it will become necessary to assess empirically the risk that the planet contains pathogens based on terrestrial examples of pathogenicity and to take a reasonably cautious approach to bio-hazard protection. A survey of terrestrial pathogens was conducted with special emphasis on those pathogens whose evolution has not depended on the presence of animal hosts. The history of the development and implementation of Apollo anticontamination protocol and recent recommendations of the NRC Space Studies Board regarding Mars were reviewed. Organisms can emerge in nature in the absence of indigenous animal hosts and both infectious and non-infectious human pathogens are theoretically possible on Mars. The prospect of Martian surface life, together with the existence of a diversity of routes by which pathogenicity has emerged on Earth, suggests that the possibility of human pathogens on Mars, while low, is not zero. Since the discovery and study of Martian life can have long-term benefits for humanity, the risk that Martian life might include pathogens should not be an obstacle to human exploration. As a precaution, however, it is recommended that EVA suits be decontaminated when astronauts enter surface habitats when returning from field activity and that biosafety protocol approximating laboratory BSL 2 be developed for astronauts working in laboratories on the Martian surface. Quarantine of astronauts and Martian materials arriving on Earth should also be part of a human Mars mission and this and the surface biosafety program should be integral to human expeditions from the earliest stages of the mission planning.
Membrane-aerated biofilm reactors (MABRs) have been studied for a number of years as an alternate approach for treating wastewater streams during space exploration. While the technology provides a promising pre-treatment for lowering organic carbon and nitrogen content without the need for harsh stabilization chemicals, several challenges must be addressed before adoption of the technology in future missions. One challenge is the transportation of bioreactors containing intact, active biofilms as a means for rapid start-up on the International Space Station or beyond. Similarly, there could be a need for placing these biological systems into a dormant state for extended periods when the system is not in use, along with the ability for rapid restart. Previous studies indicated that there was little influence of storage condition (4 or 25 C, with or without bulk fluid) on recovery of bioreactors with immature biofilms (48 days old), but that an extensive recovery time was required (20+ days). Bioreactors with fully established biofilms (13 months) were able to recover from a 7-month dormancy within 4 days (approximately 1 residence). Further dormancy and recovery testing is presented here that examines the role of biofilm age on recovery requirements, repeated dormancy cycle capabilities, and effects of long-duration dormancy cycles (8-9 months) on HFMB systems. Another challenge that must be addressed is the possibility of antibiotics entering the wastewater stream. Currently, for most laboratory tests of biological water processors, donors providing urine may not contribute to the study when taking antibiotics because the effects on the system are yet uncharacterized. A simulated urinary tract infection event, where an opportunistic, pathogenic organism, E. coli, was introduced to the HFMBs followed by dosing with an antibiotic, ciprofloxacin, was completed to study the effect of the antibiotic on reactor performance and to also examine the development of antibiotic-resistant communities within the system.
We are developing tools to link the biochemical structure of selected biomarkers with putative biogenic structures observed in mineralized samples. The detection of evidence of life on Mars and other planets will rely on methods that can discriminate compounds formed exclusively by living organisms. While biogenic compounds, such as amino acids and nucleotides have been discovered in extraterrestrial sources, such as meteorites and comets, their formation can be explained by abiotic means. The formation of cellular structures, or more elaborate organic molecules, such as complex lipids, proteins or nucleic acids, however, is strongly correlated to the presence of even the most primitive life processes. Recent evidence lends support to the hypothesis that life may have once existed on Mars. Carbonate globules and ppm concentrations of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs) have been described in ALH84001, a meteorite originating from Mars ejecta captured by Earth over 13,000 years ago. The localized high concentration of PAHs that follow an increasing gradient from the intact fusion crust towards the interior corresponds to microgram quantities of hydrocarbon. Even though ALH84001 and other similar meteorites have withstood the forces capable of ejecting rock through Mars' escape velocity, upon entering Earth's atmosphere, their core temperatures are likely not to have been raised significantly, as evidenced by the survival of remanent magnetic signatures. Ideal biomarkers of ancient or modern biological life would include molecules that are (or were) pervasive and highly resistant to degradation. Also, requisite methods of detection should be simple, extremely sensitive and broadly inclusive (NASA SP-530). Lipopolysaccharide (LPS), peptidoglycan or pseudopeptidoglycan and beta-glucan are microbial cell wall components which together cover the entire microbial spectrum of eubacteria, archea and fungi. They are all remarkably resistant to thermal degradation. Fortunately, many antimicrobial defense systems of higher organisms require sensitive detection to combat microbial pathogens. We employ here the primitive immune system of the evolutionarily ancient horseshoe crab, Limulus polyphemus. This species relies on multi-enzyme signal amplification detection of cell wall molecules and they can be applied to the development of useful detectors of life. An extension of this work includes the visualization of microbial signatures by labeling LAL components with chromogenic or electron dense markers. The protein Limulus Anti-LPS Factor (LALF) has an extremely high affinity for LPS. By coupling LALF binding with colloidal gold labels we demonstrate a correlation of the structures visible by electron microscopy with biochemical evidence of microbial cell wall materials. Pure silica particles were mixed with cultures of E. coli (10(exp 6) cfu/mL). Samples were washed sequentially with buffered saline, LALF, antibody to LALF and finally colloidal gold-labeled Protein A. Negative controls were not exposed to E. coli but received identical treatment otherwise. Samples were coated with carbon and imaged on a JEOL JSM-840 scanning electron microscope with LaB6 source in the back scatter mode with the JEOL annular back scatter detector. 20 nm-scale black spots in this contrast-reversed image originate from electrons back-scattered by gold atoms. Negative controls did not give any signal. Future work will expand application of this technique to soil simulants and mineralized rock samples.
The BioNutrients project aims to develop an on-demand biological production system capable of producing dietary nutrients and other products of interest. A key element of this system is the bioreactor itself, which needs to provide a suitable environment for growth of the selected microorganism(s). To support respiration of the organisms, the bioreactor should have gas-permeable elements to allow metabolically required gases (e.g., oxygen) to enter and byproduct gases (e.g., carbon dioxide) to escape. For systems utilizing yeast for precision fermentation, the system also needs to prevent or minimize the release of ethanol, which has impacts on the Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS). Additionally, the bioreactor must include interfaces for hydrating the microorganism(s), sampling, and crew interface. For experiments on the International Space Station (ISS), the bioreactor must also comply with ISS-levied offgassing, cold stowage, and other safety requirements. This presentation aims to explore these design considerations, using the examples of the bioreactors used for the BioNutrients ISS payload series.