Acoustic and Random Vibration Testing for Low-Cost Missions
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This paper presents an application of statistical engineering to solve the problem of determining the effects of reducing test sample sizes and environment levels in lot acceptance testing (LAT) of ordnance devices used by NASA and DoD space systems. Unlike environmental testing of dedicated qualification hardware, ordnance devices have a test-like-you-fly exception and use lot acceptance sampling or LAT. LAT is performed by randomly selecting a predefined number of devices from an individual lot and exposing them to a more severe dynamic shock and vibration testing environments than flight (sometimes as high as 6 decibels over flight environments) and then performing a destructive test on the device. Recent trends have been suggested to reduce LAT costs by reducing environment test levels or the number of devices per LAT, or both. A method is given here to compute flight risk, so the proposed methods can be compared by subject matter experts to the baseline LAT methods. In addition, this method can be used to determine the best methods to include in future LAT standards for pyrotechnic devices.
Interest in generalization of the physical environment experienced by NASA hardware from the natural Earth environment (on the launch pad), man-made environment on Earth (storage acceptance an d qualification testing), the launch environment, and the space environment, is ed to find commonality among our hardware in an effort to reduce cost and complexity. NASA is entering a period of increase in its number of planetary missions and it is important to understand how our qualification requirements will evolve with and track these new environments. Environmental conditions are described for NASA projects in several ways for the different periods of the mission life cycle. At the beginning, the mission manager defines survivability requirements based on the mission length, orbit, launch date, launch vehicle, and other factors . such as the use of reactor engines. Margins are then applied to these values (temperature extremes, vibration extremes, radiation tolerances, etc,) and a new set of conditions is generalized for design requirements. Mission assurance documents will then assign an additional margin for reliability, and a third set of values is provided for during testing. A fourth set of environmental condition values may evolve intermittently from heritage hardware that has been tested to a level beyond the actual mission requirement. These various sets of environment figures can make it quite confusing and difficult to capture common hardware environmental requirements. Environmental requirement information can be found in a wide variety of places. The most obvious is with the individual projects. We can easily get answers to questions about temperature extremes being used and radiation tolerance goals, but it is more difficult to map the answers to the process that created these requirements: for design, for qualification, and for actual environment with no margin applied. Not everyone assigned to a NASA project may have that kind of insight, as many have only the environmental requirement numbers needed to do their jobs but do not necessarily have a programmatic-level understanding of how all of the environmental requirements fit together.
The launch complexes at NASA's John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) are critical support facilities for the successful launch of space-based vehicles. These facilities include a flame trench that bisects the pad at ground level. This trench includes a flame deflector system that consists of an inverted, V-shaped steel structure covered with a high temperature concrete material five inches thick that extends across the center of the flame trench. One side of the "V11 receives and deflects the flames from the orbiter main engines; the opposite side deflects the flames from the solid rocket boosters. There are also two movable deflectors at the top of the trench to provide additional protection to shuttle hardware from the solid rocket booster flames. These facilities are over 40 years old and are experiencing constant deterioration from launch heat/blast effects and environmental exposure. The refractory material currently used in launch pad flame deflectors has become susceptible to failure, resulting in large sections of the material breaking away from the steel base structure and creating high-speed projectiles during launch. These projectiles jeopardize the safety of the launch complex, crew, and vehicle. Post launch inspections have revealed that the number and frequency of repairs, as well as the area and size of the damage, is increasing with the number of launches. The Space Shuttle Program has accepted the extensive ground processing costs for post launch repair of damaged areas and investigations of future launch related failures for the remainder of the program. There currently are no long term solutions available for Constellation Program ground operations to address the poor performance and subsequent failures of the refractory materials. Over the last three years, significant liberation of refractory material in the flame trench and fire bricks along the adjacent trench walls following Space Shuttle launches have resulted in extensive investigations of failure mechanisms, load response, ejected material impact evaluation, and repair design analysis (environmental and structural assessment, induced environment from solid rocket booster plume, loads summary, and repair integrity), assessment of risk posture for flame trench debris, and justification of flight readiness rationale. Although the configuration of the launch pad, water and exhaust direction, and location of the Mobile Launcher Platform between the flame trench and the flight hardware should protect the Space Vehicle from debris exposure, loss of material could cause damage to a major element of the ground facility (resulting in temporary usage loss); and damage to other facility elements is possible. These are all significant risks that will impact ground operations for Constellation and development of new refractory material systems is necessary to reduce the likelihood of the foreign object debris hazard during launch. KSC is developing an alternate refractory material for the launch pad flame trench protection system, including flame deflector and flame trench walls, that will withstand launch conditions without the need for repair after every launch, as is currently the case. This paper will present a summary of the results from industry surveys, trade studies, life cycle cost analysis, and preliminary testing that have been performed to support and validate the development, testing, and qualification of new refractory materials.
Additional ventilation capacity has been designed for the 3430 Building filtered exhaust stack system. The updated system will increase the number of fans from two to three and include new ductwork with a larger diameter to integrate the new fan into the existing stack. Stack operations will involve running various fan combinations at any given time. The air monitoring system of the existing two-fan stack previously was found to comply with the American National Standards Institute/Health Physics Society (ANSI/HPS) N13.1-1999 standard. Full-scale, three-dimensional computational fluid dynamics (CFD) modeling was used to evaluate the modified three-fan system for compliance with the ANSI/HPS N13.1-2011 standard, which essentially is equivalent to the ANSI/HPS N13.1-1999 standard. The four mixing criteria evaluated are 1) flow angle, 2) velocity, 3) gas tracer, and 4) particle tracer. Benchmarking of the CFD modeling methodology showed good agreement with previous testing used to qualify the stack, and modeling of the existing two-fan system showed good agreement with test data collected from the 3430 Building stack. Modeling was performed to develop a suitable three-fan design. Initial modeling of the three-fan design and basic ductwork showed that flow angles and velocity uniformity were acceptable; however, the gas tracer and particle tracer mixing results were not acceptable. To meet ANSI/HPS N13.1-2011 criteria, an air blender was added to the stack design. This revision models the individual maximum fan reduced flow capacity from 38,000 cfm to 31,200 cfm; no changes to the duct design are made.
One of the critical non-replaceable systems of a long-term manned orbital station is the propulsion system. Since the propulsion system operates beginning with the launch of station elements into orbit, its service life determines the service life of the station overall. Weighing almost a million pounds, the International Space Station (ISS) is about four times as large as the Russian space station Mir and about five times as large as the U.S. Skylab. Constructed over a span of more than a decade with the help of over 100 space flights, elements and modules of the ISS provide more research space than any spacecraft ever built. Originally envisaged for a service life of fifteen years, this Earth orbiting laboratory has been in orbit since 1998. Some elements that have been launched later in the assembly sequence were not yet built when the first elements were placed in orbit. Hence, some of the early modules that were launched at the inception of the program were already nearing the end of their design life when the ISS was finally ready and operational. To maximize the return on global investments on ISS, it is essential for the valuable research on ISS to continue as long as the station can be sustained safely in orbit. This paper describes the work performed to extend the service life of the ISS propulsion system. A system comprises of many components with varying failure rates. Reliability of a system is the probability that it will perform its intended function under encountered operating conditions, for a specified period of time. As we are interested in finding out how reliable a system would be in the future, reliability expressed as a function of time provides valuable insight. In a hypothetical bathtub shaped failure rate curve, the failure rate, defined as the number of failures per unit time that a currently healthy component will suffer in a given future time interval, decreases during infant-mortality period, stays nearly constant during the service life and increases at the end when the design service life ends and wear-out phase begins. However, the component failure rates do not remain constant over the entire cycle life. The failure rate depends on various factors such as design complexity, current age of the component, operating conditions, severity of environmental stress factors, etc. Development, qualification and acceptance test processes provide rigorous screening of components to weed out imperfections that might otherwise cause infant mortality failures. If sufficient samples are tested to failure, the failure time versus failure quantity can be analyzed statistically to develop a failure probability distribution function (PDF), a statistical model of the probability of failure versus time. Driven by cost and schedule constraints however, spacecraft components are generally not tested in large numbers. Uncertainties in failure rate and remaining life estimates increase when fewer units are tested. To account for this, spacecraft operators prefer to limit useful operations to a period shorter than the maximum demonstrated service life of the weakest component. Running each component to its failure to determine the maximum possible service life of a system can become overly expensive and impractical. Spacecraft operators therefore, specify the required service life and an acceptable factor of safety (FOS). The designers use these requirements to limit the life test duration. Midway through the design life, when benefits justify additional investments, supplementary life test may be performed to demonstrate the capability to safely extend the service life of the system. An innovative approach is required to evaluate the entire system, without having to go through an elaborate test program of propulsion system elements. Evaluating every component through a brute force test program would be a cost prohibitive and time consuming endeavor. ISS propulsion system components were designed and built decades ago. There are no representative ground test articles for some of the components. A 'test everything' approach would require manufacturing new test articles. The paper outlines some of the techniques used for selective testing, by way of cherry picking candidate components based on failure mode effects analysis, system level impacts, hazard analysis, etc. The type of testing required for extending the service life depends on the design and criticality of the component, failure modes and failure mechanisms, life cycle margin provided by the original certification, operational and environmental stresses encountered, etc. When specific failure mechanism being considered and the underlying relationship of that mode to the stresses provided in the test can be correlated by supporting analysis, time and effort required for conducting life extension testing can be significantly reduced. Exposure to corrosive propellants over long periods of time, for instance, lead to specific failure mechanisms in several components used in the propulsion system. Using Arrhenius model, which is tied to chemically dependent failure mechanisms such as corrosion or chemical reactions, it is possible to subject carefully selected test articles to accelerated life test. Arrhenius model reflects the proportional relationship between time to failure of a component and the exponential of the inverse of absolute temperature acting on the component. The acceleration factor is used to perform tests at higher stresses that allow direct correlation between the times to failure at a high test temperature to the temperatures to be expected in actual use. As long as the temperatures are such that new failure mechanisms are not introduced, this becomes a very useful method for testing to failure a relatively small sample of items for a much shorter amount of time. In this article, based on the example of the propulsion system of the first ISS module Zarya, theoretical approaches and practical activities of extending the service life of the propulsion system are reviewed with the goal of determining the maximum duration of its safe operation.
In the ever-changing paradigm of efficient and capable spacecraft design, scientific missions continue pushing the envelope enabling spacecraft subsystems to deliver effective solutions to meet challenging new mission/spacecraft needs. From an in-space storable liquid chemical propulsion perspective, monopropellant hydrazine has been, and continues to be, a dependable propellant with considerable flight heritage, a variety of engine thrust classes available from multiple vendors, with repeatable and reliable performance. Additionally, the space propulsion industry has learned to successfully handle hydrazine, its regulations, the safety protocols, the personnel protective equipment, and the unique training standards–all requisite for loading spacecraft propulsion systems with toxic hypergolic hydrazine. The question now arises as to “what is next for in-space chemical propulsion?” Further, with the evolution and concrete advancements in innovative in-space green propellant technologies, capable of providing realizable benefits to scientific missions, concern over the reliability and availability of this higher performing and safer to handle class of propellants is waning. As science missions move forward with the potential flight in fusion of High Performance Green Propulsion (HPGP), NASA and its industry partners are working to address any gaps in system reliability, performance, or unique operational considerations. Propellant technology that offers both higher performance and significant reduction in personnel hazards compared to hydrazine presents an attractive propulsion subsystem design opportunity. Increased propulsion subsystem performance can result in lower spacecraft launch mass, larger scientific payloads, or extended on-orbit lifetimes. Mission trades using green propulsion technologies have been documented on multiple NASA Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) mission classes, examining various parameters and requirements to support mission architectures in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), High Earth Orbit (HEO), geostationary, lunar, planetary, and Quasi-halo orbit around Sun-Earth Lagrange point (L2). The results of these trade studies show promising, attainable benefits. The perceived programmatic risk of flying a newer propulsion technology has, unfortunately, not outweighed the benefits to date. To take advantage of the improved performance and mitigate programmatic risk, HPGP engines must demonstrate life testing at higher propellant throughputs than have currently been demonstrated. In an effort to proactively address the challenges with technology infusion into a risk-averse community, NASA and the Swedish National Space Agency (SNSA) outlined a collaborative Implementing Arrangement (IA) for the respective agencies to pursue increased HPGP technology maturation. This initial IA effort began in 2013, fresh off the heels of the successful PRISMA HPGP technology demonstration mission. The IA targeted objective is to reduce risk to potential future HPGP missions and fully characterize the LMP-103S propellant and associated engine performance. Over the past eight years, HPGP has flown in propulsion systems on twenty-five(25) spacecraft from seven(7) different Launch Ranges around the globe and on seven (7) different Launch Vehicles. Six(6) of these launches involved multiple loading operations for multiple spacecraft. For U.S. Range operations, nine (9) HPGP systems have been processed at Vandenberg Space Force Base(VSFB):six(6) in 2017, and three (3) in 2018. Six (6) more have been processed at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS)in May 2020, with three (3) systems launched in June 2020 and the remaining three (3) system were left loaded and ready until their launch in August of 2020. Three (3) more systems have been processed at Wallops Flight Facility(WFF)and launched in June 2021. In addition, these propulsion subsystems employed heritage propulsion subsystem component such as valves, filters, and pressure transducers, and have further demonstrated nominal functionality in both diaphragm and Propellant Management Device (PDM) propellant tanks. Based on these successes, HPGP technology continues to be considered for NASA Science Mission Directorate missions at GSFC. The work presented herein represents many years of development and collaborative efforts to successfully align higher performance, low toxicity hydrazine alternatives into scientific missions. NASA GSFC Propulsion Engineering, in collaboration with Bradford ECAPS, has developed mission specific thruster design and testing requirements to establish GSFC’s desired test conditions and firing sequences.In2017, the first flight-like 22N HPGP thruster Engineering Qualification Model (EQM-1)was designed and built by Bradford ECAPS to prove out the thruster design, materials, build process, and test campaign with respect to NASA GSFC critical component and mission requirements. This test program was developed to comprehensively test the thruster, the technology, and ultimately increase the 22N HPGP Technology Readiness Level(TRL). EQM-1was tested to environmental qualification levels prior to hot fire performance testing to represent the relevant end-to-end environment (launch to on-orbit operation)with required margin. This thruster demonstrated steady-state and pulse mode operational capability with propellant thruster throughput up to~53kg.At this throughput level, the EQM-1 engine began to present off-nominal performance and the test campaign was halted to allow for non-destructive testing and identify the root cause for the an omalous performance. Capitalizing on the successful elements of the EQM-1 campaign, an upgraded 22N HPGP EQM-2 has been manufactured by Bradford ECAPS to meet the complete GSFC requirements. The EQM-2 thruster’s test campaign has further demonstrated the robustness of the HPGP propulsion technology and increased the Technology Readiness Level (TRL) by undergoing a full acceptance test program, then proceeding into qualification, including environmental testing (vibration and shock to qualification levels),as well as hot-fire life testing, operating at steady-state and pulse modes with increased propellant thruster throughput to~150kg. The HPGP thruster performance testing enables effective HPGP thruster readiness evaluation to meet NASA candidate mission requirements in the future.