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All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2022

High Explosive Testing Capabilities at Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) [Slides]

LANL is a non-profit Federally Funded Research & Development Center (FFRDC). LANL’s Integrated Weapons Experiments (J) Division addresses national security challenges by executing largescale, integrated, focused experiments, and tests of engineered devices and systems. J-NV plans, fields, and executes dynamic high explosive experiments at NNSS. This includes sub-critical experiments involving special nuclear material, as well as small- and largescale non-nuclear experiments. J-NV generates, analyzes, and disseminates unique, high-quality data.

42 ENGINEERING↗
DOE OSTI2023

The Observed Inefficiency of Explosions to Produce Large Aftershocks: Båth’s Law for Explosions is 2.5

Underground explosions are observed to produce fewer and smaller aftershocks than similar size earthquakes. The seismic magnitude difference $Δm_x$ between an explosion and its largest aftershock is an expression of Båth’s law for explosions. Based on an analysis of a compilation of aftershock studies from Soviet testing at the Semipalatinsk test site in Kazakhstan and observations from American testing at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), here we find that the average magnitude difference for explosions $\overline{Δm_x}$ is about 2.5. Based on the NNSS data, two standard deviations of $Δm_x$ is about 1.5. In all the cases studied, from ton to megaton yield, from shallow to overburied depth, and chemical or nuclear source, no explosion aftershock has been larger than the explosion that preceded it. In fact, the two events at the NNSS with the largest aftershock magnitudes relative to the explosion are associated with the collapse of the cavity created by the explosion. This is similar to observations from North Korean testing at the Punggye-ri Test Site, where the largest seismic event following the test is attributed to the collapse after the 2017 explosion and is from 0.8 to 2 magnitude units less than the mainshock.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2020

Investigation of Non-Nuclear Plowshare and Vela Uniform Sites - 20447

The Plowshare Program was initiated by the Atomic Energy Commission, a predecessor agency to the US Department of Energy (DOE), to investigate peaceful uses of nuclear devices. 'Vela Uniform,' part of the broader Project Vela, was designed to use nuclear and other explosions to increase the capability of the United States to detect nuclear tests through seismicity. There were underground nuclear tests conducted off the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) as part of the Plowshare Program (e.g., the Gnome-Coach, New Mexico, Site) and the Vela Uniform Program (e.g., Project Shoal, Nevada, Site) at which the DOE Office of Legacy Management (LM) has been conducting long-term surveillance and maintenance since fiscal year (FY) 2006. There are many additional locations, particularly for the Plowshare Program, that were considered for nuclear tests or used for non-nuclear tests off the NNSS. Some were only named on paper, but at 30 sites, field work such as drilling test wells and conducting tests using conventional explosives was done. A Plowshare nuclear explosion had been proposed at Project Chariot but was canceled in 1962. In 1992, the discovery of soils contaminated with radionuclides from tracer experiments led to a cleanup by the DOE Office of Environmental Management (EM) of the Project Chariot, Alaska, Site, which was completed in 1994. Following the cleanup of the Project Chariot site, EM was concerned that there might be environmental liabilities at other Plowshare or Vela Uniform sites where field investigations were done, even if the nuclear test was never conducted. The EM Program at the Nevada Site Office began examining records and visiting selected locations that were evaluated for Plowshare and Vela Uniform non-nuclear tests. In total, 161 Plowshare and 14 Vela Uniform sites or proposed projects were identified. The Desert Research Institute (DRI) created summaries of the work carried out at these sites and developed a collection of unclassified documents for them. Preliminary investigations had been conducted at these sites by both LM and EM since the early 2000's. In 2016, in preparation for accepting responsibility for the sites, LM started a program to determine if there were any environmental or safety liabilities associated with them. In 2019, LM formally accepted responsibility for these sites off the NNSS where non-nuclear explosive tests were conducted or where underground nuclear tests were proposed as part of the Plowshare and Vela Uniform programs but were never conducted. LM responsibilities will include maintaining institutional knowledge of the sites, responding to public inquiries, and addressing any concerns at each site. To minimize risk associated with site management, LM has archived all historical records compiled by DRI and has performed limited investigations at sites identified by the prior studies as having a higher potential liability. Preserving records related to site operations reduces the risk of doing unnecessary site investigations in the future caused by the loss of institutional knowledge. During the investigations, some maintenance needs were identified and will be addressed by the end of FY 2021. At the end of FY 2021, investigations, maintenance, and archiving activities will be complete. Remnants of test activities found at sites include craters, mud pits, debris, and open boreholes. Open boreholes are being plugged and abandoned in accordance with state regulatory standards. Other issues are being addressed in accordance with land owner requests and preferences as well as state regulations. Archiving activities include the development of project summaries identifying key operational details and current condition to allow site managers to be easily briefed. The LM experience at non-nuclear Plowshare and Vela Uniform sites applies to other programs where there is the potential for liability associated with the non-nuclear aspects of nuclear programs. This may include support activities or early phases of planned nuclear projects. Preserving institutional knowledge enables land managers to adequately address any concerns associated with operations and lowers risk. (authors)

12 MANAGEMENT OF RADIOACTIVE AND NON-RADIOACTIVE W↗
DOE OSTI2021

Evaluation of several relevant fractionation processes as possible explanation for radioxenon isotopic activity ratios in samples taken near underground nuclear explosions in shafts and tunnels

Gas samples taken from two historic underground nuclear tests done in 1989 at the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), formerly the Nevada Test Site (NTS), were examined to determine how xenon isotopes fractionate because of early-time cavity processes, transport through the rock, or dispersal through tunnels. Xenon isotopes are currently being used to distinguish civilian sources of xenon in the atmosphere from sources associated with underground nuclear explosions (UNEs). The two nuclear tests included (1) BARNWELL, a test conducted in a vertical shaft approximately 600 m below ground surface at Pahute Mesa, and (2) DISKO ELM, a horizontal line-of-sight test done in P-tunnel approximately 261 m below the surface of Aqueduct Mesa. Numerical flow and transport models developed for the two sites had mixed success when attempting to match the observed xenon isotope ratios. At the BARNWELL site, the simulated xenon isotope ratios were consistent with measurements from the chimney and ground surface and appeared to have been affected primarily by fractionation during subsurface transport. At the DISKO ELM site, samples taken from two elevations in the chimney failed to show the degree of fractionation predicted by the models during transport and did not show evidence for significant fractionation due to early-time condensation of refractory xenon-precursor radionuclides into the melt glass. Gas samples taken from the adjacent tunnels in the days following the test showed mixed evidence for early-time separation of xenon isotopes from their iodine precursors.

73 NUCLEAR PHYSICS AND RADIATION PHYSICS↗
DOE OSTI2026

Seismic velocity modeling and earthquake relocations for the southern Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), with a focus on Rock Valley

The Rock Valley Direct Comparison (RV/DC) is the third phase of the Source Physics Experiment (SPE; Snelson et al., 2014), a project aimed at improving seismic discrimination between explosive sources and natural earthquakes. Phases I and II of SPE focused on studying the generation of shear waves in endmember geologies (granite and alluvium, respectively), while Phase III aims to detonate a chemical explosion co-located with the source region of the 1993 Rock Valley earthquake sequence, located in the Rock Valley Fault Zone (RVFZ), in the southern portion of the Nevada Test Site (now the Nevada National Security Site, or NNSS).

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

Assessing the Accuracy of a Borehole-Controlled Velocity Model of Yucca Flat, Nevada, Using Large-N Seismic Data

The Source Physics Experiment (SPE) aims to improve nuclear test monitoring capabilities through a series of chemical explosions in Yucca Flat within the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS) (Snelson et al., 2013). With geologic data from over 950 boreholes, Yucca Flat has excellent borehole control on stratigraphy. These data were used to create a Geologic Framework Model (GFM) of the basin to aid in the study of seismic wave propagation through the Earth. However, the seismic velocities of the geologic units in the GFM are less well-defined. With the acquisition of five new active source Large-N datasets, we can now quantitatively assess the accuracy of the seismic model previously controlled by borehole data alone.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

Rock Valley Direct Comparison Relocation Working Group Location Results and Recommendations (Version 4.0)

The Source Physics Experiments (SPE) were designed to improve our physics-based understanding of explosion sources for the purposes of nuclear test monitoring. Phase I consisted of 6 chemical explosions in the Climax Stock Granite of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS), while Phase II consisted of 4 explosions in a contrasting dry alluvium geology (DAG) in Yucca Flat, providing essential data in various media and emplacement conditions to further modeling efforts. For Phase III, the Rock Valley Direct Comparison (RVDC) seeks to directly compare earthquake and explosion source types. An unusually shallow series of events in 1993 along the Rock Valley Fault Zone in the southeastern portion of the NNSS has been targeted for this direct comparison. Depth ranges for the events, previously estimated to be less than 3 km, is achievable by modern drilling techniques and accessibility to the epicentral locations would require minimal improvements to the infrastructure. The events providing this unique opportunity for direct comparison are the focus of this report.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2021

Reconstruction of Pre- and Post-Test Surfaces at the U-20az BARNWELL Site, Nevada National Security Site

Technical report on results of photogrammetric reconstruction task at NNSS. Modern photogrammetric methods were applied to historic aerial photographs taken six days before and four days after the BARNWELL underground nuclear explosion (UNE) to recreate the pre-UNE topography and the fresh post-UNE surface. The surfaces were compared to each other to characterize surface effects of the BARNWELL UNE. Topographic changes between the pre-UNE and post-UNE surfaces were limited to minor rock fall and intentional changes related to construction activities. Methods developed in this study could potentially be used across a much wider area to discover and catalogue as yet undescribed subtle underground nuclear explosion surface effects.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

DATASET RELEASE AND QUALITY CONTROL REVIEW OF LIVERMORE NEVADA NETWORK (LNN) RECORDINGS OF A SUBSET OF NEVADA NUCLEAR SECURITY SITE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FROM 1979 TO 1992.

Geophysical research on historical nuclear tests is an important aspect of future monitoring capabilities in seismic research. This research is challenging due to the limited number of digital seismic recordings during the peak of nuclear testing (1945-1992). These limited records are unique and non-reproducible data with potential high research impact. Releasing available nuclear explosion seismic records to the explosion monitoring community is thus of high value and is the motivation for this dataset release. The target of this effort was on compilation and quality control of regional seismic records of nuclear explosions recorded on Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory stations ELK, KNB, LAC, and MNV, known collectively as the Livermore National Network (LNN) (Figure 1). LNN was established in the early 1960s for the primary purpose of monitoring underground nuclear testing at the former Nevada Test Site (NTS), now known as the Nevada Nuclear Security Site (NNSS) following the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT). LNN consisted initially of short-period vertical component Benioff’s recorded on film located at Mina, NV (MNV) and Kanab, Utah (KNB). LNN added two additional stations at Landers, CA (LAC) and Elko, NV (ELK) in 1967 and upgraded equipment to broadband seismometers recorded on frequency modulation (FM) tapes from 1967-1979, followed by digital recordings after 1979 (Jarpe, 1989). The digital recordings were on a variety of now obsolete media, including 9-track, Exabyte, and DAT tapes. Jarpe (1989) describes the seismic station instrumentation details over the period of deployment. LNN recorded valuable non-repeatable unique data of several hundreds of nuclear explosions at NNSS, as well as earthquakes and chemical and mining explosions (Walter, 2020). The details of these nuclear tests are provided in the Department of Energy Report NV-209 Rev 16 (DOE, 2015).

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2023

Material Property Determinations for Rock Valley Legacy Samples in Support of Source Physics Experiment

The Source Physics Experiment (SPE) is a long-term NNSA research and development effort designed to improve nonproliferation verification and monitoring capabilities. The overarching goals of the SPE program are to improve understanding of prompt signals and physical signatures that develop from underground chemical explosions and associated modeling capabilities. Our work focuses on a primary factor controlling chemical explosion induced signals and signatures: the material properties of the rocks in which the chemical explosion takes place. This document reports on material property determinations of legacy core USGS Test Well F and outcrop analogs for the subsurface stratigraphy for the third phase of SPE in the Rock Valley (RV) area of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The objective of this work is to establish a baseline set of lithologic descriptions and material properties expected prior to observatory borehole drilling in support of the SPE-RVDC (Rock Valley Direct Comparison) experiment. We determine for each rock type the compressional failure envelope, elastic properties as a function of stress (bulk modulus versus mean stress, shear modulus versus shear stress, Young’s modulus versus axial stress and Poisson’s ratio versus axial stress), indirect tensile strength, and porosity. Geologic characterization, both at the core-scale and microscale, provides context for using the data in modeling efforts and to inform interpretations for the material properties testing.

36 MATERIALS SCIENCE↗
DOE OSTI2020

Fallout Cloud Regimes

The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Energy (DOE), and other organizations maintain operational nuclear explosion and atmospheric dispersion models to provide critical guidance on the expected effects of an accidental or deliberate explosion of a nuclear weapon (in this paper simply referred to as “device”). To be effective, these models must represent, as accurately as possible, the complex interactions of the blast, fire, and residual radiological hazards with the environment and population. One hundred atmospheric nuclear tests that form the basis for many models were conducted at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) (now referred to as the Nevada Nuclear Security Site, NNSS) in a dry desert environment. Other environments should be studied, but have less data available and are beyond the scope of the work presented in this paper. The debris clouds produced by the NTS tests, frequently called “mushroom clouds,” are familiar, with common structural elements such as a buoyant cap connected to a skirt of raised dust at the desert surface by a thin, dirt-filled stem. The film scanning project at LLNL has investigated historical film records of nuclear weapons tests. Here, we summarize findings showing that the mushroom cloud behavior for historic U.S. tests conducted in Nevada, has similar characteristics based on the distance of the device from the ground surface or Height of Burst (HOB), scaled by the energy release, or yield, of the device. This scaled height is referred to as the scaled-height-of-burst (SHOB). The findings discussed below show that mushroom clouds look and behave similarly when detonated at the same SHOB. The amount of residual radiation that is produced by a nuclear detonation is proportional to the yield. But, the amount of that residual radiation that actually becomes local fallout is strongly dependent on the SHOB and the type of surface over which the detonation occurs. In order to develop a more comprehensive model that predicts the fraction of the residual radiation that becomes local fallout, it is convenient to define a series of regimes based on SHOB values in which all detonations that occur within a given regime can be modeled using the same algorithms. The purpose of this paper is to provide a framework for defining different regimes, and, in a qualitative way, a basic understanding of the fundamental characteristics of each of these regimes.

45 MILITARY TECHNOLOGY, WEAPONRY, AND NATIONAL DEF↗
DOE OSTI2024

A multi-Physics Experiment for Low-Yield Nuclear Explosion Monitoring

A series of multi-physics experiments, referred to as Physics Experiment 1 (PE1) is underway at the United States’ Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The PE1 series includes detonations of three underground chemical explosions in P-tunnel, with fully coupled (PE1 A), partially decoupled (PE1 D L ), and fully decoupled (PE1 B) emplacements. Canisters with gas tracers are imbedded in the explosives, and the tracers are released when the canister is destroyed by the detonation. A dedicated electromagnetic (EM) experiment (EMX) generates well-characterized EM signals at an underground location near the chemical explosive experiments. A series of atmospheric experiments (METEX, REACT, and METREX) release smoke and radioactive tracers around Aqueduct Mesa to test gas transport in complex topography. Each of the chemical explosive experiments includes a network of sensors to record seismic, acoustic, and electromagnetic waves, measurement of atmospheric conditions, and air sample collection for measurement of tracer concentration. EMX records EM signals underground and on the surface of Aqueduct Mesa. METEX, REACT, and METREX include measurement of atmospheric condition, as well as tracking smoke releases. REACT and METREX add low-level radioactive gas tracers to the atmospheric releases.

58 GEOSCIENCES↗
DOE OSTI2025

An Architectural Survey of the U12G Tunnel Historic District, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), in conjunction with the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Field Office (NNSA/NFO), proposes to demolish six buildings and three storage areas located at the U12g Tunnel portal area in Area 12 of the Nevada National Security Site (NNSS). The buildings are 12-358 (Signal Vault); 12-201800 (Storage Quonset Hut); 12-202555 (Walker Shack); 12-868 (Pipe Assembly); 12-B100933 (Electrical Shop); 12-B100944 (Conference Room); and Storage Area 1; Storage Area 2; and Storage Area 3. The buildings and storage areas were selected for demolition as part of the DOE’s Real Property Efficiency Plan to reduce the footprint of unused and non-operational facilities on the NNSS. They are all vacant and have no proposed uses for current or upcoming NNSS missions. Demolition activities constitute an undertaking subject to review under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) (54 United States Code [USC] § 306101) and its implementing regulations, 36 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 800. Identification efforts began with resources proposed for demolition in federal Fiscal Year (FY) 23. Four buildings were proposed to be demolished in FY23 (12-358, 12-868, 12-201800, and 12-202555). These buildings and the U12g Tunnel Historic District (SHPO No. D444) were recorded in Identification, Evaluation, and Finding of Adverse Effect for the Proposed Demolition of Five Buildings in Area 12, Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (Menocal et al. 2023). Identification efforts indicated three buildings (12-358, 12-201800, and 12-868) supported nuclear testing in the U12g Tunnel. The fourth building post-dated the use of U12g Tunnel for nuclear testing activities. The report recommended that three of the four buildings (12-358, 12-201800, 12-868) and the U12g Tunnel Historic District may be eligible for the National Register of Historic Places (NRHP). The report also found that the undertaking would have an adverse effect on the three buildings and on the historic district. The Nevada State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) concurred with the report’s findings (Reed 2023). The U12g Tunnel was determined eligible as a historic district under the Secretary of the Interior’s (SOI) Significance Criterion A, at the local level, in the context of the Cold War as an underground testing environment for the development of nuclear weapons and to assess the effects of a nuclear explosion on materials and equipment with a period of significance from 1959 to 1971. It was also determined eligible under Significance Criterion C for embodying the distinctive characters of a horizontal tunnel complex used for nuclear testing and as a significant and distinguishable entity. The three buildings were determined to be contributing elements of the district. The undertaking was expanded with the addition of two buildings and three storage areas proposed to be demolished and located within U12g Tunnel Historic District in FY24. These five resources (12-B100933, 12-B100944, and Storage Areas 1, 2, and 3) were recorded in Supplemental Identification, Evaluation, and Finding of Effect for Additional Proposed Demolition at U12g Tunnel, Area 12, Nevada national Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (Brannan et al. 2024). Identification efforts indicated that the two buildings and Storage Area 1 supported nuclear testing in the U12g Tunnel. Storage Area 1 and Storage Area 2 post-dated the nuclear testing activities at U12g Tunnel and were not recommended as contributing elements to the district. The report also found that the undertaking would have an adverse effect on the newly identified buildings and one storage area and on the historic district. The SHPO concurred that the expanded undertaking would result in adverse effects to historic properties (Reed 2025). To resolve these adverse effects, NNSA/NFO, in consultation with the SHPO, is following standard mitigation as stipulated in the 2024 Programmatic Agreement DE-GM58-22NA25554 Among the U.S. Department of Energy and the Nevada State Historic Preservation Officer and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation Concerning the Protection of Historic Properties on the Nevada National Security Site, Nye County, Nevada (hereafter referred to as the NNSS PA). The standard mitigation measures are outlined in Appendix D of the NNSS PA. As such, this architectural survey has been prepared in accordance with Appendix D of the NNSS PA and follows the report format outlined in Appendix F. It includes a historic context that describes the district’s origin, history, and support functions, its significance in the context of nuclear testing on the NNSS, and identifies contributing and non-contributing elements within the district. The report is accompanied by Architectural Resource Assessment (ARA) forms for individual resources and a Historic District Resource Assessment (HDRA) for the U12g Tunnel Historic District. In total, this architectural report identified 32 primary resources within the district boundary. Six of the primary resources were previously identified as contributing elements. An additional 17 resources are recommended as contributing elements to the district for a total of 23 contributing elements. The other nine resources identified are recommended as non-contributing elements to the district.

12-201800↗
DOE OSTI2020

Project 57 Air Monitoring Report: (Jan 1 - Dec 31 2018)

During the late 1950s, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) (now the U.S. Department of Energy [DOE]) conducted a series of safety experiments to determine if a nuclear device subjected to a large conventional explosives detonation would result in a nuclear yield. The AEC obtained temporary use of a large portion of western Emigrant Valley from the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) for one of these experiments: Project 57. Following the Project 57 safety experiment, the AEC fenced the contaminated area and returned control of the surrounding land to the DOD. Emigrant Valley is part of the Nevada Test and Training Range (NTTR). For safety and security reasons, access to the NTTR is controlled using both physical (i.e., fences) and administrative (e.g., signs and postings) controls. Therefore, the public cannot access the Project 57 site and there are no known human receptors that routinely access the site. Project 57 was detonated on April 24, 1957, in Emigrant Valley approximately 13 mi (21 km) northeast of the north end of Yucca Flat. This test was undertaken to develop: (1) a means of estimating immediate distribution and long-term redistribution of plutonium dispersed during a nonnuclear detonation; (2) biomedical evaluation techniques for use in likely plutonium-laden environments; (3) methods of decontaminating ground areas, pavements, and building materials; and (4) alpha survey instruments and field monitoring procedures to promptly estimate contaminant deposition. Although the test did not result in the fission of nuclear materials, it did disseminate plutonium across the ground surface. Various radiological surveys have been performed in the area since Project 57 was conducted. The AEC delineated the area containing radioactive material based on radioactivity surveys performed shortly after the test was conducted. A designated Contamination Area (CA), marked by a fence, was established later. The distribution of americium-241 (Am-241) in the area was determined again in a 1997 flyover, which showed Am-241 ranging from as much as 70,000 counts per second (cps) at ground zero to background (<70 cps). This survey also documented Am-241 radioactivity on the ground surface beyond the east side CA fence at levels of up to 150 cps. In 2007, the DOE expanded the CA by posting “Contamination Area” signs 200 ft to 400 ft (60 m to 120 m) beyond the original fence, which formed a new CA boundary.

54 ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES↗