TATB Thermal Decomposition: An Improved Kinetic Model for Explosive Safety Analysis
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Propellant and explosive safety activities - management planning, static electricity and lightning hazards, and sensitivity measurement
This vocabulary listing characterizes the contents of over 10,000 documents of the NASA Aerospace Safety Research and Data Institute's (ASRDI) safety engineering collection. The ASRDI collection is now one of the series accessible on the NASA RECON data base. There are approximately 6,300 postable terms that describe literature in the areas of cryogenic fluid safety, specifically hydrogen, oxygen, liquified natural gas; fire and explosion technology; and the mechanics of structural failure. To facilitate the proper selection of information nonpostable, related and array terms have been included in this listing.
Space launch companies are actively developing, or in some cases have already developed, new vehicles that use large quantities of liquid oxygen (LOX) and liquid natural gas (LNG) propellants. This propellant mixture currently lacks sound/verified LOX/LNG explosive safety standards for use in explosive siting and flight safety analysis. In the U.S., multiple government and commercial organizations have conducted limited testing, or are preparing to conduct tests, intended to provide a sound technical basis for explosive standards applicable to space launch vehicle ground and flight operations. The limited testing and analysis conducted so far indicates the potential to produce extremely energetic explosions due to the miscibility of LOX/LNG (methane), a unique feature relative to previously used propellant mixtures such as hydrogen/oxygen or kerosene/oxygen. MOX is a homogenous mixture of methane and oxygen that is possible because of methane’s 100% miscibility in LOX. Preliminary testing by N2L, Inc. described in this paper shows that it is possible to form MOX with a variety of mixing methods, and that MOX is a sensitive high explosive capable of producing overpressures greater than comparable masses of C-4. The limited amount and quality of large-scale LOX/LNG explosive test data, and the potential formation of high-explosive MOX, create significant unknowns in the determination of hazard areas (cleared of the public) for ground operations (such as a static fire test) and flights of launch vehicles with LOX/LNG propellant. This paper will review the methods used by NASA to develop and validate the LOX/LH2 blast model using large-scale explosive test programs such as Project PYRO, the Hydrogen-Oxygen Vertical Impact (HOVI), and the Large-Scale Hydrogen-Oxygen Explosion (LSHOE) tests. This paper will describe how the same process was used to prepare an interim LOX/LNG blast model that applies to various LV failure scenarios and conservatively accounts for potential MOX formation. This paper also summarizes past and future testing and modeling efforts funded by a consortium of NASA, the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the US Space Force (USSF). These test programs should be concluded within the next 3 years and are intended to provide empirical data for model verification and validation.
Space launch companies are actively developing, or in some cases have already developed, new vehicles that use large quantities of liquid oxygen (LOX) and liquid natural gas (LNG) propellants. This propellant mixture currently lacks sound/verified explosive safety standards for use in explosive siting and flight safety analysis. In the U.S., multiple government and commercial organizations have conducted limited testing, or are preparing to conduct tests, intended to provide a sound technical basis for LOX/LNG explosive standards applicable to space launch vehicle ground and flight operations. The limited testing and analysis conducted so far indicates the potential to produce extremely energetic explosions due to the miscibility of LOX/LNG (methane), a unique feature relative to previously used propellant mixtures such as hydrogen/oxygen or kerosene/oxygen. MOX is a homogenous mixture of methane and oxygen that is possible because of methane’s 100% miscibility in LOX. Preliminary testing by N2L, Inc. described in this paper shows that it is possible to form MOX with a variety of mixing methods, and that MOX is a sensitive high explosive capable of producing overpressures greater than comparable masses of C-4. The limited amount and quality of large-scale LOX/LNG explosive test data, and the potential formation of high-explosive MOX, create significant unknowns in the determination of hazard areas (cleared of the public) for ground operations (such as a static fire test) and flights of launch vehicles with LOX/LNG propellant. This paper will review the methods used by NASA to develop and validate the LOX/LH2 blast model using large-scale explosive test programs such as Project PYRO, the Hydrogen-Oxygen Vertical Impact (HOVI), and the Large-Scale Hydrogen-Oxygen Explosion (LSHOE) tests. This paper will describe how the same process was used to prepare an interim LOX/LNG blast model that applies to various LV failure scenarios and conservatively accounts for potential MOX formation. This paper also summarizes past and future testing and modeling efforts funded by a consortium of NASA, the US Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and the US Space Force (USSF). These test programs should be concluded within the next 3 years and are intended to provide empirical data for model verification and validation.
This comprehensive analysis aimed to evaluate the measurement capability of the AMPTEC 630ES Explosive Safety Igniter Tester, a critical tool for organizations engaged in the measurement of High Explosive components and related Electro-Explosive devices. With a history of notable calibration issues involving specific model numbers, the Metrology Program and Calibration Laboratory (MPCL) initiated an extensive Measurement System Analysis. The analysis's primary focus was to thoroughly quantify the various sources of measurement variability intrinsic to the calibration process. It centered on two pivotal aspects: repeatability (the variation observed when the same operator uses the same instrument) and reproducibility (the variation seen when different operators perform measurements). A secondary objective was to determine whether equipment usage and age had any impact on the instrument's performance.
NASA's Constellation Program plan currently calls for the replacement of the Space Shuttle with the ARES I & V spacecraft and booster vehicles to send astronauts to the moon and beyond. Part of the ARES spacecraft is the Orion Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV), which includes the Crew Module (CM) and Service Module (SM). The Orion CM's main propulsion system and supplies are provided by the SM. The SM is to be processed off line and moved to the Vehicle Assembly Building (V AB) for stacking to the first stage booster motors prior to ARES move to the launch pad. The new Constellation Program philosophy to process in this manner has created a major task for the KSC infrastructure in that conventional QD calculations are no longer viable because of the location of surrounding facilities near the VAB and the Multi Purpose Processing Facility (MPPF), where the SM will be serviced with nearly 18,000 pounds of hypergolic propellants. The Multi-Payload Processing Facility (MPPF) complex, constructed by NASA in 1994, is located just off E Avenue south of the Operations and Checkout (O&C) building in the Kennedy Space Center industrial area. The MPPF includes a high bay and a low bay. The MPPF high bay is 40.2 m (132 ft) long x 18.9 m (60 ft) wide with a ceiling height of 18.9 m (62 ft). The low bay is a 10.4 m (34 ft) long x 10.4 m (34 ft) wide processing area and has a ceiling height of6.1 m (20 ft). The MPPF is currently used to process non-hazardous payloads. Engineering Analysis Inc. (EAI), under contract with ASRC Aerospace, Inc. in conjunction with the Explosive Safety Office, NASA, Kennedy Space Center (KSC), has carried out an analysis of the effects of explosions at KSC in or near various facilities produced by the spontaneous ignition ofhypergolic fuel stored in the CEV SM. The facilities considered included (1) Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) (2) Multi-Payload Processing Facility (MPPF) (3) Canister Rotation Facility (CRF) Subsequent discussion deals with the MPPF analysis. Figure 1 provides a view of the MPPF from the northwest. An interior view ofthe facility is shown in Figure 2. The study was concerned with both blast hazards and hazardous fragments which exceed existing safety standards, as described in Section 2.0. The analysis included both blast and fragmentation effects and was divided into three parts as follows: (1) blast (2) primary fragmentation (3) secondary fragmentation Blast effects are summarized in Section 3.0, primary fragmentation in Section 4.0, and secondary fragmentation (internal and external) in Section 5.0. Conclusions are provided in Section 6.0, while references cited are included in Section 7.0. A more detailed description of the entire study is available in a separate document.
In the Propellant Development and Characterization Subcommittee (PDCS) meeting, topics included: the analysis, characterization, and processing of propellants and propellant ingredients; chemical reactivity; liquid propellants; test methods; rheology; surveillance and aging; and process engineering. In the Safety and Environmental Protection Subcommittee (S&EPS) meeting, topics covered included: hydrazine propellant vapor detection methods; toxicity of propellants and propellants; explosives safety; atmospheric modeling and risk assessment of toxic releases; reclamation, disposal, and demilitarization methods; and remediation of explosives or propellant contaminated sites.
Chemistry laboratory safety manual outlines safe practices for handling hazardous chemicals and chemistry laboratory equipment. Included are discussions of chemical hazards relating to fire, health, explosion, safety equipment and procedures for certain laboratory techniques and manipulations involving glassware, vacuum equipment, acids, bases, and volatile solvents.
An overview is presented of the specific system safety activities required to support the ground support technology program associated with the design of an aerospace plane. Safe zones must be assessed to ensure that explosive safety requirements are attained to protect the vehicle, personnel, and support and operational facilities. Attention is given to the specific and unique design requirements connected with the utilization of cryogenic fuels as they apply to the design and development of an aerospace plane.
While numerous studies have focused on the ignition of explosives occurring in high velocity impact and the associated shock-to-detonation transition, there has been growing interest in developing computational models focused on low-velocity impact regimes. A predictive low-velocity impact ignition model will be important for analyzing high explosive safety and potential accident scenarios. This work introduces a novel ignition model based on the concept of thermally interacting hot spots to simulate low velocity impacted heterogeneous explosives where observed ignition times are on the order of milliseconds. The model asserts that relevant hot spots are micron-sized, the typical separation between neighboring hot spots is on the order of a hundred microns, and that neighbors interact thermally through heat conduction across the interstitial region between them. To achieve tractable numerical solutions, hot spots are assumed to form a periodic array as opposed to the highly irregular positioning in an actual explosive. This idealization allows a single two hotspot system to characterize the ignition process. Consequently, the model is referred to as the two hot spot Frank-Kamenetskii ignition model. In the present study, hot spots are modeled as constant heat sources terms, but this can be extended to include grain-scale phenomena like frictional heating of micron-sized growing cracks that are confined under high pressure. Because the micron-sized features are below the scale that can be efficiently resolved at a systems level, an efficient subscale scheme based on the Method of Weighted Residuals (MWR) is used to efficiently solve the equations. In conclusion, we carry out numerical examples and analytic predictions illustrating the accuracy and the functioning of the model.
Study aimed at improving safety of explosive storage examined relationship between small-scale experiments and actual explosions. Object of study to develop scaling laws that eliminate need for full-scale explosion tests and reduce need for small-scale tests. Results of study make it possible to predict explosive behavior from small tests and numerical simulation.
Here, in this study, we established an improved method for drop-hammer impact testing of small quantities of high explosives (10 mg). We performed about seven hundred impact tests under various experimental conditions (e.g., sandpaper vs bare anvil, different sample masses, drop-weights, and striker diameters) to determine an optimal set of conditions and reaction detection methods (e.g., gas analysis, video, and sound recordings) that give the most statistically reliable results with 10 mg samples. We used both Frequentist and Bayesian statistical approaches to compare estimates of the drop height (DH50) that initiates a reaction 50% of the time, and to quantify the associated uncertainty. Gas analysis proved to be the most reliable reaction detection method, showing unambiguous rises in HE decomposition products (e.g., CO 2 ) even when the other indicators (e.g., sound, video) were inconclusive. The impact tests performed with a bare anvil showed much better reproducibility than those conducted with sandpaper, reducing the largest uncertainty observed in the data sets by a factor of 1.7. The DH 50 values obtained from three different sample masses (10, 20, and 35 mg) fell within the uncertainties of the measurements. We demonstrated the improved procedure (i.e., 10-mg samples, gas analysis, bare anvil, and Bayesian approach) on a variety of PETN samples having different surface areas and thermal histories.
Definition, mechanism, and examples of explosions, deflagrations, and detonations in relation to explosive and propellant safety
The use of spirally wound lithium-thionyl chloride (Li-SOCl2) cells is currently limited because of their hazardous behavior. Safety hazards have ranged from mild venting of toxic materials to violent explosions and fires. These incidents may be related to both user- and manufacturer-induced causes. Many explanations have been offered to explain the unsafe behavior of the cells under operating and abuse conditions. Explanations fall into two categories: (1) thermal mechanisms, and (2) chemical mechanisms. However, it is quite difficult to separate the two. Both may be responsible for cell venting or explosion. Some safety problems encountered with these cells also may be due to design deficiencies and ineffective quality control during cell fabrication. A well-coordinated basic and applied research program is needed to develop safe Li-SOCl2 cells. Recommendations include: (1) learnig more about Li-SOL2 cell chemistry; (2) modeling cell and battery behavior; (3) optimizing cell design for safety and performance, (4) implementing quality control procedures; and (5) educating users.
The 2023 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) annual explosives inventory was executed from May 18, 2023 to September 27, 2023 and was verified for accuracy effective September 28, 2023 following the LLNL Explosive Materials Inventory Plan. This year’s annual inventory includes changes incorporated based on the Department of Energy (DOE) Office of Inspector General (OIG) Audit Report DOE-OIG-20-50, The Department of Energy’s Storage and Disposition of Explosives Material at Selected Sites, dated July of 2020. Based on the associated recommendations, explosives at DOE and National Nuclear Safety Administration (NNSA) sites are considered "sensitive personal property" and applicable inventories must comply with 41 CFR 109, Personal Property Management. This regulation adds additional stipulations which require the annual inventory to include accountability of the total site inventory. In addition, the inventory must be performed by personnel other than the property owner, or alternatively must include independent verification. The development of the inventory plan was agreed to by the LLNL Explosives Safety Committee in conjunction with the LLNL Property and Business Division Leader. The LLNL Explosive Materials Inventory Plan was reviewed and approved by the DOE Explosives Safety Committee Chair on May 17, 2023 and by the NNSA Property Management Office on May 25, 2023.
The mechanisms of detonation transfer across hermetically sealed interfaces created by necessary interruptions in high explosive trains, such as at detonators to explosive columns, field joints in explosive columns, and components of munitions fuse trains are demostrated. Reliability of detonation transfer is limited by minimizing explosive quantities, the use of intensitive explosives for safety, and requirements to propagate across gaps and angles dictated by installation and production restraints. The major detonation transfer variables studied were: explosive quanity, sensitivity, and thickness, and the separation distances between donor and acceptor explosives.
Testing of the initial design for the shielding to be added to the Promess servo press installed in TA9 0032 was completed on April 28, 2026. This shielding design did not provide satisfactory protection to either workers or equipment within the bay when tested at an explosive quantity of 82.5g. This memo details the design, testing method, and results of the test.