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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
NASA NTRS2012

Common Cause Failures and Ultra Reliability

A common cause failure occurs when several failures have the same origin. Common cause failures are either common event failures, where the cause is a single external event, or common mode failures, where two systems fail in the same way for the same reason. Common mode failures can occur at different times because of a design defect or a repeated external event. Common event failures reduce the reliability of on-line redundant systems but not of systems using off-line spare parts. Common mode failures reduce the dependability of systems using off-line spare parts and on-line redundancy.

reliability↗
NASA NTRS1986

Vortex creep and the internal temperature of neutron stars Timing noise in pulsars

Vortex creep theory is used to construct model noise power spectra for three physically distinct types of events which might give rise to pulsar timing noise. These are 'pure' events, in which vortex unpinning is the source of the initial frequency jump; 'mixed' events, in which the initial frequency jump is produced by some physical process other than vortex unpinning but leads to the unpinning of some vortices; and 'external' events, in which the initial frequency jumps responsible for noise do not involve any vortex unpinning. For the first two types of events, it is found that relaxation processes in the region responsible for the noise will give rise to structure in the observed power spectra, while for external events, the resulting noise spectra will not be influenced by vortex creep. The theoretical results are compared with observed power spectra for 25 pulsars. The absence of structure in the observed power spectra of the Crab and Vela pulsars within the range of time scales which characterize their postglitch behavior indicates that the pinning regions which play a role in postglitch behavior do not experience the small unpinning events leading to timing noise.

Alpar, M. Ali↗
NASA NTRS2024

Discrete Event Simulation-Based Timeline Validation Using R2U2

The Gateway Vehicle Systems Manager (VSM), the top-level software control system in a distributed, hierarchical Autonomous System Management Architecture is, like most modern spacecraft software control systems, heavily data-driven. For example, schedules (timelines) will be developed on the ground and, due to the high degree of autonomy, contain complex procedures involving conditional branching, variable timing, and resource contention resolution. In order to verify that an uploaded timeline will function correctly, it is necessary to explore the feasible set of possible executions. While it is possible to test a timeline using a mission simulation, the complexity of the system and duration of a timeline limits the number of trials and therefore the test coverage. To address this problem, the VSM team is using a discrete event system model that can rapidly generate from a timeline sets of event sequences using Monte Carlo techniques. To achieve rapid and trustworthy checking of the event sequences, we use an offline version of the runtime model checking tool R2U2. This presentation describes the approach the VSM team is using to implement the discrete event simulation and evaluate event sequences using R2U2. The presentation will discuss: 1. Description of the timelines by VSM in the context of VSM operations 2. Expansion of a timeline into a sequence of atomic events 3. Adjustment, in the Monte Carlo environment, of an event sequence to account for uncertainty, external events, and failures 4. Definition of R2U2 input and mission-time linear temporal logic files 5. Generation and use of R2U2 verdict sequences 6. Lessons learned and future work

Verification↗
NASA NTRS1984

ERPS to Monitor Non-conscious Mentation

Event Related Brain Potentials (or ERPs) are extracted from the EEG that can be recorded between a pair of electrodes placed on a person's scalp. The EEG is recorded as a continual fluctuation in voltage. It is the results of the integration of the potential fields generated by a multitude of neuronal ensembles that are active as the brain goes about its business. Within this ongoing signal it is possible to distinguish voltage fluctuations that are triggered in neural structures by the occurrence of specific events. This activity, evoked as it is by an external event, is known as the Evoked, or Event Related, Potential. The ERPs provide a unique opportunity to monitor non-conscious mentation. The inferences that can be based on ERP data are described and the limits of these inferences are emphasized. This, however, will not be an exhaustive review of the use of ERPs in Engineering Psychology. The application, its scope, and its limitations will be illustrated by means of one example. This example is preceded by a brief technical introduction to the methodology used in the study of ERPs. The manner in which ERPs are used to study cognition is described.

Donchin, E.↗
NASA NTRS2018

EoC Study Update to Examine the Cost, Schedule and Technical Changes to NASA Projects

The original National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Explanation of Change (EoC) study was conducted in 2010 to understand the underlying causes of cost and schedule growth. The first study consisted of 25 missions launched from 2000 to 2010 and looked at the events that led to growth. These events were categorized into different bins that were rolled up to quantify whether the growth was due to internal planning, or internal execution, or from external forces and found that the growth was evenly distributed among those three categories. The result of the study presented nine considerations focused at reducing growth due to project external events and internal planning events. Although no one 'magic bullet' consideration was discovered in the previous work, the nine considerations taken as a whole were postulated to help reduce cost and schedule change in future NASA missions. A recent update was conducted that included investigating 8 missions developed since the previous study to determine if the results were different. Cost, schedule, and mass increases were analyzed from the start of Phase B through Preliminary Design Review and Critical Design Review to Launch. As shown in this paper, the results are better with overall cost and schedule growth being reduced. The paper will show a comparison of the previous results to the updated results to show specific reductions and provide an explanation of which recommendations were followed.

growth↗
NASA NTRS2019

High Reliability Requires More than Providing Spares

It is sometimes optimistically hoped that a space life support system can be kept working throughout a long duration mission by repairing failed components, as long as sufficient spares are flown. It is usually assumed that the components have constant known failure rates. Then the needed numbers of spares can be computed to have any particular probability that all failed components can be replaced by available spares. This approach can provide high reliability if its favorable assumptions, including constant known failure rates, are satisfied. Other favorable assumptions are that the failures are statistically independent, repair will be successful without causing further failures, and all failures are due to internal component failures. These assumptions are not usually justified. The failure rates may be estimates that are inadequately verified because of insufficient testing. Failure rates may change due to materials substitutions, manufacturing changes, redesigns to fix failures, and new failures caused by redesigns. Failures that are not statistically independent may result from one common cause, such as a design or manufacturing error or a cascade of cause and effect, possibly caused by an external event such as a power outage. Repair may be unsuccessful or cause damage. Many failures occur at component interfaces or at the overall systems level, not within isolated components. Other failures causes are completely external to the system, due to assembly, maintenance, and operational errors or to unexpected environmental challenges. Replacement with sufficient spares can compensate for expected internal component failures but may not be able to cope with unpredictable design and manufacturing flaws, human errors, and environmental impacts. Reliability estimates based on providing sufficient spares to compensate for expected failures may be far too high. They are essentially upper bounds on reliability that might be approached if many frequent but often unconsidered failure causes can be eliminated.

spares↗
NASA NTRS1985

A model for core formation in the early Earth

Two basic types exogenous models were proposed to account for siderophile and chalcophile element abundances in the Earth's upper mantle. The first model requires that the Earth be depleted in volatiles and that, after a core formation event which extracted the most siderophile elements into the core, additional noble siderophile elements (Pt, Ir, Au) were added as a late veneer and mixed into the mantle. The second model postulates a reduced Earth with approximately CI elemental abundances in which a primary core forming event depleted all siderophile elements in the mantle. The plausibility of models which require fine scale mixing of chondritic material into the upper mantle is analyzed. Mixing in liquids is more efficient, but large degrees of silicate partial melting will facilitate the separation of magma from residual solids. Any external events affecting the upper mantle of the Earth should also be evident in the Moon; but siderophile and chalcophile element abundance patterns inferred for the mantles of the Earth and Moon differ. There appear to be significant physical difficulties associated with chondritic veneer models.

Jones, J. H.↗
NASA NTRS2011

Shuttle Risk Progression: Use of the Shuttle Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) to Show Reliability Growth

It is important to the Space Shuttle Program (SSP), as well as future manned spaceflight programs, to understand the early mission risk and progression of risk as the program gains insights into the integrated vehicle through flight. The risk progression is important to the SSP as part of the documentation of lessons learned. The risk progression is important to future programs to understand reliability growth and the first flight risk. This analysis uses the knowledge gained from 30 years of operational flights and the current Shuttle PRA to calculate the risk of Loss of Crew and Vehicle (LOCV) at significant milestones beginning with the first flight. Key flights were evaluated based upon historical events and significant re-designs. The results indicated that the Shuttle risk tends to follow a step function as opposed to following a traditional reliability growth pattern where risk exponentially improves with each flight. In addition, it shows that risk can increase due to trading safety margin for increased performance or due to external events. Due to the risk drivers not being addressed, the risk did not improve appreciably during the first 25 flights. It was only after significant events occurred such as Challenger and Columbia, where the risk drivers were apparent, that risk was significantly improved. In addition, this paper will show that the SSP has reduced the risk of LOCV by almost an order of magnitude. It is easy to look back afte r 30 years and point to risks that are now obvious, however; the key is to use this knowledge to benefit other programs which are in their infancy stages. One lesson learned from the SSP is understanding risk drivers are essential in order to considerably reduce risk. This will enable the new program to focus time and resources on identifying and reducing the significant risks. A comprehensive PRA, similar to that of the Shuttle PRA, is an effective tool quantifying risk drivers if support from all of the stakeholders is given.

Hamlin, Teri L.↗
NASA NTRS1981

Reliability analysis of the F-8 digital fly-by-wire system

The F-8 Digital Fly-by-Wire (DFBW) flight test program intended to provide the technology for advanced control systems, giving aircraft enhanced performance and operational capability is addressed. A detailed analysis of the experimental system was performed to estimated the probabilities of two significant safety critical events: (1) loss of primary flight control function, causing reversion to the analog bypass system; and (2) loss of the aircraft due to failure of the electronic flight control system. The analysis covers appraisal of risks due to random equipment failure, generic faults in design of the system or its software, and induced failure due to external events. A unique diagrammatic technique was developed which details the combinatorial reliability equations for the entire system, promotes understanding of system failure characteristics, and identifies the most likely failure modes. The technique provides a systematic method of applying basic probability equations and is augmented by a computer program written in a modular fashion that duplicates the structure of these equations.

Brock, L. D.↗
NASA NTRS2021

Lila: Optimal Dispatching in Probabilistic Temporal Networks using Monte Carlo Tree Search

Executing a Probabilistic Simple Temporal Network (PSTN) amounts at scheduling, i.e. \textit{dispatch}, a set of events under time uncertainty. This constitutes a NP-hard online optimization problem. The right execution time must be dynamically assigned to each event of the PSTN such that the temporal constraints are met, whereas activity durations are progressively observed as the execution unfolds. We propose a dispatching algorithm based on Monte Carlo Tree Search, called Lila, with the following characteristics: (i) it is an anytime algorithm, both offline and online, proven asymptotically optimal; (ii) it returns the current probability of success, either before or at any moment during operations; (iii) it handles any possible continuous or discrete, even non-parametric, probability distributions, as well as inter-dependencies between random variables, exogenous and endogenous uncertainty; and (iv) can be easily extended to handle probabilistic external events, PSTNs with resources, PSTNs with cutoff times and precondition chains, etc. Lila is universal in the sense that it can handle any dispatching protocol, simply by specifying it to the algorithm. It has the unlimited flexibility offered by the simulation paradigm, whilst it asymptotically converges to optimal decisions and/or robustness approximations.

Chien, Steve A.↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Common Cause Failures Dominate and Defeat Redundancy

Common cause failures occur when several malfunctions are produced by a single event or process. They are especially damaging when they eliminate an entire set of redundant systems and disable their intended function. Redundancy is used when the individual system failure probability is unacceptably high. Redundancy can improve the overall system failure probability if the failures are independent, but the reliability gain is limited if there are dependent failures having a common cause. No amount of redundancy can reduce the total failure probability below the common cause failure probability. Common cause failures defeat redundancy. Systems with high reliability requirements often use extensive redundancy. These highly redundant systems rarely fail unless all the redundant components providing a particular function fail. Complete failures of such highly redundant systems are then usually common cause failures. Common cause failures are prevalent in highly redundant, high reliability systems. Common cause failures dominate redundancy. Redundant systems may fail due to specification, design, manufacturing, operations, or maintenance problems that disable all the identical redundant systems. Common cause failures typically account for one tenth of all failures. If the failure probability is relatively low and common cause failures are significant, adding more than two or three redundant identical units usually gives little added reliability improvement. Common cause failures can be reduced by using diverse components with different technologies and manufacturers, by separating and shielding subsystems, and by avoiding shared control, power, or location. External events and shared vulnerabilities may still cause common cause failures.

common cause failures↗
NASA NTRSDate not supplied

Common Cause Failures Dominate and Defeat Redundancy

Common cause failures occur when several malfunctions are produced by a single event or process. They are especially damaging when they eliminate an entire set of redundant systems and disable their intended function. Redundancy is used when the individual system failure probability is unacceptably high. Redundancy can improve the overall system failure probability if the failures are independent, but the reliability gain is limited if there are dependent failures having a common cause. No amount of redundancy can reduce the total failure probability below the common cause failure probability. Common cause failures defeat redundancy. Systems with high reliability requirements often use extensive redundancy. These highly redundant systems rarely fail unless all the redundant components providing a particular function fail. Complete failures of such highly redundant systems are then usually common cause failures. Common cause failures are prevalent in highly redundant, high reliability systems. Common cause failures dominate redundancy. Redundant systems may fail due to specification, design, manufacturing, operations, or maintenance problems that disable all the identical redundant systems. Common cause failures typically account for one tenth of all failures. If the failure probability is relatively low and common cause failures are significant, adding more than two or three redundant identical units usually gives little added reliability improvement. Common cause failures can be reduced by using diverse components with different technologies and manufacturers, by separating and shielding subsystems, and by avoiding shared control, power, or location. External events and shared vulnerabilities may still cause common cause failures.

common cause failures↗
NASA NTRS1987

Scheduling real-time, periodic jobs using imprecise results

A process is called a monotone process if the accuracy of its intermediate results is non-decreasing as more time is spent to obtain the result. The result produced by a monotone process upon its normal termination is the desired result; the error in this result is zero. External events such as timeouts or crashes may cause the process to terminate prematurely. If the intermediate result produced by the process upon its premature termination is saved and made available, the application may still find the result unusable and, hence, acceptable; such a result is said to be an imprecise one. The error in an imprecise result is nonzero. The problem of scheduling periodic jobs to meet deadlines on a system that provides the necessary programming language primitives and run-time support for processes to return imprecise results is discussed. This problem differs from the traditional scheduling problems since the scheduler may choose to terminate a task before it is completed, causing it to produce an acceptable but imprecise result. Consequently, the amounts of processor time assigned to tasks in a valid schedule can be less than the amounts of time required to complete the tasks. A meaningful formulation of this problem taking into account the quality of the overall result is discussed. Three algorithms for scheduling jobs for which the effects of errors in results produced in different periods are not cumulative are described, and their relative merits are evaluated.

Liu, Jane W. S.↗
NASA NTRS1991

Report on the formal specification and partial verification of the VIPER microprocessor

The VIPER microprocessor chip is partitioned into four levels of abstractions. At the highest level, VIPER is described with decreasingly abstract sets of functions in LCF-LSM. At the lowest level are the gate-level models in proprietary CAD languages. The block-level and gate-level specifications are also given in the ELLA simulation language. Among VIPER's deficiencies are the fact that there is no notion of external events in the top-level specification, and it is impossible to use the top-level specifications to prove abstract properties of programs running on VIPER computers. There is no complete proof that the gate-level specifications implement the top-level specifications. Cohn's proof that the major-state machine correctly implements the top-level specifications has no formal connection with any of the other proof attempts. None of the latter address resetting the machine, memory timeout, forced error, or single step modes.

Brock, Bishop↗
NASA NTRS1991

NASA TileWorld manual (system version 2.2)

The commands are documented of the NASA TileWorld simulator, as well as providing information about how to run it and extend it. The simulator, implemented in Common Lisp with Common Windows, encodes a particular range in a spectrum of domains, for controllable research experiments. TileWorld consists of a two dimensional grid of cells, a set of polygonal tiles, and a single agent which can grasp and move tiles. In addition to agent executable actions, there is an external event over which the agent has not control; this event correspond to a 'gust of wind'.

Philips, Andrew B.↗
NASA NTRS1993

Signal detection theory and methods for evaluating human performance in decision tasks

Signal Detection Theory (SDT) can be used to assess decision making performance in tasks that are not commonly thought of as perceptual. SDT takes into account both the sensitivity and biases in responding when explaining the detection of external events. In the standard SDT tasks, stimuli are selected in order to reveal the sensory capabilities of the observer. SDT can also be used to describe performance when decisions must be made as to the classification of easily and reliably sensed stimuli. Numbers are stimuli that are minimally affected by sensory processing and can belong to meaningful categories that overlap. Multiple studies have shown that the task of categorizing numbers from overlapping normal distributions produces performance predictable by SDT. These findings are particularly interesting in view of the similarity between the task of the categorizing numbers and that of determining the status of a mechanical system based on numerical values that represent sensor readings. Examples of the use of SDT to evaluate performance in decision tasks are reviewed. The methods and assumptions of SDT are shown to be effective in the measurement, evaluation, and prediction of human performance in such tasks.

Obrien, Kevin↗
NASA NTRS1994

Overview on METEOSAT geometrical image data processing

Digital Images acquired from the geostationary METEOSAT satellites are processed and disseminated at ESA's European Space Operations Centre in Darmstadt, Germany. Their scientific value is mainly dependent on their radiometric quality and geometric stability. This paper will give an overview on the image processing activities performed at ESOC, concentrating on the geometrical restoration and quality evaluation. The performance of the rectification process for the various satellites over the past years will be presented and the impacts of external events as for instance the Pinatubo eruption in 1991 will be explained. Special developments both in hard and software, necessary to cope with demanding tasks as new image resampling or to correct for spacecraft anomalies, are presented as well. The rotating lens of MET-5 causing severe geometrical image distortions is an example for the latter.

Diekmann, Frank J.↗
NASA NTRS1993

Life support technology investment strategies for flight programs: An application of decision analysis

Applied research and technology development (R&TD) is often characterized by uncertainty, risk, and significant delays before tangible returns are obtained. Given the increased awareness of limitations in resources, effective R&TD today needs a method for up-front assessment of competing technologies to help guide technology investment decisions. Such an assessment approach must account for uncertainties in system performance parameters, mission requirements and architectures, and internal and external events influencing a development program. The methodology known as decision analysis has the potential to address these issues. It was evaluated by performing a case study assessment of alternative carbon dioxide removal technologies for NASA's proposed First Lunar Outpost program. An approach was developed that accounts for the uncertainties in each technology's cost and performance parameters as well as programmatic uncertainties such as mission architecture. Life cycle cost savings relative to a baseline, adjusted for the cost of money, was used as a figure of merit to evaluate each of the alternative carbon dioxide removal technology candidates. The methodology was found to provide a consistent decision-making strategy for development of new life support technology. The case study results provided insight that was not possible from more traditional analysis approaches.

Schlater, Nelson J.↗