A new fail operational control moment gyro configuration
Fail operational control moment gyro configuration of four single gimbal gyros, eliminating cross coupling by simple analog steering law
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Fail operational control moment gyro configuration of four single gimbal gyros, eliminating cross coupling by simple analog steering law
A self-learning, sensor fail-operational, control system for the TF30-P-3 afterburning turbofan engine was designed and evaluated. The sensor fail-operational control system includes a digital computer program designed to operate in conjunction with the standard TF30-P-3 bill-of-materials control. Four engine measurements and two compressor face measurements are tested. If any engine measurements are found to have failed, they are replaced by values synthesized from computer-stored information. The control system was evaluated by using a realtime, nonlinear, hybrid computer engine simulation at sea level static condition, at a typical cruise condition, and at several extreme flight conditions. Results indicate that the addition of such a system can improve the reliability of an engine digital control system.
System architectures which incorporate fail operative flight guidance functions within a total integrated avionics complex are described. It is shown that the mixture of flight critical and nonflight critical functions within a common computer complex is an efficient solution to the integration of navigation, guidance, flight control, display, and flight management. Interfacing subsystems retain autonomous capability to avoid vulnerability to total avionics system shutdown as a result of only a few failures.
The design and evaluation are described of a digital turbojet engine control which is capable of sensing catastrophic failures in either the engine rotor speed or the compressor discharge static-pressure signal and is capable of switching control modes to maintain near normal operation. The control program was developed for and tested on a turbojet engine located in a sea-level test stand. The control program is also capable of acquiring all the data that are necessary for the fail-operational control to function.
Attention is given to a redundant strapdown inertial measurement unit for integrated avionics. The system consists of four two-degree-of-freedom turned rotor gyros and four two-degree-of-freedom accelerometers in a skewed and separable semi-octahedral array. The unit is coupled through instrument electronics to two flight computers which compensate sensor errors. The flight computers are interfaced to the microprocessors and process failure detection, isolation, redundancy management and flight control/navigation algorithms. The unit provides dual fail-operational performance and has data processing frequencies consistent with integrated avionics concepts presently planned.
Two basic factors influence the design of highly reliable computer systems: the amount of failures required to be tol erated and the reliability or MTBF required. A computer system designed to tolerate any three single failures in a fail-operational-fail-operational-fail-safe manner for a real-time control application is presented. The design approach uses adaptive majority voting in both hardware and software with a four-level redundant system. Various methods of performing the adaptive majority voting functions were evaluated with the selected approach using a special module termed a voter-comparator switch (VCS). The VCS module allows the computer system to be operated in a variety of redundant modes, depending on the failure tolerance required at any particular time.
The design optimization and simulation effort of the voter-comparator switch (VCS) element are described. The VCS is an adaptive voter element that performs failure detection and reconfiguration function in a computer system designed to tolerate any three single failures in a fail operational fail operational fail safe manner. Detailed logic equations were developed and the design was evaluated and refined using a logic level fault simulator.
The NASA Dryden Flight Research Center is flight testing a triply redundant digital fly-by-wire (DFBW) control system installed in an F-8 aircraft. The full-time, full-authority system performs three-axis flight control computations, including stability and command augmentation, autopilot functions, failure detection and isolation, and self-test functions. Advanced control law experiments include an active flap mode for ride smoothing and maneuver drag reduction. This paper discusses research being conducted on computer synchronization, fault detection, fault isolation, and recovery from transient faults. The F-8 DFBW system has demonstrated immunity from nuisance fault declarations while quickly identifying truly faulty components.
An experimental redundant strap-down inertial measurement unit (RSDIMU) is being developed at NASA-Langley as a link to satisfy safety and reliability considerations in the integrated avionics concept. The unit consists of four two-degrees-of-freedom (TDOF) tuned-rotor gyros, and four TDOF pendulous accelerometers in a skewed and separable semi-octahedron array. The system will be used to examine failure detection and isolation techniques, redundancy management rules, and optimal threshold levels for various flight configurations. The major characteristics of the RSDIMU hardware and software design, and its use as a research tool are described.
An experimental redundant strapdown inertial measurement unit (RSDIMU) is developed as a link to satisfy safety and reliability considerations in the integrated avionics concept. The unit includes four two degree-of-freedom tuned rotor gyros, and four accelerometers in a skewed and separable semioctahedral array. These sensors are coupled to four microprocessors which compensate sensor errors. These microprocessors are interfaced with two flight computers which process failure detection, isolation, redundancy management, and general flight control/navigation algorithms. Since the RSDIMU is a developmental unit, it is imperative that the flight computers provide special visibility and facility in algorithm modification.
A methodology for quantitatively analyzing the reliability of redundant avionics systems, in general, and the dual, separated Redundant Strapdown Inertial Measurement Unit (RSDIMU), in particular, is presented. The RSDIMU is described and a candidate failure detection and isolation system presented. A Markov reliability model is employed. The operational states of the system are defined and the single-step state transition diagrams discussed. Graphical results, showing the impact of major system parameters on the reliability of the RSDIMU system, are presented and discussed.
A vector-based failure detection and isolation technique for a skewed array of two degree-of-freedom inertial sensors is developed. Failure detection is based on comparison of parity equations with a threshold, and isolation is based on comparison of logic variables which are keyed to pass/fail results of the parity test. A multi-level approach to failure detection is used to ensure adequate coverage for the flight control, display, and navigation avionics functions. Sensor error models are introduced to expose the susceptibility of the parity equations to sensor errors and physical separation effects. The algorithm is evaluated in a simulation of a commercial transport operating in a range of light to severe turbulence environments. A bias-jump failure level of 0.2 deg/hr was detected and isolated properly in the light and moderate turbulence environments, but not detected in the extreme turbulence environment. An accelerometer bias-jump failure level of 1.5 milli-g was detected over all turbulence environments. For both types of inertial sensor, hard-over, and null type failures were detected in all environments without incident. The algorithm functioned without false alarm or isolation over all turbulence environments for the runs tested.
A computer system is reported that uses adaptive voting to tolerate failures and operates in a fail-operational, fail-safe manner. Each of four computers is individually connected to one of four external input/output (I/O) busses which interface with external subsystems. Each computer is connected to receive input data and commands from the other three computers and to furnish output data commands to the other three computers. An adaptive control apparatus including a voter-comparator-switch (VCS) is provided for each computer to receive signals from each of the computers and permits adaptive voting among the computers to permit the fail-operational, fail-safe operation.
This paper presents a proposed on-board Telescope Protection Algorithm (TPA) for the Space Infrared Telescope Facility (SIRTF). This TPA consists of hardware and software capable of performing both fail-operational and fail-safe modes of operation. In the fail-operational mode, each ephemeris load and slew/dwell command sequence is checked on-board before use. The slew command monitor detects unallowable slew/dwell commands and transfers control to an algorithm which slews to and maintains a safe telescope orientation while preserving precise attitude determination and control. This fail-operational mode is also given the authority to autonomously restart the slew/dwell sequence at a point beyond the faulty command. The fail-safe system consists of software and hardware which detects impending earth, moon, or sun avoidance zone violations and activates a backup hardware safe hold mode. The subject TPA and relevant sensor complement were designed for the SIRTF mission; however, this system can easily be used as a basis for failure detection and correction in a wide range of other missions.
The suitability of strapdown inertial systems in providing highly reliable short-term navigation for vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) aircraft operating in an intra-urban setting under all-weather conditions was assessed. A preliminary design configuration of a skewed sensor inertial reference system employing a redundancy management concept to achieve fail-operational, fail-operational performance, was developed.
Space shuttle auxiliary propulsion subsystems for attitude control, orbit maneuvering and power supply, discussing design requirements with emphasis on fail-operational and fail-safe criteria
Approach and landing operations during periods of reduced visibility have plagued aircraft pilots since the beginning of aviation. Although techniques are currently available to mitigate some of the visibility conditions, these operations are still ultimately limited by the pilot's ability to "see" required visual landing references (e.g., markings and/or lights of threshold and touchdown zone) and require significant and costly ground infrastructure. Certified Enhanced Flight Vision Systems (EFVS) have shown promise to lift the obscuration veil. They allow the pilot to operate with enhanced vision, in lieu of natural vision, in the visual segment to enable equivalent visual operations (EVO). An aviation standards document was developed with industry and government consensus for using an EFVS for approach, landing, and rollout to a safe taxi speed in visibilities as low as 300 feet runway visual range (RVR). These new standards establish performance, integrity, availability, and safety requirements to operate in this regime without reliance on a pilot's or flight crew's natural vision by use of a fail-operational EFVS. A pilot-in-the-loop high-fidelity motion simulation study was conducted at NASA Langley Research Center to evaluate the operational feasibility, pilot workload, and pilot acceptability of conducting straight-in instrument approaches with published vertical guidance to landing, touchdown, and rollout to a safe taxi speed in visibility as low as 300 feet RVR by use of vision system technologies on a head-up display (HUD) without need or reliance on natural vision. Twelve crews flew various landing and departure scenarios in 1800, 1000, 700, and 300 RVR. This paper details the non-normal results of the study including objective and subjective measures of performance and acceptability. The study validated the operational feasibility of approach and departure operations and success was independent of visibility conditions. Failures were handled within the lateral confines of the runway for all conditions tested. The fail-operational concept with pilot in the loop needs further study.
Flight test results for two sensor fault-tolerant algorithms developed for a redundant strapdown inertial measurement unit are presented. The inertial measurement unit (IMU) consists of four two-degrees-of-freedom gyros and accelerometers mounted on the faces of a semi-octahedron. Fault tolerance is provided by edge vector test and generalized likelihood test algorithms, each of which can provide dual fail-operational capability for the IMU. To detect the wide range of failure magnitudes in inertial sensors, which provide flight crucial information for flight control and navigation, failure detection and isolation are developed in terms of a multi level structure. Threshold compensation techniques, developed to enhance the sensitivity of the failure detection process to navigation level failures, are presented. Four flight tests were conducted in a commercial transport-type environment to compare and determine the performance of the failure detection and isolation methods. Dual flight processors enabled concurrent tests for the algorithms. Failure signals such as hard-over, null, or bias shift, were added to the sensor outputs as simple or multiple failures during the flights. Both algorithms provided timely detection and isolation of flight control level failures. The generalized likelihood test algorithm provided more timely detection of low-level sensor failures, but it produced one false isolation. Both algorithms demonstrated the capability to provide dual fail-operational performance for the skewed array of inertial sensors.