Search NASA⌕ Search

SEARCH · Search NASA

Results for “false data”

Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

Quote a phrase for an exact phrase match. Source license links do not imply unrestricted reuse.

At least 19 records

Identification of Intraday False Data Injection Attack on DER Dispatch Signals

The urgent need for the decarbonization of power grids has accelerated the integration of renewable energy. Concurrently, increasing distributed energy resources (DER) and advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) have transformed the power grids into a more sophisticated cyber-physical system with numerous communication devices. While these transitions provide economic and environmental value, they also impose increased risk of cyber attacks and operation al challenges. This paper investigates the vulnerabilit y of the power grids with high renewable penetration against an intraday false data injection (FDI) attack on DER dispatch signals and proposes a kernel support vector regression (SVR) based detection model as a countermeasure. The intraday FDI attack scenario and the detection model are demonstrated in a numerical experiment using the HCE 187-bus test system.

Kim, Jip↗

Protection Against Graph-Based False Data Injection Attacks on Power Systems

Graph signal processing (GSP) has emerged as a powerful tool for practical network applications, including power system monitoring. By representing power system voltages as smooth graph signals, recent research has focused on developing GSP-based methods for state estimation, attack detection, and topology identification. Included, efficient methods have been developed for detecting false data injection (FDI) attacks, which until now were perceived as non-smooth with respect to the graph Laplacian matrix. Consequently, these methods may not be effective against smooth FDI attacks. In this paper, we propose a graph FDI (GFDI) attack that minimizes the Laplacian-based graph total variation (TV) under practical constraints. In addition, we develop a low-complexity algorithm that solves the non-convex GDFI attack optimization problem using ell_1-norm relaxation, the projected gradient descent (PGD) algorithm, and the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM). We then propose a protection scheme that identifies the minimal set of measurements necessary to constrain the GFDI output to high graph TV, thereby enabling its detection by existing GSP-based detectors. Our numerical simulations on the IEEE-57 bus test case reveal the potential threat posed by well-designed GSP-based FDI attacks. Moreover, we demonstrate that integrating the proposed protection design with GSP-based detection can lead to significant hardware cost savings compared to previous designs of protection methods against FDI attacks.

Morgenstern, Gal↗

Physics-Guided Deep Learning for Time-Series State Estimation Against False Data Injection Attacks

The modern power grid is a cyber-physical system. While the grid is becoming more intelligent with emerging sensing and communication techniques, new vulnerabilities are introduced and cyber security becomes a major concern. One type of cyber-attacks - False Data Injection Attacks (FDIAs) - exploits the limitations in traditional power system state estimation, and modifies system states without being detected. In this paper, we propose a physics-guided deep learning (PGDL) approach to defend against FDIAs. The PGDL takes real-time measurements as inputs to neural networks, outputs the estimated states, and reconstructs measurements considering power system physics. A deep recurrent neural network - Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) - is employed to learn the temporal correlations among states. This hybrid learning model leads to a time-series state estimation method to defend against FDIAs. The simulation results using IEEE 14-bus test system demonstrate the accuracy and robustness of the proposed time-series state estimation under FDIAs.

Cyber security, state estimation, physics-guided d↗

Small-Signal Angle Stability-Oriented False Data Injection Cyber-Attacks on Power Systems

The small-signal angle stability (SSAS) of a power system is determined by the property of operation points. The widely applied false data injection (FDI) cyber-attack, however, is able to stealthily mislead the optimal power flow (OPF) and thus compromise operation points, leading to damages to the SSAS margin. Here, to provide insights for cyber defenders, this paper proposes and investigates a stealthy SSAS-oriented FDI cyber-attack focusing on two attacking purposes, i.e., the SSAS margin and operation cost, with higher priority on the former one. First, this paper establishes a novel bi-level model with an implicit SSAS constraint based on a structure preserving model to compromise operation points. Then, for the SSAS interarea mode in a typical two-area system, this paper formulates closed-form expressions of how the SSAS margin and operation cost behave with respect to stealthy injections. By comparison, for the SSAS local mode in general power systems, this paper proposes a moving target cyber-attack-based hierarchical solution algorithm. Simulation results on a two-area system, a Kundur 11 bus system, and a modified IEEE 14 bus system demonstrate the significant damaging effects of the proposed SSAS-oriented FDI cyber-attack and the conflict between the two attacking purposes.

Benders decomposition↗

Perturbation-Based Diagnosis of False Data Injection Attack Using Distributed Energy Resources

Modern smart grid relies on various sensor measurements for its operational control. In a successful false data injection attack, the attacker manipulates the measurements from the grid sensors such that undetected errors are introduced into the estimates of the system parameters leading to catastrophic situations. This paper proposes a novel perturbation based false data injection attack detection mechanism that utilizes inverter based distributed energy resources (DERs) to create low magnitude perturbation signal in the distribution system voltage that is inconsequential to the normal grid operation. Two voltage sensitivity analysis based algorithms are designed to identify the optimal set of DERs that can create the voltage perturbation signal of desired magnitude. An analytical method of voltage sensitivity analysis is used to compute the magnitude of voltage perturbation signal at each node in a computationally efficient manner. Then, a detection mechanism is developed that checks for the presence of the perturbation sequence in each sensor measurement. A sensor measurement is deemed authentic if the voltage perturbation signal is present in the data. In case of sensor malfunction or cyber-attack, the perturbation signal will not be present in the measurement data. Performance of the proposed attack detection mechanism is validated via simulation of the IEEE 69 bus test system.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

False Data Injection and Detection in LQG Systems: A Game Theoretic Approach

Cyber-physical systems are vulnerable to false data injection by adversaries who compromise cyber communication links. In this paper, an infinite horizon linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) system is considered wherein the control inputs transmitted over cyber links are vulnerable to compromise and false data injection by adversaries. The adversarial cyber-attack is driven to minimize the performance of the LQG system, and the controller is equipped with an intrusion detection system that monitors the sequence of internal physical states to detect adversarial input modification. The problem is formulated as a two-player zero-sum game with the false alarm probability as the reward, wherein the attacker aims to achieve a target increase in controller cost while maximizing the false alarm probability, and a detector who wishes to minimize the false alarm probability while remaining consistent. It is shown that in such a game, an ε-equilibrium exists. The equilibrium attacker strategy is the one that minimizes the Kullback-Leibler distance between legitimate and falsified state dynamics, and the equilibrium detector strategy is the corresponding likelihood-ratio test. Numerical simulations are presented that showcase the equilibrium strategy pair and the intuitive strategies comparisons.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Distributed Load Sharing Under False Data Injection Attack in an Inverter-Based Microgrid

In microgrids, distributed load sharing plays an important role in maintaining the supply-demand balance of power. Because false data injection (FDI) is one of the crucial threats faced by future microgrids, the study of the impact of FDI on distributed load sharing is both of theoretical merit and practical value. Here, we consider the distributed load sharing problem of the microgrids operating in autonomous mode under FDI. Each bus is assumed to be equipped with an agent. Under a well-developed distributed load sharing protocol based on multiagent systems, we first construct an FDI attack model, where the attacker is capable of injecting false data into the bus agents. Finally, a utilization level is introduced for coordinating generators, and its variation is evaluated in the presence of FDI attacks with given injection strategies. The stable region of the microgrid is defined, and conditions are given to determine stability. In conclusion, theoretical results are validated on the Canadian urban distribution system.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

A Graph-Net with Node Embeddings to Detect False Data Injection Attacks in Photovoltaic Systems

Distributed energy resources (DER) contribute to the operational stability of the larger power grid both at utility-scale as well as commercial and residential scales in aggregated forms. These DER in-turn are susceptible to increasing cyber threats. An adversary can plug into the same local network that a field photovoltaic (PV) system uses to interconnect its data loggers and inverters and manipulate certain measurements collected from the network or trick existing irradiance and inverter readings through false data injection attacks (FDIA). Control routines that rely on these measurements can propagate the false data, impacting critical decisions that result in a suboptimal operation or even cause intentional harm leading to inverter-tripping or unscheduled loads that need to be shed. To detect FDIA in PV systems, the paper introduces an attention-based graph neural network with node embeddings and applied it to a simple prototypical DC-coupled microgrid with PV, energy storage, and load. The algorithm shows a detection accuracy of up to 98.95%. The proposed FDIA detection technique will provide micro-grid operators with an effective method to safeguard their systems, guaranteeing the secure and reliable operation.

Parvez, Imtiaz [Utah Valley University]↗

Discovery of False Data Injection Attacks on Power Grid Frequency Controllers with Reinforcement Learning [Poster]

While inverter-based DER (distributed energy resources) are instrumental to integrating renewable energy into the power grid, they reduce the grid's mechanical inertia, thereby increasing the risk of frequency instabilities. To compensate for frequency instability risks, the grid must also undergo a transformation to include digital technologies that allow for two-way communication between the utility and customers. The current and future state of the power grid allows for building a cleaner energy landscape. However, the grid may also become vulnerable to novel cyber threats. To preemptively protect the power grid against elaborate cyber-attacks, we propose to discover potential threats via reinforcement learning. In this work, the focus is on studying false data injection attacks that target the control logic of frequency controllers. We show that a reinforcement learning agent can successfully discover how to best inject false data into linear droop controllers.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Optimal D-FACTS Placement in Moving Target Defense Against False Data Injection Attacks

Moving target defense (MTD) is a defense strategy to detect stealthy false data injection (FDI) attacks against the power system state estimation using distributed flexible AC transmission system (D-FACTS) devices. However, existing studies neglect to address a fundamental yet critical issue, i.e., the D-FACTS placement, by assuming that all lines are equipped with D-FACTS devices. Here, to tackle this problem, we first derive analytical necessary conditions and requirements on the D-FACTS placement for a complete MTD. Further, we propose sufficient conditions using a graph theory-based topology analysis to ensure that the MTD under the proposed D-FACTS placement has the maximum rank of its composite matrix, which is indicative of the MTD effectiveness. Based on the analytical conditions, we design D-FACTS placement algorithms by using the minimum number of D-FACTS devices to achieve the maximum MTD effectiveness. A novel MTD-based ACOPF model, in which the reactance of D-FACTS lines is introduced as decision variables, is proposed to find a trade-off between the system loss and the MTD effectiveness. Numerical results on 6-bus, IEEE 14-bus, and IEEE 118-bus systems show the efficacy of MTDs using the proposed D-FACTS placement algorithms in maximizing the composite matrix rank and detecting FDI attacks.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Hidden Moving Target Defense against False Data Injection in Distribution Network Reconfiguration

This paper introduces Moving Target Defense (MTD) in distribution system against False Data Injection (FDI) attacks on the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system. Based on the AC power flow model, a hidden MTD (HMTD) strategy is constructed in combination with network reconfiguration by minimizing the system loss and line power flow differences before and after the HMTD. The proposed HMTD-based network reconfiguration is formulated as a mixed-integer nonlinear programming (MINLP) problem. A refined Genetic Algorithm (GA) is proposed to solve it. Numerical test is conducted in a modified IEEE-66 bus system. The simulation results show that the proposed model reduces the power loss introduced by the HMTD as well as yields a stealthy MTD to the attackers. The impact of HMTD on the system performance is also compared with that of the existing MTD strategies.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Moving-horizon false data injection attack design against cyber–physical systems

Systematic attack design is essential to understanding the vulnerabilities of cyber–physical systems (CPSs), to better design for resiliency. In particular, false data injection attacks (FDIAs) are well-known and have been shown to be capable of bypassing bad data detection (BDD) while causing targeted biases in resulting state estimates. However, their effectiveness against moving horizon estimators (MHE) is not well understood. In fact, this paper shows that conventional FDIAs are generally ineffective against MHE. One of the main reasons is that the moving window renders the static FDIA recursively infeasible. Here, this paper proposes a new attack methodology, moving-horizon FDIA (MH-FDIA), by considering both the performance of historical attacks and the current system’s status. Theoretical guarantees for successful attack generation and recursive feasibility are given. Numerical simulations on the IEEE-14 bus system further validate the theoretical claims and show that the proposed MH-FDIA outperforms state-of-the-art counterparts in both stealthiness and effectiveness. In addition, an experiment on a path-tracking control system of an autonomous vehicle shows the feasibility of the MH-FDIA in real-world nonlinear systems.

42 ENGINEERING↗

Detecting False Data Injection Attacks Against Power System State Estimation With Fast Go-Decomposition Approach

State estimation is a fundamental function in modern energy management system, but its results may be vulnerable to false data injection attacks (FDIAs). FDIA is able to change the estimation results without being detected by the traditional bad data detection algorithms. In this paper, we propose an accurate and computational attractive approach for FDIA detection. In this work, we first rely on the low rank characteristic of the measurement matrix and the sparsity of the attack matrix to reformulate the FDIA detection as a matrix separation problem. Then, four algorithms that solve this problem are presented and compared, including the traditional augmented Lagrange multipliers (ALMs), double-noise-dual-problem (DNDP) ALM, the low rank matrix factorization, and the proposed new “Go Decomposition (GoDec).” Numerical simulation results show that our GoDec algorithm outperforms the other three alternatives and demonstrates a much higher computational efficiency. Furthermore, GoDec is shown to be able to handle measurement noise and applicable for large-scale attacks.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Detecting False Data Injection Attacks in Smart Grids: A Semi-Supervised Deep Learning Approach

The dependence on advanced information and communication technology increases the vulnerability in smart grids under cyber-attacks. Recent research on unobservable false data injection attacks (FDIAs) reveals the high risk of secure system operation, since these attacks can bypass current bad data detection mechanisms. To mitigate this risk, this paper proposes a data-driven learning-based algorithm for detecting unobservable FDIAs in distribution systems. We use autoencoders for efficient dimension reduction and feature extraction of measurement datasets. Further, we integrate the autoencoders into an advanced generative adversarial network (GAN) framework, which successfully detects anomalies under FDIAs by capturing the unconformity between abnormal and secure measurements. Also, considering that the datasets collected from practical power systems are partially labeled due to expensive labeling costs and missing labels, the proposed method only requires a few labeled measurement data in addition to unlabeled data for training. Numerical simulations in three-phase unbalanced IEEE 13-bus and 123-bus distribution systems validate the detection accuracy and efficiency of this method.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗

Detection of False Data Injection Attacks in Battery Stacks Using Input Noise-Aware Nonlinear State Estimation and Cumulative Sum Algorithms

Grid-scale battery energy storage systems (BESSs) are vulnerable to false data injection attacks (FDIAs), which could be used to disrupt state of charge (SoC) estimation. Inaccurate SoC estimation has negative impacts on system availability, reliability, safety, and the cost of operation. In this article a combination of a Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) algorithm and an improved input noise-aware extended Kalman filter (INAEKF) is proposed for the detection and identification of FDIAs in the voltage and current sensors of a battery stack. The series-connected stack is represented by equivalent circuit models, the SoC is modeled with a charge reservoir model and the states are estimated using the INAEKF. Further, the root mean squared error of the states’ estimation by the modified INAEKF was found to be superior to the traditional EKF. By employing the INAEKF, this article addresses the research gap that many state estimators make asymmetrical assumptions about the noise corrupting the system. Additionally, the INAEKF estimates the input allowing for the identification of FDIA, which many alternative methods are unable to achieve. The proposed algorithm was able to detect attacks in the voltage and current sensors in 99.16% of test cases, with no false positives. Utilizing the INAEKF compared to the standard EKF allowed for the identification of FDIA in the input of the system in 98.43% of test cases.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗

Systematic planning of moving target defence for maximising detection effectiveness against false data injection attacks in smart grid

Abstract Moving target defence (MTD) has been gaining traction to thwart false data injection attacks against state estimation (SE) in the power grid. MTD actively perturbs the reactance of transmission lines equipped with distributed flexible AC transmission system (D‐FACTS) devices to falsify the attacker's knowledge about the system configuration. However, the existing literature has not systematically studied what influences the detection effectiveness of MTD and how it can be improved based on the topology analysis. These problems are tackled here from the perspective of an MTD plan in which the D‐FACTS placement is determined. We first exploit the relation between the rank of the composite matrix and the detecting effectiveness. Then, we rigorously derive upper and lower bounds on the attack detecting probability of MTDs with a given rank of the composite matrix. Furthermore, we analyse existing planning methods and highlight the importance of bus coverage by D‐FACTS devices. To improve the detection effectiveness, we propose a novel graph theory–based planning algorithm to retain the maximum rank of the composite matrix while covering all necessary buses. Comparative results on multiple systems show the high detecting effectiveness of the proposed algorithm in both DC‐ and AC‐SE.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗

Real-Time Cyber-Physical False Data Attack Detection in Smart Grids Using Neural Networks

Attacks on cyber-physical systems have recently increased in frequency, impact, and publicity. In this paper, a cyber-physical false data attack detection mechanism is proposed to protect the operation of power transmission and distribution systems by automatically inferring underlying physical relationships using cross-sensor analytics in order to detect sensor failures, replay attacks, and other data integrity issues in real-time. We investigate a neural network based mechanism acting on voltage and current readings resulting from a wide variety of load conditions on the IEEE 30-bus power system standard and compare its performance with a support vector machine based mechanism. Experiments showed that 99% detection accuracy of replay attacks was achieved using the proposed neural network mechanism. More importantly, we showed that the best approach was to not create physics-based features using what we knew about the system, but rather to use a neural network to automatically learn the laws, and then use the outputs of that to build a classifier to identify whether and where data spoofing occurs. Thus, it is preferable to infer and exploit the physics using a single machine learning solution

Ferragut, Erik M.↗