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Search indexed NASA NTRS and DOE OSTI research on propulsion, heat transfer, battery materials and energy systems. Follow report and document links to the original sources.

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At least 19 records
All sourcesNASA NTRSDOE OSTI
DOE OSTI2025

A Graph-Net with Node Embeddings to Detect False Data Injection Attacks in Photovoltaic Systems

Distributed energy resources (DER) contribute to the operational stability of the larger power grid both at utility-scale as well as commercial and residential scales in aggregated forms. These DER in-turn are susceptible to increasing cyber threats. An adversary can plug into the same local network that a field photovoltaic (PV) system uses to interconnect its data loggers and inverters and manipulate certain measurements collected from the network or trick existing irradiance and inverter readings through false data injection attacks (FDIA). Control routines that rely on these measurements can propagate the false data, impacting critical decisions that result in a suboptimal operation or even cause intentional harm leading to inverter-tripping or unscheduled loads that need to be shed. To detect FDIA in PV systems, the paper introduces an attention-based graph neural network with node embeddings and applied it to a simple prototypical DC-coupled microgrid with PV, energy storage, and load. The algorithm shows a detection accuracy of up to 98.95%. The proposed FDIA detection technique will provide micro-grid operators with an effective method to safeguard their systems, guaranteeing the secure and reliable operation.

Parvez, Imtiaz [Utah Valley University]↗
DOE OSTI2023

Discovery of False Data Injection Attacks on Power Grid Frequency Controllers with Reinforcement Learning [Poster]

While inverter-based DER (distributed energy resources) are instrumental to integrating renewable energy into the power grid, they reduce the grid's mechanical inertia, thereby increasing the risk of frequency instabilities. To compensate for frequency instability risks, the grid must also undergo a transformation to include digital technologies that allow for two-way communication between the utility and customers. The current and future state of the power grid allows for building a cleaner energy landscape. However, the grid may also become vulnerable to novel cyber threats. To preemptively protect the power grid against elaborate cyber-attacks, we propose to discover potential threats via reinforcement learning. In this work, the focus is on studying false data injection attacks that target the control logic of frequency controllers. We show that a reinforcement learning agent can successfully discover how to best inject false data into linear droop controllers.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2023

Small-Signal Angle Stability-Oriented False Data Injection Cyber-Attacks on Power Systems

The small-signal angle stability (SSAS) of a power system is determined by the property of operation points. The widely applied false data injection (FDI) cyber-attack, however, is able to stealthily mislead the optimal power flow (OPF) and thus compromise operation points, leading to damages to the SSAS margin. Here, to provide insights for cyber defenders, this paper proposes and investigates a stealthy SSAS-oriented FDI cyber-attack focusing on two attacking purposes, i.e., the SSAS margin and operation cost, with higher priority on the former one. First, this paper establishes a novel bi-level model with an implicit SSAS constraint based on a structure preserving model to compromise operation points. Then, for the SSAS interarea mode in a typical two-area system, this paper formulates closed-form expressions of how the SSAS margin and operation cost behave with respect to stealthy injections. By comparison, for the SSAS local mode in general power systems, this paper proposes a moving target cyber-attack-based hierarchical solution algorithm. Simulation results on a two-area system, a Kundur 11 bus system, and a modified IEEE 14 bus system demonstrate the significant damaging effects of the proposed SSAS-oriented FDI cyber-attack and the conflict between the two attacking purposes.

Benders decomposition↗
DOE OSTI2023

Detection of False Data Injection Attacks in Battery Stacks Using Input Noise-Aware Nonlinear State Estimation and Cumulative Sum Algorithms

Grid-scale battery energy storage systems (BESSs) are vulnerable to false data injection attacks (FDIAs), which could be used to disrupt state of charge (SoC) estimation. Inaccurate SoC estimation has negative impacts on system availability, reliability, safety, and the cost of operation. In this article a combination of a Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) algorithm and an improved input noise-aware extended Kalman filter (INAEKF) is proposed for the detection and identification of FDIAs in the voltage and current sensors of a battery stack. The series-connected stack is represented by equivalent circuit models, the SoC is modeled with a charge reservoir model and the states are estimated using the INAEKF. Further, the root mean squared error of the states’ estimation by the modified INAEKF was found to be superior to the traditional EKF. By employing the INAEKF, this article addresses the research gap that many state estimators make asymmetrical assumptions about the noise corrupting the system. Additionally, the INAEKF estimates the input allowing for the identification of FDIA, which many alternative methods are unable to achieve. The proposed algorithm was able to detect attacks in the voltage and current sensors in 99.16% of test cases, with no false positives. Utilizing the INAEKF compared to the standard EKF allowed for the identification of FDIA in the input of the system in 98.43% of test cases.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2024

Online and Offline Identification of False Data Injection Attacks in Battery Sensors Using a Single Particle Model

The cells in battery energy storage systems are monitored, protected, and controlled by battery management systems whose sensors are susceptible to cyberattacks. False data injection attacks (FDIAs) targeting batteries’ voltage sensors affect cell protection functions and the estimation of critical battery states like the state of charge (SoC). Inaccurate SoC estimation could result in battery overcharging and over discharging, which can have disastrous consequences on grid operations. This paper proposes a three-pronged online and offline method to detect, identify, and classify FDIAs corrupting the voltage sensors of a battery stack. To accurately model the dynamics of the series-connected cells a single particle model is used and to estimate the SoC, the unscented Kalman filter is employed. FDIA detection, identification, and classification was accomplished using a tuned cumulative sum (CUSUM) algorithm, which was compared with a baseline method, the chi-squared error detector. Online simulations and offline batch simulations were performed to determine the effectiveness of the proposed approach. Throughout the batch simulations, the CUSUM algorithm detected attacks, with no false positives, in 99.83% of cases, identified the corrupted sensor in 97% of cases, and determined if the attack was positively or negatively biased in 97% of cases.

25 ENERGY STORAGE↗
DOE OSTI2023

Bayesian GAN-Based False Data Injection Attack Detection in Active Distribution Grids With DERs

Advancements in information and communication technologies have revolutionized monitoring and control capabilities within smart grids. However, it also brings new vulnerabilities to data acquisition systems and state estimation functions, which attackers can subtly tamper with the measurement data through compromising the communication network. Moreover, the high penetration of renewable energy sources with the inherited characteristics of uncertainty and variability further complicates the design of effective intrusion detection systems. In this paper, a Bayesian deep learning-based approach is developed to detect cyber attacks and maintain the security of smart grids. Our method specifically addresses the prevalent issue of imbalanced data in real power systems, which arises from the predominance of normal system operations over compromised or attacked states. Employing a novel Bayesian GAN-based technique, our approach successfully discriminates between secure and compromised measurement data, even in scenarios with significant data imbalance. Furthermore, the proposed method accommodates various practical application factors, ensuring accurate intrusion detection despite the presence of measurement noise. The feasibility and effectiveness of the proposed detection mechanism are validated by testing on IEEE 13-node and 123-node test systems. Simulation results and comparisons with literature methods demonstrate the superiority of proposed cybersecurity solutions.

Bayesian GAN↗
NASA NTRS2024

False Cape Data Collection Annex, Solid Waste Management Unit 113, Limited Resource Conservation and Recovery Act Facility Investigation Report, Kennedy Space Center, Florida

This Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) Facility Investigation (RFI) Report summarizes groundwater investigation activities performed between July 2020 and October 2023 at the False Cape Data Collection Annex (FCDC) (Solid Waste Management Unit [SWMU] 113) located at Kennedy Space Center, Florida. The purpose of the RFI is to characterize the nature and extent of volatile organic compound (VOC)-contaminated groundwater at FCDC; evaluate the fate and transport of VOC contamination; collect sufficient data to evaluate potential future requirements for the site, such as corrective measures, long term monitoring, or No Further Action; and conduct a human health preliminary risk evaluation (PRE) based on the groundwater data.

False Cape Data Collection Annex↗
NASA NTRS2024

Interim Measure Report False Cape Data Collection Annex Solid Waste Management Unit (SWMU) # 113 Kennedy Space Center, Florida

This report documents the Interim Measure (IM) completed at False Cape Data Collection Annex, Solid Waste Management Unit (SWMU) #113 (formerly potential release location [PRL] 217), at Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Florida. This document has been prepared for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), in accordance with HydroGeoLogic, Inc.’s (HGL) Contract 80KSC019D0012, Task Order 80KSC019F0224.

False Cape Data Collection Annex↗
DOE OSTI2023

Robust Distribution State Estimation for Reliable Locational Marginal Pricing under Cyber-Attacks

Here this paper examines the impact of false data injection (FDI) cyber-attacks on distribution system state estimation (DSSE) and the resulting distribution locational marginal price (DLMP) in power markets. Two robust high-breakdown regression estimators, namely S- and MM- estimators, are implemented to provide resistance against FDI attacks targeting measurements and grid topology, creating leverage points. The introduced estimators are compared to the weighted least squares (WLS) with a bad data detection and rejection module (BDD) and the robust Huber M-estimator. The proposed estimators are shown to be effective and compare favorably to both existing Huber M- and the WLS with BDD in the presence of topology FDI attacks. Both the S- and MM-estimators provide good performance in the case of clean and corrupted measurements. Their performance is comparable in this case to the Huber M- and the WLS, followed by a BDD module. The simulation considered a modified distribution IEEE 13 and 34-bus systems where the impact of FDI attack scenarios is shown on the state and the DLMP pricing in the presence of distributed Generation.

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗
DOE OSTI2026

Discovering the Most Severe K-Point Failure Based on Reinforcement Learning: Preprint

Smart devices are essential to ensure the stability of the power grid and resilience to intermittent energy production. However, smart devices can also be the target of cyber adversaries that may exploit false data injection attacks (FDIAs) to induce unstable grid conditions. A practical consideration of FDIA mitigation approaches is addressed here: given a finite available budget, for which smart device should cyber-threat mitigation be deployed first? In this work, this question is answered by identifying the so-called most-sensitive devices, i.e., the devices that, if compromised, can let an adversary induce the most serious grid instabilities. The method proposed utilizes an adversarial reinforcement learning (RL) framework to identify the k-mostsensitive smart devices (here, smart inverters). The adversarial agent can tamper with the compromised inverters' active and reactive operating power setup points, with the goal of maximizing voltage deviations. Numerical results show that the proposed RL method finds the optimal attack scenarios for 1-point failure and the near-optimal solution for the 2-point case. Additionally, the proposed RL method achieves an 8.8 speed-up ratio in running time compared to the brute force method for the 2-point case.

97 MATHEMATICS AND COMPUTING↗
DOE OSTI2024

Network Security Challenges and Countermeasures for Software-Defined Smart Grids: A Survey

The rise of grid modernization has been prompted by the escalating demand for power, the deteriorating state of infrastructure, and the growing concern regarding the reliability of electric utilities. The smart grid encompasses recent advancements in electronics, technology, telecommunications, and computer capabilities. Smart grid telecommunication frameworks provide bidirectional communication to facilitate grid operations. Software-defined networking (SDN) is a proposed approach for monitoring and regulating telecommunication networks, which allows for enhanced visibility, control, and security in smart grid systems. Nevertheless, the integration of telecommunications infrastructure exposes smart grid networks to potential cyberattacks. Unauthorized individuals may exploit unauthorized access to intercept communications, introduce fabricated data into system measurements, overwhelm communication channels with false data packets, or attack centralized controllers to disable network control. An ongoing, thorough examination of cyber attacks and protection strategies for smart grid networks is essential due to the ever-changing nature of these threats. Previous surveys on smart grid security lack modern methodologies and, to the best of our knowledge, most, if not all, focus on only one sort of attack or protection. This survey examines the most recent security techniques, simultaneous multi-pronged cyber attacks, and defense utilities in order to address the challenges of future SDN smart grid research. The objective is to identify future research requirements, describe the existing security challenges, and highlight emerging threats and their potential impact on the deployment of software-defined smart grid (SD-SG).

24 POWER TRANSMISSION AND DISTRIBUTION↗